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“Creon’s secretaries handle and dispatch the case of Antigone.”1 
(Friedrich Dürrenmatt) 
 
This dissertation does three things. First, it anatomizes the historical forces and 
conceptual commitments that undergird the configuration of modern bureaucracies. 
Second, it explains the normative roots of opposition to modern bureaucracies and the 
conceptual vocabulary employed to resist the bureaucratization of state and society. Third, 
it explores ways to overcome the opposition between these two fronts by developing a 
novel theory of bureaucratic legitimacy. 
This project is animated by a lifelong fascination with administrative practices. 
More recently, I have become troubled by the tone of hopelessness that people take on 
when they talk about bureaucracies. Nobody likes them; nobody seems to know how we 
could make them better; nobody dares to imagen a world beyond current bureaucratic 
practices. In this dissertation I seek to change that. What I have in mind is not merely 
                                                 
1 “Kreons Sekretäre erledigen den Fall Antigone.“ Friedrich Dürrenmatt, "Theaterprobleme," in 
Gesammelte Werke, ed. Franz Josef Görtz and Georg Hensel (Zürich: Diogenes, 1988), 56-57. 
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shorter lines at the DMV or clearer forms, but rather a fundamentally new framework to 
conceptualize the relationship between the bureaucracy, the state, and the citizenry.  
I do this by exploring first the conceptual and historical forces that gave rise to 
bureaucracies and the opposition to them, and then by presenting a historically informed 
proposal to ameliorate some of the flaws and pitfalls of bureaucracies. In the process, I 
introduce the notion of bureaucratic legitimacy as a supplement to the currently dominant 
theories of political legitimation. I propose that we incorporate carefully situated citizens 
into the administrative structure and empower them within the state, against the state. Just 
as they do in a criminal or civil jury system, citizens, properly prepared and situated within 
the state apparatus, can provide an essential check on state power and increase the 
legitimacy of outcomes.  
The dissertation culminates in this proposal. First, we have to understand the 
historical development of bureaucracies, the growth of opposition to them, and earlier 
attempts at reform. The first two sections of this dissertation explore the constraints that 
past developments have placed on our ability to reform bureaucracies, while the last section 
investigates unexplored possibilities for rethinking the structure of bureaucracies and their 
relation to the citizenry.  
Many of the constraints on reform are deeply embedded in our political vocabulary. 
Traditionally, bureaucracies are understood as agents of the state.2 Insofar as they are 
                                                 
2 Hobbes, Leviathan, Book 2, Chapter XXIII, “Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power”; A significant 
amount of current and important work is based on this model. For useful starting places see: Matthew 
Stephenson and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2007) "Regulatory Quality under Imperfect Oversight". 
American Political Science Review. 101(3): 605.; Nolan McCarty (2004) "The Appointments Dilemma". 
American Journal of Political Science. 48(3): 413.; Nolan McCarty and John Huber (2004) "Bureaucratic 
Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform" American Political Science Review. 98(3): 481.; Jonathan 
Bendor and Adam Meirowitz (2004) "Spatial Models of Delegation" American Political Science Review. 
98(2): 293.; Randall Calvert, Matthew McCubbins, and Barry Weingast (1989) "A Theory of Political 
Control and Agency Discretion."  American Journal of Political Science. 33(3): 588. 
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agents with their own will, the sovereign (in a principal/agent relationship) must be 
empowered to control the “bureaucratic drift” of the agent (the deviation from intended 
policy outcomes). In democracies, this model acquires additional levels of complexity, 
since citizens are principals in relation to politicians, who are in turn the principals of 
political appointees, who in turn might be principals to midlevel career bureaucrats. Under 
this traditional model of the state, legitimacy is supposed to flow from one end of the chain 
(the citizens) through all the links of the chain towards the other end (policy outcomes). If 
all links are operational, then outcomes are “authored” by the sovereign. To say that 
citizens control the state and authored the outcomes requires confidence in all of these 
links. 
This basic model of political legitimacy was developed before states were complex 
and before bureaucracies were capillary and omnipresent. It is ill-suited, on its own, to 
provide for a satisfying or accurate account of state legitimacy in modern times.  
The basic model of political legitimacy suffers from three principal shortcomings: 
first, the links between the sovereign and policy outcomes might not hold; second, even if 
they do, citizens might perceive that they do not; third, it is a purely procedural model of 
state legitimacy. These shortcomings together contribute to a lack of agency for citizens, a 
lack of accountability, and ultimately the aforementioned sense of hopelessness associated 
with bureaucracies. Even in bureaucracies that manage to minimize Kafkaesque conditions, 
people can feel that they are confronted with an administrative behemoth that treats them as 
a silent and passive mass, without regard to the subtle distinctions on which individuals 
found their sense of identity. These themes might ring familiar to a range of political 
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scientists and political theorists who have been grappling with citizens’ sense of a loss of 
efficacy, trust, and influence.  
The only way to improve these conditions is to empower citizens at both ends of the 
chain. Democratic practices empowered citizens at the beginning of the chain, but the 
expansion of bureaucracies has contributed to a sense of de facto disenfranchisement at the 
other end of the chain (outcomes). A genealogical account of bureaucracy’s development 
provides useful pointers on how to remedy this situation by empowering people not against 
bureaucracies, but within bureaucracies. The motivation to do so, the problems a reform 
effort will encounter, and the conceptual barriers to this proposal will form the backbone of 
this dissertation. Finally, the last chapter elaborates and defends this particular model of 
bureaucratic legitimacy.  
 Before we can improve on current conditions we must understand their structure 
and internal logic. As such, I understand political theory to function within the realms of 
both imagination and limitation. Political theorists probe the coherence of conceptual links. 
They tell us about the implications of our commitments, about what cannot be done, about 
the institutions that are not attainable and the worlds we have foreclosed by our choices. 
But they also tell us what our world could look like. Many political theorists are dreamers 
and quiet poets, exploring with their imagination the kinds of political societies we could 
build and the kind of people we could become. Political theory flourishes at the boundary 
between imagination and limitation.  
In this dissertation, I apply this framework to the study of bureaucracies. Political 
theorists have largely neglected the normative foundations and conceptual possibilities of 
bureaucracies. I seek to address this omission in two parts: first, by exploring the 
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limitations historical developments have built into bureaucracies and, second, by imagining 
what, within these limitations, could be done to reconceptualize bureaucratic institutions 




The Leitmotif of this endeavor is borrowed from Friedrich Dürrenmatt’s saying that 
in modern times “Creon’s secretaries handle and dispatch the case of Antigone.” I do not 
accept this statement as axiomatically true. Instead, I seek to probe the ways in which it 
encapsulates limitations on political realities and possibilities for change.  
These words first appeared in a 1954 essay on theater and politics, in which the 
Swiss playwright Friedrich Dürrenmatt described the transformations of modern political 
realities that have reshaped all attempts to stage theater.3 For Dürrenmatt there can be no 
more true tragic protagonists. We live in a world where political power has become so 
gigantic, convoluted, brutal, and mechanical that tragic heroes cannot arise.4 Even if they 
somehow did arise, they would simply struggle futilely in the long corridors of power, 
never heard and soon forgotten. The modern state does not allow for heroic agency. It has 
become far too anonymous, too labyrinthine, and too bureaucratic for a meaningful 
engagement with the community it administers.5 Its disciplinary powers are everywhere, 
yet it is hardly visible.  
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 “riesenhaft,” “weitverzweigt,” “verworren,” “grausam,” “zu mehanisch,” “oft einfach auch alzu sinnlos” 
5 “Der heutige Staat ist jedoch unüberschaubar, anonym, bürokratisch geworden.”  
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Theater in earlier times presumed a visible world of state and power, of direct 
struggle and direct confrontation. Modern politics and modern bureaucracies, in contrast, 
are quiet, nebulous, and hard to grasp.6 The sole remaining recognizable actors in such a 
world are the disciplinary officers of the state. The minor paper pushers, insignificant 
administrators, and petty policemen—these are, for better or worse, the true representatives 
of modern life.  
Dürrenmatt is describing a world marked by a profound antifoundationalism, a 
destabilized moral core, and a faltering political community. The characters in his tales are 
similarly uncertain, ironic, and deeply skeptical of truth and subjectivity. They are adrift 
without a reliable political community to which they belong or a rationality that could 
anchor them. The political institutions of their world have failed them and remain foreign 
and inaccessible. Agency, if it is to be found at all, can only spring from vain resistance to 
the administrative behemoth. Meaningful political agency has all but disappeared.  
Dürrenmatt’s characters inhabit a world radically changed by the trends toward 
diminished agency, uncertain identities, and pervasive disciplinary institutions. All of these 
elements combine to force his characters to question their relationship to their political 
communities. Bureaucratic institutions have displaced direct political participation and 
control. Perhaps their invocation of rationality, efficiency, and progress was merely a cover 
for new and insidious forms of discipline and control. Such alienation alters whether and 
how citizens participate in politics, as well as the meaning they ascribe to their own actions 
and the actions of the state.  
                                                 
6 Previous theater (such as the Greek plays) presumed a “sichtbare Welt,” “echte Staatsaktion.” “Die 
heutige Macht ist nur zum kleinsten Teil sichtbar.” 
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The elements and effects that Dürrenmatt describes are deeply embedded in the 
struggle over the contours of modern bureaucracies and the social order they administer—
the struggle, more specifically, over the relationship of the well-regulated, well-structured, 
legitimate modern state to a political community and political agents. To understand this 
struggle properly, I return to an important moment in the development and configuration of 
the public sphere and the administrative sphere.  
 
 
Theories of Social Order 
 
This dissertation provides an important and never before told genealogy of 
competing notions of social order and the state in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-
century Prussia.  It anatomizes the moment when the public bureaucracy and the public 
sphere became two distinct, almost unbridgeably distant domains, driven by different 
discourses and different theories of political agency, rationality, sovereignty, and 
legitimacy. The normative commitments that drove this separation remain embedded deep 
within contemporary political practice and thought. Bureaucracy and public sphere live 
uneasily side by side, in a mutually impoverishing standoff. Both sides struggle with the 
aftermath of their separation.  
This dissertation aims to reestablish a much-needed dialogue between these two 
separate spheres. The thinking and the practice that drive bureaucratic institutions have had 
great difficulty generating resistance to dehumanizing practices and morally questionable 
ends. Deliberative theories built on the public sphere, in turn, have struggled to impose a 
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procedural framework on indeterminate deliberations. They also have struggled to translate 
general deliberation into concrete administrative practice. There exists, in short, a great gulf 
between the public sphere of deliberation and the administrative sphere of policy 
implementation. The two all too often stand in only the most tentative connection, or none 
at all. Not surprisingly, people sense a loss of efficacy, and they lose hope of influencing 
distant decisions using standards and procedures that are inscrutable to them. 
Administrators, in turn, can claim that they must make policy with little guidance that is 
properly configured for their position and function. This is a dangerous discrepancy.  
This dissertation will not solve all the concerns arising from this state of affairs, but 
it will provide a helpful genealogical account of “how we got here.” Only with such an 
account in hand can we begin to disentangle competing and contradictory strands of 
thought in administrative and deliberative theories.  
The next part of this introduction will lay out how this dissertation proceeds 
chronologically through three sections, each dealing with a different moment in the 
development of Prussia’s bureaucracy and its relation to society under varying theories of 
social order. Following that, I will provide a short account of the methodological 
foundations of this dissertation. Finally, I will spell out in greater detail my engagement 
with Foucault and Habermas. 
 
 
Plan of the Work 
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The genealogy on offer in this dissertation largely traces the evolution of Creon’s 
secretaries. I use the term (borrowed from Dürrenmatt) anachronistically to capture 
multiple facets of bureaucratic power and rationalizations, and of resistance to them. The 
three sections of this dissertation trace the changing configuration of Creon’s secretaries 
and the varying and competing notions of social order and the state tied up with them.  
 Section I analyzes the search for a new manner of conceptualizing social order, 
structuring the state, and administrating society. Frustrated with inefficiencies and 
embarrassing judicial scandals, the Prussian crown commissioned a set of practitioners and 
theorists to develop a new science of government. These thinkers and doers are collectively 
known as cameralists. They gradually developed a new theory of the state and society. For 
them, the state became a desubstantiated, procedural framework with three parts: 1) a 
society kept docile by an efficient police and welfare apparatus, 2) a sovereign, and 3) the 
sovereign’s administration, which translates the will of the sovereign into policy. 
Cameralists gave much thought to the most efficient way of structuring these three 
components within a new framework of social order. In the process of reimagining the 
state, society, and the docile subject, they hit upon an unlikely, counterintuitive, but 
immensely powerful insight: to strengthen the state, it has to be contained.  
The cameralists became increasingly wary of the willful, arbitrary, uncontrolled 
exercise of power. However, their motivation was not curtailing abuse per se. Instead, they 
attempted to isolate and contain administrative practices that would hurt the crown. 
Individual impulses, under this model, were simply inefficient and dangerous. Cameralists 
subsequently devised practices and institutions that limited individual agency within the 
state in favor of procedures and regulations. Such a framework would create an explicit and 
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unorthodox separation of normative concerns (normativity) from factual concerns 
(facticity). Cameralists sought to strengthen the state by containing it within a purely 
procedural framework. However, cameralists were neither revolutionaries, nor anglophile 
liberals, nor rabble-rousing proto-Jacobins. Rather, they were loyal subjects of the crown, 
in the crown’s service, who dutifully devised new mechanisms to strengthen the state. This 
entailed a broadening of police and welfare functions, a new science of governance, and 
new modes of knowledge production. Throughout, legitimacy was an important, perhaps 
primary concern for the cameralists. Strikingly, their model of state/society relations 
entailed a desubstantiated, depoliticized state in which legitimacy was the product of 
following the right procedures, not of outcomes.  
Resistance to the administrative state coalesced around this theme, as we will see in 
Section 2. Cameralists had developed a specific theory of the state and its relation to 
society and subjects. Their notion of social order was noticeably at odds with the vision of 
society and political community that a variety of thinkers began to broadcast in diverse and 
nontraditional channels. These writers fiercely resisted becoming the kind of subjects the 
cameralists had prototyped. In response to the mechanically administered, hyper-policed, 
procedural vision of the well-regulated state, these thinkers constructed novel metaphors 
for society, political community, and meaningful agency. Important for their resistance was 
an emphasis on vibrant passions, personalized rule, and “organic” communities. Under 
their model of social order, the legitimate state could only survive and thrive in the German 
context if it was attentive to precisely those elements that the cameralists sought to exclude 
from the administrative sphere: willfulness, impulse, individualism, and personified 
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representations of the state. Legitimacy, for them, was to be found far from where the 
cameralists had located it.  
This community of critics of the administrative state is loosely bundled under the 
heading of German Romanticism. It was a movement structured around resistance and 
opposition to the cameralistic state. In response to the cameralists, the German Romantics 
articulated new visions of social relations and state/society interactions. In tracing their 
resistance, it is important to broaden our analytical categories beyond the typical genres of 
political theory. Analyzing the Romantics’ resistance to the administrative state requires 
that we focus on a range of genres and modes of argumentation traditionally overlooked by 
political theory. Attentiveness to poems, folk tales, songs, and horror stories allows us to 
see the novel and innovative strategies Romantics used to resist the dominant discourse of 
cameralistic thought and practice. Though not typically understood as articulating a 
political ideology, this diverse cast of writers formulated a range of political narratives that 
mattered “on the ground.” This alternative discourse is the primary locus of a historical 
investigation of how and why people resist administrative domination.  
However, despite all their resistance to many elements of the cameralist project, 
most Romantics already accepted—and indeed, deepened—one of its fundamental 
premises: the separation between the administrative sphere and the public sphere. Facticity 
and normativity, for them, became segregated into different domains. These two domains 
were constructed in opposition to each other. They followed different and completely 
separate logics.  
This separation gave rise to concerns about how to relate the two spheres. The 
question of “translation” between these two spheres, in Habermas’s phrase, became an 
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increasing concern for modern politics. Section 3 focuses on one of the last episodes when 
the division between the two spheres was not taken completely for granted. Instead, 
translation between the spheres was imagined as an endogenous process intrinsic to both 
the administrative sphere and the deliberative sphere. In this section, we will encounter a 
group of bureaucratic reformers, clustered around Karl von Stein, who, in response to 
historical accidents and calamities, tried to develop a new understanding of participatory 
citizenship within the administrative institutions of the state. Their struggles to stabilize a 
failing state and to strengthen that state’s capacities turned on broad political participation.  
In contrast to most contemporary models of participation, however, Stein and his 
followers did not conceive of participation as limited to a representative model or to check 
marks on a ballot. Instead, they came to think of broad political participation as entailing 
carefully crafted agency within the administrative sphere. Stein sought to import parts of 
the public sphere of deliberation into the administrative sphere. This would not only 
radically reconfigure the state and society, but would also enable new considerations on the 
relationship between the two. Crucially and paradoxically, Stein conceived of citizenship as 
enfranchising and empowering the individual within the administration against the state in 
order to strengthen the ailing legitimacy of the state.  
The experiment of Stein and his allies eventually failed. We live in the inherited 
world left in the wake of this failure. The struggles over social order and the shape of the 
modern state reveal a hard separation between the administrative sphere of the state and the 
deliberative sphere of the political community. Attempts to bring them together have 
largely failed, and we consequently struggle with how to relate the two: shall we hope and 
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attempt to “translate” the commands of one into the output of the other, or shall we resign 
ourselves to desperate resistance to the state’s endless encroachments on the lifeworld?  
However, the narrative arc of this dissertation is not tragic in nature. While it is true 
that Stein failed, his failure was due to historical forces largely outside the project of fusing 
the administrative and deliberative spheres, not intrinsic to it. A pessimist might read this 
episode as suggesting that the two spheres are irreversibly separated, driven now by their 
own logics, and that even a balance between the two is at best accidental. But the forecast 
need not be so bleak. The genealogy on offer in this dissertation shows the process through 
which the administrative sphere and the deliberative sphere became separated. This process 
was not inevitable or predetermined. Rather, it was the outcome of a history fraught with 
accident and contingency. Thus, this genealogy shows that the two spheres are not 
separated by logical necessity, but by the outcome of a historical process. That is not to say 
with certainty that the separation is reversible, but hopefully unlocking the hidden 
connections between competing notions of social order, political community, and the state 
provides the raw material for reimagining, once again, what modern politics could look like 
beyond the grasp of Creon’s secretaries. This genealogy suggests a way forward in a 
manner not commonly considered: a careful reconnecting of the public sphere and the 
administrative sphere in which citizens are empowered within the state, against the state. 
This entails recreating the political public sphere within the state, not outside and in 
conceptual opposition to it. In a way, only if we dare to become Creon’s secretaries 






In developing the arguments of this dissertation I build on a pragmatist 
methodology and a rich spectrum of source materials. I understand methodological 
pragmatism simply as a balance between imagination and limitation. Political theory that 
puts too much emphasis on limitation can border on being mere history or narrative. Too 
much attention to possibilities without due regard for limitations risks turning political 
theory into a laundry list of nice things (Democracy! Freedom! Autonomy!).   
As a pragmatist, I believe that political theory can only thrive in the middle ground. 
Political theory, under this model, is a method to specify what is attainable within a set of 
temporarily accepted parameters. It is difficult to change the whole world at once, but it is 
worthwhile to accept some parts of the world as given (for the moment), and to consider 
what other elements can be changed for the better. We must first understand the limitations 
our commitments impose on us before, second, exploring what can be done within these 
limitations to make the world better, step by step.  
The structure of this dissertation follows this methodology. The first two sections 
stress limitations. They provide rich genealogical accounts of two key moments in the 
development of bureaucracies. Just as with genealogical investigations of family 
relationships, I am not searching for ultimate origins. The account I offer is also non-
causal. I am not interested in imposing on history a linear, teleological account of the 
inevitable rise of bureaucracies. In fact, I aim to do just the opposite by exploring that 
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which “we tend to feel is without history.”7 In my analysis, bureaucracies have a complex, 
sometimes contradictory, and deeply historical past. It is this contentious, paradoxical 
genealogy that provides vital details of “how we got here.” Far from being inevitable or 
determined, bureaucracies developed in modern times as part of disputatious institutional 
and discursive struggles over the relation of the individual to the state and a political 
community. Bureaucracies are the result of countless individuals reacting to institutional 
and conceptual innovations, social developments, and raw historical accidents.  
The third section of this dissertation builds on these foundations by emphasizing 
imagination within the aforementioned boundaries. In fact, it might be more accurate to 
regard the first two sections as enablers of imagination, rather than constraints. 
Understanding what is essential and what is superfluous provides the raw material for an 
informed proposal on improving bureaucracies. To unlock and understand these 
boundaries, I turn to a rich diversity of materials. I bring into dialogue administrative 
textbooks, official decrees and correspondence, literary texts, court cases, newspaper 
accounts, folk tales, private correspondence, sermons, plays, short stories, poetry, and 
paintings. 
In some cases I am the first political theorist to write about these texts. For 
example, beyond a handful of German historians, I believe that nobody has published on 
the Acta Borussica (“A.B.B.”). This is unfortunate. The Acta Borussica is a massive, 
                                                 
7 I borrow the phrase from: Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-
Memory, Practice : Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139.; 
For more consider also: Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972-1977, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 83.; For helpful 
secondary sources concerning Foucault’s methodological commitments consider also: Giovanna Procacci, 
"Governing Poverty: Sources of the Social Question in Nineteenth-Century France," in Foucault and the 
Writing of History, ed. Jan Goldstein (Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1994), 216-7.; Michael Mahon, 
Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy : Truth, Power, and the Subject, Suny Series in Contemporary 
Continental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). 
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priceless sixteen-volume collection of official and informal communication from the 
eighteenth century between the crown in Potsdam, the administration in Berlin, and offices 
in the provinces. At times these communiqués are short and factual. Entire volumes are 
filled with details about the endless administrative struggle to distribute salt efficiently. At 
other times the communiqués read like an eighteenth- century soap opera. They are loaded 
with chronicles of personal betrayals, the rise and fall of family fortunes, petty insults, 
personal attacks, and endless bickering. Often these episodes are very humorous, and we 
will spend quite some time trying to understand why Prussian administrators spent an 
enormous amount of energy quibbling over the order of signatures on documents, 
sometimes to the point of asking for duels. Other episodes are simply tragic, as when 
innocent administrators are hanged to appease the crown’s misguided wrath.  The Acta 
Borussica, in short, is one of the best windows into the quotidian and extraordinary 
practices of state administration in the eighteenth century.  
 Similarly, the cameralist textbooks of the period are a rich source of insights into 
the normative and conceptual foundations of the growing administrative state and changing 
practices within it. Some cameralists are widely known among historians, and others, like 
Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, have even found their way to political theorists (via 
Foucault). However, dozens more have never been read or cited. For this dissertation I read 
through dozens and dozens of the cameralist tomes. On cheerful days I have often 
wondered if that would have enabled me to pass one of the old Prussian administrative 
exams. Many of these texts appear very dull at first. But I believe that understanding what 
is repetitive, common ground among these authors is often as valuable as knowing what is 
unique and idiosyncratic. The footnotes reflect this thought, and I have often compiled long 
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lists of references to indicate and illustrate where cameralists firmly agreed with each other. 
I have also done so to make it easier for future researchers to dive into this material and 
find some of the more obscure texts (though what is obscure now and what was in the 
eighteenth century is quite a different matter).   
 In section 2 we will encounter a number of authors, poets, folklorists, statesmen, 
pastors, and military officials in a range of literary genres. I believe that a full account of 
German state modernization requires that we consult “genres” and modes of political 
engagement beyond canonical texts and official decrees. The battle over the shape of 
state/society interactions and social order was carried out on many fronts. The choice of 
venue, in many cases, is almost as telling as the raw “content” of the message. Indeed, 
politics and struggles over “political ideology” occur in many places. Political theory is 
much enriched when it is attentive to the myriad ways in which theoretical struggles occur 
and manifest themselves “on the ground” in ways that matter to a society. 
My pragmatist understanding of political theory extends from my own work to how 
I approach other writers.8 Political theory is done, I believe, to achieve things out there in 
the world. It is a political act. Equally important, political theory is hammered out in a wide 
range of forums, some of which are direly neglected by the discipline of political theory. 
There is no shortage, for example, of valuable discussions of Antigone the Sophoclean 
play, but little has been said about what people do with this material: how they rewrite, 
reinterpret, recontextualize, and appropriate the source material for their own ends. German 
writers, for example, have been busily producing dozens (perhaps hundreds) of Antigone 
adaptations. They have been using them, as does Dürrenmatt, as a site for their political 
                                                 
8 I am heavily influenced by, most obviously: Don Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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arguments.9 This dissertation looks to these productions to develop the metaphor of 
Creon’s secretaries. It is a useful and strangely reccurring motif that will help to illustrate 
and puzzle through the many currents of thought that are woven throughout this 
dissertation.  
Political theory thrives in many places, some familiar, some wickedly strange. In 
this dissertation we will encounter both. We will see how the construction of a carp pond 
spawned one of the most important legal codifications in Germany history. We will meet 
the rotting corpse of an innocent royal bureaucrat left hanging in the town square for days, 
and other, living bureaucrats who buy, trade, and inherit their offices (they also pay taxes 
on these transactions). We will encounter the young man who falls in love with a woman 
who turns out to be a machine, the author who thinks that all women at the royal court and 
all judges are machines, and the physician who thinks the soul is a machine. We will see 
academics trying to empower the king by taking power away from him, and we will see 
some of them praised and others chased away or hanged. We will meet a Queen who did 
very little while she was alive but motivated wars long after she was dead. We will see 
Goethe struggling to bring Antigone to Weimar, and we will see theater and opera 
productions in which Antigone survives. We will see the career path of a dull and perhaps 
conservative bureaucrat who ushered in some of the most progressive and dramatic reforms 
in Germany’s history. We will see a proud army nearly eradicated in a single day and a 
nation nearly destroyed. And we will see how history was changed by the careless 
entrusting of a single letter into the hands of a clumsy courier.  
                                                 
9 Hellmut Flashar, Inszenierung Der Antike : Das Griechische Drama Auf Der Bühne Der Neuzeit, 1585-
1990 (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1991).; George Steiner, Antigones (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1996). 
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At first sight some of these episodes may seem small and insignificant, but political 
theory lived and flourished in each and every one of them. However, to unlock the meaning 
of these historical moments we must situate them within a larger analytical framework. 
Here, I rely on the work of Habermas and Foucault. Both contribute essential insights into 
the historically contingent configuration of modern politics, the modern state, and the 
modern subject struggling with the state. Rather then reading Habermas and Foucault 
separately, I aim instead to read both research agendas in parallel. Doing so will throw into 
sharper relief some of the strengths and limitations of both approaches. The genealogy in 
this dissertation illuminates their insights, but might also help to explain certain blind spots 
in their theories. Habermas and Foucault are the two primary interlocutors of this 
dissertation. Many of its themes and arguments are built on their work; I am very much 
indebted to their analytical frameworks.  
However, the focus of this dissertation is social order and bureaucracies, not 
exegesis on Foucault and Habermas. I do not seek to explicitly improve upon them; rather, 
I use their insights as tools to understand and analyze bureaucracies.  
In the case of Foucault, I employ his analytical frameworks of governmentality, 
power, and resistance to capture the evolution and silent expansion of disciplinary 
administrative institutions. Foucault’s account of governmentality will help to reveal how 
administrative power concretely begets resistance and shapes this resistance. As I suggest 
below, the modern, political, resisting actor is created in and through the performance of 
resisting administrative power. Attentiveness to the contours of this actor will also help us 
answer a question Foucault, oddly enough, does not directly address: why should we resist 
domination? Foucault makes it clear that this is an important and maybe necessary task, but 
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he provides no explicitly normative grounds to justify his stance. Where does the resisting 
being come from? Instead of injecting our own normative commitments into this question, 
I suggest we consider first how and why people actually resisted the administrative state.  
As for Habermas, I am deeply indebted to his analytical framework springing from 
the distinction between facticity and normativity, as well as his attentiveness to the 
deliberative components of modern politics. However, Habermas’s notion of speech, 
though seemingly very inclusive, proves too narrow for the kind of discourse people 
constructed in response to administrative domination. Faced with the immense power of the 
administrative state, many of the newly constituted political agents of Foucault’s account 
resorted to novel forms of nonrational argumentation that Habermas tends to disregard in 
his normative and historical accounts. Their “arguments” against a primacy of facticity 
over normativity rely on such nonrational modes of discourse as horror, ridicule, prejudice, 
and passion. Broadening Habermas’s analysis makes recognizable again innovative forms 
of resistance to administrative power that are now all too easily misunderstood or 
overlooked.  
 
A Quick Aside on Translations 
 
A good number of the printed materials I consulted for this dissertation have never 
been translated into English. Some have been translated decades or centuries ago, but 
poorly. Still others have translators that imposed idiosyncratic interpretations on the source 
material. In all of these cases, I chose to translate the original material myself and to 
provide pertinent sections of the original in the footnotes (particularly important or 
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recognizable terms are often included in the main text in brackets). I hope this makes it 
easy and convenient for readers to check my translations. I am not a translator by training 
or profession, and I lay no claim to artful translations. However, I am a native German 
speaker, and I have spent far more time reading eighteenth- and  nineteenth-century 
German than I care to remember. Throughout, I have tried to keep the translations as 
precise and to the point as I possibly could. Unfortunately (for native English speakers), 
eighteenth-century German tends towards long-winded, complex sentences that overflow 
with flowery language. The authors of many documents, especially the crown and some of 
the Romantics, seem to have been oblivious to grammatical rules and conventions. When 
appropriate, I tried to retain some of the flavor of the original source language, even when 
it came at the cost of readability.  
One point where this is particularly noticeable is in the use of the passive voice. In 
the usage of the time, nobody would have stigmatized the use of the passive voice as poor 
grammar. Just as it privileged long sentences, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German 
endorsed the passive voice. Partly this is a matter of style and conventions. However, it is 
also, and importantly, an expression of a metaphysical stance. For many of the authors we 
will encounter, much of the world is beyond control and influence. For them, the passive 
voice is the honest and obvious way to focus the reader’s attention on the evident fact that 
things are done to people far more than people do things.  
The passive voice, then, is an important signal that tells us much about the author’s 
understanding of the workings of the state, society, and the universe. I am aware that many 
readers will tire of reading lengthy quotations or paraphrases in the passive voice. 
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Inventing the Logic of the Administrative Sphere 
 
Throughout the eighteenth century the German term “Herrschaft” underwent a 
significant transformation.10 Originally the term connoted the dominion of a “Herr,” a 
mister, or master. However, the term became gradually depersonified in the course of the 
eighteenth century. From implying personal domination or lordship, it morphed to become 
increasingly attributed to abstract entities. It now referred to the control the state exerted 
over society, rather than the direct rule of the king. The king, however, remained very 
much in power. The linguistic development of the term “Herrschaft” indicates more than a 
mere shift in who held power:  it speaks to the configuration of power itself. Sovereignty in 
this time period was recast in novel ways.  
The three chapters of this section trace this development. They parse the moment, 
metaphorically speaking, when Creon’s secretaries displaced Creon from administrative 
matters. This is not a shift of power, but a displacement of the decision-making locus from 
the will of individuals towards procedures. Bureaucracies and the rise of the bureau figure 
prominently in this story. The word “bureaucracy” itself is revealing: the Greek suffix 
“cracy” denotes “power of,” while its prefix specifies who actually holds the power. 
                                                 
10 Robert M. Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 
1770-1848 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 10-11, 90-1. 
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Commonly, an individual or a group of individuals holds power: the demos holds power in 
a demo-cracy, the few in an aristo-cracy, the mob in an ochlo-cracy, the talented in a 
merito-cracy, the wealthy in a pluto-cracy, etc. But who holds power in a bureaucracy? 
Taking the previous analysis literally, we have to say that the bureau holds power. Power, it 
seems, is vested not in individuals but in the institution they inhabit. This is not an 
etymological flaw, but rather the encapsulation of an important insight. Institutionalized 
procedures, in a bureaucracy, replace individual impulse. Concomitantly, outcomes become 
judged by procedural standards instead of by ends. The direct question whether an outcome 
is proper, decent, just, or fair is replaced with the indirect question whether procedures 
were properly followed to reach the outcome.11 
This displacement did not happen suddenly, accidentally, or in metaphysical 
isolation. Bureaucracies and a procedural understanding of the state came into being, 
conceptually and institutionally, through a serpentine, glacial, and historically contingent 
process. Chapters 1 and 2 of this section explore the content and crisis of “Herrschaft” in its 
original configuration. Under this model of social and political order, power is exercised 
and experienced in a direct and personal manner. It is in constant and direct dialogue with a 
population. This description is not allegorical. The Prussian kings prided themselves on 
                                                 
11 For the most commonly cited account of procedural justice in modern political theory see: John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, Rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 73-78.; 
For an n-person version of Rawls’ cake dividing game see: John Allen Paulos, A Mathematician Reads the 
Newspaper (New York: BasicBooks, 1995).; For insightful and useful accounts of procedural justice from a 
legal perspective conisider: B. L. Hay, "Procedural Justice-Ex Ante Vs. Ex Post," UCLA Law Review 44, 
no. 6 (1997).; R. G. Bone, "Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of 
Procedural Fairness," Boston Universtiy Law Review 83 (2003).; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and 
Political Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).; Patrick Johnston, "Civil Justice Reform: 
Juggling between Politics and Perfection," Fordham Law Review, no. 62 (1994).; Jon O. Newman, 
Rethinking Fairness : Perspectives on the Litigation Process (New York, N.Y.: Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York, 1984).; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed., Law School 
Casebook Series (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), 549.; Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in 
Adjudication (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 1993).; For a distinct but related theme see: Harvey 
C. Mansfield, "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government," The American Political Science Review 
65, no. 1 (Mar., 1971). 
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their face-to-face contact with the population. Periodically they took grand tours of the 
country to acquaint themselves with local conditions, meet the provincial administrators, be 
seen, and interact with their subjects. People brought grievances and concerns literally to 
the feet of the kings, who listened and often rectified many perceived wrongs. This 
dialogue, though lopsided, contributed considerably to the legitimacy of the crown’s rule. It 
increased the perception that the crown was approachable and in touch, ruled close to the 
ground, and was not aloof or foreign.  
However, the crown grew increasingly dissatisfied with this model of governance. 
It was cumbersome, inefficient, slow, and prone to error. The crown began to look for new 
ways of structuring the relationship between itself, its administration, and the population. 
This search was driven by the strains of fierce international military competition, newly 
acquired but poorly integrated territories, and endless strife and inefficiency within the 
administration. Notable judicial scandals did the rest to push the crown to revise how it 
governed.  
Chapter 1 of this section describes one of the most important judicial scandals in 
Prussian history. A key episode in the reshaping of “Herrschaft,” this incident lastingly 
reconfigured the relationship between the crown, its administration, and society. Chapter 2 
explores in greater detail the crown’s dissatisfaction with its administrative services. The 
precise configuration of this dissatisfaction gave rise to and shaped the search for a new 
theory of the state. Chapter 3 explores the nascence and development of this new theory. It 
describes the maturation and deployment of a logic of administration that we have grown 
familiar with. Its main advocates are collectively known under the rubric of Cameralism. 
Conceived as a new science, cameralism developed and deployed a novel theory of the 
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state that radically reimagined its structure, function, and form. The state, under this model, 
developed new forms and rationalizations of power, new means of control, and new tools 
of knowledge. Cameralists adapted their understanding of social order accordingly. With 
new ways to govern came a new understanding of the (administrated) subject. The 
population was now understood as silent and outside of the legitimation process. 
Cameralists arrived at these innovations by way of their focus on the efficiency of means 
and the power of the state. Concerns with facticity, in Habermas’s terminology, far 
outweighed concerns with normativity. The two spheres became increasingly isolated from 
each other. However, this did not mean, pace Foucault, that questions of legitimacy 
dropped out of the picture. Instead, the cameralists’ understanding of the state and the 
social order entailed a radical recasting of legitimacy. Cameralists attempted to generate 
legitimacy endogenously within the administrative sphere, as the result of properly 
followed procedures. They aimed to replace the direct question with the indirect question. 
Legitimacy, under this model, was not dependent on the public. Cameralists instead tried to 
monopolize questions of legitimacy. The cameralists’ notion of social order and 
“Herrschaft” marginalized the agency of the community that it sought to administer 
efficiently and quietly. This created a serious and fundamental backlash (explored in 
Section II). To understand this reaction to administrative power, we have to understand the 
precise configuration and development of “Herrschaft” from an intensely personal exercise 
of power to a procedural application of rules. That story begins with the construction of 




1. “A Game of Arbitrariness”12 - The case of the Müller Arnold 
 
Christian and Rosine Arnold were rather ordinary Prussians in the closing years of 
Frederick the Great’s reign.13 The Arnolds were commoners in charge of a modest mill in 
Brandenburg–Prussia that was powered by a small river. The mill was located on an estate 
belonging to a locally influential but financially struggling aristocratic family headed by 
Count Gottfried Heinrich Leopold von Schmettau. The Arnolds fully controlled mill 
operations, but did not outright own the mill or the river that drove it. Instead, their family 
operated the mill under a standard heritable leasehold [Erbpacht] that Christian Arnold had 
acquired from his father Hans in 1762. Christian Arnold had paid his father 300 Taler for 
the leasehold and the promise of support during Hans’s retirement. The original lease had 
been contracted in 1710 and specified that the mill’s operators owed its aristocratic owner a 
yearly payment of three Malter of grain as well as 10 Taler in cash.14  
 The small river that powered the Arnolds’ mill flowed first through the property of 
Count Georg Samuel Wilhelm von Gersdorf before reaching the property of Schmettau. 
                                                 
12 “Ein Spiel der Willkühr” (Johann Friedrich Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe 
Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den Germanischen Ländern (Kiel: Gedruckt bei C.F. 
Mohr, 1816), 7.) 
13 Throughout this chapter I rely heavily on the excellent accounts below. They contain most of the key 
elements of the case and are largely in agreement as to the facts. Where appropriate I will supply in the 
following paragraphs additional references. However, their numeral dominance should not obscure that the 
references in this footnote are the best place to begin investigating the Miller Arnold case. The best places 
to start are: Malte Diesselhorst, Die Prozesse Des Müllers Arnold Und Das Eingreifen Friedrichs Des 
Grossen, Göttinger Rechtswissenschaftliche Studien ; (Göttingen: O. Schwartz, 1984).; David Luebke, 
"Frederick the Great and the Celebrated Case of the Millers Arnold " Central European History 32, no. 4 
(1999).; Thomas Carlyle, History of Friedrich Ii of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great, 10 vols., vol. 6 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1870), 606-32.; Eberhard Schmidt, Beiträge Zur Geschichte Des 
Preussischen Rechtsstaates (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980).; As well as the appendix to: C. B. A. 
Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and 
Prussia (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985). 
14 One Malter corresponds to 12 Scheffel that translates to a volume of roughly 600-700 liters. Notice 
however that “Malters” were used throughout many regions and times with widely varying definitions. For 
an account of the value of one Taler see: Dieter Sinn and Renate Sinn, Der Alltag in Preussen ([Frankfurt 
am Main]: Societäts-Verlag, 1991), 129-36. 
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Around 1770, Gersdorf began constructing two new carp ponds, mainly for his amusement. 
Once construction was completed, Gersdorf began to divert water from the river to the 
ponds. The Arnolds claimed that this diversion significantly reduced the water level of the 
river and rendered the mill inoperable (particularly during the dry but important summer 
months). As a result, in their view, they  were  rendered unable to pay their annual 
obligation to Schmettau. They suspended their annual lease payments, for which Schmettau 
sued them in court a couple of years later, in 1773. The first hearing of this lawsuit fell, as 
was customary at the time, in the local patrimonial court that was controlled by Schmettau 
himself. In the fall of 1773, one of Schmettau’s deputies ruled against the Arnolds and 
ordered them to pay all back dues or risk expulsion from the mill.  
 From there, matters quickly turned ugly. The Arnolds resisted the judgment and 
refused to pay. The local court, in turn, sought to compel full payment by forcibly 
confiscating the Arnolds’ milk cows. Additionally, Christian Arnold was imprisoned twice 
for short spells. In September of 1778, Schmettau finally instructed the patrimonial court to 
confiscate the mill and evict the Arnolds. Shortly thereafter, the court auctioned off the mill 
for 600 Taler to a third party, who immediately sold it to the carp pond-loving Gersdorf just 
up the stream. Gersdorf sold the mill two years later for 800 Taler.  
The story could easily have ended at this point, as many like it did, but the Arnolds 
did not give up easily. The Arnolds’ case quickly found its way to higher provincial courts, 
and eventually to the high court in Berlin [Kammergericht]. Each court affirmed the 
unfavorable judgment of the lower provincial court. Undeterred by their legal setbacks, the 
Arnolds sought to bypass the court system by petitioning King Frederick II directly. After 
numerous petitions, Christian Arnold obtained an audience with the king (in August 1779), 
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and Frederick ordered an immediate royal investigation of the Arnolds’ complaint. The 
investigation comprised two members, one a royal appointee, the other a member of the 
provincial tribunal. Unable to find much common ground, they wrote, inconclusively, two 
separate memoranda, with different views and different recommendations. This venue 
exhausted without success, the Arnolds renewed their legal efforts and aimed their lawsuits 
no longer against Schmettau (their landlord), but against Gersdorf (the pond builder). The 
courts, on royal orders, heard the case in the fall of 1779. All local and provincial courts 
once again denied the Arnolds redress. In reply to yet another petition, the king ordered the 
case to be heard in the Kammergericht in Berlin. However, the Arnolds lost in the highest 
appellate forum as well, despite the obvious implied blessing of the king.  
 The king was furious. Shortly after the court announced its final judgment, 
Frederick II ordered the four judges of the Kammergericht to his palace. The king 
recounted the facts of the Miller Arnold case as he saw them, and when the highest-ranking 
judge (Fürst) tried to correct the king on his misunderstanding of the appellate system, the 
king barked, “Go you, Sir, about your business, on the instant! Your successor is 
appointed; with you I have nothing more to do. Disappear!”15 Ranssleben, one of the 
remaining judges present, said about this meeting merely that “The king […] made use of 
very strong expressions against us and, at last, dismissed us…”16 On a printable level, the 
king kept repeating that: 
 
[Their] sentence is altogether contrary to his Majesty’s fatherly intentions: – my 
name cruelly abused. […] My name to such a thing! When was I found to oppress a 
poor man for love of a rich? To follow wiggeries and form with solemn attention, 
                                                 
15 Carlyle, History of Friedrich Ii of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great, 622.; "An Eighteenth Century 
Recall of Judges," California Law Review 3, no. 5 (Jul., 1915): 406-7.; Norwood Young, The Life of 
Frederick the Great (New York,: H. Holt and company, 1919), 364-7. 
16 As cited in: Carlyle, History of Friedrich Ii of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great, 623. 
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careless what became of the internal fact? […] What is the meaning of your sitting 
there as Judges? Dispensers of Right in God’s Name and mine? I will make an 
example of you that shall be remembered! – Out of my sight!17 
 
 In a statement published the next day and ordered to be printed in various 
newspapers, the crown reaffirmed this stance and announced that the courts, if “they do not 
carry out justice in a straightforward manner […] shall have to answer to his Majesty.”18 
The king left little doubt about the extralegal, extraprocedural, and highly personalized 
nature of his understanding of justice. Even though he had appointed new justices, “his 
Majesty will not the less look sharply with his own eyes after the Law-proceedings in all 
the Provinces.”19 The crown also warned judges throughout the realm against delivering 
judgments “so wicked and openly opposed to justice.”20 There was little need for such 
explicit verbal threats. The fate of the four judges of the Kammergericht was threat enough. 
They were immediately put under guard and send to the Spandau fortress. Another four 
judges of the provincial court, the provincial president, Schmettau’s deputy in the 
patrimonial court, and Gersdorf were also all imprisoned for various periods of time. 
Frederick returned the mill to the Arnolds and compelled the various judges involved with 
the case to compensate the Arnolds for the costs incurred during their legal proceedings.21  
The minister von Zedlitz was charged with administering these tasks—but he 
refused to countenance Frederick’s decisions. The king, once again outraged, wrote back to 
him:  
 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 622-3. 
18 “… sollen sie es mit Seiner Königlichen Majestät zu thun kriegen...“ (Ibid., 624.) 
19 Ibid. (My emphasis); "An Eighteenth Century Recall of Judges," 407. 
20 Carlyle, History of Friedrich Ii of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great, 624-5.; See also: "An Eighteenth 
Century Recall of Judges," 407. 
21 Walther Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, Studien Zur Geschichte 
Preussens ; ([Köln]: Grote, 1973), 218.; "An Eighteenth Century Recall of Judges," 408. 
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Your Report of the 20th in regard to Judgment on the arrested Raths has been 
received. But do you think I don't understand your Advocate fellows and their 
quirks; or how they can polish-up a bad cause, and by their hyperboles exaggerate 
or extenuate as they find fit? The Goose-quill class [Federzeug] can't look at facts. 
When Soldiers set to investigate anything, on an order given, they go the straight 
way to the kernel of the matter; upon which, plenty of objections from the Goose-
quill people!22 
 
Public opinion in Berlin, Prussia, and throughout Europe seems to have been 
divided on the merits of Frederick’s decision. The prisoners in Spandau received sufficient 
traffic from the sympathetic aristocracy to prompt an Austrian emissary to scoff that “in 
other countries, everyone rushes off to [visit] newly installed ministers; here, I see, [one 
visits those] who have been dismissed in disgrace!”23 However, further away the judges’ 
troubles were perceived very differently. Empress Catherine the Great (the other 
“enlightened despot,” with strong family ties to Prussia) sent to her Senate a copy of 
Friedrich’s printed public announcement on the case, as a “noteworthy instance of royal 
supreme judicature.”24 Others celebrated Frederick as an enlightened despot whose 
judgment avoided all red tape and bias and cut to the source of the Arnolds’ plight. 
Numerous paintings and etchings from the time illustrate and glamorize Frederick’s 
reception of humble petitioners and his uncomplicated adjudication of conflicts in his 
realm.25  
  In fact, it is all too easy and tempting to see this case in sharply Manichaean terms. 
All the elements of the stereotypical oppression of the common people in pre-
                                                 
22 "An Eighteenth Century Recall of Judges," 409.; Franz Mehring, Gesammelte Schriften Und Aufsätze in 
Einzelausgaben, ed. Eduard Fuchs, 15 vols., vol. 5 ([Berlin,: Soziologische Verlagsanstalt, 1929), 449.; 
Young, The Life of Frederick the Great, 366. 
23 As cited in: Luebke, "Frederick the Great and the Celebrated Case of the Millers Arnold ". 
24 Ibid. 
25 For another example of Frederick’s aproceduralism see: Johann Daniel Richter, Beyträge Zur Finanz-
Gelahrheit Überhaupt, Vorzüglich in Den Preussischen Staaten, 3 pts. in 1 vols. (Frankfurt ; Leipzig: 
1785), 144. 
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Revolutionary feudal Europe were present: powerful and exploitative aristocrats bent on 
their own amusement, blind to the costs they impose on meek, hard-working commoners 
who are without voice or power, trapped in a system that puts them at the mercy of a 
corrupt judiciary, an unsympathetic bureaucracy, and a conception of justice that stacks the 
cards heavily against them.  
 However, such a reading is hard to sustain. The Arnolds lost their case properly, in 
accordance with the legal framework of the time and with just about any reasonable 
standard of fairness. Whatever their initial motivation to refuse their yearly lease payments, 
it was unconnected to diminished water supplies or nearby pond construction. Their entire 
case, as presented, is without merit. Three elements support this view. First, a sawmill, 
operating between the Arnolds’ mill and the carp ponds, remained fully functional during 
the period that the Arnolds alleged an unworkable water supply. The sawmill did not 
complain about or even notice a diminished water supply in the river. Second, with the carp 
ponds firmly in place and the Arnolds’ legal battles widely known, the mill was 
nevertheless twice bought by willing buyers who paid significant sums. The second owner 
of the mill was “Widow Poelchen,” in all likelihood Christian Arnold’s own sister. Third, 
there is simply next to no evidence that speaks in favor of the Arnolds’ case. Despite ten 
years of legal disputes and royal support, very little could lead a detached observer to find 
in the Arnolds’ favor.26  
 Frederick’s interventions in the legal proceedings, then, suddenly appear in a 
different light, as arbitrary, amateurish, and potentially dangerous to the stability of his own 
country. However, similar actions by previous kings never received much attention, and are 
                                                 
26 This states the broad consensus amongst historians of the period (see for example: Young, The Life of 
Frederick the Great, 367. 
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now largely lost in the records of mundane day-to-day administration of the country. Two 
high-profile cases in the decades leading up to the Miller Arnold episode demonstrate that 
few people, if any, thought the king’s direct involvement in legal affairs was illegitimate or 
harmful. In both cases, the allegedly illegal acts themselves were the scandal, not the 
procedures leading up to the sentencing.27 In contrast, the Miller Arnold case was a scandal 
not for its outcome per se, but for the crown’s arbitrary intervention into an established 
legal process. After all, millers, peasants, and the downtrodden won legal victories all the 
time (even in a system that stacked the cards against them).  
 Had the Arnolds won in the course of regular legal proceedings, few would have 
cared about their case, and their names would be lost to history. However, the royal dictum 
of power [Machtspruch] that ended the legal proceedings came at a time when Creon’s 
secretaries were gaining in power and legitimacy.28 What might have been ordinary and 
quotidian a few short decades earlier was now viewed by many as dangerous and 
distasteful. The Miller Arnold case was certainly not the first time, but it was probably the 
last time that a Prussian king intervened so palpably in a legal case over the objections of 
proper judges. Shortly after the death of Frederick the Great, the Miller Arnold case was 
overturned and finally laid to rest. All the judges were exonerated and compensated.29   
Ever since, scholars and commentators have disagreed sharply about the details and 
the meaning of the case, but the mere fact that the king’s actions were questioned  signals a 
fundamental departure from the long-standing conception of justice that put the will of an 
individual at the heart of the judicial system. Frederick’s periodic declarations that judges 
                                                 
27 For more on these cases (concern Görne and von Trenck) see: Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die 
Preussische Verwaltung, 218. 
28 See Hubatsch also for an account of the increased assertment of royal officials in judicial proceedings 
(Ibid., 218-9.) 
29 Ibid., 218. 
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often are “worse than the greatest knaves the world contains, and deserve double 
punishment” were now regarded as unhelpful and detrimental to the worthy cause of 
creating an independent and vibrant judiciary system.30 As one historian put it: “for justice 
Frederick had perpetuated a heavy injustice.”31 This paradox raised weighty questions. 
Many people wondered whether Frederick had acted unjustly. They pondered where 
precisely Frederick’s thinking might have gone awry. Was adherence to procedures 
advantageous or detrimental to the king’s rule? In which hands should the administration of 
justice ultimately rest, Creon’s or his secretaries’? What would a system of justice under 
the rule of Creon’s secretaries look like? 
Perhaps these issues were on Frederick’s mind in the wake of the Miller Arnold 
case. Or perhaps the more pressing issue was what to do with the hundreds of petitioners 
that had been arriving at the palace ever since the Arnolds’ case had been widely publicized 
(December 12, 1779).32 An attendee at court described the scene thus: 
 
I often crossed in the forenoon the Esplanade in front of the Palace at that side 
where the king's apartments were [....]. I remember that here, on that part of the 
Esplanade which was directly under Friedrich's windows, there stood constantly 
numbers of Peasants, not ten or twelve, but as many as a hundred at a time; all with 
petitions in their hands, which they were holding up towards the window shouting, 
“Please his Majesty to look at these; we have been still worse treated than the 
Arnolds!” And indeed, I have understood the Law Courts for some time after, found 
great difficulty to assert their authority - the parties against whom judgment went, 
taking refuge in the Arnold precedent, and appealing direct to the king.33 
 
                                                 
30 "An Eighteenth Century Recall of Judges," 407. 
31 G. R. R. Treasure, The Making of Modern Europe, 1648-1780 (New York: Methuen, 1985), 456-7. 
32 For a helpful account of these events see Mehring, Gesammelte Schriften Und Aufsätze in 
Einzelausgaben, 449.; For comments on the same see: Young, The Life of Frederick the Great, 366.; 
Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 219. 
33 "An Eighteenth Century Recall of Judges," 408-9. 
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The king had brought this upon himself. In his publications, he insisted repeatedly that he 
would look after legal proceedings “in all the provinces” with “his own eyes.”34 Taken 
literally, this implied an endless amount of work that no individual could possibly master. 
Shortly after the Miller Arnold episode, still besieged by endless petitioners seeking 
redress, Frederick ordered (14. April 1780) Johann Heinrich Casimir von Cramer to author 
a new set of procedures for criminal and civil cases [Prozessordnung] and a new set of 
codified laws [Gesetzeskodifikation].35 This was the first step in a process that led to the 
writing and eventual adoption of the “Zivilprozessordnung,” the “Allgemeines Landrecht 
für die Preussischen Staaten“ (ALR) and eventually the “Kriminalordnung.”36 All three 
attempted to systematize and rationalize the administration of justice under the idea of, in 
the words of one historian, “gapless and non-contradictory structures of scientific . . . 
norms of justice.”37 Seen in this context, it is understandable, if improbable, how an ad hoc 
exercise of will in the Miller Arnold case became the founding act of the most important 
legal codification in Germany in two hundred years.38 
 In Germany, the case of the Miller Arnold was a cause célèbre of comparable 
notoriety to the case of Jean Calas in France; and, just as in France, the king’s unhindered 
interference in the regular administration of justice (through lettres de cachet or the plain 
German “Machtspruch”) was increasingly questioned. To see why, upon what grounds, and 
how the legacies of this development remain with us, we have to turn to the political and 
                                                 
34 Carlyle, History of Friedrich Ii of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great, 624. (My emphasis); "An 
Eighteenth Century Recall of Judges," 407. 
35 Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 219. 
36 For a helpful introduction to these documents and attending circumstances see: Ernst Rudolf Huber, 
Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 4 vols., vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1957), 105-7. 
37 “…lückenloses und widerspruchloses Gefüge wissenschaflitch durchdachter und aufgebauter 
Rechtsnormen.“ (Ibid., 106.) 
38 Roger Berkowitz, The Gift of Science : Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 75-7. 
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conceptual struggles that surrounded the Miller Arnold case and the administration of 
justice in Prussia.  
 
 
2.  Forging Creon’s Secretaries:  The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Bureaucracy 
 
The case of the Miller Arnold was not the first time that the crown had clashed 
sharply with its own administrative system. Prussia’s administrative history is one of 
constant struggle, in which conceptual disagreements over effective and normatively 
desirable bureaucratic arrangements frequently take on shockingly physical manifestations. 
Constant admonitions and complaints about the failures of their administrative institutions 
gushed form the pens of Prussian kings. Frederick William I, for example, exclaimed 
angrily in shaken grammar that the administrators of his state “shall dance to my music or 
the devil shall take me; like the Czar, I let them hang and roast and treat them like 
rebels.”39 
 This was not an empty threat. Frederick William I, constantly upset over the poor 
administration of his country, rarely blamed structural flaws, but readily found fault instead 
with token, allegedly culpable individuals. The fate of von Schlubuth, an ordinary 
                                                 
39 The translation loses much of its original flavor: “Sie sollen nach meine pfeiffe dance oder der Deuffel 
hohle mir, [....] ich lasse hengen und Brahten wie der Zahr und tratire sie wie Rebeller.“ (Acta Borussica. 
Die Behördenorganisation Und Die Allgemeine Staatsverwaltung Preussens., ed. Otto Hintze and Gustav 
Schmoller, 16 vols., vol. 2, Acta Borussica. Denkmäler Der Preussischen Staatsverwaltung Im 18. 
Jahrhundert. (Berlin: Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1894-1982), 130-31.). For more on 
Frederick William I’s character and disposition concerning administrative reforms see: Rodney Gothelf, 
"Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism, 1713-1740," in The Rise of Prussia : 
Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, ed. Philip Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000), 48-9. 
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administrator in Königsberg, exemplifies the king’s misguided wrath. Responsible for 
overseeing a number of building projects, Schlubuth had used his own funds to complete a 
building when official funds were unavailable or slow to arrive. He subsequently 
reimbursed himself for these expenses from the royal treasury. The king, hastily mistaking 
this for theft, ordered Schlubuth’s execution even though no evidence for his guilt was 
found. Following the king’s decree to the letter, Schlubuth was hanged not far from a busy 
square in Königsberg, across from the entrance to the main administrative offices. His 
corpse was left on display there for a few weeks, presumably as a warning to Schlubuth’s 
colleagues.40  
 Similarly, the king hanged the administrator Hesse for keeping untidy records that 
showed a modest deficit. A later investigation showed that this had been due to 
carelessness and not malice. The king, unmoved, commented that every simple thief should 
be hanged.41 Such thinking enjoyed a distinguished genealogy amongst Prussia’s rulers. 
Frederick William I’s grandfather had advised him curtly in his political testament, “The 
more civil servants, the more thieves,” while Frederick William’s son, Frederick II, 
remarked unsmilingly that one could always hang a hundred officials with a clear 
conscience, since finding even one honest man amongst them would be fortunate.42  
                                                 
40 Acta Borussica. Die Behördenorganisation Und Die Allgemeine Staatsverwaltung Preussens., ed. Otto 
Hintze and Gustav Schmoller, 16 vols., vol. 5 - part 1, Acta Borussica. Denkmäler Der Preussischen 
Staatsverwaltung Im 18. Jahrhundert. (Berlin: Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1894-1982), 
261-62. See also “2 Briefe des Kriegsraths von Schlubhut an seine Frau kurz vor seinem Ende geschrieben. 
“ in Preussischen Monatsschrift, 2. Bd. 1. Stück (1789). S.251-257. For more on the crown’s direct 
interference in the administration of justice see: Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The 
Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 99-115.; See also: Hans Martin Sieg, Staatsdienst, 
Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien 
Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), 39-47.  
41 A.B.B., 452-54. 
42 Cited in: Walter L. Dorn, "The Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century," Political Science 
Quarterly 46, no. 3 (Sep., 1931): 421.; For a standard introduction to Friedrich I see: Johann Gustav 
Droysen and Eberhard Straub, Friedrich I., König Von Preussen, 3. Aufl. / ed. (Berlin ; New York: De 
Gruyter, 2001). 
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 Unsurprisingly, such acts did little to change the systemic flaws and weaknesses in 
Prussia’s system of governance.43 Absent the ability to differentiate between the office and 
the person holding the office, arbitrariness and amateurism crippled the Prussian 
administrations.44 Instead of following regulations and maintaining a semblance of  
meritocracy, mutual expectations assured, instead, inefficient practices of excessive 
patronage and proprietary tenures. Before turning to a discussion of procedures and 
cameralism, I will first situate these administrative flaws in the context of changing social 
practices in the period surrounding the French Revolution. In this time span, administrative 
officers gradually matured from mere servants of the royal household to “royal servants” 
[königliche Bediente], and eventually into “servants of the state” [Staatsdiener, Civildiener] 
and “professional officials of the state” [Beamte des Staates].45 This entailed the 
depersonalization and regulation of bureaucratic offices, as concerns with efficiency and 
effectiveness gradually overruled administrative practices that had long been integral to 
Prussia’s social and political makeup.  
                                                 
43 For more on this theme see: Edgar Kiser and Joachim Schneider, "Bureaucracy and Efficiency: An 
Analysis of Taxation in Early Modern Prussia," American Sociological Review 59, no. 2 (Apr., 1994): 188. 
44 Most historians agree with this assessement. For representative examples see: Behrens, Society, 
Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 22.; 
Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism, 1713-1740," 48. 
45 Historians frequently comment on this important transition. Unfortunately, most do so only in passing 
and I am unaware of a complete and detailed treatment of this subject matter. For an abundance of hints, 
suggestions, and partial statements see: Henry Jacoby, Die Bürokratisierung Der Welt; Ein Beitrag Zur 
Problemgeschichte, Soziologische Texte ; ([Neuwied]: Luchterhand, 1969), 23.; Hans Rosenberg, 
Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, Harvard Historical 
Monographs ; 34 (Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 191.; See also Sieg, Staatsdienst, 
Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien 
Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 75-6, 80, 92, 100-02.; Otto Hintze and Gerhard Oestreich, Regierung 
Und Verwaltung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 2., 
durchgesehene Aufl. ed., 3 vols., vol. 3 (Göttingen,: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1967), 204-54.; Walther 
Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : Die Preussischen Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn Karl Vom Stein Zwischen 
Revolution Und Restauration (Köln: Grote, 1975), 98-9.; Hubert C. Johnson, "The Concept of Bureaucracy 
in Cameralism," Political Science Quarterly 79, no. 3 (Sep., 1964): 381-2.; For a comperative perspective 
consider: Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State : The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).; 
Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State; an Introduction to Bureaucracy ([Chicago]: University of 
Chicago Press, 1957), 76-80. 
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 The kings fought, at times desperately and mostly in vain, to turn their 
administrative organs into effective tools, no small priority for a beleaguered Prussia in a 
time of frequent warfare. A series of royal decrees throughout the eighteenth century (some 
in the handwritings of the kings) minutely specified official codes of behavior aimed at 
improving Prussia’s administration.46 All these codes sought to regularize the 
administration of the country, to render it effective and efficient, and to remove decisions 
increasingly from the arbitrary will of individuals and submit them to prescribed processes. 
However, much stood in the way of these attempts. The aristocratic norms that permeated 
the administrative organs of the state long impeded the rise of effective administrative 
practices.47  
 
(i) Buying Positions 
 
 Perhaps the most notable institutionalized hindrance to the rise of a capable 
bureaucracy was the practice of treating administrative positions as transferable property. 
The archives of the Prussian administration in the eighteenth century are filled with 
accounts of military, legal, and administrative positions for sale to the highest bidder.48 
                                                 
46 A.B.B., vol.III, 532-651, 681-714; A.B.B., vol.VII, 572-839; ABB, vol.V, part I, 464-65; A.B.B., vol.VI, 
part I, 260-269; A.B.B., vol.VI, part 2, 64-65, 278-286; A.B.B., vol.IX, 437-445; A.B.B., vol.XIV, 105-
107. 
47 For one assessment in line with this position see: Robert M. Berdahl, "The Stande and the Origins of 
Conservatism in Prussia," Eighteenth-Century Studies 6, no. 3 (Spring, 1973): 300. 
48 See for example: A.B.B. - V. part 2, 836; A.B.B., IV, part I, 491-93.; V, part 2, 293, 796; VI, part I, 204-
5, 208, 278, 439; VII, 47.; For comperative views on conditions in France, Bavaria, and Austria consider: 
Bernard S. Silberman, Cages of Reason : The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United 
States, and Great Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 95.; Jacoby, Die Bürokratisierung 
Der Welt; Ein Beitrag Zur Problemgeschichte, 41-2.; Walter Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum 
Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte ; (München: Oldenbourg, 1993).; 
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Positions, in fact, were not only sold, but also lent, rented, inherited, given as compensation 
for received goods or damages, and taken in lieu of monetary payments. These practices 
made sense within their historical context. Administrative positions were traditionally 
attached to tracts of land, and the same rules and norms that governed thesale of lands 
attached to many administrative posts. The position of “Landrath,” for example, was in 
many regards like a piece of real estate, or a chicken.49 A man owned the position of the 
local Landrath the same way generations of his family might own an acre outside of town.  
 As the influential historian Hans Rosenberg put it, “it was quite common to use the 
office as an object of trade, a transferable commodity, and a tool of acquisitive 
speculation.”50 Few people thought of this as a form of corruption. Instead, it was a time-
honored and established practice, one that interfaced easily with feudal norms and 
expectations that, in fact, condemned doing anything else.51 The nobles that occupied or 
staffed the higher administrative ranks did not suddenly become detached bureaucrats once 
they entered the office, but remained who they had always been, just as if they had stepped 
onto a tract of their own land. Far from adhering to a procedural understanding of the 
state’s administration, treating administrative positions as property allowed and contributed 
to an understanding of the individual that hindered regularized decision procedures.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Bernd Wunder, Geschichte Der Bürokratie in Deutschland, 1. Aufl., Erstausg. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1986), 21. 
49 A.B.B., IV, part 2, 472; V, part 2, 836-38.; For more on the position of “Landrath” see: Sinn and Sinn, 
Der Alltag in Preussen, 407-11. 
50 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 191.; I rely 
in this section very heavily on Rosenberg’s work. His work on this period and on these themes are rarely 
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treatment of offices as property see: Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in 
Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 39.; 
Adolf M. Birke, Ilja Mieck, and Klaus Malettke, Ämterkäuflichkeit : Aspekte Sozialer Mobilität Im 
Europäischen Vergleich (17. Und 18. Jahrhundert) (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1980).; Edgar Kiser and 
Joachim Schneider, "Rational Choice Versus Cultural Explanations of the Efficiency of the Prussian Tax 
System," American Sociological Review 60, no. 5 (Oct., 1995): 789. 
51 A.B.B. - V. part 2, 293. 
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 The practice of purchasing offices, apart from being completely intelligible to 
inhabitants of the eighteenth-century Prussian social order, was also highly profitable. 
Treating positions as private property gave license to officeholders to exploit their quasi-
official status. Predictably, the ingrained and seemingly inescapable fusion of public 
business and private enterprise led to the expectation that public service was a source of 
private income. Purchasers expected the land they bought to bear fruit and return their 
investment. They similarly expected that an administrative position, once purchased, would  
repay its owner in income, rent, power, and favors to be handed out to relatives and 
supporters.52 More concerned with the pragmatic and monetary aspects of being a royal 
administrator than with any civil-service agenda, many within the Prussian administration 
paid little heed to their duties, and thus contributed to a languid administration.  
 For some time, the kings, while aware of the inefficiencies and dangers thus 
incurred, did little to change this system. The crown, after all, benefitted from transactions 
involving administrative positions (which were long taxable), and routinely regarded the 
income from the sale of offices as regular state revenue.53 Given the profits from selling 
administrative assignments and promotions, the crown repeatedly found itself  
polemicizing against the excesses of practices it simultaneously sanctioned. For example, 
in May of 1729 the Landrat Otto Albrecht von Rohr auf Ganzer requested that the king 
install his son Kaspar Otto Christoph von Rohr (who was still in school at the time) in an 
administrative capacity. The king (Frederick William I) simply added to the permission, in 
handwriting, the required monetary compensation:  
                                                 
52 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 54, 79. 
53 Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism, 1713-1740," 64-5.; 
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Ludwig Benjamin Martin Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und 
Finanzwissenschaft (Mannheim: In der Schwanischen buchhandlung, 1785), 90. 
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“600 th. [Thaler]    FW.”54  
 
There was of course not the slightest guarantee that the highest bidders for administrative 
positions were also the most qualified—or qualified at all. Consequently, the lack of 
qualified administrators was a constant anxiety for the crown. Even when technically 
qualified, the owners of positions had little interest in fully executing their duties, and often 
left their posts and responsibilities to poorly paid substitutes.55 As critics lamented, people 
who had bought their positions tended “not to ask much about the common good, as long as 
their business does not suffer.” Holders of appointed posts, in contrast, are more likely to 
display “an understanding of the common good” and to “advance justice.”56 
 
(ii) Inheriting Positions 
 
A further element that contributed to the crown’s justified worries was that 
administrative positions could not only be bought and sold, but also inherited.57 As 
                                                 
54 A.B.B. - IV. part 2, 472. 
55 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 54. 
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Rosenberg pointedly remarked, “it did not prove too difficult to hold on to one or several 
positions over generations or even centuries.”58 Again, the crown found itself torn between 
pushing for greater efficiency in the administration and preserving long-standing norms 
that permeated the Prussian social order.  
The Prussian kings repeatedly pleaded, almost begged, that no importance be given 
to family relations when hiring, recommending, or promoting administrators.59 A royal 
cabinet order from 1746 reiterates the need to replace incompetent servants of the state that 
owe their position merely to family relations with “loyal, capable, experienced, as well as 
disinterested people.” The order stated:  
 
[They should be capable to] deal with all affairs with the proper dexterity and 
energy, set all family . . . relations to one side, and have nothing but [the king’s] 
service and the welfare of the country in front of their eyes.60 
 
Other cabinet orders plead that officials at least be chided “when they suggest brothers or 
brothers-in-law” for administrative positions.61 The temptation to do just that was 
considerable. As one observer of administrative practices at the time remarked, whoever 
managed to take possession of an important office was “well taken care of, together with 
all his uncles and brothers-in-law, and the petty co-Junkers must worship the mister 
                                                                                                                                                 
Review of Administrative Sciences 38 (1972): 24-6. Notice also the considerable disagreement and 
confusion within the literature whether specific offices could be inherited or only claims to a certain type of 
office. 
58 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 80. 
59 A.B.B., III, 575-80, V. part 2, 432, 537, 564; VII, 649. 
60 “...treue, geschickte, erfahrne, auch desinteressierte Leute“ [] “die alles mit der gehörigen Dexterite und 
Activite bearbeiten können, die alle Familien- und übrigen Confiderationes auf die Seite legen und die 
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Bericht dergestalt erwarten.“ (A.B.B. - VII., 51) 
61 “...wann es auch ihre Brüder und Schwäger wären...“ (A.B.B. - V. part 2, 537) 
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Hauptmann and the mister Landrat like a god.”62 It must have been hard for officeholders 
to understand why and how they should separate the pressures of family relations from the 
(frequently well-paid) capacities of their royal office. Family relations might affect the 
judgments of officials, but they had few conceptual resources or social practices available 
to partition their identities into private will and  public duty. Consequently, the king’s half-
hearted pleas to set aside “all affections and alternative goals and to not let friendships or 
family relations” influence them were bound to fall on deaf ears.63  
 Nepotism thrived freely under these conditions and constituted the lifeblood of 
many venerated families.64 Though ostensibly annoyed by the practice, the crown tolerated 
and frequently supported appointments and promotions based on family relations.65 For 
example, Frederick William I had promoted Adam Otto von Vierech “in consideration of 
his father-in-law.” The king nevertheless quickly rediscovered the negative aspects of such 
decisions and angrily instructed Vierech that he should finally “show some merit and work 
more diligently, not play too much cards […] and be vigilant in his work and not as slow 
and lazy as the devil like hitherto.”66 
                                                 
62 Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg, XV 
(1894), 402 – cited in: Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 
1660-1815, 53. 
63 “...wobei aber all Passiones und Nebenabsichten hintengesetzt und nicht auf Freud- oder Verwandtschaft, 
noch auch um etwa jemanden zu helfen, gesehen, sondern...“ (A.B.B. - V. part 2, p.614: Anno 1738). For 
more on this point see: Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 159-62. 
64 For a helpful account see: Rolf Straubel, Beamte Und Personalpolitik Im Altpreussischen Staat : Soziale 
Rekrutierung, Karriereverläufe, Entscheidungsprozesse (1763/86-1806), 1. Aufl. ed., Bibliothek Der 
Brandenburgischen Und Preussischen Geschichte ; Bd. 2 (Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 1998), 
156-62, 260. 
65 See for example: A.B.B. – VIII, 46.  
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 In some cases, families developed quasi-hereditary monopolies over specific 
administrative organs. Consider the case of the renowned Ilgen family.67 The patriarch, 
Rüdiger von Ilgen, used his considerable influence within the foreign office to establish 
numerous members of his family in lucrative careers. Under the thin cover of picking 
knowledgeable and capable individuals for open posts, he lobbied tirelessly on behalf of 
various family members.68 Employing the usual slander of competitors and flattery of the 
king,69 von Ilgen prepared the ground to recommend individuals “who are, as I can say 
before God, the most capable, that I could find in the world for these positions.”70 
Coincidentally, most were from his own family. Ilgen recommended his son-in-law as a 
minister, his nephew as chief councilor, and another nephew as councilor junior grade – all 
in the course of a single period of reorganization within Ilgen’s administrative department.  
 As Ilgen himself acknowledges in a letter to the king, he might have been able to 
install more relatives in their careers. However:  
 
Three from one family, I thought, was enough of a blessing and that, if I had pulled 
more relatives into the affairs of the state, my enemies would only have been given 
occasion to accuse me that I try to take over the department . . .  completely by 
filling it up with individuals that are my relatives. The dear God however has kindly 
prevented me from such schemes and hopefully will keep me from them.71 
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Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 99-101. 
68 A.B.B. - IV., part 2, 380-1. 
69 A.B.B. - IV., part 2, 381-2. 
70 “...die, wie ich vor Gott sagen kann, wohl die geschicktesten sein, die ich zu ihrer Arbeit in der Welt 
auszufinden wüsste.“ (A.B.B. - IV., part 2, 383.) 
71 “...drei aus einer Familie, [...] emploziret, so habe ich gemeint, dass solches vor uns Gnade gnug wäre 
und dass, wenn ich noch mehr von meinen Verwandten in solche Staatsaffären zöge, meine Feinde, [...] nur 
dadurch Gelegenheit nehmen würden, mich bei E.K.M. zu beschuldigen, dass ich dieses Departement des 
affaires etrangeres ganz an mich ziehen und solches mit lauter Leuten von meiner Verwandtschaft zu 
besetzen trachen wollte; vor welchen und andern dergleichen interessirten Absichten der liebe Gott mich 
aber bisher gnädiglich bewahret und die wenige Zeit, die ich annoch zu leben habe, hoffentlich auch ferner 
bewahren wird.“ (A.B.B. - IV., part 2, 386-7). 
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Ilgen skillfully walked the thin line between outright usurpation of royal prerogatives and 
cautious respect for dynastic politics. The king consented shortly afterwards to all of the 
suggested postings.72  
 Ilgen’s case, far from unusual, is noteworthy for illustrating the considerable 
tensions entrenched in the Prussian administration throughout the eighteenth century. The 
kings, though at times pressing ferociously for more capable, diligent, and disinterested 
administrators, nevertheless allowed people like Ilgen to favor relatives over capable 
applicants. Ilgen, in turn, seemed to treat his office almost as a private resource from which 
to provide sinecures liberally to friends and relatives, but he also recognized that he was 
acting in a system of norms that increasingly prioritized public office over private 
possession. The administration continued, in the words of Hans Rosenberg, to be “on a 
limited scale an object of private ownership and a source of personal gain within the 
‘nationalized’ domain of the Prussian state.”73 Rüdiger von Ilgen illustrates this point, since 
he readily accepted lavish presents for his own person while serving in high administrative 
positions. However, even more dubious (from a modern perspective) were Friedrich 
Wilhelm von Grumbkow’s loyalties to the state: it was widely known that he received a 
salary from the Austrian crown while serving as a Prussian minister. But then again, even 
the kings themselves accepted significant gifts from politically motivated parties.74  
                                                 
72 A.B.B. - IV., part 2, 387 
73 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 79. 
74 For more on this practice see: Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-
Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 34-6.; For more 
on gifts and official positions in general consider: Friedrich von Cölln, Praktisches Handbuch Für Staats- 
Und Regierungsbeamte Besonders in Den Preussischen Staaten Nach Anleitung Adam Smiths 
Untersuchung Über Die Natur Des Nationalreichthums, 2. Aufl. des Buchs neue Staatsweisheit. ed. 
(Berlin: G. Hann, 1816), 381-2. 
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 Just as the notion of corruption played out differently than in our time, so did the 
concept of “merit.”75 In the usage of the time, “merit” only partially overlapped with pure 
technical skill; rather, it entailed the whole person. Consider, for example, the following 
enumeration by Julius von Massow, the later Prussian minister of religious affairs (which 
included education at the time), who argued that it is not enough to merely consider 
“applicable knowledge or skills,” but that one should instead consider the “morality and 
virtue” of the, hopefully, “good human being” in his private life as well as within the 
administrative offices. Massow goes on to enumerate the desirable qualities of applicants 
for administrative posts: a practical Christian attitude; a proper self-presentation, with 
masculine clothing and manners; modesty; an open heart under the leadership of moral 
wisdom; prudential housekeeping; and the proper choice of company and entertainment.76 
Here, as elsewhere, the crown finds itself torn between two paradigms. Though seeking and 
desiring an administrative staff marked by pure technical merit and devoted to regularized 
procedures, the crown was beholden, in its own practices and ideology, to an understanding 
of the individual that is incompatible with a conception of merit as merely finding effective 
and efficient means for given ends. Corruption, similarly, means one thing when we 
understand administrative practices to be guided by Creon’s will, and quite another when 
we understand Creon’s secretaries to be bound by the procedures of a machine.  
                                                 
75 For useful discussions of the changing meaning of this concept see for example: Demel, Vom 
Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 78-80.; Armstrong, "Old-Regime 
Administrative Elites: Prelude to Modernization in France, Prussia, and Russia," 25-31.; Johann Heinrich 
Gottlob von Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, 
Das Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere 
Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, Anjetzo bey dieser 3. Aufl. 
allenthalben verbessert, mit Anmerkungen versehen, und von unzähligen Fehlern in der Schreibart 
gereiniget. ed., 3 vols., vol. 1 (Wienn: Verlegts Joh. Paul Krausz, 1761), 118-22. 
76 Eberhard Julius Wilhelm Ernst von Massow. “Ueber die Bildung der Referndarien bei den Königl. 
Preuss. Justiz-Collegiis, insbesondere der Pommerschen Regierung.“ In: Annalen der Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtsgelehrsamkeit in den preussischen Staaten, 3 (1789), p.339-359.  
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 The crown, in its efforts to secure a more capable and regular administration of its 
domain, was therefore conflicted and hypocritical in its aims. The king himself viewed the 
state as his own property, and he would hardly have consented to let merit or procedure be 
the decisive factor in filling his own administrative position or evaluating his decisions.77 
As such, it might not be surprising that many Prussian kings vacillated between, on the one 
hand, staffing administrative offices according to merit, and, on the other hand, allowing 
genealogy to guide these decisions. Frederick II, for example, urged high administrative 
officials to recommend for open positions primarily the relatives of established families, 
because of their alleged inbred qualities and natural fitness:  
 
[The higher and lower administrative offices] shall be filled with such subjects, that 
received a good education and sentiments from their honorable position, and who 
have been raised, as much as that is possible, from a young age to the position 
where they want to be employed. […]. To that end his royal majesty declares that, 
when sons of [ministers] can be found that have by nature the appropriate talents 
and abilities, they shall be employed [in the same positions] as their fathers.78  
 
When the crown finally introduced examinations towards the end of the eighteenth century 
that supposedly set standards of merit for administrative posts and removed the 
                                                 
77 Consider the position of Raack, one of the eminent historians of the era: “He [the king] wanted to create 
a state in which no one would have any special class or privilege – except himself, divinely anointed.” (R. 
C. Raack, The Fall of Stein (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1965), 169.; For similar views 
see: Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert 
(1713-1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 100-6.; Bruno Preisendörfer, Staatsbildung Als 
Königskunst : Ästhetik Und Herrschaft Im Preussischen Absolutismus (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), 
28-9. 
78 “Dero Collegia, wie auch Kanzleien mit solchen Subjectis besetzt wissen wollen, die eine gute Education 
und Sentiments von Ehre und Honnetete bekommen haben, und die, so viel es möglich ist, zu den Stellen, 
wozu sie employiret werden sollen, gleichsam von Jugend auf zugezogen und angeführet worden seind. [...] 
Zu welchem Ende dann E.K.M. [Eure Königliche Majestät] declariren, dass, wenn Söhne von Kriegs- und 
Domänenräthen oder aber von Regierungsräthen und dergleichen mehr sich finden, die von Natur die 
gehörige Talents und Fähigkeit haben, dergleichen Bedienungen, als ihre Väter haben, einmal wiederum 
bekleiden zu können...“ (A.B.B., VII, 168-170). 
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appointment process from raw will, the exams were only vaguely competitive and often not 
required.79  
Given these tensions and conflicting practices, it is not surprising that the Prussian 
administration, contrary to its time-honored reputation, was terribly inefficient.80 Various 
reports submitted to the kings complain that “meticulous work ceased to be fashionable” 
and that administrative offices were packed with people who lacked the skills and 
motivation to get the job done.81 Many of the Prussian kings recognized these persistent 
problems but were either unable or unwilling to address their structural, deeply 
institutionalized roots.82 The undifferentiated understanding of the individual undergirded 
the nepotistic and proprietary elements of the administration that led to negligent, 
unprofessional, and irregular management of the affairs of the state. A hallmark of such 
management was the lack of known and obeyed rules and regulations.  
 
                                                 
79 For a contemporary view of such examinations consider: Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Gutachten Über Die 
Organisation Der Ober-Examinations-Kommission," in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit Der Erniedrigung, ed. 
Rudolf Vaupel (München: Drei Masken, 1923), 109-10. 
80 For a range of approaches and conclusions to this highly contested theme see: Gustav von Schmoller, 
Umrisse Und Untersuchungen Zur Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- Und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Besonders Des 
Preusischen Staates Im 17. Und 18. Jahrhundert (Leipzig,: Duncker & Humblot, 1898).; Dorn, "The 
Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century."; Edgar Kiser and Joachim Schneider, "Bureaucracy and 
Efficiency: An Analysis of Taxation in Early Modern Prussia," American Sociological Review 59, no. 2 
(1994).; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Bureaucracy," American Sociological 
Review 60, no. 5 (Oct., 1995).; Kiser and Schneider, "Rational Choice Versus Cultural Explanations of the 
Efficiency of the Prussian Tax System."; Christopher Clark, "Piety, Politics and Society: Pietism in 
Eighteenth-Century Prussia," in The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, ed. Philip 
Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000).  
81 A.B.B. - XIV, 333; XV, 243, 260 
82 A range of historians arrive at the same conclusion though it is difficult to find one definitive source of 
authority on the subject. See for example: Otto Büsch, Wolfgang Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission 
zu Berlin., Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte (Berlin ; New York: W. de Gruyter, 1992), 19-20.; 
Philip G. Dwyer, The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830 (New York: Longman, 
2000), 22-4.; H.M. Scott, "1763-1786: The Second Reign of Frederick the Great?," in The Rise of Prussia : 




 Struggles over this conflicted conceptualization of administrative order occurred at 
every level. As we have seen, the kings wavered; through decrees and bloodier means, they 
acted now on the side of pushing for more efficient administrative institutions, now on the 
side of preserving the status quo. Many privileged administrative officials, for their part, 
fought for their own understanding of proper administrative institutions with the weapons 
of the (relatively) weak.83 As Rosenberg remarked, they frequently obscured and bent the 
crown’s will through “cunning subterfuges, outright deception, and willful sabotage,” as 
well by as withholding information, thus allowing for policy drift, outright paralysis, and 
obstruction.84  
 Another struggle, equally telling, occurred not between the crown and 
administrators, but on a daily basis within administrative chambers over seemingly 
mundane trivialities. Ambiguity about the proper order of signatures affixed to official 
documents, for instance, gave rise to endless skirmishes at seemingly every level of the 
administrative hierarchy. Reports from regional administrative offices frequently requested 
that the crown intervene in disputes over the order of signatures on official documents. 
Should the order be determined purely by aristocratic rank? Service rank? Productivity? Or 
seniority in the crown’s service? Or perhaps seniority only within a particular branch of the 
                                                 
83 For more on this theme see: E. P. Thompson, "Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture," Journal of Social 
History 7, no. 4 (Summer, 1974). For the origins of this term in a foreign setting and applications in very 
different contexts see: James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak : Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).; James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance : Hidden 
Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). I apply Scott’s insights only reluctantly in this 
context but it is important to recognize that 1) administrators frequently opposed the crown, and 2) they 
employed methods that most readers will be familiar with from very different contexts.  
84 Various historians remark on the (perhaps strange) lack of a clear standard. See for example: Rosenberg, 
Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 193.; Jacoby, Die 
Bürokratisierung Der Welt; Ein Beitrag Zur Problemgeschichte, 56-7.  
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administration? Should other appointments in the administration or the military count 
additionally?85  Again and again, individuals in the administrative branches battled fiercely 
over these issues. For example, von Danckelmann, having just bought his new 
administrative position, was not content to accept a lower rank than von Korff and Freiherr 
von Wartensleben, who had more seniority within the administration but held inferior 
aristocratic ranks. Befitting von Danckelmann’s noble rank, he tended to ask rashly for 
duels to solve the dispute at hand.86  
The crown and higher administrative elements frequently attempted to restore peace 
in these situations through ad hoc decisions. Though loudly complaining about the 
damaging effects of such “quarrels and disputes,” they did little to settle definitively the 
underlying issues plaguing the administrative state.87 Characteristically, the crown wavered 
on what principle to apply, to whom, and whether to follow rules in all cases and provinces 
or allow for case-by-case decisions. At times, the crown seemed to favor (loosely) the 
principle of seniority as the decisive factor in these questions, independent of a person’s 
estate, in an effort to “avoid all unnecessary disputes over rank.”88 At other times, the 
crown preferred other principles, or ambiguous combinations of principles.89  
The confrontation between von Oftau and von Ziegenhorn exemplifies many of 
these issues. Von Ziegenhorn demanded the “preference” for himself when signing official 
documents. Von Oftau objected since he had been longer in the crown’s service, while von 
Ziegenhorn argued that he technically qualified for a higher rank and also held another 
                                                 
85 See for example A.B.B. – VII, 699, where an administrator’s “capacite” seems to trump other 
considerations, such as seniority or age. See also: Straubel, Beamte Und Personalpolitik Im Altpreussischen 
Staat : Soziale Rekrutierung, Karriereverläufe, Entscheidungsprozesse (1763/86-1806), 253-54. 
86 A.B.B. - V, part 1, 132-4 
87 A.B.B. - III, 625 
88 A.B.B. - II, 387 
89 A.B.B. - I, 702; A.B.B. - XIII, 606 
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office (in another administrative branch) of a higher rank. Both wrote numerous angry 
letters to the General-Directorium (the central administrative committee). Many of these 
letters lacked “dignified argumentation,” but all were filled with immense legal 
technicalities concerning murky jurisdictional claims that are nearly incomprehensible 
nowadays.90 The crown eventually responded by ordering that in most instances, the person 
who should sign official documents first was the one who had received the papers for his 
administrative post first and the one that was older.91 The crown did not clarify what to do 
when these two principles (seniority and age) were in conflict. Perhaps the central 
administrative organs (General-Directorium) were of little help in settling these questions 
because they themselves were riddled with the very same seemingly pointless struggles.92 
Similar battles were fought on many fronts. People clashed not only over the order 
of signatures, but also over office-space allocation and the privilege of opening official 
meetings. In one extreme case, the principality of Hessen sought to regulate the order of 
admission to Holy Communion. Worried about quarrels over precedence, the ordinance in 
Hessen attempted to specify proximity to the altar with respect to status and rank.93 
Such skirmishes could easily be described as mere symbolic confrontations. 
However, the effort and energy expended over them indicates that for the people involved, 
something important was at stake in such a simple question as whose signature should 
appear higher or lower on official correspondence. After all, administrative positions and 
regalia were, in the words of Rosenberg, important “conspicuous symbols of high social 
                                                 
90 A.B.B. - XIII, 709-11 
91 A.B.B. - XIII, 606. 
92 A.B.B. - III, 726-8; A.B.B. - IV., part 2, 374-6 
93 As cited in: Marc Raeff, "The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in 
Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach," The American 
Historical Review 80, no. 5 (Dec., 1975): 1231. 
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standing.”94 The markers of social precedence involved in these struggles translated beyond 
the narrow realm of the office and are, here as elsewhere, deeply intertwined with the 
structural transformation of the bureaucracy in Prussia. A system once decisively marked 
by the arbitrary and unaccountable acts of individual wills was increasingly challenged by 
calls for procedures that would regularize administrative practices.  
These struggles reveal a resistance to procedural decision making and a tendency to 
revert to ad hoc decisions. At stake was not the order of signatures per se, but the nature of 
decisions within the administrative services. Would the administrators be a collection of 
individuals guided by their own wills, or would they be regimented, standardized, 
regularized cogs in the emerging bureaucratic machine? Many administrators balked at this 
possibility, which would divest them of previously accrued benefits and status. One writer, 
in a letter about (what else?) the order of signatures, thought of this regularization as 
“nothing less than the prostitution of the government in society.”95 
 An equally important struggle that addressed the same concerns went on over the 
compensation for royal administrators. Not only was there a massive income gap between 
low- and midlevel administrators (mostly commoners) and high-level administrators 
(mostly nobles), but even within the same rank non-nobles were at a severe disadvantage.96 
Nobles were not only paid more, but also promoted earlier and higher even when they were 
                                                 
94 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 74.; For 
more on the use and transfer of various forms of capital consider: Pierre Bourdieu, "Forms of Capital," in 
Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. John G. Richardson (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1986), 245.: Pierre Bourdieu, "Ökonomisches Kapital, Kulturelles Kapital, Soziales 
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95 A.B.B. - IV., part 1, 557-9 
96 A.B.B. - VIII. 190-223. For more on this theme see: Wunder, Bernd. Geschichte der Bürrokratie in 
Deutschland. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. 50-2 
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less capable than their non-noble peers. Consider the case of August von Boden and Ernst 
Gottlieb Cautius. Both served in the same administrative chamber, where Cautius held 
seniority. Von Boden’s superior described him thus:  
 
He is precisely as Your Majesty has characterized him to me and as the former 
president, too, has described him, namely, completely unfit and unable to do any 
good, but excelling in malevolence, arrogance, and sinister plotting. His absence, 
therefore, is always of greater usefulness to the department than his presence.97 
 
Cautius’s superiors, in contrast, praised him frequently for his diligence and hard work.98 
Nonetheless, Cautius earned considerably less than von Boden. The explanation is easy to 
find:  Cautius outdid von Boden in seniority, age, administrative rank, and competence – 
but not in aristocratic rank.  
 It is tempting to read this case as exemplifying the increasingly heated opposition 
between nobles and non-nobles in the years surrounding the French Revolution.99 Clearly, 
such an analysis has merit, but it fails to consider the underlying conceptual tools employed 
in various struggles within the administration, for example over signatures. In thought and 
deed, the Prussian kings supported practices that favored the ad hoc decisions of 
individuals over rationalized procedures.100 In doing so, they built assumptions into their 
administrative structure that were sharply at odds with simultaneously attempted reform 
proposals. The crown aimed at increasing the efficiency of the administration while 
supporting practices that undermined its efficiency to the core. The proper analytical 
categories are, consequently, bureaucratic reformers versus administrative conservatives, 
                                                 
97 A.B.B. - IX, 718-19; X, 154-6. 
98 A.B.B. - IX, 718-725 
99 See for example the semi-anonymous article by “K” on this topic: K, "Ueber Den Werth Und Die 
Grenzen Des Adels," Deutsche Monatsschrift 3 (1791). 
100 For a range of examples see: Wunder, Geschichte Der Bürokratie in Deutschland, 18.; Consider also: 
Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and 
Prussia, 16-7.). 
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not simply nobles versus commoners or the crown versus complacent aristocrats.101 While 
many nobles saw their immediate benefit in preserving the status quo, many others did not. 
Numerous nobles joined the ranks of non-noble reformers and advocated for regularizing 
administrative practices under the newly constituted role of the bureaucrat.102 Importantly, 
such a program did not entail the eradication of the nobility.103 Many nobles felt 
nevertheless that such a redefinition of proper administrative procedures was threatening 
and insulting. They were reluctant to become Creon’s secretaries within a newly 
constituted administrative machine.  
 
(iv) Establishing the Science of Cameralism 
 
In 1727 King Frederick William I created the first professorships in cameral science 
[Kammeralwissenschaften] at the universities of Hall and Frankfurt to address the various 
shortcomings in the administrative branches of his state.104 Before the end of the eighteenth 
century, at least thirty-six universities had chairs for cameral science professors, extensive 
                                                 
101 This categorization is shared by a range of commentators. See for example: Paul Nolte, Staatsbildung 
Als Gesellschaftsreform : Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820 
(Frankfurt ; New York: Campus, 1990), 26.; Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The 
Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 175-202.; Walter M. Simon, "Variations in Nationalism During the Great 
Reform Period in Prussia," The American Historical Review 59, no. 2 (Jan., 1954): 306. 
102 For examples see: David Spring, European Landed Elites in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977), 49. 
103 As historians make clear, there is simply very little evidence that would support an opposing view: 
Wunder, Geschichte Der Bürokratie in Deutschland, 23. Behrens, Society, Government and the 
Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 19.  
104 See the introduction to: Johann Christian Förster, Versuch Einer Einleitung in Die Cameral- Policey- 
Und Finanzwissenschaften (Halle im Magdeburgischen: Bey Carl Christian Kümmel, 1771).; Keith Tribe, 
"Cameralism and the Science of Government," The Journal of Modern History 56, no. 2 (Jun., 1984): 263.; 
Mack Walker, "Rights and Functions: The Social Categories of Eighteenth-Century German Jurists and 
Cameralists," The Journal of Modern History 50, no. 2 (Jun., 1978): 236. 
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courses of study, and an endless supply of textbooks for aspiring administrators.105 
According to one count from 1805, roughly as many students were enrolled at Prussian 
universities in cameralism as in medicine.106 Cameralism flourished as the primary 
introduction to administrative sciences for multiple generations of German administrators 
at all levels. Though diverse in some respects (such as pedagogical approach), the field of 
cameralism shows an astonishingly stable core. Its disciplinary conventions, enforced by 
the need to curry the crown’s favor and produce a steady stream of reliable administrators, 
exhibit significant homogeneity across time and space.107 As such, the writings of 
cameralists are an important, useful, and consistent window into the principles and 
practices that guided German administrators throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.108  
Mention of the German bureaucracy usually invokes visions of aristocratic 
privilege, exclusion, and ultimately, slavish submission to the Nazi regime. This legacy 
appears utterly damning. However, the cameralists of the 1700s and early 1800s surprise: 
they are one of the leading forces for dismantling guild privileges, abolishing torture, 
broadening the participation of the lower classes, increasing freedom of speech, and 
                                                 
105 For a quick introduction to this understudied topic see: Geraint Parry, "Enlightened Government and Its 
Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany," The Historical Journal 6, no. 2 (1963): 180-1. 
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relaxing deeply embedded social boundaries that blocked the emancipation of peasants, 
religious minorities, and women.109  
This should not blind us, however, to the simple fact that cameralists were not 
revolutionaries.  They remained, in their writings and in their practice, deeply indebted to 
the absolutist state. The story on these pages is not a drama of opposing sides in a struggle 
between titans. It is not about brave reformers who rang in modernity with appeals to 
human dignity and political equality. It is about an array of simple bureaucrats and their 
teachers who  responded to the problems highlighted by the Miller Arnold case and to the 
crown’s dissatisfaction with its administrative services by developing a new theory of the 
state: its function, structure, purpose, and relation to society. In doing so, they prototyped a 
new understanding of the (docile) subject and of an efficiently administrated social order. 
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Cameralism was a movement driven and supported by the crown, which saw it as a 
means to increase the overall efficiency of the state and to uproot or ameliorate some of the 
deeply ingrained flaws that we encountered in the last chapter. However, this attempt had 
an unexpected result. The cameralists, staying true to their mission, reconceptualized the 
administration of justice by removing it from Creon’s clumsy and limited grasp, and 
handing it instead to Creon’s secretaries. Cameralism, in the words of one historian, “was 
intended to further and improve the intensively personal and direct rule of German princes, 
and led, instead, to impersonal, bureaucratic practices.”110 This constitutes the puzzle and 
enduring legacy of cameralism 
Cynics might think of the cameralists’ agenda as a thinly veiled power grab. After 
all, many of the individuals who furnished the conceptual machinery of the cameralist 
movement were also active in numerous administrative organs. However, such a view 
obscures the significant lessons of this episode. Cameralists, while depersonifying justice 
and adhering to a procedural understanding of the state’s administration, remained 
unwaveringly indebted to the sovereign’s supremacy. I can find no hint in the cameralist 
literature that suggests a desire to dethrone the crown or to deprive it of substantial power. 
Instead, cameralists are driven, from beginning to end, by a sincere desire to strengthen the 
sovereign’s rule. The conceptual struggle described in these pages is, then, an effort to 
reimagine the administration of the state in such a way as to avoid the pitfalls exemplified 
                                                 
110 Olson, The Emergence of the Social Sciences, 1642-1792, 3, 27-35.; For more on the conceptual 
legacies of this shift consider: L. J. Hume, Bentham and Bureaucracy, Cambridge Studies in the History 
and Theory of Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 11, 42-54. 
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by the Miller Arnold case without undermining the crown’s authority. The cameralist’s 
attempted solution to this challenge is the development of procedural justice. Under this 
model, the administration creates legitimacy and fair outcomes entirely endogenously. The 
people are the recipients of outcomes; they have no part in shaping outcomes or even 
debating their merits. This radical departure from early models of sovereignty and 
legitimacy has a conflicted legacy that is deeply embedded in our conceptions of 
bureaucracies. Its roots lie in the relentless search for efficiency.  
Cameralism originated, not accidentally, in the century following the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, as a campaign to deal with the destruction and mayhem brought about 
by a century of religious fanaticism and endless cycles of warfare.111 The Thirty Years’ 
War, in particular, had wreaked immense havoc on Germany, leaving the population of 
many areas reduced by one-third and  vast amounts of of property destroyed by roaming 
and looting armies. A century after its conclusion, Frederick the Great insisted that his 
domain had not completely recovered.112 An overwhelming concern of the German princes 
was, consequently, the procurement of ready cash to maintain (fragile) internal security, to 
finance court activities, and to raise and field mercenary armies in a time of constant 
dangers. Cameralism developed in this historic moment primarily as the study of sound 
management.113 It is concerned, first and foremost, with finding and refining techniques of 
                                                 
111 Johnson, "The Concept of Bureaucracy in Cameralism," 379-8.; Erhard Dittrich, Die Deutschen Und 
Österreichischen Kameralisten (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974).; Raeff, "The Well-
Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: 
An Attempt at a Comparative Approach," 1223-4.; For a much older account of the origin and development 
of cameralism see: Karl Gottlob Rössig, Versuch Einer Pragmatischen Geschichte Der Oekonomie-
Polizey-Und Cameralwissenschaften Seit Dem Sechsehnten Jahrhunderte Bis Zu Unsern Zeiten 
Deutschland, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Weidmans Erben und Reich, 1781). 
112 As recounted in: Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-
Century France and Prussia, 11. 
113 For an elaboration on this notion see for example: Ludwig Wilhelm von Griesheim, Versuch 
Gemeinnütziger Beyträge Zur Praktischen Staats- Finanz-Und Land-Wirthschaftsverwaltung Nebst 
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governance. Its adherents, all in the pay of the local sovereign, were initially preoccupied 
with maximizing the wealth of the state and the income of the prince. As one of the very 
early cameralists put it in 1686:  
 
Those who rightly examine the chain by which the members of a state are bound 
together must acknowledge, in accordance with sound reason and experience, that 
the prosperity and welfare of the subjects is the foundation upon which all 
happiness of a prince as ruler of subjects is based.114  
 
Because the early cameralists emphasized finances and trade, cameralism is often described 
and discarded as the German version of mercantilism. Given the overwhelmingly negative 
connotations associated with a discredited economic theory, it is not surprising that 
cameralism is rarely systematically studied and is often belittled. This is unfortunate, since 
the cameralists quickly surpassed such a narrow economic focus. Their mission, stated a bit 
more broadly, was to put the sovereign’s rule on a secure footing. Economic matters were 
clearly important to that endeavor, but cameralists were necessarily drawn into a range of 
other topics and domains that spoke to their broad aims.115 Their writings are filled with 
instructions ranging from the administration of justice and the proper regulation of salt 
mines and international trade to excessive swearing in public, local welfare programs, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Beantwortung Der Fragen Ob Dermalen Zu Den Staats-Kassen Neue Erhöhungen Der Abgaben 
Erforderlich Sind Und Wie Solche Nach Möglichst Gleicher Vertheilung, Auf Die Sicherste Und Billigste 
Weise Auszumitteln Seyn Möchten (Jena: In der Akademischen Buchhandlung, 1808).; Consider also: 
Cölln, Praktisches Handbuch Für Staats- Und Regierungsbeamte Besonders in Den Preussischen Staaten 
Nach Anleitung Adam Smiths Untersuchung Über Die Natur Des Nationalreichthums.; Michel Foucault et 
al., The Foucault Effect : Studies in Governmentality : With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel 
Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 102. 
114 The quote originates from Wilhelm Freyherr von Schröder: Fürstliche Schatz- und Rent-Kammer 
(1686): cited in Olson, The Emergence of the Social Sciences, 1642-1792, 30.; See also: Colin Gordon, 
"The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and Government," in Max 
Weber, Rationality and Modernity, ed. Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (London ; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
1987), 298. 
115 Consider on this point: Fritz Blaich, Die Epoche Des Merkantilismus (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1973), 16-7. 
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botany, and the dangers of chocolate.116 Whether or not it was their original intention, 
cameralists were also compelled to grapple with questions of legitimacy, without which the 
success of economic policies would be hollow.117 As cameralists realized, a population 
convinced of the legitimacy of the rules that govern their lives is simply cheaper to 
administer than a rambunctious mob.118 
 The cameralists’ concern with legitimacy followed their search for the optimum fit 
between means and ends. In contrast to the more utopian thinkers of the nineteenth century, 
cameralism remained focused on techniques of implementation instead of articulating 
abstract goals, ends, or ideals.119 However, we will see throughout this chapter how 
slippery the ground is between means and ends, and how a concern for efficient and 
effective means quickly implicates substantive ends. Cameralists seemed fairly oblivious to 
this hazard; they kept referring vaguely to the “general welfare,” insofar as they spoke 
directly of moral considerations at all.120  
 Instead, their writings are an exercise in sober, practical, hands-on guidance and 
advice, in contrast to the massively refined and metaphysical language of Kant, Fichte, or 
                                                 
116 The range of themes cameralists customarily address is astonishing. For instructive examples consider: 
Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das 
Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere 
Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 10.; Reitemeier, Der 
Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den 
Germanischen Ländern, 99-106.; Johann Jakob Moser, Von Der Landes-Hoheit in Policey-Sachen Nach 
Denen Reichs-Gesezen Und Dem Reichs-Herkommen, Wie Auch Aus Denen Teutschen Staats-Rechts-
Lehrern Und Eigener Erfahrung (Franckfurt und Leipzig: [s.n.], 1773), 102-3.; Justus Möser, Politische 
Und Juristische Schriften, ed. Karl H. L. Welker, Bibliothek Des Deutschen Staatsdenkens ; (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2001), 189-90. 
117 Cameralist practicioners and modern commentators tend to agree on this point, for examples of each 
consider: Johann Jakob Moser, Schwäbische Nachrichten Von Oeconomie-Cameral-Policey-Handlungs-
Manufactur-Mechanischen-Und Bergwercks-Sachen (Stuttgart: [s.n.], 1756), 215, 771, 874.; Olson, The 
Emergence of the Social Sciences, 1642-1792, 29-30. 
118 Hoffmann, Politische Anmerkungen Von Der Wahren Und Falschen Staatskunst Worinnen Aus Den 
Geschichten Aller Zeiten Bemerkt Wird Was Den Regenten, Bürgern Und Einwohnern Eines Landes 
Zuträglich Oder Schädlich Ist, 90-134, 315. 
119 Usually this stance is simply implied in cameralistic thought and practice. For a rare exception to this 
rule see: Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 17-18. 
120 This articulation is very widespread. See for example the introductory chapters in: Ibid. 
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Hegel. However, it is important to note that cameralism is not properly read in the “mirror 
of princes” tradition (despite superficial similarities).121 Cameralists do not treat politics as 
an art to be learned by an aspiring prince. Successful rule is not, in their view, based upon 
personal virtues or intuitive knowledge particular to one or a few individuals. Instead, 
cameralism was conceived as an aid to the prince that would be eminently practical, yet 
deeply impersonal and subject to systematic study:  
 
Habit, that is to say unguided practice, produces political charlatans; theory, without 
knowledge of the circumstances, without experience, produces dreamers and 
utopians.122 
 
Cameralism was a science [Kameralwissenschaft] in the making, properly studied in 
academic settings. Cameralists consequently spoke of their work as “the science, namely, 
to handle the welfare of the state, the science of governing.”123  Worldly and pragmatic, 
cameralism aimed to be an applied science, but it  was nonetheless fundamentally a science 
by the standards of its time.124 Epistemologically, cameralists are empiricists in the sense 
that its theorists and practitioners must “be capable of proving the agreement of the chosen 
                                                 
121 For the most famous discussion of this theme consider: Foucault et al., The Foucault Effect : Studies in 
Governmentality : With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, 87-88. 
122 “Die Routine, das ist, die ungeleitete Uebung, macht politische Charletane; die Theorie, ohne Kenntniss 
der Umstände, ohne Erfahrung, macht Träumer, Utopisten.“ (Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, 
Handlung, Und Finanz, 17-18.) 
123 “...die Wissenschaft nämlich, die Wohlfahrt eines Staates handzuhaben, die Wissenschaft zu 
regieren.”(Ibid., 16.); For a rare instance from the cameralist literature that is more ambigious on this point 
consider: Hoffmann, Politische Anmerkungen Von Der Wahren Und Falschen Staatskunst Worinnen Aus 
Den Geschichten Aller Zeiten Bemerkt Wird Was Den Regenten, Bürgern Und Einwohnern Eines Landes 
Zuträglich Oder Schädlich Ist.; Consider also: Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz, Die Staatslehre Für Denkende 
Geschäftsmänner, Kammeralisten Und Gebildete Leser (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1808), 26-7. 
124 Justus Christoph Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis Opificum Apud 
Germanos Emendandis (Francofurti ad Viadrum: Typis Tobiae Schwartzii, 1731), 6-12.; Lindenfeld, The 
Practical Imagination : The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century, 1-2. 
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means with the given ends.”125 As such, cameralists tend to argue inductively and to remain 
skeptical of first principles. Their writings are filled with illustrations and examples. 
Cameralism as a science and practice had three principal and interlocking 
components. Its original aim was the effective management of the princely budget.126 As 
Dithmar, the first professor of cameralism at the University of Frankfurt, succinctly put it 
in an early tract on cameralism in 1731:  
 
The science of Cameralism teaches how to raise the sovereign’s income, how to 
improve it from time to time, and how to shape it for the maintenance of the polity 
in such a way that a yearly surplus is retained.127  
 
 In Prussia, as elsewhere, the budget of the prince (king from 1701) consisted of 
taxes and revenues from the prince’s own lands.128 The Kammer (chamber, vault, court)129 
was tasked with collecting taxes, and Kammeralists aided these efforts by developing 
principles for dealing systematically, procedurally, and fairly with a population. Crucial to 
                                                 
125 “...die Uebereinstimmung des gewählten Mittels mit dem vorgesetzten Endzwecke zu beweisen fähig 
sein.” (Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 23.) 
126 Walker, "Rights and Functions: The Social Categories of Eighteenth-Century German Jurists and 
Cameralists," 235-36. 
127 “Die Cameral-Wissenschaft lehret, wie die Landes-Fürstlichen Einkünfte mögen erhoben, von Zeit zu 
Zeit verbessert und zu Erhaltung des gemeinen Wesens dergestallt angewendet werden, dass jährlich ein 
Ueberschuss verbleibe.“ (Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis Opificum Apud 
Germanos Emendandis, 225.; Justus Christoph Dithmar, Einleitung in Die Oeconomische Policey Und 
Cameralwissenschaften (Frankfurt a.O.: New Edition, 1745), 225.); For more on this theme see also: 
Förster, Versuch Einer Einleitung in Die Cameral- Policey- Und Finanzwissenschaften, 4-7. 
128 Cameralists remain usually faithful to this distinction: Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, Auf Höchsten 
Befehl an Sr. Röm. Kaiserl. Und Zu Ungarn Und Böhmen Königl. Majestät Erstattetes Allerunterthänigstes 
Gutachten Von Dem Vernünftigen Zusammenhange Und Practischen Vortrage Aller Oeconomischen Und 
Cameralwissenschaften Wobey Zugleich Zur Probe Die Grundsätze Der Policeywissenschaft Mit Denen 
Darzu Gehörigen Practischen Arbeiten Vorgetragen Werdenachen (Leipzig: 1754), 7-9.; Schmid, 
Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 77-78.; Johann Heinrich 
Gottlob von Justi, Ausführliche Abhandlung Von Denen Steuern Und Abgaben Nach Ächten, Aus Dem 
Endzweck Der Bürgerlichen Gesellschaften Abfliessenden Grundsätzen, Und Zur Wohlfarth Der Völker 
Dienlichen Maassregeln (Königsberg und Leipzig: In verlag bey G. Ludwig Woltersdorffs wittwe, 1762).; 
Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis Opificum Apud Germanos Emendandis, 
228-61.; Consider also: Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, Der Staat Als Maschine : Zur Politischen Metaphorik 
Des Absoluten Fürstenstaats, Historische Forschungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1986), 77. 
129 An aside for those interested in classical music: Kammermusik, chamber music, derives from the same 
root and designates, consequently, music presented at court in contrast to church or sacred music.  
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their endeavor was the attempt to render tax collection consistent across time and space and 
to provide the intellectual foundations for clear and reliable record-keeping. This branch of 
their literary production is referred to as economia satrapica, and Melchior von Osse 
provides an early but characteristic example of much thought given to proper bookkeeping 
procedures to handle revenues from different sources.130 Similarly, with respect to revenue 
originating from the prince’s own lands, the cameralists published and taught principles for 
effectively and accurately managing the prince’s own resources, including the 
administration of government monopolies and privileges (Kammer-regalien).131  
The salt, tobacco, and coffee monopolies were among the most important princely 
monopolies, but it is telling that early cameralist tracts include the administration of justice 
                                                 
130 Johnson, "The Concept of Bureaucracy in Cameralism," 381.; Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die 
Policey, Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 57-9.: Consider also: Georg Hassel, Statistischer Umriss Der 
Sämmtlichen Europäischen Und Der Vornehmsten Ausser-Europäischen Staaten, in Hinsicht Ihrer 
Entwickelung, Grösse, Volksmenge, Finanz- Und Militärverfassung, Tabellarisch Dargestellt (Weimar,: 
Geographisches institut, 1805).  
131 Cameralists consider the Kammerregalian as of the utmost importance. They are also an excellent venue 
to illustrate how similar the thoughts and writings of cameralists are that lived far apart in time and space. 
For a long (but far from complete) list of examples on this point see:  Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, 
Handlung, Und Finanz, 21.; Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und 
Finanzwissenschaft, 63, 78-85.; See also: Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und 
Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den Germanischen Ländern, 129-31.; Dithmar, Dissertatio 
Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis Opificum Apud Germanos Emendandis, 6-7, 226-36.; Johann 
Jakob Moser, Von Der Landeshoheit in Cameral-Sachen, Nach Denen Reichs-Gesezen Und Dem Reichs-
Herkommen, Wie Auch Aus Denen Teutschen Staats-Rechts-Lehrern, Und Eigener Erfahrung (Franckfurt 
und Leipzig: [s.n.], 1773), 6-7.; Simon Peter Gasser, Einleitung Zu Den Oeconomischen Politischen Und 
Kameral-Wissenschaften ... Nebst Einem Vorbericht Von Der Fundation Der Neuen Eoconomischen 
Profession (Halle,: In verlegung des Wäysenhauses, 1729), 248-305.; Moser, Von Der Landes-Hoheit in 
Policey-Sachen Nach Denen Reichs-Gesezen Und Dem Reichs-Herkommen, Wie Auch Aus Denen 
Teutschen Staats-Rechts-Lehrern Und Eigener Erfahrung, 262-324.; For a historical persepctive see: Karl 
Dietrich Hüllmann, Deutsche Finanz-Geschichte Des Mittelalters (Berlin,: H. Frölich, 1805), 53-77.; Karl 
Dietrich Hüllmann, Geschichte Des Ursprungs Der Regalien in Deutschland (Frankfurt an der Oder: In der 
Akademischen Buchhandlung, 1806).; Justus Möser, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Werner Kohlschmidt and Paul 
Göttsching, Historisch-kritische Ausgabe in 14 Bde. ed., vol. 10 (Oldenburg (Oldb.): G. Stalling, 1943), 
336-38.; Veit Ludwig von Seckendorf, Teutscher Fürsten-Stat : Oder, Gründliche Und Kurtze 
Beschreibung Welcher Gestalt Fürstenthümer, Graff- Und Herrschafften Im H. Römischen Reich Teutscher 
Nation, Welche Landes, Fürstliche Unnd Hohe Obrigkeitliche Regalia Haben Von Rechts- Und Löblicher 
Gewonheit Wegen Beschaffen Zu Seyn, Regieret, Mit Ordnungen Und Satzungen, Geheimen Und Iustitz 
Cantzeleyen, Consistoriis Und Andern Hohen Und Niedern Gerichts-Instantien, Aemptern Und Diensten, 
Verfasset Und Versehen, Auch Wie Deroselben Cammer- Und Hoffsachen Bestellt Zu Werden Pflegen 
(Frankfurt: Thomae Matthiae Götzens, zu Franckfurth am Mäyn, 1656).; Johann Heinrich Gottlob von 
Justi, Staatswirtschaft : Oder Systematische Abhandlung Aller Ökonomischen Und Kameralwissenschaften, 
Die Zur Regierung Eines Landes Erfordert Werden, 2 vols. (Aalen: Scientia, 1963), 144-305. 
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as simply one of many other Regalien.132 While most cameralists regard Regalien in 
general as indispensable supplements to regular taxes, some cameralists were quick to 
highlight the dangers and downsides of applying the principles of administering Regalien 
to the administration of justice. In an uncharacteristically frank passage, Dithmar, for 
example, stresses the potential for abuse when questions of justice are subsumed under 
principles of economic gain. Abuse, in such instances, is in his eyes inevitable,133 and 
might significantly hinder a concern with the proper and just distribution of resources 
amongst the population.134  
The second aim, often referred to under the heading of Oekonomie, aimed at 
structuring and improving basic economic interactions such as assessing, leasing or selling 
property. Cameralists at first directed their efforts toward royal officials, but quickly 
realized that success in the official sphere required reforms in the private sphere. Many 
young nobles ruined their estates due to a lack of understanding of basic economic 
principles, and the cameralists extended their studies and teaching to encompass property 
owners’ private concerns. As Frederick William I claimed in 1713, the rapidly developing 
field of cameralism would be just as advantageous to the administration of private estates 
as to his own.135 Soon the study of Oekonomie, like much of cameralism, extended beyond 
its original royal domain to cover estates, farms, villages, towns, and eventually the 
                                                 
132 The most famous example of this practice hails from Dithmar, an influential and much cited cameralist : 
Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis Opificum Apud Germanos Emendandis, 
261-3. 
133 “Missbrauch“ (Ibid., 262-3.) 
134 Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 57-76, 92-
105.; Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis Opificum Apud Germanos 
Emendandis. 
135 Gasser, Einleitung Zu Den Oeconomischen Politischen Und Kameral-Wissenschaften ... Nebst Einem 
Vorbericht Von Der Fundation Der Neuen Eoconomischen Profession, 8-10. 
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workings of the entire state, including questions of the proper and just distribution of 
resources.136  
The third component of cameralism was the study of proper police administration 
(Polizeiwissenschaft). The term has an illustrious history that points towards its broader 
meaning beyond current usage.137 The German word Polizei appeared first in the sixteenth 
century in the context of the religious confusion throughout Germany. In the Protestant 
domains, Polizei compensated for the shaky social discipline left after the demise of a 
strong, centralized church structure.138 Its prescriptions regulated proper attire, sought to 
curb luxury consumption, enforced religious observance, and by and large sought to 
                                                 
136 For a useful introduction to this theme see: Johann Friedrich von Pfeiffer, Grundsätze Der Universal-
Cameral-Wissenschaft Oder Deren Vier Wichtigsten Saülen Nämlich Der Staats-Regierungskunst, Der 
Policey-Wissenschaft, Der Allgemeinen Staats-Oekonomie, Und Der Finanz-Wissenschaft, Zu 
Akademischen Vorlesungen Und Zum Unterricht Angehender Staatsbedienten, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Mayn: 
In der Esslingerschen Buchhandlung, 1783). 
137 I will refrain from translating it to emphasize its peculiarities. 
138 Hans Maier, Die Ältere Deutsche Staats- Und Verwaltungslehre, 2., neubearbeitete und erg. Aufl. ed. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 1980), 82-3.; Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State : Social and Institutional 
Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 
43, 54-9.; F-L. Knemeyer, "Polizei," Economy and Society 9, no. 2 (1980).; For a comperative perspectives 
consider: Raeff, "The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and 
Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach," 1222-4.; Mitchell Dean, The 
Constitution of Poverty : Toward a Genealogy of Liberal Governance (London ; New York: Routledge, 
1991), 34, 53-67.; For a detailed account of the internal workings of the “Polizei” in a city see: Magnus 
Friedrich von Bassewitz, Die Kurmark Brandenburg, Ihr Zustand Und Ihre Verwaltung Unmittelbar Vor 
Dem Ausbruche Des Französischen Krieges Im Oktober 1806 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1847), 260-85. 
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eliminate immoral behavior.139 Föster, for example, deals with police affairs under the 
heading of “the police’s care for education, virtue, and religion:”140 
 
The police sees each act as disadvantageous that goes against the final goal of 
society and that plants obstacles to its achievement (in part or full).141 
 
In the most expansive interpretations, this entailed the regulation of “eating, drinking, and 
the clothes of people.”142 However, commonly and practically it was read far more 
narrowly. A widely shared definition is presented by Moser, who defines Polizei as existing 
to provide two things: 
 
1. Good order in the common life and interactions, 2. The advancement of the outer 
happiness of the subjects, to which end the authorities use their power and conduct 
everything so that said end may result.143 
 
                                                 
139 Consider notable examples from: Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 19, 74.; 
Justus Christoph Dithmar, Project Der Oeconomischen-Policey- Und Cameral-Wissenschafft Worinnen 
Eine Generale Erkäntniss Der Land- Und Stadt-Oeconomie So Wohl Als Des Commercien- Policey- Und 
Cameral-Wesens : Samt Vorschlägen Zu Derselben Aufnahme Und Oeconomischen Bücher-Vorrath Zu 
Nutz Der Studirenden Jugend Und Mehrerer Erklährung in Seinen Academischen Lectionen (Franckfurt an 
der Oder: Gedruckt bey J.C. Schwartzen, 1730).;Justi, Auf Höchsten Befehl an Sr. Röm. Kaiserl. Und Zu 
Ungarn Und Böhmen Königl. Majestät Erstattetes Allerunterthänigstes Gutachten Von Dem Vernünftigen 
Zusammenhange Und Practischen Vortrage Aller Oeconomischen Und Cameralwissenschaften Wobey 
Zugleich Zur Probe Die Grundsätze Der Policeywissenschaft Mit Denen Darzu Gehörigen Practischen 
Arbeiten Vorgetragen Werdenachen, 17.; Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- 
Und Finanzwissenschaft, 16-19.; Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis 
Opificum Apud Germanos Emendandis, 133-6. 
140 “Sorge der Policei für die Erziehung, Tugend und Religion.” (Förster, Versuch Einer Einleitung in Die 
Cameral- Policey- Und Finanzwissenschaften, 229-39.) 
141 “Jede Handlung, die dem gesellschaftlichen Endzwecke widerstrebt, und dessen Erreichung im Ganzen, 
oder zum Teil Hindernisse legt, wird von der Polizei für nachteilig angesehen...“ (Sonnenfels, Grundsätze 
Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 53.) 
142“Essen / Trinken / und Kleidung der Menschen” (Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De 
Collegiis Opificum Apud Germanos Emendandis, 5.) 
143 “1. gute Ordnung im gemeinen Leben und Wandel, 2. die Beförderung der äusserlichen Glückseligkeit 
der Unterthanen; zu welchem Ende die Obrigkeit ihre Macht so gebraucht und alles so dirigirt, dass 
besagter Zweck herauskomme.“ (Moser, Von Der Landes-Hoheit in Policey-Sachen Nach Denen Reichs-
Gesezen Und Dem Reichs-Herkommen, Wie Auch Aus Denen Teutschen Staats-Rechts-Lehrern Und 
Eigener Erfahrung, 4.); For more on this point see: Joseph von Sonnenfels, Sätze Aus Der Polizey, 
Handlungs- Und Finanz-Wissenschaft (Wien: Gedruckt bey Johann Thomas Edlen von Trattnern, 1765), 
61-64.; Moser, Schwäbische Nachrichten Von Oeconomie-Cameral-Policey-Handlungs-Manufactur-
Mechanischen-Und Bergwercks-Sachen, 34, 195, 518, 602, 807, 924. 
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As with the other domains of cameralism, the focus here remained on the means of 
implementation rather than on goals and norms.  
 Polizei became the effective application of a largely secularized understanding of 
proper conduct (still exclusively interpreted and decreed by the sovereign) to the means by 
which a territory could be administrated.144 The arsenal of tools the Polizei had at its 
disposal was extensive, and its field of action encompassed everything from general 
welfare and relief for the poor to the dispensation of justice. However, the focus of the 
Polizeiwissenschaften remained, as throughout cameralism, on the welfare and prosperity 
of the state.145 The state was the active and principal subject, while the people remained the 
passive objects and recipients of the attention of the Polizei. The police, then, was very 
much about “the principles for establishing and preserving the internal security” of a 
state.146  
 However, the cameralists viewed this mission as more effectively addressed in the 
larger context of social welfare and the prevention of  conditions conducive to criminal 
activities [Polizeivorsorge]. Security, societal well-being, and moral guidance were 
consequently all encompassed in the cameralists’ understanding of the proper role of the 
Polizei. Cameralists’ treatments of police affairs thus often deal with matters of education, 
                                                 
144 Often this view is implicit in the cameralist’s writings. Rarely, as in Wolff’s writings, it is more explicit: 
Christian Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken Von Dem Gesellschaftlichen Leben Der Menschen Und 
Insonderheit Dem Gemeinen Wesen, ed. Hans Werner Arndt, vol. 5, Gesammelte Werke (Hildesheim ; 
New York: Olms, 1980), 172-3. 
145 Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 3-9.; 
Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 50-71.; For dissenting opinions on many of 
these points consider: Förster, Versuch Einer Einleitung in Die Cameral- Policey- Und 
Finanzwissenschaften.; Consider also: Alf Lüdtke, Police and State in Prussia, 1815-1850 (Cambridge 
[England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 23. 
146 “Die Grundsätze, die innere Sicherheit zu gründen und zu erhalten, lehret die Polizeiwissenschaft“ 
(Joseph von Sonnenfels and Ambrosius von Strahlendorf, Von Der Anzulänglichkeit Der Alleinigen 
Erfahrung in Den Geschäften Der Staatswirtschaft Eine Rede Beym Antritte Seines Lehramtes ; Nebst 
Angehängten Lehrsätzen Aus Der Einleitunng in Die Polizey Und Kameralwissenschaften (Wien: G.L. 
Schulz, 1765), 10.) 
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poverty relief, and medical services.147 In more recent times, many societies have 
differentiated these functions into sharply separated domains, each with its own 
organizational structures, recruitment patterns, and operational principles. It is useful to 
highlight the cameralists’ consistent practice of treating as unitary a range of state tasks that 
seem radically distinct to most modern readers. For them, social justice and criminal justice 
were, at most, two sides of the same coin. The cameralists worried endlessly about securing 
the sovereign’s rule through legitimacy-enhancing decisions, processes, and procedures. It 
followed that the proper administration of the Polizei was at heart a question about 
anchoring the legitimacy of the state. In the words of two influential cameralists: 
 
The core principle of the Polizei [is that] the greater the mass of the people whose 
support one can count upon, the less one has to fear from them.148 
 
Tellingly, fear is the driving force behind the cameralists’ concern with legitimacy. 
With the dangers of the Seven Years’ War barely survived, leaving the kingdom with 
diminished savings, new territories to incorporate, and its reputation tarnished, Prussia was 
stretched thin for most of the 18th century. Legitimacy, not surprisingly, was a valued 
commodity at this moment in the eyes of the academics of the state. The Miller Arnold case 
was harmful to the cameralists’ mission. An exercise of arbitrary, and ultimately wrong, 
interference could only harm the crown’s standing. While many peasants might have 
rejoiced temporarily at the Arnolds’ fleeting victory, their hopes were soon and inevitably 
disappointed. The crown and its academics realized that there were many good reasons to 
                                                 
147 For an illustrative example see: Sonnenfels, Sätze Aus Der Polizey, Handlungs- Und Finanz-
Wissenschaft, 72, 149-63. 
148 “Der Hauptgrundsatz der Polizei [...]. Je grösser die Menge des Volkes ist, auf dessen bereiten Beistand 
man zählen darf, destoweniger hat man von innen zu fürchten“ (Sonnenfels and Strahlendorf, Von Der 
Anzulänglichkeit Der Alleinigen Erfahrung in Den Geschäften Der Staatswirtschaft Eine Rede Beym 
Antritte Seines Lehramtes ; Nebst Angehängten Lehrsätzen Aus Der Einleitunng in Die Polizey Und 
Kameralwissenschaften, 13. My emphasis.) 
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be concerned about the administration of justice in Prussia and the state’s legitimacy. As 
the influential cameralist Sonnenfels argued at the time, it is imperative that the 
“sacredness” of the state’s laws “cannot be doubted in any way.”149 
To fulfill this mission, the cameralists reimagined the disciplinary apparatus of the 
state and began to regard its previous incarnation as inefficient and defective. The previous 
ideal of (by and large) blind obedience to the ad hoc will of the sovereign in matters of 
justice was seen as too costly—and perhaps impossible to achieve. Instead, cameralists 
began to look for ways to instill a sense of self-discipline in the subjects of the absolutist 
state, whereby they would render their obedience willingly. In this model, the fundamental 
structure of the state was not open to debate; instead, the cameralists attempted to find, 
within their inherited framework, new solutions to render the administration of justice 




 Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi exemplifies this search for new and better means 
of administering justice.150 Justi is a towering figure in the cameralism movement. He 
                                                 
149 “...dass ihre [die Gesetze] Heiligkeit auf keine Weise bezweifelt werden könnte.“ (Sonnenfels, 
Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 170.) 
150 For useful introductions to Justi’s work see: Justi, Staatswirtschaft : Oder Systematische Abhandlung 
Aller Ökonomischen Und Kameralwissenschaften, Die Zur Regierung Eines Landes Erfordert Werden.; 
Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, Die Grundfeste Zu Der Macht Und Glückseligkeit Der Staaten; Oder, 
Ausführiliche Vorstellung Der Gesamten Polizeiwissenschaft (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1965).; Johann 
Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, Gesammelte Politische Und Finanz-Schriften : Über Wichtige Gegenstände 
Der Staatskunst, Der Kriegswissenschaften Und Des Kameral- Und Finanzwesens (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 
1970).; For useful accounts in the secondary literature see: Olson, The Emergence of the Social Sciences, 
1642-1792, 134-7.; Lars Atorf, Der König Und Das Korn : Die Getreidehandelspolitik Als Fundament Des 
Brandenburg-Preussischen Aufstiegs Zur Europäischen Grossmacht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, Köln, 
1999), 42-47.; Hans Erich Bödeker, Ulrich Herrmann, and Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Erforschung des 
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taught at various universities (most notably Göttingen) before eventually joining the 
Prussian central administration. A tireless and prolifically published writer, Justi is the 
most widely read and widely cited cameralist of his time.151 Active both as academic and 
practitioner, Justi held for a while the post of Superior Police Commissioner 
[Oberpolizeikomissar] while simultaneously publishing and teaching cameralism.  
 Typical for Justi, he places little trust in individuals but instead focuses on the 
organs of the state. His teachings are marked by the typical cameralist belief that  
 
A lasting [political] power must be founded upon science. The greatest empires 
crumble under their own weight, if they are not sustained by the wisdom, reason, 
and the fruits of science. Furthermore, the most important conquests have no 
permanence unless they are supported by wise institutions.152 
 
 In a section titled “On the necessary provisions in court cases,”153 Justi argues that 
individuals are often overpowered by emotion and prone to err.154 Instead of focusing on 
                                                                                                                                                 
18. Jahrhunderts. Jahrestagung, Aufklärung Als Politisierung, Politisierung Der Aufklärung, Studien Zum 
Achtzehnten Jahrhundert ; (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1987), 158-78.; Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination : 
The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century, 25-27.; Peter Becker and William Clark, Little 
Tools of Knowledge : Historical Essays on Academic and Bureaucratic Practices, Social History, Popular 
Culture, and Politics in Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 173-4. 
151 For a very small selection see: Sonnenfels and Strahlendorf, Von Der Anzulänglichkeit Der Alleinigen 
Erfahrung in Den Geschäften Der Staatswirtschaft Eine Rede Beym Antritte Seines Lehramtes ; Nebst 
Angehängten Lehrsätzen Aus Der Einleitunng in Die Polizey Und Kameralwissenschaften, 12.; Sonnenfels, 
Sätze Aus Der Polizey, Handlungs- Und Finanz-Wissenschaft, 117.; See also the introduction to: Johann 
Christian Christoph Rüdiger, Grundriss Des Wahren Physiokratismus Und Preussischen Cameralwesens 
Zum Gebrauch Beym Mündlichen Unterricht in Einer Tabelle (Halle: J.J. Curt, 1781). 
152 “Denn eine dauerhaftige Macht muss selbst auf den Grund der Wissenschaften  erbaut werden. Die 
grössten Reiche zerfallen unter ihrer eigenen Last, wenn sie nicht von der Weisheit und dem Verstande, 
diesen Früchten der Wissenschaften, erhalten werden: und die wichtigsten Eroberungen sind nichts weniger 
als dauerhaftig, wenn sie nicht von weisen Einrichtungen unterstützt werden.“ (Justi, Auf Höchsten Befehl 
an Sr. Röm. Kaiserl. Und Zu Ungarn Und Böhmen Königl. Majestät Erstattetes Allerunterthänigstes 
Gutachten Von Dem Vernünftigen Zusammenhange Und Practischen Vortrage Aller Oeconomischen Und 
Cameralwissenschaften Wobey Zugleich Zur Probe Die Grundsätze Der Policeywissenschaft Mit Denen 
Darzu Gehörigen Practischen Arbeiten Vorgetragen Werdenachen, 78.) 
153 “Von den nöthigen Verordnungen in Processsachen.“ (———, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung 
Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, 
Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im 
Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 352-54.) 
154 Ibid., 149-50. 
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the merits of cases, people “make decisions based merely on impulse [Gutdünken].”155 As a 
consequence, legal proceedings turn into a gambling affair. Cases that are “from identical 
incidents and indistinguishable circumstances” are decided “in completely different and 
contradictory ways.”156 Apart from violating most intuitions about justice, such a 
capricious approach to the administration of justice is adverse to the flourishing of an 
economy, the legitimacy of a ruler, the efficiency of a court system, and the rationality of 
the state – all central concerns for cameralists such as Justi.  
As Justi argues, arbitrary rulings “could never happen if a directive, regulation or 
guideline” standardized the proceedings in place of the volatile will of flawed 
individuals.157 Justi admits that perhaps “it would be impossible to write such a complete 
and detailed ordinance that took account of all the varying circumstances,” but keeps 
insisting that even a fairly complete set of procedural guidelines [Vorschriften] would have 
“great utility.”158 
Going one step further, Justi makes an unusual move by the standards of his time 
and locale: he distinguishes between the realm of politics and the realm of justice. In 
German, the root word Recht applies to both. Calling something Recht [noun], a right, or 
gerechtig [adjective], just, could thus speak equally well to matters of law, right, justice, 
simple authorization, or even a mere description of facts (richtig, correct or accurate). 
                                                 
155 “...nur nach Gutdünken entschieden, und nicht aus dem Grunde hervorgesuchet.“ (Ibid., 352-54.) 
156 Ibid. 
157 “...Sachen von gleichem Vorfall und einerlei Umständen, auf verschiedene ganz widersprechende Arten 
entschieden worde, welches nicht hätte geschehen können, wenn eine Ordre oder Vorschrift zu einer 
Richtschnur wäre vorhanden gewesen.“ (Ibid.) 
158 “Es ist zwar nicht möglich, eine solche vollkommene und ausführliche Verordnung zu verfertigen, so 
alle verschiedene Umstände der Sachen in sich halten könnte. Dennoch aber behalten die Vorschriften 
ihren grossen Nutzen .... [fairly complete] ... zu grossem Nutzen gereichen.“ (Ibid.); See also: Johann 
Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die 
Staatsklugheit, Das Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- 
Auch Andere Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, Anjetzo bey 
dieser 3. Aufl. allenthalben verbessert, mit Anmerkungen versehen, und von unzähligen Fehlern in der 
Schreibart gereiniget. ed., 3 vols., vol. 3 (Wienn: Verlegts Joh. Paul Krausz, 1761), 57-65. 
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Justi’s argumentative move is thus all the more surprising. Not only does he distinguish 
political affairs from questions of justice, but he also advocates the revision of institutions 
so that they will not “prefer politics to justice.”159 
 Given how easily people decide poorly (or rightly, but for the wrong reasons), there 
is much need in Justi’s mind to develop new regulations and procedures in order to 
improve the machinery of justice.160 The first prong of Justi’s charge focuses on 
streamlining and standardizing the cogs of the machine. Justi developed and advocated for 
a complex system of recruitment procedures, regulated apprenticeships, and promotions. 
He, like many of his colleagues, attempted thereby to rationalize decisions in the state’s 
administrative organs within the framework of a clear and rational hierarchy.161 All these 
steps would, in the words of one historian, “reduce the authority of the ruler to that of a 
rubber-stamp verification of bureaucratic decision making.”162    
 However, while this might reduce the capricious elements of the administrative 
decision-making process, it would still leave flawed individuals with too much discretion. 
Justi consequently turns to the second prong of his argument. He suggests that it is 
endlessly difficult (but nevertheless very desirable) to know how legal cases will turn out if 
decisions depend purely on the will of an individual. However, the more elements of a 
process (e.g. the process of admitting evidence) are fixed, the more predictable cases 
                                                 
159 “…die Politique der Gerechtigkeit vorzuziehen.” (Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung 
Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, 
Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im 
Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 292.) 
160 ———, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das 
Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere 
Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 18. 
161 For more on this theme see the writtings of Ludwig von Seckendorff who pushed for the 
procedurificaiton of decisions at all levels of public administration, the rational ordering of offices and 
information, and the increased division of labor and decsisions (Johnson, "The Concept of Bureaucracy in 
Cameralism," 384-5.; Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination : The German Sciences of State in the 
Nineteenth Century, 12.) 
162 Johnson, "The Concept of Bureaucracy in Cameralism," 394-95. 
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become.163 Furthermore, Justi argues that making cases more predictable not only is 
desirable in and of itself, but would also lower the overall number of cases that bog down 
the Prussian court system. Justi advocates, in short, for the rationalization and 
standardization of the administration of justice.164  
 Notice that Justi, throughout his several-thousand-page oeuvre, never complains 
about specific laws, but instead, wisely, focuses on the process of applying them.165 Doing 
so not only shields him from the sovereign’s fiery temper, but also makes him palatable to 
his cameralist cohorts. They, like Justi, show no overt signs of even mild revolutionary 
tendencies. Instead of focusing on the overall structure of the government or society, Justi, 
like all cameralists, focuses on the means to implement ends.166   
In Justi’s mind, it seems obvious that this task of building new foundations for the 
administration should fall, of course, to a cameralist.167 That cameralist, however, was not 
going to be Justi. Having held a range of academic and lower administrative posts for most 
of his life, Justi finally attained a prestigious post in the Prussian administration in 1765.168 
A mere three years later, however, he was sacked and imprisoned by the king for alleged 
undue financial deficits and improper behavior. Little evidence attested to this charge, and 
                                                 
163 Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das 
Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere 
Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 57-65. 
164 Parry, "Enlightened Government and Its Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany," 185. 
165 Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das 
Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere 
Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 57-65. 
166 ———, Auf Höchsten Befehl an Sr. Röm. Kaiserl. Und Zu Ungarn Und Böhmen Königl. Majestät 
Erstattetes Allerunterthänigstes Gutachten Von Dem Vernünftigen Zusammenhange Und Practischen 
Vortrage Aller Oeconomischen Und Cameralwissenschaften Wobey Zugleich Zur Probe Die Grundsätze 
Der Policeywissenschaft Mit Denen Darzu Gehörigen Practischen Arbeiten Vorgetragen Werdenachen, 13. 
167 ———, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das 
Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere 
Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 65-9. 
168 His official title was “königlichen Berghauptman und Oberaufseher der Glass- und Stahlfabriken.“ 
 75 
it seems that Justi, ironically, was simply another victim of the king’s unmediated wrath.169 
Justi died as one more testament to history’s messy irony: the most famous cameralist of 
his time falling victim to the very flaw that he sought to curb in order to strengthen the 
sovereign who ultimately condemned him. Nonetheless, Justi’s arguments and their 





 Cameralists’ guiding principle, as always, was to strengthen the crown. However, 
the crown’s periodic, rash, and misguided interference in matters of justice seemed to hurt 
the absolutist state more than it helped. The cameralists’ answer, following Justi, was 
simple: if people are flawed, remove them from the process as much as possible and let 
established rules and regulations take their place. Take Creon out of the equation and 
replace him with an army of secretaries that would each constitute a small and 
noncapricious element of a larger, well-oiled machine. Doing so, however, would shift the 
focus from outcomes to the process of reaching outcomes, from the direct to the indirect 
question of justice. For cameralists, the criterion for whether a case had been properly 
decided was no longer primarily whether the correct outcome had been reached, but 
whether good and routine processes had been followed. Unintentionally, the cameralists 
invented procedural justice in an effort to strengthen the crown by curtailing its power.  
                                                 
169 Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 82, 218.; Walker, "Rights and 
Functions: The Social Categories of Eighteenth-Century German Jurists and Cameralists," 239-40. 
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A first step in this effort was to streamline the system of existing courts into a 
coherent, increasingly predictable, and hierarchical system.170 To accomplish this, state 
control of retribution,  peacekeeping, and adjudication was necessary. Enforcing the 
primacy and hierarchical dominion of the law over private acts is easily overlooked as a 
key element in forging our modern understanding of the proper administration of justice. 
The cameralists sought to limit the people’s reliance on “private acts of judging” and their 
“willful and idiosyncratic exemptions from laws”171 for three reasons.  
 First, according to the cameralists’ new understanding of justice, private acts of 
vengeance are compelled by the wrong motives. The terms cameralists use for these acts 
are often associated with blind vengeance or retribution [Rache], as in “private vengeance,” 
[Privatrache]172 or “self-vengeance” [Selbstrache].173 Their extraprocedural character 
renders them dangerous and undesirable. Private approaches to justice are not driven by 
defined procedures and are not calm or strictly rational, but instead motivated by the heat 
of passion.174 Notice, in contrast, Hoffmann’s appeal that justice shall be executed “without 
wrath, without regard of the person, without brutality nor love or hate.”175 
 Second, unregulated acts of justice are now conceptualized as fracturing the fabric 
of society. If the people take justice into their own hands, the person receiving punishment 
                                                 
170 Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 105-6.; Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische 
Verwaltung, 219.; For more on this point consider: Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, Materialen Für Die 
Statistick Und Neuere Staatengeschichte, 5 vols., vol. 2 (Lemgo: Meierschen Buchhandlung, 1777), 148-
78. 
171 “...Selbsthülfe, Privatgerichtsbarkeit, eigenwillige Ausnahme von Gesetzen.” (Sonnenfels, Grundsätze 
Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 196-98.) 
172 Ibid., 263. 
173 Moser, Von Der Landes-Hoheit in Policey-Sachen Nach Denen Reichs-Gesezen Und Dem Reichs-
Herkommen, Wie Auch Aus Denen Teutschen Staats-Rechts-Lehrern Und Eigener Erfahrung, 356-8. 
174 “Hitze“ (Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 261.) 
175 “... Gerechtigkeit ohne Zorn, ohne Ansehung der Person, ohne Grausamkeit sowohl als Liebe und 
Hass.“ (Hoffmann, Politische Anmerkungen Von Der Wahren Und Falschen Staatskunst Worinnen Aus 
Den Geschichten Aller Zeiten Bemerkt Wird Was Den Regenten, Bürgern Und Einwohnern Eines Landes 
Zuträglich Oder Schädlich Ist, 311.) 
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ceases “to be a citizen” [Bürger].176 Consequently, it is imperative that “not the rabble, but 
the court must punish.”177 
 Third, people’s private acts in matters of justice undermine the crown’s claim to 
supremacy and sovereignty.178 Some cameralists consequently count such “self-help” 
[Selbsthülfe] in the same category as raising a private army, building private fortifications, 
and proclaiming one’s own laws and regulations.179 All these acts amount to “somebody 
not recognizing and respecting the supreme judicial power of the sovereign.”180 
 The cameralists objected to private acts of crude justice even if all the participants 
are there “willingly,” as in the case of a duel. They lament that duelists are not properly 
integrated into the “regular administration of criminal affairs.”181 Such a position renders 
their self-help “improper” and “incompatible with the concept of a civic society.”182 Since 
duels constitute acts of singular will, they violate the state-regulated procedural 
requirements of the cameralists. They represent “a violation of the rights of judicial power” 
that ultimately renders all laws without force [kraftlos].183 
                                                 
176 Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 407-8. 
177 “Nicht der Pöbel, sondern das Gericht muss strafen, muss das Mass der Strafe bestimmen und [so that] 
der Bestrafte höret noch nicht auf, ein Bürger zu sein.” (Ibid.) 
178 ———, Sätze Aus Der Polizey, Handlungs- Und Finanz-Wissenschaft, 128-9. 
179 See for example: “...das Recht Soldaten zu halten forderte...” (Ibid., 44-46.) 
180 “…wenn jemand die oberrichterliche Gewalt des Fürsten nicht erkennte.” (Ibid.) 
181 ———, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 261. 
182 “...mit dem Begriffe einer bürgerlichen Gesellschaft unverträglich...” (Ibid., 257-63.); Möser, Politische 
Und Juristische Schriften, 335-7.;Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und 
Finanzwissenschaft, 29, 31.; Möser, Sämtliche Werke, 317-8. 
183 “...ein Eingriff in die Rechte der richterlichen Gewalt [...] kraftlos.“ (Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der 
Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 257-63.); See also: Möser, Politische Und Juristische Schriften, 335-
7.;Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 29, 31.; Möser, 
Sämtliche Werke, 317-8.; Sonnenfels, Sätze Aus Der Polizey, Handlungs- Und Finanz-Wissenschaft, 128-
31.; For more on the serpentine development and complex status of dueling see: Mika LaVaque-Manty, 
"Dueling for Equality: Masculine Honor and the Modern Politics of Dignity," Political Theory 34, no. 6 
(December 2006).; Alex Livingston and Leah Soroko, "From Honor to Dignity and Back Again: Remarks 
on Lavaque-Manty's "Dueling for Equality"," Political Theory 35, no. 4 (2007). 
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Another argumentative move that was guided by the same underlying principles 
was the depersonification of judicial power and its integration into a rationalized hierarchy. 
As we saw during the Miller Arnold case, the first set of courts plaintiffs usually 
encountered was staffed and controlled by local aristocrats [Patrimonialgerichtsbarkeit].184 
Usually noble lords were free to entrust those courts to anybody they saw fit, whether it 
was a local lawyer, foreman, or even themselves. Much to the cameralists’ approval, they 
were eventually required to hire only government-approved, university-trained jurists who 
were asked to “tame passions and emotional shifts.”185 Again, the cameralists’ efforts to 
advance a procedural understanding of the state’s administration did not end with the 
personnel. Many cameralists saw inherent structural problems in relying merely on the 
whims of individuals. Johann Friedrich Reitemeier, a professor and low-level administrator 
in Frankfurt an der Oder, puts this point in no uncertain terms: 
 
It is entirely clear what renders the administration of justice in its current 
configuration dangerous and receptive to the greatest decay: leaving an unmeasured 
power for defining and fixing judgments to judges [Urteilsverfassern]. That is the 
true source of the occurring injustices and the dangers of an even greater decay.186 
 
                                                 
184 Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 214. 
185 William W. Hagen, Ordinary Prussians : Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500-1840, New Studies 
in European History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 423.; Wunder, Geschichte Der 
Bürokratie in Deutschland, 24.; Hoffmann, Politische Anmerkungen Von Der Wahren Und Falschen 
Staatskunst Worinnen Aus Den Geschichten Aller Zeiten Bemerkt Wird Was Den Regenten, Bürgern Und 
Einwohnern Eines Landes Zuträglich Oder Schädlich Ist, 330.; Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken Von Dem 
Gesellschaftlichen Leben Der Menschen Und Insonderheit Dem Gemeinen Wesen, 523-4.; Bernd von 
Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-
1812, Veröffentlichungen Des Max-Planck-Instituts Für Geschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1987), 289. 
186 “Was also die Justiz, bei ihrer gegenwärtigen Einrichtung, höchst gefährlich, und für den grösssten 
Verfall empfänglich macht, ist hieraus ganz klar: dass man den Urteilsverfassern eine zu ungemessene 
Gewalt in der Bildung und Festzetung der Urteilsbegriffe gelassen hat, dass ist die wahre Quelle der 
vorkommenden Ungerechtigkeiten, und der einen noch grösseren Verfall bedrohenden Gefahren.“ 
(Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in 
Den Germanischen Ländern, 14-15.) 
 79 
James Steuart’s writings mirror these sentiments clearly. Born in Scotland, Steuart spent 
almost half of his life outside of Scotland, much of it in Germany. Perhaps best known as 
derided by Adam Smith and praised by Karl Marx, Steuart encapsulated an important point 
of cameralistic thought: for him, “a people are free  . . . when they are governed by general, 
well-known laws that are not dependent on the changeable will of a single individual, or 
multiple individuals.” Freedom that is dependent on the will of individuals, in Stuart’s 
thought, stands on terribly unstable foundations.187 Similarly, Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz 
argued that it is improper to consider the power of the state as “an arbitrary power or blind 
physical force.”188  
Many cameralists felt likewise, and consequently searched for new ways of 
conceiving the administration of justice.189 Their writings trace the steps of a trial, at each 
point seeking to remove choice from the hands of individual whim and divide decisions 
instead into mechanized steps. Only when clearly defined processes guide legal 
proceedings can the judge’s private whims and passions [Willkühr und Leidenschaft] be 
constrained effectively.190 As the cameralist Christian Jacob Kraus argued, even concerning 
“the most lowly offices, the defined formalities and procedures [Verfahrungsarten] that 
guide all affairs serve as a very useful bridle against the natural evil in humans.”191 Here as 
elsewhere, cameralists do not concern themselves with the outcomes of legal cases, but 
                                                 
187 James Steuart, Untersuchung Der Grundsätze Der Staatswirthschaft, Oder, Versuch Über Die 
Wissenschaft Der Innerlichen Politik in Freyen Staaten Worin Vornehmlich Die Bevölkerung, Der 
Ackerbau, Die Handlung, Die Indüstrie, Rechnungsmünze, Geld, Interessen, Circulation, Banken, Wechsel, 
Öffentlicher Credit, Und Taxen, Erwogen Werden (Hamburg: 1769), 257-8. 
188 Pölitz, Die Staatslehre Für Denkende Geschäftsmänner, Kammeralisten Und Gebildete Leser, 90. 
189 Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 15. 
190 For more on the dangers of “Willkühr” and “Justizwillkühr” see: Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für 
Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den Germanischen Ländern, 14, 17, 
50-2, 66-8. 
191 Christian Jacob Kraus, "Das Politik Sich Zu Einer Wissenschaft Erhaben Lasse," in Vermischte 
Schriften Über Staatswirthschaftliche, Philosophische Und Andere Wissenschaftliche Gegenstände 
(Könisberg: F. Nicolovius, 1808), 210. 
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merely with establishing adequate procedures for reaching those outcomes. Beginning with 
the proper announcement of laws and regulations, the cameralists define the elements that 
such procedures entail.192 Rather than addressing the justness, fairness, or decency of 
stipulated laws, the cameralists focus instead on the process of providing adequate notice of 
those laws to all people concerned – the first step in a legal procedure. Similarly, the 
cameralists’ discussion of due cause for imprisonments or investigations are purely about 
the proper handling of evidence – not about whether people should be investigated or 
imprisoned for a given act in the first place.193 An analogous concern with efficient means 
leads some cameralists to advocate for the differentiation of institutions that handle the 
various steps of an investigation.194 Reitemeier goes even further and argues for the 
importance of differentiating between the judge that deals with questions of evidence 
[Verhörsrichter] and the judge that renders the final verdict [Spruchrichter].195 As long as 
processes are not in place that restrain individual arbitrariness, judges might render “white 
black, and black white.”196 More digestibly for the crown, the mere hypothetical possibility 
of such an occurrence periodically raises the appearance of impropriety that is as harmful 
to the crown’s standing as actual wrongdoing by the sovereign’s anointed deputies.  Again, 
institutional redesign is the solution to inherent individual flaws, not for intrinsic reasons of 
morality or justice, but as a byproduct of efficiency and expediency.  
                                                 
192 Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis Opificum Apud Germanos 
Emendandis, 223-4.; Förster, Versuch Einer Einleitung in Die Cameral- Policey- Und 
Finanzwissenschaften, 219. 
193 Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 508. 
194 “...Unterschiedliche Commissarien...” (Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- 
Und Finanzwissenschaft, 48, 50-1.) 
195 Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung 
in Den Germanischen Ländern, 33-34, 46-8. 
196 Ibid., 15. 
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Similarly, the cameralists’ strong disapproval of torture during investigations rarely 
touches on moral considerations of human dignity and worth.197 Instead, cameralists simply 
view torture as ineffectual and detrimental to the overall judicial process. For them, there is 
nothing inherently wrong with these means, except that they systematically frustrate the 
given end of rendering the administration of justice efficient and legitimacy-enhancing. 
The cameralists’ discussion of appropriate penalties and punishments for the convicted is 
marked by the same set of narrow concerns with means.198 Appropriate punishments for 
crimes are determined, simply, by a calculus of cheap and effective deterrence, rather than 
by concerns about avoiding cruel or indecent retribution.199  
The cameralists’ considerable attention to the proper production of documents 
[Aktenverschickung] is exclusively concerned with the (perceived) procedural fairness of 
having accusing documents available prior to a court appearance.200 Throughout their 
writings cameralists insist fanatically on the importance of speedy and precisely executed 
legal proceedings. Clearly defined and regulated deadlines eliminate yet another element of 
human whim.201 Lastly, many cameralists stress the importance of speedy and lucid 
procedures for the appeal of decisions.202 Cameralists support the complex system of 
                                                 
197 Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 234-9.; Sonnenfels, Gesammelte Schriften 
(Vol.7). 
198 Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 49, 53-4.; 
Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in 
Den Germanischen Ländern, 161-3.; Möser, Sämtliche Werke, 24, 27.; Förster, Versuch Einer Einleitung in 
Die Cameral- Policey- Und Finanzwissenschaften, 222.; Moser, Von Der Landes-Hoheit in Policey-Sachen 
Nach Denen Reichs-Gesezen Und Dem Reichs-Herkommen, Wie Auch Aus Denen Teutschen Staats-Rechts-
Lehrern Und Eigener Erfahrung, 112-5.; Möser, Politische Und Juristische Schriften, 350-63. 
199 Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 53-4.; 
Sonnenfels, Grundsätze Der Polizey, Handlung, Und Finanz, 508. 
200 Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung 
in Den Germanischen Ländern, 82-4, 90. 
201 Ibid., 71-2.; Dithmar, Dissertatio Historico-Politico-Jurispublici De Collegiis Opificum Apud Germanos 
Emendandis, 218. 
202 Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung 
in Den Germanischen Ländern, 36-41.; Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener 
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appellate courts203 precisely because it is an effective tool for removing decisions from the 
brute will of individuals, so that judges “may be standing further away from the [involved] 
parties.”204 
 The cameralists, in short, give much thought to the effective, legitimate, and 
efficient administration of justice.205 Their goal is, on the broadest level, to secure the 
crown’s rule, and on a more narrow reading, render its administration of justice less 
arbitrary, more predictable, and ultimately more legitimate in the eyes of its subjects. Their 
chosen means are speedy processes, clearly defined steps, and compartmentalized decisions 
which follow depersonalized rules to render clear verdicts that are easily understandable 
and at least appear just.206 Many of the cameralists rejected the general trend that would 
have everything “reduced to broad and, as much as possible, simple principles.”207 Experts 
at categorization and system building, the cameralists see simplicity as anything but a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, 
Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben 
Vorkommen, 57-58, 68.; Frederick and Jean-Henri-Samuel Formey, Code Fréderic, Ou, Corps De Droit, 
Pour Les États De Sa Majesté Le Roi De Prusse Fondé Sur La Raison, & Sur Les Constitutions Du Pays : 
Dans Lequel Le Roi a Disposé Le Droit Romain Dans Un Ordre Naturel ... Établissant De Cette Manière 
Un Droit Certain Et Universel (1751), 6-7.; Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken Von Dem Gesellschaftlichen 
Leben Der Menschen Und Insonderheit Dem Gemeinen Wesen, 516-20.; Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag 
Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den Germanischen Ländern, 4-
5. 
203 For example: “Justizcollegien“ “Oberappellationsgerichten“, judicial “Regierungscollegien“, 
“Provinzialgerichten“,“Spruchgerichte,“ etc.; For more on this theme consider: Bassewitz, Die Kurmark 
Brandenburg, Ihr Zustand Und Ihre Verwaltung Unmittelbar Vor Dem Ausbruche Des Französischen 
Krieges Im Oktober 1806, 58-84, 400-07. 
204 “…dass sie von den Parteien noch entfernter stehen.“ (Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, 
Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den Germanischen Ländern, 41-2.) 
205 Justi, Auf Höchsten Befehl an Sr. Röm. Kaiserl. Und Zu Ungarn Und Böhmen Königl. Majestät 
Erstattetes Allerunterthänigstes Gutachten Von Dem Vernünftigen Zusammenhange Und Practischen 
Vortrage Aller Oeconomischen Und Cameralwissenschaften Wobey Zugleich Zur Probe Die Grundsätze 
Der Policeywissenschaft Mit Denen Darzu Gehörigen Practischen Arbeiten Vorgetragen Werdenachen, 14. 
206 Möser, Politische Und Juristische Schriften, 317-8.; Möser, Sämtliche Werke, 32-4.;Justi, Auf Höchsten 
Befehl an Sr. Röm. Kaiserl. Und Zu Ungarn Und Böhmen Königl. Majestät Erstattetes Allerunterthänigstes 
Gutachten Von Dem Vernünftigen Zusammenhange Und Practischen Vortrage Aller Oeconomischen Und 
Cameralwissenschaften Wobey Zugleich Zur Probe Die Grundsätze Der Policeywissenschaft Mit Denen 
Darzu Gehörigen Practischen Arbeiten Vorgetragen Werdenachen.; See also: Behrens, Society, 
Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 104-5. 
207 “...auf allgemeine und so viel möglich einfache Grundsätze zurückgeführet sehen. “ (Möser, Politische 
Und Juristische Schriften, 245-48, 338-40.) 
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virtue. For many of them the “truth remains plain: the more simple the laws, and the more 
general the rules become, the more despotic, dry, and wretched the country becomes.”208 
 These cameralists advocate instead for a well-regulated process to take the place of 
a simple understanding of right and wrong (as was on display in the misguided case of the 
Miller Arnold), a process that goes beyond the mere will of individuals. They push for the 
“wise construction of the process during criminal trials [Kriminalverfahren].”209 Here is the 
intellectual birthplace of the mechanization of justice, of the marginalization of Creon and 
the rise of his secretaries. It is also the beginning of an appreciation of the benefits of 
procedural justice. As “Kreon” is forced to say anachronistically in an Antigone adaptation 
from 1787:  
 
It is impossible to know each man’s heart, intention, and judgment, before he has 
been tested by the complex business of the administration of justice 
[Rechtsverwaltung].210 
 
Procedures hold considerable epistemological power to evaluate truth claims and to skirt 
the dangers of individual will and whim. As, ironically, Creon suggests here, procedures 
can inform our understanding of the justness of outcomes more than Creon could himself.  
 
 
                                                 
208 “Man mag hier annehmen was man will, die Wahrheit bleibt allemal, je einfacher die Gesetze, und je 
allgemeiner die Regeln werden, desto despotischer, trockner und armseliger wird ein Staat.“ (Justus Möser, 
Gesellschaft Und Staat : Eine Auswahl Aus Seinen Schriften (München: Drei Masken Verlag, 1921), 159-
63.; Möser, Politische Und Juristische Schriften, 245-48, 338-40.) 
209 “...weisse Einrichtung des Kriminalverfahrens.“ (Schmid, Ausfuehrliche Tabellen Über Die Policey, 
Handlungs- Und Finanzwissenschaft, 15.) My emphasis.  
210 “Unmöglich ist es, jedes Mannes Herz 
      Und Sinn und Urtheil zu erforschen, eh' 
      Er durch das mannichfaltige Geschäft 
      Der Rechtsverwaltung sich geprüft uns zeigt.”  
(Christian Stolberg and Friedrich Leopold Stolberg, Gesammelte Werke Der Brüder Christian Und 
Friedrich Leopold Grafen Zu Stolberg, 20 vols., vol. 14 (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1827), 16-7.) 
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(iii) “Arbitrariness under the Banner of Justice” 211 
 
So far, most of the themes I have addressed concerned the crown’s deputies – a 
relatively safe area for the cameralists to discuss. However, the principles developed with 
respect to low-level judges applied equally to higher appellate judges.  
Most cameralists extended their skepticism about the arbitrary will of judges 
upwards throughout the judicial hierarchy. The sovereign as the supreme judge, like any 
other judge, is often not reasonable and acts harshly.212 There is room for considerable 
irony here. Frederick II, as we saw, complained frequently about wayward administrators. 
He thought that they were unduly subject to “mean passions” that obscured their judgment, 
led them to commit “injustices,” and rendered them on the whole “more dangerous and 
worse than a band of thieves.” Still more to the point, even Frederick realized that “no 
human” can be safe from such passions, and that they deserved a “double punishment.”213 
However, as the Prussian kings never failed to illustrate, and as the cameralists periodically 
experienced on their own bodies: the choices of the kings themselves were often driven by 
temporary and much-feared eruptions of “wrath” [Zorn] rather than by well-balanced 
reasoning.214  
                                                 
211  Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung 
in Den Germanischen Ländern, 88-9. 
212 Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das 
Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere 
Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 288-94.; Reitemeier, Der 
Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den 
Germanischen Ländern, 15.; Möser, Gesellschaft Und Staat : Eine Auswahl Aus Seinen Schriften, 216. 
213 All quotation from a Cabinetsordre from the 11th December, 1779, as quoted in: Reitemeier, Der 
Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den 
Germanischen Ländern, 16-17. 
214 Justi, Deutsche Memoires, Oder, Sammlung Verschiedener Anmerkungen Die Staatsklugheit, Das 
Kriegswesen, Die Justiz, Morale, Oeconomie, Commercium, Cammer- Und Polizen- Auch Andere 
Merkwürdige Sachen Betreffend, Welche Im Menschlichen Leben Vorkommen, 351-2, 430-31. 
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The letters of direct appeal to the king [Bittschriften], for example, were a sore 
point for the cameralists for precisely this reason: they were uncomfortably irregular and 
unpredictable. In a manual for aspiring bureaucrats, the Austrian cameralist Sonnenfels 
vents his distaste for royal petitions: they are filled with endless empty formulas, do not 
argue persuasively, are repetitive and undisciplined, and the true facts of the case are 
difficult if not outright impossible to ascertain.215 Royal petitions consequently push “the 
cold sweat of fear onto the forehead of many.”216 Sonnenfels then takes the unusual step of 
trying to tame and regulate royal petitions: how they are written, whom they are addressed 
to, how the paper is to be formatted, how signatures should be affixed to them, etc. He 
attempts, in short, to integrate royal petitions into the regular process of administering 
justice. As far as I can tell, no other cameralist did the same or even cited Sonnenfels on 
this point. His plan received little support from the cameralists due to its inconsistency. 
Royal petitions are inherently extraprocedural; integrating them with the usual judicial 
procedures would undermine their entire raison d'être. People employed direct petitions 
precisely at the point when they were frustrated by the regular administration of justice, and 
sought instead to bypass regular procedures by reaching directly for a singular act of will. It 
was exactly this extraprocedural character of royal petitions that encouraged the 
detrimental tendencies of the crown’s arbitrary will. Carefully crafted procedures for the 
proper handling of evidence, for example, were simply not followed during direct appeals 
to the crown. Often this led to the omission or outright loss of evidence.  
                                                 
215 Joseph von Sonnenfels, Über Den Geschäftstyl; Die Ersten Grundlinien Für Angehende Österreichische 
Kanzleybeamten, Zum Gebrauche Der Öffentlichen Vorlesung, Zweyte etwas verm. Aufl. ed. (Wien: 
Joseph Edler von Kurzbek, 1785), 91-119.; For more on Sonnenfels see: Atorf, Der König Und Das Korn : 
Die Getreidehandelspolitik Als Fundament Des Brandenburg-Preussischen Aufstiegs Zur Europäischen 
Grossmacht, 39-42.; Tribe, "Cameralism and the Science of Government," 275-77. 
216 “...manchem den kalten Angstschweis vor die Stirne.” 
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The cameralists vented similar concerns with the extraprocedural, arbitrary 
character of private audiences with the king [Privataudienz]. As the Miller Arnold episode 
illustrates, only one side of a legal dispute might be present during such a meeting (and no 
lawyers), and the petitioner might switch accusations, blur facts, and appeal to emotions 
and stereotypes. All of this leads to the formation of doubts about the foundations for a 
decision that ultimately complicates or undermines the regular judicial process. The 
resulting decisions are inherently unstable and remain dependent on the arbitrariness of an 
individual rather than on designable, uniform features of institutions and processes.217 As 
Hoffmann complains:  
 
What kind of justice would this be if one rewarded or punished this [person], but 
paid no heed to people who did the same deeds? An uneven dispensation of justice 
brings the people’s hate upon the authorities.”218 
 
Even when the king’s decisions are not driven by violent outbursts or pure acts of arbitrary 
will, the decision maker is still susceptible to “favor and animosity,” or, again, the equally 
harmful perception thereof.219 The problem with the extraprocedural powers of the 
sovereign is not necessarily that its decisions are wrong: after all, the Miller Arnold might 
have been the blameless victim of malevolent, plotting aristocrats. Rather, the mere and 
easily raised appearance of impropriety leads to a legitimacy deficit for the state. As long 
as the crown can trump the procedural steps of a trial, there will 
                                                 
217 Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung 
in Den Germanischen Ländern, 6. 
218 “Denn was wäre dies für eine Gerechtigkeit, wenn man diesen oder jenen nur belohnen oder strafen, 
adnere aber um gleicher Taten will gar nicht ansehen wollte? Eine ungleiche Ausspendung der 
Gerechtigkeit bringt der Obrigkeit der Untertanen Hass auf den Hals.” (Hoffmann, Politische Anmerkungen 
Von Der Wahren Und Falschen Staatskunst Worinnen Aus Den Geschichten Aller Zeiten Bemerkt Wird 
Was Den Regenten, Bürgern Und Einwohnern Eines Landes Zuträglich Oder Schädlich Ist, 313.) 
219 “...Gunst und Abneigung...” (Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und 
Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung in Den Germanischen Ländern, 9.) 
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always be room for suspicion that can grow under certain circumstances to the point 
that can infuse warranted doubts into the administration of justice in the land. 
Everything under the current system of administering justice depends on the 
personality of the judge […], consequently the doubt that there are perhaps a great 
many unjust decisions cannot be seen as presumptuous or unjustified.220  
 
Notice that under this formulation no individual, strictly speaking, is blamed for the 
flaws of the current system. Nobody could act like a machine, free of biases, temptations, 
and irrationality. What Reitemeier is worried about here is not justice itself, not the fairness 
of outcomes. Instead, his writings concern the easily misperceived flaws of the “indicators 
of justice” [Kennzeichen des Rechts].221 
We might hope that “those who make the decisions about the most important affairs 
of the state have the required traits of mind and character for the business at hand,” but 
such hope would be foolhardy.222 Individuals will always be afflicted by human 
weaknesses, and reason is all too easily overwhelmed by passions. Given this deep distrust 
of individual will and choice, cameralists like Reitemeier insist that “as long as it is not 
possible to free decision makers from human weaknesses and passions and render them 
akin to angels,” it would be a most daring proposition to think them infallible. All that can 
be expected from them is “what one can observe in praxis with all public bureaucrats” 
                                                 
220 “...bleibt immer Raum für den Verdacht, der unter gewissen Umständen so gross warden kann, dass er 
gegen die Justizpflege im Lande ein gegründedtes Misstrauen einzuflössen geschickt ist. Alles hängt in der 
gegenwärtigen Verfassung der Rechtspflege von der Persönlichkeit der Urteilsverfasser ab [...] und so kann 
der Verdacht, dass sich unter die gerechten Richtersprüche auch ungerechte, und vielleicht sehr viele, mit 
einschleichen, nicht gerade als gewagt und vermessen angesehen werden. ” (Ibid., 5-6.) 
221 Ibid., 8. 
222 “Es ist nun zwar eben sowohl zu hoffen als zu wünschen, dass diejenigen, die über die wichtigen 
Angelgenheiten der Einwohner entscheiden sollen, allemal die Eigenschaften des Kopfes und Characters 
besitzen, die für ein solches Geschäft nöthig sind.“ (Ibid., 8-9.) 
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[Beamten].223 The influential publicist, jurist, and bureaucrat Justus Möser argued concisely 
and seditiously in this vein that “all people can err, the king just as the philosopher.”224 
Justice in the hands of a few individuals, rather than in the keeping of carefully 
crafted procedures, is deeply worrying for cameralists like Reitemeier, Möser, and 
Hoffmann. However, Reitemeier is far more blunt in his critique than others. For him, a 
system of arbitrary wills driving the administration of justice is so deeply flawed that it 
amounts, at best, to a pseudo-legal state [Scheingesetzmässigkeit].225 Even if it were seen as 
legitimate (though it should not be), it nevertheless is merely “a structure of arbitrariness 
under the banner of justice” that might fool some, but could never hide “that in fact there 
could be an undeniable injustice.”226 
Notice that even Reitemeier hedges his bets (“could”). Cameralists normally 
cushion their critique of the crown very carefully, in friendly terms, and in the hypothetical 
tense. Cameralists, whose livelihood depends on the crown’s continued patronage as 
academics and/or administrators, are caught in a bind here. On the one hand, they are the 
intellectual force behind rendering the crown’s rule efficient and stable, even if that entails 
significant reforms. On the other hand they are, functionally speaking, producers of the 
absolutist superstructure and thus deeply beholden to the status quo. Reitemeier sticks out 
of the cameralist crowd because his work illustrates this tension clearly.  
                                                 
223 “So longe es aber nicht möglich ist, sie von den menschlichen Schächen und Leidenschaften frei und 
den Engeln gleich zu machen, [...] als was man in der Praxis bei allen öfftenlichten Beamten wahrnimmt.“ 
(Ibid.) 
224 “Alle Menschen können irren, der König wie der Philosoph, und letztere vielleicht am ersten, da sie 
beide zu hoch stehen, und vor der Menge der Sachen, die vor ihren Augen schweben, keine einzige 
vollkommen ruhig und genau betrachten können.“ (Möser, Gesellschaft Und Staat : Eine Auswahl Aus 
Seinen Schriften, 214-18.) 
225 Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit Der Ständeverfassung 
in Den Germanischen Ländern, 155. 
226 “...ein Gebilde der Willkühr unter dem Stempel der Gerechtigkeit, dass seinem wahren Werthe nach 
nichts weiter al seine Brille ist, die den Parteien und dem Publikum aufgesetzt wird, um ihnen in der Form 
die Gerechtigkeit zu zeigen, während in der Sache eine unleugbare Ungerechtikeit liegen kann.“ (Ibid., 88-
9.) 
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 In parts of his work, he sharply—and very boldly—criticizes the crown’s direct 
involvement in legal proceedings as a practice suitable to “the regents of the orient.”227 In 
other parts, his language is more guarded and accommodating of the crown’s temptations. 
Yes, it would be great if the regent could be bothered to get involved in legal matters as the 
highest judge of the land, but the “partisan presentation” of facts in front of the sovereign 
cannot be prevented. Even if this problem could be overcome, the mere “suspicion of 
partiality and arbitrariness” would hurt the crown more than help it.228 Reitemeier even 
invents the new term “judicial-caprice” [Justizwillkühr] to differentiate his concerns from 
matters of mere private whim or vagary.229  
 
 
(iv) Codifying the Law – The Case of the Other Miller 
 
Whether through outright critique or subtle reassessment, Reitemeier, like many of 
his colleagues, came to view Creon’s direct involvement in trials as detrimental to Creon’s 
own rule. They searched at length for the best tools to “maintain upright the state and its 
purpose against the private will” of the regent in order to enhance the regent’s rule.230 
Frederick the Great, for his part, initially saw little allure in this line of reasoning. In his 
Anti-Machiavel (1739), the crown prince argued for the importance of having rulers that 
“see everything with their own eyes and rule their state by themselves,” rulers that are “in 
                                                 
227 “…den Regenten des Orients.“ (Ibid., 157.) 
228 “...Verdacht der Parteilichkeit und Willkühr...” (Ibid., 50-2.) 
229 Ibid., 66-8. 
230 “... gebietet uns auch be der Konstituirung eines Regent, es juridisch möglich zu machen, den Staat und 
desssen Zweck gegen seinen möglichen Privatwillen aufrecht zu erhalten...“ (Pölitz, Die Staatslehre Für 
Denkende Geschäftsmänner, Kammeralisten Und Gebildete Leser, 169.) 
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many ways the soul of the state, on whose shoulders lies the weight of ruling just as the 
world lies on the shoulders of Atlas.” In Frederick’s words:  
 
[Such rulers] lead in internal affairs as well as in external [affairs]; all orders, laws, 
ordinances originate with them, they inhabit simultaneously the post of justice 
minister, head of the army, finance minister; in short everything that is connected to 
politics in any way depends on their decision.231 
 
A French diplomat residing in Berlin remarked upon Frederick’s ascension to the 
throne that “the regnant king is even more impervious than his father; he does everything 
himself, and his ministers are mere henchmen of mediocre importance.”232 
 Two contemporary Antigone adaptations illustrate this temporary preeminence of 
individual will over procedures.233 The first of these adaptations was an opera by Gaetano 
Roccaforte that premiered in 1752 to wide popular acclaim in Mannheim. It became the 
inspiration for the production of twelve more Antigone operas in the years to follow. As in 
Sophocles’ version, Roccaforte’s Creon prohibits the burial of Polyneices, and Antigone 
disregards his directive. However, from there the opera deviates sharply from the Greek 
source material. Creon orders his son Eurysteon (not Haimon) to kill Antigone. Eurysteon 
disregards his father’s command and installs Antigone under a false name as a priestess in a 
nearby temple to Apollo. Fifteen years later Antigone returns to the royal palace in Thebes, 
                                                 
231 “Es gibt zwei Arten von Fürsten in der Welt, solche, die alles mit eigenen Augen sehen und ihren Staat 
selbst regieren, und solche, die sich auf die Zuferlässigkeit ihrer Minister verlassen und sich von denen 
leiten lassen, die Einfluss auf sie gewonnen haben. Die Fürsten der ersten Art sind gewissermassen die 
Seele ihres Staates, auf ihnen allein ruht die Last der Regierung wie die Welt auf den Schultern des Atlas; 
sie führen die inneren Angelegenheiten sowohl wie die äusseren; alle Befehle, Gesetze, Vorschriften gehen 
von ihnen aus; sie füllen zu gleicher Zeit die Posten des Justizministers, des Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres 
und des Finanzministers aus; kurz alles, was nur irgendwie mit Politik zusammenhängt, unterliegt ihrer 
Entscheidung.“ (Quoted in: Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 40.) 
232 Ibid., 41. 
233 See: Flashar, Inszenierung Der Antike : Das Griechische Drama Auf Der Bühne Der Neuzeit, 1585-
1990, 42-4. 
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secures the support of the guards, and overthrows Creon. In shackles, Creon is brought 
before Antigone, who magnanimously pardons him. The final chorus shouts triumphantly:  
 
So live with bliss, noble queen,  
you miracle of our times, rule always with joy,  
may heaven graciously grant this wish.234 
 
There is nothing tragic about this adaptation of Antigone. There are no irreconcilable 
differences and no unavoidable pain. Creon’s acts of singular will are merely replaced by 
the singular, and equally arbitrary, will of Antigone. Both are firmly in charge of the 
administration of justice, and all is well. In another Antigone adaptation from the same time 
period, the happy end is produced with even less effort: Antigone dies, and Creon 
celebrates in his palace, untouched by doubt or tragic loss, while the crowd cheers and 
dances. Antigone’s act of rebellion is duly meet by Creon’s reassertion of singular will.  
 However, much had happened over the course of the century, since these Antigone 
adaptations and Frederick’s declarations: the Miller Arnold case had proven to be an 
unlikely crystallization of changed perception and an even less likely impetus for 
institutional reforms. Still angry with the judges of the Miller Arnold case, Frederick 
ordered Johann Heinrich Casimir von Cramer and later Carl Gottlieb Svarez to write new 
procedures for civil and criminal cases (the General Court Ordinances), as well as 
codifying a new set of laws (the eventual Allgemeines Landrecht, or ALR).235 Cramer and 
Svarez, good cameralists that they were, interpreted this as a commission to find the legal 
means that would most strengthen the crown’s rule, and this entailed, as we have seen, 
                                                 
234 “So leb’ vergnügt dann, edle Königin, du Wunder unserer Zeiten, regiere stets in Freuden, der Himmel 
nehm’ zur Gnad’ den treuen Wunsch dahin.“ (Ibid., 43.) 
235 The ALR was finished on the 20th March, 1791 and acquired the force of law on June 1st, 1794 (Huber, 
Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 105-7.) 
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procedures to regularize trials and remove them from the arbitrary will of individuals. As 
some historians have pointed out, throughout the eighteenth century in Prussia, 
administrators had struggled against and with the crown to attain independence from 
interference in the legal system’s internal workings.236 At the close of his reign, Frederick 
finally seemed committed to this project and was willing to grant, in the words of one 
historian, “the independence of the judiciary . . . and exclusive judicial jurisdiction over 
matters of private civil law and criminal law.”237 The ALR, launched shortly after the 
Miller Arnold episode, made significant strides towards ridding Prussia of royal dicta in 
judicial affairs.238 A flurry of codification efforts attests to similar lines of thought 
throughout Germany. Most of the important German domains adopted important lessons 
from the cameralists and codified them in new civil and criminal codes.239 In them, Creon’s 
secretaries, and the machinery of justice they increasingly inhabited, displaced Creon’s 
direct commands. In another nod to Antigone, one of the new legal codes decreed that the 
bodies of those who had died dishonorably should no longer be turned over to scavengers, 
but were to be buried, in private.240 At the same time, various cameralists began publishing 
criminal law and criminal procedure journals that argued for understanding justice as 
procedures.241  
                                                 
236 Kenneth F. Ledford, "Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia," Central European History 37, no. 2 
(2004): 209-10.; Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 219. 
237 Ledford, "Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia," 209-10. 
238 For more on this see: Hans Hattenhauer, "Das Alr Im Widerstreit Der Politik," in Kodifikation Gestern 
Und Heute : Zum 200. Geburtstag Des Allgemeinen Landrechts Für Die Preussischen Staaten, ed. Detlef 
Merten and Waldemar Schreckenberger (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995).; Berkowitz, The Gift of 
Science : Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition, 75-7, 79. 
239 L. v Bar, A History of Continental Criminal Law (Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange, 1999). 
240 Ibid., 251. 
241 See for example: Giessen: “Grundsätze der Criminalrechtswissenschaft nebst einer systematischen 
Darstellung des Geistes der deutschen Criminalgesetze.“; Grolmann & Feuerbach: “Bibliothek für 
peinliche Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzkunde.“; Giessen: “Über die Begründung des Strafrechts und der 
Strafgesetzgebung.“; and the, for many years, premier publication of German criminal law: Kelin & 
Kleinschrod: “Archiv des Criminalrechts.“ (Ibid., 327.) 
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Eventually, cameralists, with increasing brazenness, differentiated between the kind 
of justice that results from properly followed procedures and what they called “real” or 
“actual” justice. They began to distinguish, explicitly, between two genera of justice: one 
determined by an a priori notion or intuition of justice, the other the outcome of a series of 
steps within a procedural framework. For these cameralists, "actual justice" exists, 
ontologically, independently of "formal justice," and vice versa. The key conceptual 
development here is the decoupling of "justice" as usually understood and "justice" as the 
outcome of a court process.  
One might think that it would be the critics of cameralism who would engage in the 
project of drawing this distinction. Such critics could then use the distinction to highlight 
the flaws and defects of the kinds of procedures the cameralists sought to impose on the 
administration of justice. Notice, however, that it was the cameralists themselves who drew 
the distinction between "actual" and "formal” justice. In their view, this was a great 
achievement, a development to cherish. As the cameralist Justus Möser put it: “Each 
human has to recognize with a thankful heart that formal justice is preferred to real 
justice.”242   
 Möser recognized that there might be “sad cases” in which a judge recognized the 
demands of “actual justice” but was prevented from obeying them because of procedural 
limitations. Nonetheless, according to Möser, it is better that one judge “mourns” for real 
justice than that the whole system be threatened by a reassertion of individual will over 
proper procedures.243 Procedural justice is separate from "actual justice" and trumps it if 
                                                 
242 “Jeder Mensch hat es mit dankbarem Herzen zu erkennen, dass man das förmliche [Recht ] dem 
wirklichen vorziehe.“ (Möser, Gesellschaft Und Staat : Eine Auswahl Aus Seinen Schriften, 214-18.) 
243 “Der traurige Fall, worin ein Richter sich oft befindet, ist dieser, wenn er das wirkliche Recht 
augenscheinlich erkennet, und es doch nicht zum förmlichen machen kann. Aber demungeachtet ist es 
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they are not in agreement. Möser, like many cameralists hereby elevates procedural 
decision making over the raw will of individuals. Intuitions and competing notions of 
justice, decency, and right are subsumed under a broad and powerful procedural 
framework. The cameralists, it seems, had successfully reconfigured the sovereign power 
of the state. Their understanding of a well-regulated state marginalized the will of 
individuals and all competing notions of desert in favor of an administrative, procedural 
machinery that derived its legitimacy from successful and effective management.  
An immensely popular anecdote, then and now, about Frederick the Great (without 
much proof for or against it) illustrates and summarizes the significant developments that 
had taken place: The aging Frederick, it is said, was bothered by the rattling of the 
windmill of Sanssouci not far from his palace. Having difficulty resting with this noise 
around him, the king order the mill destroyed. However, the miller of Sanssouci reminded 
the king: “Your Majesty, there are still judges in Prussia!” The king, half-disgruntled, half-
smiling, bowed to the laws he himself had decreed, and the mill of Sanssouci remains 
standing to this day. It is a popular tourist attraction a short drive outside of Berlin.244  
 
 
(v) Suing the King 
 
The crown, if we accept the arguments of many cameralists, gained mightily by 
institutionalizing such self-restraint. However, taking such arguments to their conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                 
besser, dass ein einzelner Mann traure, als das man alles in Gefahr setze; und dies würde geschehen, wenn 
jeder Richter dasjenige, was er für wirklich Recht erkennet, sogleich als rechtskräftig annehmen könnte.“ 
(Ibid.) 
244 See for example: Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 212-3. 
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reveals a multifaceted Faustian bargain. Johann Jakob Moser’s illustrates one side of this 
bargain. Moser took the implications of the cameralists further than any of his colleagues 
dared. Active academically and administratively in Prussia and Württemberg, Moser 
carved out in his voluminous writings narrow grounds upon which the sovereign itself can 
be sued.245 Rather than ruling purely by fiat and dictum, the sovereign in Moser’s 
cameralistic assessment was limited by general principles: 
 
[If the sovereign] abuses jurisdictional constraints in the administration in order to 
influence administrative decisions; then we have new examples that would ground 
the taking away of his exercise of the sovereign jurisdiction.246  
 
It is of little importance here that Moser’s account is vague and riddled with the practical 
difficulties of implementing his suggestions. For the purposes of this argument, what 
counts is that Moser, a cameralist with solid academic credentials and service in numerous 
German polities, envisions the sovereign as bound by his own laws – for his own sake! 
Rather than granting the sovereign the power to intervene in any judicial case, Moser takes 
the extensive cameralist argument about procedural justice to its conclusion. For Moser, the 
sovereign is incorporated into the workings of the law; he is merely another part of the 
machinery of justice.247 
                                                 
245 Though hard to find, the best introduction to Moser’s work is his fifty-volume opus: Johann Jakob 
Moser, Teutsches Staats-Recht, 50 vols. (Nürnberg,: Stein, 1737-53).; For more biographical accounts see: 
Erwin Schömbs, Das Staatsrecht Johann Jakob Mosers (1701-1785); Zur Entstehung Des Historischen 
Positivismus in Der Deutschen Reichspublizistik Des 18. Jahrhunderts, Schriften Zur 
Verfassungsgeschichte. (Berlin,: Duncker & Humblot, 1968).; Reinhard Rürup, Johann Jacob Moser. 
Pietismus Und Reform (Wiesbaden,: Steiner, 1965). 
246 “…misbrauchet er sich der ihme annoch übrig beliebenden Verwaltung derer Jurisdictionalien, um in 
obbefagte Administration Eingriff zu thun; so haben wir noch ganz neue Exemple, dass ihme so dann auch 
die Ausübung der Landesherrlichen Gerichtbarkeit genommen worden ist.“ (Moser, Von Der Landeshoheit 
in Cameral-Sachen, Nach Denen Reichs-Gesezen Und Dem Reichs-Herkommen, Wie Auch Aus Denen 
Teutschen Staats-Rechts-Lehrern, Und Eigener Erfahrung, 53, 59.) 
247 Ibid., 52-3.; Consider also: Ernst Moritz Arndt, Staat Und Vaterland : Eine Auswahl Aus Seinen 
Politischen Schriften, Deutsche Staatsgedanke. 1. Reihe. Fürer Und Denker ; (München: Drei Masken 
Verlag, 1921), 40. 
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 The multifaceted argumentative moves of the cameralists have an interesting and 
potentially unintended consequence: under their model of the proper administration of 
justice, verdicts increasingly become justified by and during the process, not by their 
outcomes. Instead of asking whether Miller Arnold, von Gerdorf, or von Schmettau 
received the proper verdict, we are directed to investigate the proper adherence to all the 
procedural elements of the trial. Many people were upset about the Miller Arnold case not 
because the wrong verdict had been reached (for little was known to people at the time 
about the merits of the Arnolds’ case), but because they could agree that it was thoroughly 
improper for the crown to intervene directly in a case and thereby unsettle the procedural 
justifications that legitimize decisions. As we have seen, such outrage was a new 
phenomenon, driven by and reflected in the cameralists’ developing understanding of the 
proper administration of justice. The scandal surrounding the Miller Arnold case would 
have been unthinkable in earlier times, when the crown’s actions would have been viewed 
as perfectly unremarkable.  
Interestingly enough, the critics of the king’s interference were not trouble-rousing 
Jacobins in the making, but completely loyal subjects of the crown. Whether they were 
cameralists (in the pay of the crown) or aristocrats who flourished under the crown’s 
patronage, they could all now agree that the crown should not undermine the sanctity of 
procedural justifications of verdicts. They reached this conclusion not in the name of some 
enlightened ideal, but for raw political advantage and ultimately for the crown’s own sake. 
This should make us suspicious, and it points us toward a nontrivial question: why should 
the crown limit itself? Why accept de facto restrictions on its ability to intervene directly in 
legal cases? Why curtail the time-honored tradition of the Machtspruch? 
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In many ways it was a brilliant, if unintended, move on the part of an absolutist 
state. Instead of focusing on the justice and fairness of a given outcome, the apologists for 
despotic rule could now focus on the procedures leading up to a given outcome. The 
question no longer is whether a given outcome is just, but whether the process was properly 
followed in reaching the outcome. Verdicts are justified internally through an evaluation of 
numerous procedural steps, rather than externally by comparison to an outside yardstick. 
As such, the hegemony of procedures in the administration of justice allows for easy 
deflection of criticism away from the crown itself, and focuses complaints instead on the 
opaque machinery of the state. As many experiences with bureaucracies attest, it can be 
notoriously tricky to blame any-body, any person, for flaws in the outcomes of 
administrative processes. Bureaucracies redirect such complaints to an intricate process 
instead. This is one facet of Hannah Arendt’s famous statement that “bureaucracy is the 
rule of nobody.”248 “Pure administration,” for Arendt, replaces “personal rulership” at the 
cost of our ability to assign blame clearly and decisively.249 The notorious difficulty of 
attaching blame on anybody within the bureaucratic machinery, seen from this perspective, 
is a considerable advantage to the sovereign.250 
The hegemony of procedures, then, is necessarily marked by a paradoxical duality. 
While it constrains the sovereign, it also enables him. While it limits the sovereign’s power 
to intervene in any given case, it enhances the sovereign’s reach in all cases. The crown 
might be hindered from single, visible, and potentially offensive exercises of will, but its 
                                                 
248 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed ed. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
45. 
249 Ibid. 
250 For more on this point consider also that “the self-conscious transformation of the administrative role 
from the easily accountable but private, informal patron-client base to the protected but public, contractual 
administrative role that was, paradoxically, much lesss accountable in a direct fashion.” (Silberman, Cages 
of Reason : The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain, 5. 
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influence is now yielded indirectly, more latently, and more persistently through the power 
to articulate procedures. While the crown is limited to “execut[ing] the decisions of judges 
without changing them,” it is immensely empowered by the authority to articulate the 
procedural rules [Processordnung] that these judges must follow.251 As some cameralists 
recognized, it was no accidentthat the crown implemented procedural reforms well before 
revisions of substantive laws. Both were initiated on the same day (14. April 1780), but the 
Prussian minister responsible for the reforms, von Cocceji, implemented the procedural 
rules years before the substantive laws.252 As one cameralist put it:  
 
Actual law could be done away with entirely if necessary […] but one cannot do 
without formal justice/procedures and formal truth. All nations have recognized this 
that thought first of procedural rules and [only secondly] of substantive laws, as the 
minister Cocceji who implemented the procedural regulations before the substantive 
laws.253 
 
In this, the cameralists themselves entered, knowingly or not, into a dangerous 
Faustian bargain with the crown. As some cameralists recognized, and as Reitemeier put 
most clearly, the brilliance [Glanz] of properly designed procedures is inseparable from 
what makes them dangerous. Procedures are desirable, but they are built, inherently, “on 
shaky foundations” that are “of no secure duration,” because procedural understandings of 
justice desubstantiate law.254 Adolf Albrecht Heinrich Leopold von Danckelmann (the 
                                                 
251 Pölitz, Die Staatslehre Für Denkende Geschäftsmänner, Kammeralisten Und Gebildete Leser, 154. (My 
emphasis) 
252 Hubatsch, Friedrich Der Grosse Und Die Preussische Verwaltung, 219.; Huber, Deutsche 
Verfassungsgeschichte, 105-7. 
253 “Das wirkliche Recht könnte zur Not in der Welt ganz entbehrt werden [...] aber förmliches Recht und 
förmliche Wahrheit lassen sich durchaus nicht entbehren. [...] Alle Nationen haben dieses erkannt, die eher 
an Prozessordnungen als an Gesetzbücher gedacht haben [] wie denn auch der Grosskanzler von Cocceji 
[welcher ] die Prozessordnung dem Gesetzbuche vergehen liess.“ (Möser, Gesellschaft Und Staat : Eine 
Auswahl Aus Seinen Schriften, 214-18.) 
254 “ihr Dasein am gefährlichsten ist [...]ihr auf eine wandelbare Grundlage gebauter Vorzug [ist] von 
keiner sichern Dauer“ (Reitemeier, Der Bürgervertrag Für Die Justiz, Staatshülfe Und Finanzpflege Mit 
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minister of justice from Silesia) argued this point approvingly in a letter to one of the 
drafters of the ALR shortly before its official adoption (Oct. 28, 1793). In his view, it was 
deeply unnecessary and perhaps even dangerous to promulgate justifications and 
elucidations for laws:  
 
For the inhabitant of a state it is generally sufficient, that he knows that, for 
example, for doing this or that act, the death penalty is legislated.255 
 
He thereby approves of shifting questions of justice away from concerns with 
morality or decency. The laws themselves, a set of interdictions and sanctions, are all that 
should properly concern people. What the law requires is simply the “short expressions of 
command, prohibition or determination of the consequences.” 256 Karl Heinrich Ludwig 
Pölitz, a professor at Leipzig and Wittenberg, explained similarly in a manual for 
“businessmen, cameralists, and learned readers” that “morality is not to be considered for 
the evaluation of individual actions of citizens, but firstly the legality of such an action.”257 
Two other cameralists, Grolmann and Feuerbach, argued extensively in newly founded 
journals devoted to criminal procedures that law and morality have nothing to do with each 
other.258 Finally, Justus Möser argued that if procedures were properly followed, “it does 
not matter if judges have erred or not; their final sentence transforms actual white into 
formal black, and vice versa.”259 Möser summarized his position succinctly by explaining 
                                                                                                                                                 
Der Ständeverfassung in Den Germanischen Ländern, 42-4.); For more on this theme consider also: 
Mansfield, "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government." 
255 Hans Thieme, Ideengeschichte Und Rechtsgeschichte : Gesammelte Schriften (Köln: Böhlau, 1986), 
758-9. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Pölitz, Die Staatslehre Für Denkende Geschäftsmänner, Kammeralisten Und Gebildete Leser, 21. 
258 Bar, A History of Continental Criminal Law, 427-32. 
259 “...es tut im eigentlichen Verstande nichts zur Sache, ob [...] die Richter geirret haben oder nicht; ihr 
letzter Ausspruch verwandelt wirkliches Weiss in förmliches Schwarz, und umgekehrt.“ (Möser, 
Gesellschaft Und Staat : Eine Auswahl Aus Seinen Schriften. 
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that without the primacy of the indirect question “people would never stop disputing with 
each other; everybody would want to act based on his own conceptions, and that would 
give rise to the greatest confusion.” The only way to avoid such confusion and secure peace 
is through a procedural understanding of truth and justice. The result of proper procedures 
is considered “formal truth and formal justice.” The declared outcome of such a process 
thus trumps truth and justice per se: “That which has been announced has to be considered 
formal justice and has to be obeyed.” Möser concludes by arguing that of course, 
“everybody retains his free opinion about actual and real justice, if he cannot convince 
himself [to believe in] formal justice, but nobody cares about that.”260 
Möser, Pölitz, Danckelmann and their cameralist cohorts had elevated procedures 
above a concern with the justness of outcomes per se. They thought of law simply as the 
command of a sovereign that was now interpreted and applied through carefully crafted 
procedures and resulted in a set of known and uniformly applied sanctions. They thus 
helped to establish the dangerous understanding of justice as merely the outcome of 
properly designed procedures. Evaluations of the justness of a case no longer depended on 
the results reached. Under the cameralists’ theory of the state, the administration created 
just outcomes and legitimacy endogenously, while the public remained silent, 
administrated, and excluded from questions of right and wrong. Facticity and normativity, 
in Habermas’s phrase, were united in the administrative sphere. The public sphere, insofar 
as it existed at all, functioned by a different logic. It was preempted of meaningful agency 
                                                 
260 “Denn es ist hier ein Notrecht für die menschliche Ruhe, nach welchem nun einmal dasjenige förmliche 
Wahrheit und förmliches Recht sein soll, was also dafür erklärt oder ausgesprochen worden. Der Mensch 
würde nimmer aufhören zu zanken; jeder würde nach seinem eigenen Begriffe handeln wollen, und es 
würde daruas die grösste Verwirrungen entstehen, wenn man sich nicht endlich weislich darüber 
verstanden hätte: dass man dasjenige, was also ausgesprochen ist, für förmliches Recht halten und befolgen 
wollte. Einem jeden bleibt dabei seine freie Meinung von dem wirklichen Rechte, wenn er sich von dem 
förmlichen nicht überzeuben kann; aber man achtet darauf nicht.“ (Ibid., 214-18.) 
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or any role in generating legitimacy. The subject, under this account, was the entirely 
passive recipient of orders and instructions from a faceless bureaucratic structure.  













Critics of the cameralist project wanted to reclaim normativity from the 
administrative sphere. These critics came from many backgrounds and spanned the multi-
dimensional ideological spectrum. They included distinguished members of the old 
Brandenburgian nobility  such as Ludwig von der Marwitz, Karl von dem Kesebeck, and 
Otto von Voss-Buch; influential journalist-philosophers such as Adam Müller and Heinrich 
von Kleist; high ranking members of the military, including Generals Ludwig Yorck von 
Wartenburg, Ludwig von Jagow, and August von Kalckreuth; poets Novalis, Achim von 
Arnim, Joseph von Eichendorff, August and Friedrich Schlegel, Clemens Brentano, and 
others; members of the clergy; and pamphleteers.261 They are loosely and customarily 
bundled under the heading of “German Romanticism” or “Romantics.” 
This diverse group attacked the procedural state the cameralists were building from 
a wide array of angles. Their critiques are often in competition with one another. However, 
                                                 
261 For a quick introduction to these individuals and some of the themes they raise see: Eric Dorn Brose, 
The Politics of Technological Change in Prussia : Out of the Shadow of Antiquity, 1809-1848 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 32-33.; Guy Stanton Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 
1807-1815 (Gloucester, Mass.,: P. Smith, 1965), 210.; Gordon Alexander Craig, The End of Prussia 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 68.; Goetz A. Briefs, "The Economic Philosophy of 
Romanticism," Journal of the History of Ideas 2, no. 3 (Jun., 1941): 296.; Frank-Lothar Kroll, "Romantik 
in Preussen," in Preussische Stile : Ein Staat Als Kunststück, ed. Patrick Bahners and Gerd Roellecke 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2001). 
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in some respects their common target unified their argumentative strategies. In the views of 
many, purely procedural understandings of the state’s administration were destabilizing the 
state, undermining morality, and contributing to individual and social alienation. The 
cameralist project, seen from this perspective, was morally bankrupt; it undermined the 
foundations of a patriotic community, and so forfeited any claim to legitimacy. As the 
influential Prussian aristocrat Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz pointed out, the 
cameralistic, procedural state was far from inevitable or desirable. In earlier times, before 
the cameralists completed their project, bureaucrats “didn’t hide, as now, behind forms, 
without care of their relation to reality, or hide behind the ‘decision of the office’ so as to 
not to have to deal with injustices.”262 According to Marwitz and many like-minded critics, 
the cameralistic theory of the state took a myopic and self-defeating stance towards 
generating normativity and facticity. Disallowing meaningful agency within the public 
sphere undermined the efficacy of individuals, the vibrancy of the community, and the 
ability of the state to survive in contentious times. In contrast to the cameralists, whose 
primary level of analysis was the efficiency of means, the authors we will encounter in this 
section are fundamentally opposed to the dull, dispassionate calculation of proper means.  
Opposition to the cameralists’ theory of the state and social order had four 
interrelated elements. In chapter 4, I will first explore opposition to the bracketing of 
passions required by the cameralists’ procedural understanding of the state. The poets 
Novalis, Achim von Arnim, and August Schlegel assert that the primacy of empiricism, 
raw calculation, means over ends, procedures, and the bracketing of passions are dangerous 
and fundamentally misguided. These authors aim to undermine the foundations of the 
                                                 
262 Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften 
Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, ed. Friedrich Schinkel (Breslau,: W.G. Korn Verlag, 1932), 
62. 
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cameralist project by reorienting the people’s imagination away from the cameralists’ 
obsession with lifeless, mechanical efficiency and towards vibrant, heroic, mystical, poetic, 
and passionate individualism. 
 In chapter 5, I will turn to the argument of Theodor Körner, Heinrich von Kleist, 
and Novalis that the depersonalization entailed by the cameralists’ project is destabilizing 
the state. In place of the cameralists’ focus on mechanized and depersonalized procedures, 
they argue that we should think of the state as inherently personal, impulsive, idiosyncratic 
and beyond procedures. Legitimacy, under this model, can only spring from interactions 
between individuals. The state has to be personified; it must live in and through 
individuals, not procedures. Only once the state has been restructured to allow for dialogue 
and personal interactions can it lay claim to obedience and sacrifice.  
Chapter 6 explores these themes further by anatomizing a clash of metaphors: while 
cameralists thought of the state as a machine beyond individual whims and passions, many 
of their critics viewed the state and society as an organism. E.T.A. Hoffman, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, and Adam Müller, among others, argued that a mechanical, passionless, 
depersonalized conception of the state as a machine is both erroneous and harmful, 
draining the lifeblood out of much-needed vibrant, passionate patriotism. As one 
commentator put it, the state, “despite all mechanical posing,” should “remain . . . heartedly 
organic.”263 Focusing on efficient, mechanical procedures rather than wholesome ends 
undermines the moral core of society and renders the state “merely an institution of 
                                                 
263 Das “ewige[s] Gesetz ist, dass das Verhältniss von Menschen zu Menschen, also auch das Verhältniss 
von Regirung zu Regirten überal und allezeit ein in sich lebendiges, flüssiges, sich im Guten und Bösen, in 
Tugend und Frucht wie in Sünde und Strafe in's Gleichgewicht setzendes, troz alles mechanischen 
Verhaltens ein innerlichst organisches ist und bleibt...” (Heinrich Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte 
Zum Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 6 vols., vol. 6 (Halle,: Eduard Anton, 1839), 82.). 
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force.”264 Such deviation towards a procedural, mechanical model of the state would 
amount to a “communal calamity.”265 
 The final chapter of this section (chapter 7) turns towards one reading of what this 
calamity would entail. As Friedrich Schiller argued, the desubstantiation of justice by the 
“intricate clockwork of the states” tore apart “the inner bond of human nature.”266Justice 
has been “torn asunder,” dividing “laws and morals” into separate camps. Society, under 
such “a paltry and coarse mechanic,” is a “clockwork” that imposes a fractured 
“mechanistic life” on what formerly had been whole.267 The end result of adhering to a 
procedural understanding of the state is a soulless and soul-destroying society, in which 
people become alienated from themselves, from their passions, from each other, and from 
the state.  
The authors we will encounter in this section articulate numerous principled 
objections to the hegemony of procedures and its manifestation in bureaucracies. Their 
positions are sharply and completely at odds with the habits, values, and mentality of the 
bureaucrat and with the conceptual foundations of bureaucracies. The administrative might 
of the cameralistic state begot this resistance. The Romantics organized and shaped their 
                                                 
264 “... den Staat wie eine blosse Zwangsanstalt betrachtet...” (Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz, 
"Lebuser Denkschrift (9. Mai. 1811) " in Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich 
August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, ed. Friedrich Schinkel (Breslau,: W.G. Korn Verlag, 1932), 247.; Craig, 
The End of Prussia, 23. ) 
265 Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Aus Einem Brief an Georg Reimer (1806)," in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit Der 
Erniedrigung, ed. Rudolf Vaupel (München: Drei Masken, 1923), 231-2.; For more on this theme consider: 
Anthony J. LaVopa, Fichte : The Self and the Calling of Philosophy, 1762-1799 (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 91-2. 
266 “...das verwickeltere Uhrwerk der Staaten eine strengere Absonderung der Stände und Geschäfte 
notwendig machte, so zerriss auch der innere Bund der menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit 
entzweite ihre harmonische Kräfte.” (Friedrich Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in 
Einer Reihe Von Briefen, ed. Klaus L. Berghahn (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000), 22.). 
267 “Diese Zerrüttung, welche Kunst und Gelehrsamkeit in dem innern Menschen anfingen, machte der 
neue Geist der Regierung vollkommen und allgemein.”; The old world order “machte jetzt einem 
kunstreichen Uhrwerke Platz, wo aus der Zusammenstückelung unendlich vieler, aber lebloser, Teile ein 
mechanisches Leben im Ganzen sich bildet.” (Ibid., 23.). 
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message in opposition to the cameralists. Often read in isolation, Romantics did not exist 
outside of or prior to their engagement with power. There was no a priori identity that then 
came into contact with administrative power. Rather, the Romantics were forged in 
confrontation with the cameralistic state. The managerial, bureaucratic state with its many-
tentacled police powers helped to bring into being the dreaming, mythical, romantic 
protagonist.  
As such, the Romantics were an early line of defense against the administrative 
state. They inform our historical understanding of how and why people resisted the rise of 
bureaucracy. Let’s begin with the why.  
In their writings, the Romantics express skepticism of both the foundations and the 
impact of the cameralistic state. To their minds, it is in open conflict with human nature. 
Humans are inherently passionate and cherish personal, direct interactions. In contrast, the 
desubstantiated, depersonalized cameralistic state treats humans as mere means to 
externally generated ends. It does not allow for meaningful participation; it silences the 
public sphere. In the end, the cameralistic state treats humans as bland, interchangeable, 
silent cogs in the administrative machinery. Romantics argue that such mechanical, 
technical, economic, functional definitions cannot capture our humanity. Nor does the 
cameralistic state treat humans in a dignified manner. Rationalized bureaucracy is 
dispiriting and dehumanizing. It reduces our humanity, stifles noble and heroic sentiments, 
undermines communities, and fails to engender patriotism. Even if people could endure 
such a world, it would be lifeless, dull, gray, devoid of beauty, and revoltingly ugly.For all 
these reasons, the cameralistic state and its vision of social order must be opposed.  
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Foucault does not speak to the question of why we should oppose the administrative 
state, its police functions, and its capillary domination. Examining the Romantics’ 
normative commitments helps to fill this lacuna, historically and conceptually by returning 
us to the roots of that opposition.  It also informs our understanding of how people opposed 
the emerging administrative state. For the Romantics, the content and form of their 
opposition are closely aligned. The questions of why and how to resist the administrative 
state are thus importantly related. In tracing the Romantics’ opposition to the cameralistic 
state, it is necessary that we broaden our analytical focus to encompass a range of genres 
and modes of argumentation traditionally overlooked by political theory. The Romantic 
resistance  builds on novel and innovative strategies to resist the dominant discourse of the 
cameralistic state. It relies on genres and literary forms that the rationality and 
rationalizations of the cameralists cannot adequately address. Romantics do not simply 
speak out against the overly calculated, unfeeling, depersonalized cameralistic project; the 
genres the Romantics choose already carry the same message. For example, horror stories, 
a staple of Romantic literature, appeal to raw sentiments beyond rational calculations of the 
efficacy of means to given ends. They invoke visceral, personal emotions. This is a well-
calculated move. Romantics’ weapons against the mechanistic state include overflowing 
passions, irrational horror, derision, and flowery rhetoric. Attentiveness to folktales, songs, 
poems, and horror stories allows us to see the interdependence of form and content in the 
Romantics’ fight against the cameralists’ vision of the state. Opposing modes of discourse 
were key armaments in a contentious battle between opposing visions of social and 
political order and of the relationship between state and society. For us, then, this cultural 
battlefield at the turn of the nineteenth century is a site where familiar problems, crises, and 
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anxieties over the articulation of competing political ideologies play out in an unfamiliar 
environment.  
Understanding the Romantic movement as opposition to the emerging modern, 
bureaucratic state helps us to understand the growing antagonism and alienation between 
the administrative sphere and the public sphere. The two, increasingly, were in direct 
conflict with one another. The cameralists had attempted to monopolize facticity and 
normativity within the administrative sphere. Now, the Romantics wrestled normativity 
from the grip of the administrative sphere. However, they made no attempt to 
reconceptualize facticity. In an ironic twist, Romantics tried to bootstrap facticity, just as 
the cameralists had tried to bootstrap normativity. The Romantics believed without much 
elaboration that a legitimate state based on Romantic ideals would also be a state that could 
survive on the dangerous stage of European power politics, just as the cameralists had 
presumed without much elaboration that an efficient state would also inherently be a 
legitimate state. Romantics presumed that legitimacy would inspire patriotism and a 
willingness to sacrifice that could protect the state. Normativity would automatically 
generate facticity. Yet at the same time, they structured the public sphere in opposition to 
the administrative sphere and thereby antagonized the two.  
Unsparing in their criticism, Romantics tirelessly vituperated against the 
cameralistic state and its effects. As the famous pastor Friedrich Schleiermacher, among 
others, argued:  the procedural thinking of the cameralists has robbed us of the ability to 
know justice. It is undermining society everywhere by raising mechanical modes of 
thinking above impulsive, passionate appeals directly to justice itself. Instead, we are left 
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with an indirect approach to justice that thinks of the state as an “artful machine.”268 The 
“state-machine”269 is stuck in a lifeless “mechanism of administration.”270 All that 
bureaucrats really desire is to invent vapid “controls, formalities, and forms.”271 Instead of 
asking the direct question of justice, bureaucrats are locked into mechanized procedures 
that focus their attention on the indirect question – just as the cameralists had intended. 
However,  critics argued, such a mechanical application of justice is anything but just: “It 
has been overlooked that precisely in [the] mechanical application [of justice] lies the most 
monstrous disparity.”272 The “mechanical aspects”273 of justice have their roots, declare 
these critics, in lackadaisical modes of living and a disregard for blue flowers.  
 
 
4. Blue Flowers and the Fear of Living Lackadaisically 
 
“The security of the throne is founded upon poetry.”  
[Gneisenau, one of the highest ranking Prussian  
military officers, to Friedrich Wilhelm III in 1811]274 
 
                                                 
268 Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Aus Den Monologen (1800)," in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit Der Erniedrigung, 
ed. Rudolf Vaupel (München: Drei Masken, 1923), 215. 
269 August Wilhelm Anton Gneisenau, "Militärisch-Politische Aufzeichnungen," in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit 
Der Erniedrigung, ed. Rudolf Vaupel (München: Drei Masken, 1923), 60. 
270 See for example: Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August 
Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 223. 
271 “…Kontrollen, Formalitäten und Bezettelungen.“ (Friedrich von Cölln, "Über Verschiedene Mängel Im 
Militär Und in Der Ehemaligen Geschäftsverwaltung Im Preussischen Staate," in Neue Feuerbrände 
(Amsterdam ; Cölln: P. Hammer, 1807), 75.) 
272 Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 312-3. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Gneisenau to Friedrich Wilhelm III. (8.20.1811) – cited in: August Wilhelm Anton Gneisenau, 
Gneisenau; Ein Leben in Briefen, ed. Karl Griewank (Leipzig,: Koehler & Amelang, 1939). [Letter 80] 
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In one of the most influential literary pieces of the era, the Baron Friedrich Leopold 
von Hardenberg, better known as Novalis, sets the blue flower at the center of his 
sumptuous tale of longing, love, and poetry.275 His Heinrich von Ofterdingen, first 
published in 1802, became one of the leading inspirations for the writers of the era. It 
encapsulates and exemplifies much of the key aesthetic vocabulary of the time. For a while, 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen held a landmark status often compared to that of Hamlet or 
Faust, and its influence reached well beyond literature into the political thought of, for 
example, Walter Benjamin and Herbert Marcuse.276 Largely because of this book, the 
influential Adam Müller called Novalis in 1807 the “reincarnation, under fundamentally 
                                                 
275 For good place to begin exploring the aesthetic discourse at the time consider: M. H. Abrams, The 
Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1953).; Arthur O. Lovejoy, "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms," Publications of the Modern 
Language Association of America 39, no. 2 (Jun., 1924).; George S. Williamson, The Longing for Myth in 
Germany : Religion and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004).; Fritz Strich, Deutsche Klassik Und Romantik, Oder Vollendung Und Unendlichkeit; Ein 
Vergleich, 5. Aufl. ed. (Bern,: Francke, 1962).; Maynard Solomon, "Some Romantic Images in Beethoven," 
in Lessons of Romanticism : A Critical Companion, ed. Thomas Pfau and Robert F. Gleckner (Durham 
[N.C.]: Duke University Press, 1998).; Mathys Jolles, Das Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter 
Napoleons, Studien Zur Geschichte Des Staats- Und Nationalgedankens (Frankfurt am Main,: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1936), 159-203.; Max Blechman, "The Revolutionary Dream of Early German 
Romanticism," in Revolutionary Romanticism : A Drunken Boat Anthology, ed. Max Blechman (San 
Francisco: City Lights Books, 1999).; For a romanticized account of the Novalis and his followers see: 
Ludwig Pesch, Die Romantische Rebellion in Der Modernen Literatur Und Kunst, Beck'sche Schwarze 
Reihe ; Bd. 19 (München: Beck, 1962).; Manfred Frank, Der Kommende Gott : Vorlesungen Über Die 
Neue Mythologie, 1. Aufl. ed., Edition Suhrkamp ; (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982).; For strong 
reactions to Frank’s work consider: Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity : From Kant to Nietzsche, 
2nd ed. (Manchester, UK ; New York: Manchester University Press, 2003).; Jochen Fried, Die Symbolik 
Des Realen : Über Alte Und Neue Mythologie in Der Frühromantik, Literatur in Der Gesellschaft ; 
(München: W. Fink, 1985).; For a more political perspective consider: Lothar Kittstein, Politik Im Zeitalter 
Der Revolution : Untersuchungen Zur Preussischen Staatlichkeit, 1792-1807 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2003), 
30-34, 40-1, 46-49.  
276 For more on the reception of Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen see: Dennis F. Mahoney, The Critical 
Fortunes of a Romantic Novel : Novalis's Heinrich Von Ofterdingen, 1st ed. (Columbia, SC: Camden 
House, 1994).; J.F. Haussmann, "German Estimates of Novalis from 1800 to 1850," Modern Philology 9, 
no. 3 (Jan., 1912).; Walter Benjamin, Der Begriff Der Kunstkritik in Der Deutschen Romantik, 1. Aufl. ed. 
(Frankfurt (am Main): Suhrkamp, 1973).; Herbert Marcuse, Der Deutsche Künstlerroman ; Frühe Aufsätze, 
1. Aufl. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978).; Michael Löwy, "Under the Star of Romanticism," in 
Revolutionary Romanticism : A Drunken Boat Anthology, ed. Max Blechman (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1999). 
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different conditions, of Plato himself.”277 Novalis thought of his literary production more 
humbly. Like many of the authors we will encounter in this section, Novalis spent most of 
his adult life as a low-level government bureaucrat [Salinenbeamter].278 Though important 
to Novalis himself and ultimately to many others, his nonprofessional writings were in 
Novalis’s own estimation only a “minor affair” [Nebensache]. As Novalis explained in a 
letter to a friend, writing was for him, first and foremost, a diversion and an educational 
tool [Bildungsmittel].279 Like Joseph von Eichendorff, who was a bureaucrat for 30 years 
while simultaneously writing a voluminous and influential literary oeuvre, Novalis spent 
most of his energies and his short adult life as an ordinary functionary in the state’s 
administration.280 As a result, his implicit and explicit critiques of administrative affairs 
were informed by his own professional experiences. However, Novalis’s skepticism of the 
cameralistic practices he encountered every day at work is revealed indirectly. Instead of 
questioning cameralistic practices here or there, Novalis aims instead at the very 
foundations of the cameralist project.   
On its surface, Heinrich von Ofterdingen is a simple, apolitical tale about the 
physical and spiritual journey of a young man - Heinrich.281 Traveling with a group of 
merchants, Heinrich visits castles, encounters enchanting maidens, is led by the power of 
dreams, falls in love, and adventures into mystical caverns. The story is self-consciously 
fantastic and makes no claims to be realistic or plausible in a straightforward manner. 
                                                 
277 Heinrich Müller, Vorlesungen Über Die Deutsche Wissenschaft Und Literatur, 2., vern. und verb. Aufl. 
ed. (Dresden: Arnold, 1807). 
278 Most of Novalis’s writings from this line of work (called the “Salinenschriften”) are lost since World 
War 2 and have most likely been destroyed.  
279 Novalis, "Briefe Von Novalis," in Schriften; Die Werke Friedrich Von Hardenbergs, ed. Paul 
Kluckhohn and R. H. Samuel (Stuttgart,: W. Kohlhammer, 1960), 264-67. 
280 Jacoby, Die Bürokratisierung Der Welt; Ein Beitrag Zur Problemgeschichte, 53. 
281 For more on this motif see: David L. Mosley, "Wandering as Topic and Trope in Early Nineteenth-
Century German Culture," in Romanticism across the Disciplines, ed. Larry H. Peer (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1998). 
 112 
Novalis argues instead against the primacy of empiricism, raw calculation, means over 
ends, and procedural understandings of desert. Things just are: some people are noble and 
valiant, others are cowardly and evil. Novalis’s tale works on a fundamentally different 
level than cameralistic thought. Through it, Novalis labors to reorient the reader’s 
imagination and to kindle dormant passions. 
 Consider the instructive final passage of the fourth chapter of Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen, in which Novalis emphasizes the unconscious and prerational – symbolized 
by a stream that carries Heinrich’s unconsciousness forward. In one of Novalis’s 
characteristic narrative ploys, Heinrich finds an important insight on his journey through a 
dream. There, Heinrich encounters a deep, blue, mystical river. Drawn to it by the presence 
of his love interest (Mathilde), he approaches the river and is filled with fear. Soon he finds 
himself in the river, without really knowing how, and is carried away by its current, unable 
to struggle against its raw force. As Mathilde’s boat begins to sink, “a terrible fear robbed 
him of his consciousness.” When he becomes aware of his surroundings again (that is not 
to say that he has regained consciousness), he finds himself in an alien environment:  
  
He didn’t know what had happened to him. His mind [Gemüt] had disappeared. 
Thoughtlessly, he traveled deeper into this country.  
 
Heinrich is exhausted from his travels but is replenished by a small spring. He 
ventures further and further, and “flowers and trees talked to him.” Heinrich begins to feel 
at ease and at home in this new environment. Finally he is called again by the song of 
Mathilde, and as they reunite, Heinrich weeps from the heart. He asks her where the river 
 113 
went, and she points out the blue waves above them. Here, in the river, they will stay united 
forever. At last she tells him “a wonderful, secret word,” and he awakens.282   
This passage, like much of Novalis’s writing, is loaded to the brim with symbolic 
meaning. Perhaps Novalis meant  it to literally overflow with multilayered representations 
of forces unseen. In the world he wants us to travel in, the unconscious, passionate, and 
unthought is always and necessarily spilling into seemingly mundane affairs: alongside the 
unexceptional work of merchants lurk the absurd and unfathomable (Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen, chapter 2). Near the huts of ordinary peasants lie caves, ready to be explored, 
filled with surprising treasures (Heinrich von Ofterdingen, chapter 5). Beneath the simple 
world of an insignificant youth lies the ravening world of unconscious forces, carrying 
one’s mind into unknown territory, replenishing it, and providing the willing traveler with 
the password that might soon prove crucial. 
The blue flower itself embodies this understanding of the world as split into 
calculating and emotional halves. For Novalis, the two are interconnected through many 
gates, cracks, and portals. In the beginning of the book, Heinrich, once again in a dream, 
travels through a gap in a mountain into a miraculous cave. In it, he is drawn to a blue 
flower that reveals to him the face of a girl he will not meet for a long time, but who will 
become the focus of his longing and journey as well as a leitmotif of Novalis’s imagery. 
Imagine a whole book mostly in the same vein as the two short passages I have discussed 
thus far, and you have a sense of where Novalis is heading and why some consider his 
work arduous to read. However, there is method to Novalis’s idiosyncratic style.  
 
                                                 
282 “…entsetzliche Angst raubte ihm das Bewusstsein.” - Novalis, "Heinrich Von Ofterdingen," in 




(i) The Primacy of Passions 
 
Like those omnipresent cracks, gates, ports, passageways, and doors, Novalis 
presents himself as a connection, a gatekeeper and importer of the wisdom of one realm 
into the other. He brings us the neglected wisdom of passions lying dormant deep within us 
that reason could suppress but never contain. Novalis tries to get us back in touch with our 
allegedly dormant passions. He attempts to reunite the splintered individual into one 
coherent whole. Reading his books and poems is not only intended to show the reader 
individuals who achieved such coherence successfully and fruitfully, but the experience of 
reading his books is meant to demonstrate the theory on the page. Poetry, for Novalis, is 
based upon “tätiger Ideenassoziation” – the active but largely subconscious play-like 
association of latent meanings.283 The poet, for him, necessarily “prays at the pedestal of 
chance and accident.”284 In many of Novalis’s chapters, there is simply far too much to 
absorb, and the mind wanders in such passages. That is a calculated effect. 
As Novalis explains, narratives are ideally “without coherence, yet with 
associations, like dreams.”285 His tales have only an “allegorical meaning” and “an indirect 
effect like music”286 that sways and moves us through latent causes. As we find ourselves 
                                                 
283 “idealischer Zufallsproduktion“ - from Werke Nr.128 in: ———, Novalis Werke, ed. Gerhard Schulz 
(München,: Beck, 1969), 493. 
284 “Der Dichter betet den Zufall an. “ (———, "Fragmente Zur Poetik," in Schriften; Die Werke Friedrich 
Von Hardenbergs, ed. Paul Kluckhohn and R. H. Samuel (Stuttgart,: W. Kohlhammer, 1960).; for a more 
widely available version see: Novalis, "Fragmente Zur Poetik," in Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-
Jürgen Schmitt (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974). 
285 “Erzählungen, ohne Zusammenhang, jedoch mit Assoziation, wie Träume.” (Novalis, "Fragmente Zur 
Poetik.") 
286 “Höchstens kann wahre Poesie einen allegorischen Sinn im grossen haben und eine indirekte Wirkung 
wie Musik usw. tun.” (Ibid.) 
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tapping our feet to the rhythm before us, Novalis accomplishes his two-pronged project. On 
the one hand, he envelops us in a fantastic universe, created in contrast to the disenchanted 
and dispassionate one ushered in by an undue emphasis on means rather than ends, 
calculation rather than passion. On the other hand, as we read about the dreams and 
journeys of the protagonists on the page, our minds wander as well, jumping by vague 
association from one symbol to another. Just as the heroes on the page get in touch with 
their passions and subconscious drives, so do the readers whom Novalis leads to 
experiment with the all-importance of spiritual intangibles, dismissed by the cameralist 
crowd as chains that bind us to superstitions and backwardness. Only a person (real or 
fictitious) who is not enslaved to procedures and means can escape a spiritually numbing 
materialistic world.287  
Two kinds of truths confront one another here. Since the waning of Novalis’s era, 
historical and social accuracy, objectivity, and gritty realism have become central aims of 
literature. Novalis and his like-minded contemporaries, in sharp contrast, aimed for truth in 
narratives and not a simulation of “reality.” A novel that merely tries to depict events 
accurately, they held, is an artless chronicle and bound to remain incomplete.288 In contrast, 
the true novel is “free history – at once mythology and history (mythology here understood 
                                                 
287 Consider on this point Weber: “Release from the rationalism and intellectualism of science is the 
fundamental premise of life in communion with the divine. This, or something very like it, is one of the 
basic slogans that you hear from our young people who are religiously minded or in search of religious 
experience” or of “experience as such.” The path they take is “that only realm that intellectualism had 
failed to touch until now, namely, the realm of the irrational” that which “is now made conscious and 
subjected to intellectual scrutiny. For that is what the modern intellectualist romanticism of the irrational 
amounts to in practice.”  (Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures : "Science as a Vocation" "Politics as a 
Vocation" (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2004), 16. 
288 E.g. “Die Geschichte muss immer unvollständig bleiben.” (Novalis, "Fragmente Zur Poetik."); consider 
also Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling: “Wollte er [der Künstler] sich aber mit Bewusstsein dem Wirklichen 
ganz unterordnen und das Vorhandensein mit knechtischer Treu wiedergeben, so würde er wohl Larven 
hervorbringen, aber keine Kunstwerke” (Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, "Abkehr Von Der 
Naturnachahmung," in Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-Jürgen Schmitt (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), 93.) 
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in my sense, as free poetic invention, which symbolizes reality in manifold ways).”289 Only 
through the poet and his art does a story (“Geschichte,” also translatable as history) become 
a true story.  
Consider on this point Achim von Arnim, a poet heavily influenced by Novalis and 
influential in his own right as one of the main forces behind the Berliner Abendblätter, and 
one of the founders of the infamous Deutsche Tischgesellschaft. Arnim cares very little 
about historical truth and insists that “to lie is a beautiful duty of the poet.”290 The literary 
author is functioning on a higher plane of truth,291 where 
 
Stories are not truths as we demand them from history and interactions with 
contemporaries, they wouldn’t be what we are looking for, what is looking for us, if 
they could completely belong to the truth of the earth, because they all lead the 
alienated earthly world back to the eternal community.292 
 
In Arnim’s view, the world has gone awry and has alienated us from each other and 
ourselves. Given this analysis, one cornerstone of Arnim’s and Novalis’s project is to 
reunite us with the parts of ourselves that an overly calculating, mechanized modernity has 
taken from us. Emotional fervor is central to this re-joining, since “passion grants the 
original true, human heart”293 as opposed to the naked and cold calculation of the most 
effective means for given ends.  
 
                                                 
289 “...freie Geschichte – gleichsam die Mythologie der Geschichte. (Mythol[ogie] hier in meinem Sinne, 
als freie poetische Erfindung, die die Wirklichkeit sehr mannigfach symbolisiert usw.).” (Novalis, 
"Fragmente Zur Poetik.") 
290 “…die Lüge [ist] eine schöne Pflicht des Dichters” (Achim von Arnim, "Dichtung Und Geschichte," in 
Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-Jürgen Schmitt (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), 261.) 
291 “das Dichten ein Sehen höherer Art zu nennen.” (Ibid., 262.) 
292 “Dichtungen sind nicht Wahrheit, wie wir sie von der Geschichte und dem Verkehr mit Zeitgenossen 
fordern, sie wären nicht das, was wir suchen, was uns sucht, wenn sie der Erde in Wirklichkeit ganz 
gehören könnten, denn sie alle führen die irdisch entfremdete Welt zu ewiger Gemeinschaft zurück.” (Ibid.) 
293 „Die Leidenschaft gewährt [], das ursprünglich wahre, menschliche Herz, gleichsam den wilden Gesang 
des Menschen....” (Ibid.) 
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(ii) Of Ends and Means 
 
Novalis and Arnim do not seek to find truth through reason and the empirical 
investigation of the world. For them, such a scheme is fundamentally misguided, since 
“nature, per se, is incomprehensible – stillness and formed inexplicableness.”294 They reject 
a utility-driven reliance on reason for its unrealistic understanding of the relation of humans 
to the universe, its dangerous downplaying of the passions, and its relentless search for 
utility and gain. In Friedrich Schiller’s words, “utility is the great idol of our time.”295 
Instead of striving for concrete, immediate aims and objects,296 Novalis asks us to aim at 
“distant objectives”297:  
 
Distant mountains, distant peoples, distant incidents etc. All will be romantic, 
which is the same – and from there springs our original, ancient nature.298  
 
One of the Schlegel brothers (August) argues in the same vein when he questions 
the subordination of the good to the useful.299 He continues by attacking unguided 
rationality for its limitation to the finite (rather than contemplation and admiration of the 
                                                 
294 “Die Natur ist unbegreiflich per se. Ruhe und gebildete Unbegreiflichkeit.” (Novalis, "Ferne Philosophie 
Klingt Wie Poesie," in Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-Jürgen Schmitt (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), 64.) 
295 “Der Nutzen ist das grosse Idol der Zeit” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in 
Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 9.) 
296 “Jeder bestimmte Zweck ist ein konsonierter – gehemmter Zweck überhaupt.” (Novalis, "Ferne 
Philosophie Klingt Wie Poesie," 64.) 
297 “ferne Zwecke” 
298 “Ferne Berge, ferne Menschen, ferne Begebenheiten usw. Alles wird romantisch, quod idem est – dahr 
ergibt sich unsre urpoetische Natur.” (Novalis, "Ferne Philosophie Klingt Wie Poesie," 64.) 
299 “Hier zeigt sich nun schon die ganze verkehrte Denkart, das an sich Gute (wovon das Wahre ein Teil, 
eine Seite ist) dem Nützlichen unterzuordnen.” (August Wilhelm Schlegel, "Kritik an Der Aufklärung," in 
Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-Jürgen Schmitt (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974).; For a quick introduction to 
Schlegel consider: Jolles, Das Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter Napoleons, 182-92. 
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infinite), its praise for cameralistic principles, its diminution of imagination and passions in 
favor of reason, and its quest for complete comprehension.  
Schlegel’s critique begins with the assertion that a concern with usefulness and 
efficiency is the “economical principle […], which leads the followers of the 
Enlightenment.”300 In the German context, economic principles and demographic politics 
were inherently tied up with cameralistic teachings and practice. For Schlegel, following 
such cameralistic principles invited disastrous consequences for individuals and for society, 
for example in the realm of morality:  
 
Naturally, the Enlightenment mixed itself into morality and did thereby great 
damage. Based on its economic bent, it described all virtues that it did not find 
useful for earthly applications as mere superstition and passing fancy. Without 
allowing for special cases, everybody was supposed to be imprisoned under the 
yoke of certain bourgeois duties; in business, administration, and then family life – 
not out of patriotism or love, but to till the acre of the state like cattle and to 
advance the population.301   
 
For Schlegel, similar thinking applies to questions about the ultimate meaning of 
existence. Schlegel believes it is wrong to view the world as driven by sterile and abstract 
principles. For him, the cameralists’ unrelenting will to analyze and comprehend the 
universe is as dangerous as their willingness to constrain passions in the interests of reason:   
 
Enlightened theology consists primarily in the advancement of complete 
comprehension of religion, that is to say in the rejection of all secrets and mysteries; 
wherever they are found in a revealed religion, which one pretends to find valid, 
they are explained away. The unreasonableness in the attempt to reduce everything 
                                                 
300 “...ökonomische Prinzip [...], welches die Aufklärer leitet” (Schlegel, "Kritik an Der Aufklärung.") 
301 “Natürlich hat sich die Aufklärung auch in die Moral gemischt und darin grosses Unheil angerichtet. 
Nach ihrer ökonomischen Richtung gab sie alle Tugenden, die sich nicht der Brauchbarkeit fur irdische 
Angelegenheiten fügen wollten, für Ueberspannung und Schwärmerei aus. Ohne irgendeine Ausnahme für 
besondere Naturen gelten zu lassen, sollten alle gleichermassen in das Joch gewisser bürgerlicher Pflichten 
gespannt werden, in das Gewerbs- und Amts- und dann das Familienleben, und zwar nicht aus Patriotismus 
und Liebe, sondern um den Acker des Staates wie Zugvieh zu pflügen und die Bevölkerung zu befördern.” 
(Ibid.) 
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to the comprehensible shows itself here to the fullest degree, since humans, which 
are woven together out of contradictions, cannot envelop themselves in the 
contemplation of the invisible and infinite, without throwing themselves down an 
abyss of secrets.302  
 
August Schlegel has a desperate need for the world to remain enchanted. His 
writings, like Arnim’s or Novalis’s, are filled with the mysterious and improbable, but  
aspire also to the charming and lovingly quaint. These are the Romantics’ weapons in the 
aesthetic and immediately political struggle to articulate an effective response to the 
dominance of “means over ends.”  
The anxieties of these authors stem, in part, from the cameralists’ quest to build 
institutions that contain the personal and passionate in favor of bureaucratic regularity, 
efficiency, and a belief that even the social universe can be understood and regulated. 
Schlegel, Arnim and Novalis argue instead that “the magic of life” depends upon a world 
that resists such a development, a world that cherishes darkness and “unsolvable secrets.” 
Since the dispassionate and empirical cameral science does not respect darkness, it 
becomes the nemesis of those like Schlegel or Arnim who seek to immerse themselves in 
the currents of the passions.303  
 
 
                                                 
302 „Die aufgeklärte Theologie besteht zuvörderst in der Förderung vollkommener Begreiflichkeit der 
Religion, also in der Verwerfung aller Geheimnisse und Mysterien; wo sie sich in einer geoffenbarten 
Religion finden, die man zum Scheine noch will gelten lassen, werden sie wegerklärt. Das Unvernünftige 
in dem Bestreben, alles auf Verständlichkeit zurückzuführen, tritt hier im vollsten Masse ein, denn der 
Mensch, der ganz aus Widersprüchen zusammengewebt ist, kann sich nicht mit seiner Betrachtung in das 
Unsichtbare und Ewige vertiefen, ohne sich in einen Abgrund der Geheimnisse zu stürzen.” (Ibid.) 
303 The unabridged quote reads as follows: “Eben auf dem Dunkel, worin sich die Wurzel unseres Daseins 
verliert, auf dem unauslöslichen Geheimnis beruht der Zauber des Lebens, dies ist die Seele aller Poesie. 
Die Aufklärung nun, welche gar keine Ehrerbietung vor dem Dunkel hat, ist folglich die entschiedenste 
Gegnerin jener und tut ihr allen möglichen Abbruch.” (Ibid.) 
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(iii) The Poetic Imagination 
 
The Romantics’ conceptual project seeks to turn our scientific minds into poetic 
organs. Only thus, individuals whose experiences are divided into separate realms could 
once again become whole (just as in the dreams we encountered above). Instead of 
disenchanting the world, one should surrender to the mysteriousness of the universe and 
marvel at its glories. After all, “the unknown, mysterious is the result and beginning of 
everything.”304 That is why many of Novalis’s tales seem convoluted and implausible. 
Novalis hopes that the reader will see the futility of analyzing the world and begin to 
wander through a garden she does not understand, where she loses all motivation to seek 
understanding and simply drowns pleasurably in the currents of her own passions. All is 
alive, rich, wonderful, aimless, and colorful – but also, at an important level, 
unknowable.305 Novalis’s discussion of passions, latent currents and rivers, caverns and 
blue flowers is not merely an early attempt at psychoanalysis. Rather, it is a distinct, clever, 
and influential reaction to an emphasis on calculation and procedures. Novalis and his 
cohorts oppose a world of institutionalized procedures that undermine the passionate will 
of individuals.  
As we have seen, dreams are an important element of this opposition in the tales of 
Novalis and Schlegel.306 In a space freed from the all-too-rational thought of the bright day, 
dreams provide a refuge and a reminder of proper human functioning. Dreams function as 
                                                 
304 “...das Unbekannte, Geheimnisvolle ist das Resultat und der Anfang von allem.” (Novalis, "Ferne 
Philosophie Klingt Wie Poesie," 64.) 
305 “In einem echten Märchen muss alles wunderbar – geheimnisvoll und unzusammenhängend sein – alles 
belebt.” (———, "Fragmente Zur Poetik.") 
306 Der Traum ist „ein sehr poetisches Element, und die Poesie, wohl eingedenk, dass sie selbst nur ein 
schöner Traum sei, hegt und liebt ihn.” (Schlegel, "Kritik an Der Aufklärung.") 
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gates through which one can glimpse hidden truths. They frequently contain vital clues for 
literary protagonists that would mean nothing to a purely rational, empirically driven eye, 
painstakingly separated from emotional considerations. Dreams free one’s imagination 
“from all necessity” and can thereby “reveal many . . . secrets” that are otherwise not 
directly accessible.307   
 This emphasis on passions and imagination should not be taken lightly. It 
immediately connects, in the minds of writers such as Schlegel, to a particular conception 
of liberty, one sharply at odds with more familiar competitors. Schlegel explicitly 
admonishes Locke and his followers for their “philosophical Protestantism,”308 which 
would “eventually paint everything onto the empty tablet, actually onto the empty 
nothingness, of reason.”309 A related charge against formalism and procedures is that it 
“misunderstands completely the rights of fantasy and imagination, and would, if possible, 
heal humans entirely from it.”310 Not individuals, but an independent, anthropomorphized 
cognitive mode is the bearer of rights in this account. Novalis explains:  
 
To be free is the tendency of the self – the capacity to be free is the productive 
imagination – harmony is the precondition of its functioning – the hovering, 
between opposing poles. To be internally united is also a condition of existence for 
the highest purpose – to be or to be free. […]. From this standpoint of hovering 
derives all reality – in it all is contained. […] the hovering [...] is the source, the 
matter of all reality, reality itself.311 
                                                 
307 “[Die Fantasie] scheint z.B. in Träumen, wo sie von allem Zwange entbunden Spielt, manche ihrer 
Geheimnisse zu verraten.” (Ibid.) 
308 “philosophischem Protestantismus” (Ibid., 33.) 
309 “allmählich alles auf die leere Tafel, eigentlich auf das leere Nichts, des Geistes eingezeichne[n].” 
(Ibid.) 
310 “...verkannten durchaus die Rechte der Fantasie und hätten, wo möglich, die Menschen gern ganz von 
ihr geheilt.” (Ibid.) 
311 “Frei sein ist die Tendez des Ich – das Vermögen frei zu sein ist die produktive Imagination – Harmonie 
ist die Bedingung ihrer Tätigkeit – des Schwebens, zweischen Entgegengesetztem. Sei einig mit dir selbst 
ist also Bedingungsgrundsatz des obersten Zwecks – zu sein oder frei zu sein. [...]. Aus diesem Lichtpunkt 
des Schwebens strömt alle Realität aus – in ihm ist alles enthalten [...]. [...] das Schweben [...] ist der Quell, 
die Mater aller Realität, die Realität selbst.” (Novalis, "Lichtpunkt Des Schebens," in Romantik, ed. Otto F. 




Without the experience of hovering above calculating, lifeless modes of existence, 
we are bound to live pathological lives. The healing function of imagination is important 
because without it, individuals degenerate into passionless cogs in the soulless machinery 
of modernity. Against the nihilistic tendencies of aherence to procedures (“the empty 
nothingness”), people like Novalis or Arnim try to posit the pleasures and joys of loving 
one’s world and contemplating its mysteriousness. Their writings are a celebration of 
passion, but they never portray passion against social wrongs.312 The passions Novalis 
celebrates are deeply individual and oblivious to social and political dilemmas. Novalis’s 
heroes are not revolutionaries. Their world is one of flowers, moons, and enchanting 
landscapes that envelop them. They, like their author, have an agenda: a return to simpler 
times, and the concomitant rejection of modern fads that threaten to estrange us from our 
elemental passions. They are skeptical of innovation, preferring to try to preserve a glorious 
past in the face of a modern onslaught.313 Novalis and his allies are hard at work to 
romanticize personal emotions vis-à-vis a depersonalized, rationalized social order.   
 They celebrate the tearing down of walls that separate us from our passions—but 
only some of our passions. Novalis and company do not seek completely unbound 
passions. Rather, Novalis, like most authors of his time, advocates well-directed, 
controlled, and guided passions. Perhaps one of the strongest objections to this claim is 
Joseph von Eichendorff’s famous “Aus dem Leben eines Taugenichts.” In one of the best-
                                                 
312 There is some disagreement in the secondary literature on this point. For a useful starting place on this 
theme see: Rupert Christiansen, Romantic Affinities : Portrait of an Age, 1780-1830 (London: Bodley Head 
; Putnam, 1988), 76. 
313 For a foundational and very influential discussion of this theme consider: Klaus Epstein, The Genesis of 
German Conservatism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966). 
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known stories of the era, Eichendorff rehearses the same themes I have discussed so far, 
but also depicts a romantic entanglement between a commoner and a baroness – a 
fundamental violation of social boundaries. Passions, after all, have the capacity to “tear 
down the bastions of rank and estate.”314 However, we learn on the final page of the story 
that the protagonist’s love interest is not of aristocratic birth after all, but has simply been 
taken into the Baron’s household due to their kindness to an orphan. The world is in order 
once again. Passions rage and remain in their place. No violation of the social order has 
occurred, and “like in a dream” the happy couple can settle into their new home, “the little 
white palace that shines over there in the moonlight,” which the real baron has generously 
given to them. Like the writings of Arnim, Schlegel, and Novalis, Eichendorff’s tale ibrims 
with passions—but only those that are suitable and safe, directed at wholesome and 
permissible targets.   
 Novalis pleads time and again for the virtues of a “childlike trust” that marks us as 
“children of heaven” and allows us to be rescued “from the most horrible dangers.”315 The 
passive voice is important in the previous sentence: it is somebody else who does the 
saving. Instead of calling on us to save ourselves, Schlegel encourages us to be more like 
children and to “wander, in good faith, into the incomprehensible.”316 Children are the 
model audience for many of the abovementioned authors because “words affect them 
                                                 
314 The full passage reads as follows: “Die Liebe – darüber sind nun alle Gelehrten einig – ist eine der 
couragiösesten Eigenschaften des menschlichen Herzens, die Bastionen von Rang und Stand schmettert sie 
mit einem Feuerblicke darnieder, die Welt ist ihr zu eng und die Ewigkeit zu kurz.” - Joseph Eichendorff, 
Aus Dem Leben Eines Taugenichts, Originalausg., 1. Aufl. ed., Suhrkamp Basisbibliothek ; (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). 
315 “Kindliches Zutrauen,” “Kinder des Himmels”, “...wunderschönen Frau der Christenheit, die mit 
göttlichen Kräften versehen, jeden Gläubigen aus den schrecklichsten Gefahren zu retten bereit war.” - 
Novalis, "Die Christenheit Oder Europa (1799)," in Schriften; Die Werke Friedrich Von Hardenbergs, ed. 
Paul Kluckhohn and R. H. Samuel (Stuttgart,: W. Kohlhammer, 1960). 
316 “...in guter Zuversicht sich ins Unverständliche hinein begeben.” (Schlegel, "Kritik an Der Aufklärung," 
31.) 
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magically.”317 Perhaps that is why Novalis thinks that “a child is far smarter and wiser than 
an adult.”318 Novalis praises children for lacking autonomy, maturity, and reason. Rather 
than following procedures towards claims of justice, children jump passionately and 
impulsively to conclusions. Impatient with the indirect question, they seize unswervingly 
the direct question of justice –as, so Novalis, should we.   
 Much is thus politically at stake when Novalis proclaims that “the world has to be 
romanticized.” This entails giving the “commonplace the air of mysteriousness, endowing 
the known with the dignity of the unknown, and giving the finite the appearance of the 
infinite, that’s how one romanticizes” the world.319 Novalis’s slogan has become necessary 
because instead of cherishing our passions, modern individuals have come to live 
dispassionate lives. Following the cameralist view would affirm the domination of cold, 
rational principles over spontaneous, unexamined emotions of horror and joy. Human 
freedom and human feeling are emptied of all meaning if calculation replaces natural 
inclinations and the surrender to illusion, chance, and raw passion. Following the 
cameralists reconfigures individuals into dull mechanical devices. Like machines, we have 
come to live lives without conviction, enthusiasm, or fundamental values—routinized, 
mechanized, rationalized, lackadaisical lives.  
 Consider in this context the ideal of bureaucracy and the nature of the bureaucrat. 
As Weber argues, the more the bureaucracy “succeeds in eliminating from official business 
love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape 
                                                 
317 “...dass die Worte ganz magisch auf sie [Kinder] wirken.” (Ibid.) 
318 “Ein Kind ist viel klüger und weiser als ein Erwachsener” (Novalis, "Fragmente Zur Poetik.") 
319 “…dem Gewöhnlichen ein geheimnisvolles Ansehen, dem Bekannten die Würde des Unbekannten, dem 
Endlichen einen unednlichen Schein gebe, so romantisiere ich es...” (———, "Die Welt Muss Romantisiert 
Werden," in Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-Jürgen Schmitt (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), 57.) 
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calculation,” the better it functions.320 In short, we associate strong norms with bureaucrats 
keeping their private inclinations and passions out of public affairs. However, for 
predictable reasons, this modern concern is very much at odds with the Romantic authors 
we have encountered thus far. As one of the most important reformers of the bureaucracy 
(and the subject of a later chapter) complained, the army of bureaucrats is merely “salaried” 
and “lack[s] interests and property.”321 The reference to property is significant here. Lower 
bureaucrats were certainly not rich, owned little, and were frequently even legally excluded 
from owning certain land. As such, they were a suspect category of individuals: unbound, 
free-floating, not tied to land and region but to an abstract administrative structure. They 
invoked little trust. Instead of living, as Novalis advocates in Heinrich von Ofterdingen, an 
“infinitely colorful [life], dying and returning again” and “loving to the highest extremes of 
passion,”322 bureaucrats simply “write, write, write.”323 Their professionally cultivated 
disinterest, far from being a valuable virtue, is cause for much scorn, then as now: 
 
To learn how one can serve a system against one's conscience and conviction for an 
entire lifetime, one must be a Prussian official; to know how one covers the 
disgrace of abandoned conviction with a title or a decoration, one must know the 
secrets of the higher bureaucracy.324  
                                                 
320 Max Weber, Economy and Society : An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 975. 
321 Karl Stein, Erich Botzenhart, and Walther Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften ([Stuttgart]: W. 
Kohlhammer, 1957-1974), 381. 
322 “Er durchlebte ein unendlich buntes Leben; starb und kam wieder, liebte bis zur höchsten 
Leidenschaft...” (Novalis, "Heinrich Von Ofterdingen." Chapter 1) 
323 Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, 381.; consider also: Reinhart 
Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform Und Revolution; All-Gemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung Und Soziale 
Bewegung Von 1791 Bis 1848 (Stuttgart,: E. Klett, 1967), 164.: Stein disliked “die beamteten 
Schreiberseelen abgründig.” 
324 Rudolph Gneist, Der Rechtsstaat (Berlin,: J. Springer, 1872). For a sharply diverging view consider to 
following quote from Klaus Epstein: “One must view the bureaucracy as the single most important 
progressive force in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. Their motivation was as frequently an 
idealistic desire to serve mankind as a personal desire to make a career for themselves. ... Their self-respect 
required that they view themselves as servants of the law and the general welfare rather than instruments of 
the king's arbitrary whim.” (Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism, 53.); For a third perspective 
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Living such dispassionate lives is a cardinal sin. The vision Novalis, Schlegel, 
Arnim, and Eichendorff present is stridently at odds with the norms of an emerging 
procedural and bureaucratic order. The mentality that is supposed to drive the bureaucrat is 
completely out of tune with the Romantics’ ideal of indulging in passions to the point of 
irrationalism, marveling at the world rather than administrating it, and endorsing impulse 
and arbitrary fiat rather than following procedures and regulations.   
 
 
5. The Personalized State 
 
Passions reside in individuals. As cameralists were well aware, to introduce 
procedures into the state meant to find institutional devices to contain the errant passions of 
individuals. In the cameralists’ conception, the state machinery is revised to contain the 
whims of individuals and to routinize interactions. Under ideal conditions, it is of no 
significance who carries out the standardized procedures of the state. Such a state is not, 
strictly speaking, ruled by anybody, but is ruled by the bureau. It is ruled by mechanized 
and depersonalized procedures. Objecting to this prospect, various critics warn that the 
depersonification of the state entailed by the cameralist project is actually destabilizing the 
state. They argue that instead of focusing on mechanized and depersonalized procedures, 
                                                                                                                                                 
see: Andre Liebich, "On the Origins of a Marxist Theory of Bureaucracy in the Critique of Hegel’s 
“Philosophy of Right”," Political Theory 10, no. 1 (Feb., 1982).  
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we should think of the state as inherently personal, impulsive, idiosyncratic, and beyond 
procedures. 
Consider again Weber’s above-cited claim that successful bureaucracies need to 
eliminate “from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and 
emotional elements which escape calculation.” What this amounts to, as Weber very much 
realizes, is to “dehumanize” bureaucracies.325 For skeptics, this is simply further proof that 
bureaucrats misunderstand human nature and social interactions. In their view, passions are 
a key ingredient of our humanity. Institutions that encourage or enshrine routinized and 
rationalized bureaucratic norms are degenerate and have a corrupting influence upon 
society.  
For these critics, bracketing passions off in certain areas of life amounts to 
dismantling our humanity and the social order that is built upon it. Not surprisingly, many 
resisted the move to depersonalize authority. Instead, they cherished the personal elements 
of political and social power. The linguistic turn whereby Herrschaft [domination or 
lordship] became increasingly applied to abstract entities (such as the state, rather than the 
king) was cause for considerable alarm.326 As such, the idea of depersonalization 
(noticeably in the offices of the bureaucracy) is the second major point of contention 
between cameralists and their critics.  
 Two contending representations of the state confront one another here. The critics 
of bureaucratization emphasize the intensely personal, passionate, and vibrant against the 
ideal of the cold, depersonalized, procedural state. For example, Novalis calls for the 
                                                 
325 Weber, Economy and Society : An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 975. 
326 Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-
1848, 10-11, 90-1. 
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“personification of the totality of the people.”327 For him, the proper state is “a person like 
an individual.”328 Rather than being mechanical or procedural, the state for Novalis has 
“only one meaning. It is reality through love.”329 Schlegel echoes these sentiments when he 
contrasts the desubstantiated mechanical qualities of the bureaucratic state with his own 
conceptof the state as the “greater moral individual.”330  
One notable site where Schlegel, Novalis, and likeminded critics of the cameralists’ 
project celebrated and highlighted their principles to great effect was in discussing the 
young Prussian queen who reigned from 1797 to 1810 beside Friedrich Wilhelm III. Such 
critics employed the figure of the queen as an effective device to personalize the state and 
to contrast their personified state with the depersonified, procedural model of the 
cameralists. Building on the model of the state as a (happy) family, they portrayed the 
queen as the compassionate mother figure. Poets such as Novalis and Körner assiduously 
pointed out the queen’s immense beauty, her presence, and her uniqueness. Her image was 
designed to clash with the purportedly uncaring, abstract, ugly bureaucrat embedded in the 
standard and standardizing bureaucratic machinery. Her lovely face was the antithesis of 
the faceless bureaucrat. The queen’s figure represented, in this context, primarily an 
organic, beautiful image of the state and society sharply at odds with the grey diagrams of 
the cameralists. The manner in which the queen was invoked in numerous poems and 
stories was aimed at inciting passions (for her and the nation)—a deliberate attempt to 
deploy the power of personal sentiment to forge and recover social and political unity. 
 
                                                 
327 “Personifizierung des Volksganzen“ (Novalis, Novalis Werke. Min II. No.11) 
328 Ibid. Betrachtungen II. No.627 
329 Jolles, Das Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter Napoleons, 174. 
330 Ibid., 187. 
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(i) Drawing the Queen 
 
Born Luise von Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the future queen was not particularly smart. 
Throughout her life she had difficulty writing coherently in either French or German. 
However, contemporaries routinely  described her as exceedingly beautiful and 
charming.331 A slew of paintings exist to allow contemporaries and later generations to 
judge her appearance for themselves. The most famous representation of the queen was 
drawn by Elisabeth Vigée-Lebrun. Widely renowned at the time, Vigée-Lebrun had made 
her name by drawing another queen: Marie-Antoinette.332 In a bid to help arrest the 
deterioration of the French Queen’s reputation and to shore up sympathies, Vigée-Lebrun 
depicted the queen with her children and the empty crib of her dead child.333 That portrait is 
intensely political, as is less flattering contemporary pornography of the queen.. As 
Edmund Burke reminds us, how the crowd views a queen can significantly sway their 
attitudes toward revolutions. Is she the pompous, degenerate, deeply corrupted head of a 
                                                 
331 For a helpful biography see: Luise Schorn-Schütte, Königin Luise : Leben Und Legende, Originalausg. 
ed. (München: Beck, 2003), 15-6.; For a perspective from a contemporary of the Queen see: Hermann von 
Boyen, Denkwürdigkeiten Und Erinnerungen 1771-1813, Neue bearb. ausg. in 2 bänden mit bildnis ed. 
(Stuggart: R. Lutz, 1899), 360. 
332 Even recently some of her paintings and self-portraits have been duplicated endlessly on postal stamps 
by a variety of countries. For more on Vigée-Lebrun’s interactions with the Prussian Queen see: Philipp 
Demandt, Luisenkult : Die Unsterblichkeit Der Königin Von Preussen (Köln: Böhlau, 2003), 123-30, 32, 
60. For recent and useful accounts of Queen Luise see: Heinrich Hartmann, Luise : Preussens Grosse 
Königin, 2. Aufl. ed. (Berg/Starnberger See: Türmer, 1985).: Johannes Thiele, Luise : Königin Von 
Preussen ; Das Buch Ihres Lebens (München: List, 2003).; Dagmar von Gersdorff, Königin Luise Und 
Friedrich Wilhelm Iii. : Eine Liebe in Preussen, Ungekürzte Ausg. ed. (Berlin: Rowohlt Berlin, 2002).; 
Karin Feuerstein-Prasser, Die Preussischen Königinnen (Regensburg: F. Pustet, 2000). 
333 Simon Schama, Citizens : A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 220-23. 
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defunct state? Or is she the angelic exemplification of the best the aristocracy has to offer, 
worthy of admiration, love, and ultimately protection?334  
 Predictably, people like Novalis advocate mobilizing our passions on the side of the 
beautiful queen and therefore, implicitly, of the personalized state. In their artistic 
renderings, they portray her as the exemplifier of the state, the true representation of the 
proper order of things. They argue that a state based exclusively on “mechanical 
administration” will inevitably fail. Administered as a “factory,” the state would be based 
purely on self-interest [Eigennutz]. Such rampant egotism is “the seed of revolutions.”335 
Instead, passionate love for the ruling couple should be the real glue of a society and 
political system. It alone can effectively prevent strife and revolution. Even with regard to 
the bureaucracy, “personal love” should bind civil administrators to their sovereign.336 The 
necessity and value of an absolute love for the king and queen is the central claim of 
Novalis’s otherwise purposefully vague political agenda.337 Without such passions, 
officials are just empty carriers of titles.338 Novalis repeats indefatigably in his poetry that 
                                                 
334 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett 
Pub. Co., 1987), 62-68. 
335 “Kein Staat ist mehr als Fabrik verwaltet worden, als Preußen, seit Friedrich Wilhelm des Ersten Tode. 
So nötig vielleicht eine solche maschinistische Administration zur physischen Gesundheit, Stärkung und 
Gewandtheit des Staats sein mag, so geht doch der Staat, wenn er bloß auf diese Art behandelt wird, im 
wesentlichen darüber zugrunde. Das Prinzip des alten berühmten Systems ist, jeden durch Eigennutz an den 
Staat zu binden. Die klugen Politiker hatten das Ideal eines Staats vor sich, wo das Interesse des Staats, 
eigennützig, wie das Interesse der Untertanen, so künstlich jedoch mit demselben verknüpft wäre, daß 
beide einander wechselseitig beförderten. An diese politische Quadratur des Zirkels ist sehr viel Mühe 
gewandt worden: aber der rohe Eigennutz scheint durchaus unermeßlich, antisystematisch zu sein. Er hat 
sich durchaus nicht beschränken lassen, was doch die Natur jeder Staatseinrichtung notwendig erfordert. 
Indes ist durch diese förmliche Aufnahme des gemeinen Egoismus, als Prinzip, ein ungeheurer Schade 
geschehn und der Keim der Revolution unserer Tage liegt nirgends, als hier.” (Novalis, "Glauben Und 
Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin," in Schriften; Die Werke Friedrich Von Hardenbergs, ed. Paul 
Kluckhohn and R. H. Samuel (Stuttgart,: W. Kohlhammer, 1960). Section 36) 
336 Ibid.; See also: Schorn-Schütte, Königin Luise : Leben Und Legende, 38-9. 
337 “...absolute Liebe” (Novalis, "Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 53) 
338 Ibid. Section 54.; For a literary account of such emptiness consider the work by August von Kotzenbue. 
In his Die deutschen Kleinstädter he provides an account of the dispassionate petit bourgeois that is 
obsessed with ridiculous administrative titles rather than the human heart. Not surprisingly, such vapid 
concerns fade when compared to the calm grandeur of the real attentendants of the high court (August von 
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the king “received more than a kingdom from heaven in the form of Luise, and [his] heart 
needed her more than the crown.”339 Novalis uses the trope of the king’s love as the 
foundation of the legitimacy of Friedrich Wilhelm III:  
 
Only he who is already more than king, can rule in a royal fashion, 
Therefore, he should be king who loves the loveliest being [i.e. Luise].340  
 
Novalis understands marriage as founded in arational passion. Such a love-marriage 
constitutes the foundation of the state: “Isn’t the king rendered king simply through the 
heartfelt feeling of her worth?”341 Novalis defends this claim by arguing that “each 
improvement of imperfect constitutions amounts to an enabling of love.342 Novalis exploits 
here the ambiguity of the term “constitution” by paralleling a person’s internal 
psychological makeup and basic outlook on the world with the political and social 
framework of a society.343 In both, so Novalis, letting love and passions reign is natural and 
beneficial, since it helps us return to simpler, more unified, more innocent times.344 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kotzebue, Die Deutschen Kleinstädter: E. Lustspiel in 4 Akten, Universal-Bibliothek, Nr. 90 (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 1985). For Kotzenbue’s considerable influence, mostly in death, see: George S. Williamson, 
"What Killed August Von Kotzebue? The Temptations of Virtue and the Political Theology of German 
Nationalism, 1789-1819," The Journal of Modern History 72, no. 4 (Dec., 2000). 
339 Novalis, "Blumen (1798)," in Schriften; Die Werke Friedrich Von Hardenbergs, ed. Paul Kluckhohn 
and R. H. Samuel (Stuttgart,: W. Kohlhammer, 1960). - An den König: 
Mehr, als ein Königreich gab der Himmel dir in Louisen, 
   Aber du brachtest ihr auch mehr, als die Krone, dein Herz.   
340 Ibid.:  
Nur wer mehr, als König schon ist, kann königlich herrschen, 
   Also soll König sein, welcher die Herrlichste liebt.  
341 “Wird nicht der König schon durch das innige Gefühl ihres Werts zum König?” (———, "Glauben Und 
Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 24) 
342 “Jede Verbesserung unvollkommener Konstitutionen läuft daraus hinaus, daß man sie der Liebe fähiger 
macht. (Ibid. Section 55) 
343 For more on the contemporary uses of this strategy see: Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : 
The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 130-1. 
344 Novalis, "Blumen (1798)." - Es ist an der Zeit  
Glänzend steht nun die Brücke, der mächtige Schatten erinnert 
  Nur an die Zeit noch, es ruht ewig der Tempel nun hier, 
Götzen von Stein und Metall mit furchtbaren Zeichen der Willkür 
  Sind gestürzt und wir sehn dort nur ein liebendes Paar – 
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depictions of the queen are meant to make this journey easier for us: open your eyes and 
just see how deserving the queen is of your admiration. How heartless would a person have 
to be to resist her charms? How can you speak out against the aristocracy that produced 
someone like her and which she now heads as queen? 
 In short, just as in the French context, the image of the queen is a contested site of 
political campaigning. For people like Novalis, turning the popular imagination towards 
seeing the ruling power through the figure of the “queen of hearts”345 (as Luise was 
frequently called) is not merely a poetic exercise, but rather a politically charged aesthetic 
declaration. Presenting “the image of this happy, intimately connected couple” has a 
morally educating effect upon the people (the youth in particular) and reduces the risk of 
revolution.346   
In a parallel argument, Novalis uses the image of the queen to question the value of 
mere paper constitutions. The establishment of a tight procedural framework within a 
constitution was a point of frequent contention between the crown and reformers. 
Advocates of constitutional safeguards were repeatedly disappointed by Friedrich Wilhelm 
III, who promised a constitution in 1808, 1811, 1815, and again in 1820, but never 
delivered.347 As the influential and renowned statesman Metternich argued, “a paper 
                                                                                                                                                 
An der Umarmung erkennt ein jeder die alten Dynasten, 
  Kennt den Steuermann, kennt wieder die glückliche Zeit.  
345 “Königin der Herzen.” 
346 Die edle Simplizität des königlichen Privatlebens, das Bild dieses glücklichen, innig verbundenen Paars, 
würde den wohltätigsten Einfluß auf die sittliche Bildung dieses Kerns der preußischen Jugend haben, und 
so würde dem König am leichtesten der angeborne Wunsch seines Herzens gewährt, der wahrhafte 
Reformator und Restaurator seiner Nation und seiner Zeit zu werden. (Novalis, "Glauben Und Liebe Oder 
Der König Und Die Königin." Section 36) 
347 For a range of historians who comment on these promisses and the implications for Prussia see: 
Wolfgang Neugebauer, Geschichte Preussens (Hildesheim ; New York: Georg Olms, 2004), 95-6.; 
Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 
182-98.; Matthew Levinger, "The Prussian Reform Movement and the Rise of Enlightened Nationalism," in 
The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, ed. Philip Dwyer (New York: Longman, 
2000), 273-5.; Büsch, Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission zu Berlin., Handbuch Der Preussischen 
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constitution is as much a [real] constitution as a marriage-contract amounts to 
matrimony.”348 Somebody interested in such technicalities misses the essence of politics. 
People can only be concerned about a paper constitution “the way one is interested in a 
single letter of the alphabet.” Their attachments should instead aim at beauty and elegance 
– the very attributes the queen exudes. As Novalis put it, if the “sign is not a beautiful 
image, or song, then attachment to the sign is one of the most misguided of inclinations.”349 
Paper constitutions might appease the concerns of mere reason, a theme familiar by now, 
but they are inattentive to the realm of emotional intangibles. Reformers might take solace 
in the codification and bracketing of political power, but they misinterpret law, which in 
the end, we are told, only amounts to the utterance of a “loved, venerated person” anyway. 
As such, “a true royal couple is for the whole person what a constitution is for naked 
reason.”350  
Abstract law and political power is meaningless and without force in the absence of 
a way to appeal to the realm of emotions and passions. However, to do so effectively the 
“mystic sovereign requires a symbol, and which symbol is worthier and more fitting, than a 
loveable apt human being?”351 An abundance of mugs, plates, mirrors, and vases adorned 
                                                                                                                                                 
Geschichte, 26.; Matthew Bernard Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian 
Political Culture, 1806-1848 (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 12, 54, 92, 146-57.; 
Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 55.; Dwyer, The Rise of 
Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, 26.; Nolte, Staatsbildung Als Gesellschaftsreform : 
Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 79-85. 
348 “Eine Charte ist ebensowenig eine Verfassung, wie der Ehekontrakt die Ehe ist. Man schreibe soviel 
man wolle – und das Wenigste wird immer das Beste sein – und man wird nie etwas Anderes als ein Blatt 
Papier in der Hand haben. England allein hat eine Verfassung ... sie ist durch Jahrhunderte geschaffen 
worden. (Wien, 10. April 1820, an Mme de Lieven, cited in: Clemens Wenzel Lothar Metternich and 
Arthur Breycha-Vauthier, Aus Diplomatie Und Leben; Maximen Des Fürsten Metternich, [2. Aufl.] ed., 
Österreichische Diplomaten (Graz,: Verlag Styria, 1964), 85-86.  
349 Novalis, "Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 15. 
350 “Ein wahrhaftes Königspaar ist für den ganzen Menschen, was eine Konstitution für den bloßen 
Verstand ist.” (Ibid. Section 15) 
351 “Bedarf der mystische Souverän nicht, wie jede Idee, eines Symbols, und welches Symbol ist würdiger 
und passender, als ein liebenswürdiger trefflicher Mensch?” (Ibid. Section 15) 
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with the image of the queen (frequently taken from Vigée-Lebrun’s painting) attests to the 
symbolic and propagandistic qualities of the queen, who fits, or is made to fit, Novalis’s 
bill perfectly.  
This formula for sustaining political legitimacy in the face of the challenges of the 
French Revolution is enabling, but also constraining. For example, Novalis, like Adam 
Müller,352 insists forcefully that the king is not the first servant [Beamte] of the state:  
 
One is very wrong to call the king the first servant of the state. The king is not a 
citizen, consequently not a civil servant either. That is precisely the differentiating 
element concerning monarchies in that they are based on the belief in a higher-born 
human, based on the voluntary acceptance of an ideal-human.353 
 
In pronounced contrast to Frederick the Great’s famous claim to the contrary, the 
king cannot be a depersonalized bureaucrat (Staatsbeamter) in Novalis’s account.354 
Instead, he is the all-too-human, lovable and loving father of the nation. Novalis’s 
conceptual push furnishes a ready-made and easily communicated model of political power 
to underwrite the coercive powers of the king. Lasting happiness, for the king and his state, 
only flows from unselfish love that is the “sole, eternal foundation of all true, inseparable 
connections.” Novalis concludes this important train of thought by asking rhetorically, 
“What other thing is the connection in a state, than wedlock?”355 What could be more 
                                                 
352 Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-
1848, 171. 
353 “Man hat sehr unrecht, den König den ersten Beamten des Staates zu nennen. Der König ist kein 
Staatsbürger, mithin auch kein Staatsbeamter. Das ist eben das Unterscheidende der Monarchie, dass sie 
auf dem Glauben an einen höher-geborenene Menschen, auf der freiwilligen Annahme eine Idealmenschen 
beruht.” (Novalis in the  “Jahrbüchern der Preussischen Monarchie” [1798] as cited in: Jacoby, Die 
Bürokratisierung Der Welt; Ein Beitrag Zur Problemgeschichte, 54-5. 
354 Novalis, "Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 18.; For more on this theme 
consider: Jacoby, Die Bürokratisierung Der Welt; Ein Beitrag Zur Problemgeschichte, 54-5. 
355 “Ein dauerhaftes Glück macht nur der rechtliche Mann, und der rechtliche Staat. ... Uneigennützige 
Liebe im Herzen und ihre Maxime im Kopf, das ist die alleinige, ewige Basis aller wahrhaften, 
unzertrennlichen Verbindungen, und was ist die Staatsverbindung anders, als eine Ehe?” (Novalis, 
"Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 36) 
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“beautiful, poetic” or a more “natural form” than the “form of the family – monarchy - 
multiple masters – multiple families – one master – one family!”356 As such, the family and 
“bands of the heart”357 are the true glue that keeps society from falling into atomistic 
egotism and the horrors of revolution. In these times, 
 
A regent can do nothing more purposive for the sustaining of the state … than 
trying to make it as individualized as possible.358 
 
Only through the personification of the state in concrete individuals, most notably 
the king and queen, does the counterrevolutionary agenda take root. For it to flower, 
Novalis develops the figure of the queen as the caring mother. In this model of the state as 
a family, the queen functions in a manner that makes full use of the “sphere of influence in 
the home.”359 Portrayed as fulfilling that role effectively and tenderly, she would be the 
example that shifts public sentiment, “the strongest restoration- and education-tool of 
mores.”360 Properly depicted, the queen’s court can be the “great model of a household, 
after which all smaller ones are modeled.”361  
 Highlighting the caring nature of the queen advances one crucial aspect of this 
model of the state. Rather than following standardized, abstract procedures, the mother of 
the nation loves and cares for all her children. For example, in the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift we learn that the queen cut through seemingly unjust and slow-moving 
                                                 
356 Dann aber würde man am ersten die schönste, poetische, die natürlichste Form wählen – Familienform – 
Monarchie, – mehrere Herrn – mehrere Familien – Ein Herr – Eine Familie! (Ibid. Section 67) 
357 Ibid. Section 40. 
358 “Ein Regent kann für die Erhaltung seines Staats in den jetzigen Zeiten gewiß nicht zweckmäßiger 
sorgen, als wenn er ihn vielmöglichst zu individualisieren sucht.” (Ibid. Section 20, emphasis added) 
359 “häuslichen Wirkungskreis” (Ibid. Section 27) 
360 “...und am Ende ist doch die öffentliche Meinung das kräftigste Restaurations- und Bildungsmittel der 
Sitten.” (Ibid. Section 27) 
361 “Der Hof ist eigentlich das große Muster einer Haushaltung. Nach ihm bilden sich die großen 
Haushaltungen des Staats, nach diesen die kleinern, und so herunter.” (Ibid. Section 29) 
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bureaucratic procedures and technicalities, and took upon herself the individual case of an 
unfairly treated subject of the state.362 Rather than asking the indirect question of 
procedural requirements by mechanically following the prescribed steps of the 
bureaucracy, the queen allowed the impulse of her passion to immediately reach the direct 
question of guilt or innocence.  
 Notice that the authors of these paeans to the queen are not concerned with the issue 
of historical accuracy versus artifice. As Novalis himself argues rather candidly, the “true 
regent is an artist of artists; that is, the manager of artists.”363 In this all-encompassing role, 
the “regent puts on a manifold theatrical spectacle, where stage and sitting-area, performer 
and audience are one and the same, and the regent himself is poet, director, and hero of the 
piece at the same time.”364 Stagecraft and statecraft largely overlap here.365 This spectacle 
grows all the more enchanting once we discover that  
 
The co-director is also the love of the hero, the heroine of the piece, and when one 
notices that she is the muse, who inspired the poet with a holy glow, and who tunes 
his instruments for soft and heavenly play.366  
 
Such a royal spectacle serves to mobilize affection, channel passions, and  turn the 
tide against the depersonalization of the state. Insofar as its underlying agenda is 
successful, the portrayal of the queen by Novalis and his followers serves as a motivational 
                                                 
362 K. Müchler, "Anekdote Von Der Verewigten Königinn," Berlinische Monatschrift 1 (1811): 312-14. 
363 “Ein wahrhafter Fürst [regent] ist der Künstler der Künstler; das ist, der Direktor der Künstler.” 
(Novalis, "Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 39) 
364 Der Regent führt ein unendlich mannigfaches Schauspiel auf, wo Bühne und Parterre, Schauspieler und 
Zuschauer eins sind, und er selbst Poet, Direktor und Held des Stücks zugleich ist. (Ibid. Section 39) 
365 Notice also a considerable shift in attitudes whereby Machiavelli is now publicly praised (by an 
unnamed author) for capturing the essence of politics in contrast to contemporary thinking on the subject: 
"An Machiavels Manen. 1806," Minverva 2 (1806): 191-2.; See also: Foucault et al., The Foucault Effect : 
Studies in Governmentality : With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, 88. 
366 Wie entzückend, wenn wie bei dem König, die Direktrice zugleich die Geliebte des Helden, die Heldin 
des Stücks ist, wenn man selbst die Muse in ihr erblickt, die den Poeten mit heiliger Glut erfüllt, und zu 
sanften, himmlischen Weisen sein Saitenspiel stimmt. (Novalis, "Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und 
Die Königin." Section 39) 
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tool that forges political unity and combats ‘vapid’ procedures. Consider in this context 
Karl Theodor Körner’s poem “For the Queen Luise.” It was written at the height of the war 
to drive Napoleon out of Germany (1813). Before Körner died in the gory war he 
romanticized, he wrote popular, nationalistic war songs, most notably “Lützow’s wild 
daring hunt,”367 which celebrates an extraordinary military unit whose uniform colors 
(black coat, red rims, and yellow buttons) were the inspiration for the current German flag. 
The same patriotic fervor found in Körner’s war songs saturates his poems about the queen. 
With Germany lying “in cowardly shame,” only the queen was capable of “hearing her 
children” and “saving German courage.” Thanks to her, now “all hearts burn faithfully and 
courageously!”368 Körner’s passionate outpouring finishes with the feverish cry that  
 
[Her] picture should sway on their flags 
      And should shine for them through the night to victory. 
 Luise be the guardian-spirit of German affairs, 
 Luise be the password to revenge!369 
 
In another poem (“Aufruf”) Körner invokes Luise again to bless the cause against 
Napoleon despite the growing “mountains of corpses.” Novalis, similarly, uses the 
beautiful image of the queen (“das schöne Wesen”) for patriotic gain and ends with the call 
                                                 
367 “Lützows wilde verwegene Jagd.” For more on Körner’s relative influence and popularity see: Gerhard 
Ritter, Das Deutsche Problem; Grundfragen Deutschen Staatslebens, Gestern Und Heute, 2. neu 
durchgearb. und erw. Aufl. ed. (München,: R. Oldenbourg, 1966), 60-61. 
368 Du Heilige, hör' deiner Kinder Flehen! 
    [...] 
    So hast du uns den deutschen Mut gerettet. 
    Jetzt sieh auf uns, sieh auf dein Volk zurück, 
    Wie alle Herzen treu und mutig brennen! 
    Nun woll' uns auch die Deinen wieder nennen! 
(Karl Theodor Körner’s : “For the Queen Luise”) 
369 So soll dein Bild auf unsern Fahnen schweben 
    Und soll uns leuchten durch die Nacht zum Sieg. 
    Luise sei der Schutzgeist deutscher Sache, 
    Luise sei das Losungswort zur Rache! 
(Karl Theodor Körner’s : “For the Queen Luise”) 
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for “eternal love toward the beautiful female-regent.”370 A mere letter or picture of the 
queen  
 
would be medals, honors of the highest kind, decorations that would inflame and 
motivate to the highest deeds. Deserving housewives should also be recipients of 
similar marks of distinction.371 
 
Novalis even proposes that each wedding ceremony should include a “meaningful 
obeisance ceremony [Huldigungszeremonie] to the queen, just as the gods were treated in 
old times where true religiosity was created through the unrelenting mixing of the realm of 
gods with [daily] life.” Such personification and representation of the state would “ennoble 
the common life,” and the “constant presence of the royal couple in the public and private 
life would create true patriotism.”372 
 
 
(ii) Of Queens and Guillotines 
 
However, this kind of patriotic fervor does not amount to a boundary-leveling 
force.  Quite the contrary. Passion for the state as personalized through the image of the 
queen is a powerful boundary-preserving tool. To individualize the state through the icon 
of the queen as the mother of the nation invokes, as we have seen, the notion of the family 
                                                 
370 “Ewige Liebe der schönen Fürstin.” (Novalis, "Blumen (1798).")  
371 Ein Brief, ein Bild der Königin; das wären Orden, Auszeichnungen der höchsten Art; Auszeichnungen, 
die zu den ausgezeichnetsten Taten entzündeten. Auch verdienstvolle Hausfrauen sollten ähnliche 
Ehrenzeichen bekommen. (———, "Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 26) 
372 “Mit jeder Trauung ließe sich leicht eine bedeutungsvolle Huldigungszeremonie der Königin einführen; 
und so sollte man mit dem König und der Königin das gewöhnliche Leben veredeln, wie sonst die Alten es 
mit ihren Göttern taten. Dort entstand echte Religiosität durch diese unaufhörliche Mischung der 
Götterwelt in das Leben. So könnte hier durch diese beständige Verwebung des königlichen Paars in das 
häusliche und öffentliche Leben, echter Patriotism entstehen. “ (Ibid. Section 30) 
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as the model for a proper understanding of the state. As Novalis reminds us, wishing “to 
live as family, in One [sic] family – in a regulated household is to ask for order, security, 
quiet.” This amounts for Novalis to a “search for a true monarchy,”373 certainly not to 
revolution or overturning the social order. In the words of one historian, “her subject’s love 
for her [became] a synonym for loyalty to the throne.”374 
 The figure of the queen served to protect the old boundaries that had given shape 
and form to Prussia by winning over “all hearts” through her “unspeakable grace and 
charm.”375 The Prussian queen largely succeeded where the French Queen had mostly 
failed. Novalis and his allies (even when they do not directly discuss the queen) were 
instrumental in this antirevolutionary project. Without such literary productions, so Novalis 
himself, the “French king was dethroned long before the Revolution.”376 When a state is 
lacking a proper representation of the king and queen, “the complete disintegration of the 
modern world is certain.”377 
 On the other hand, if things work well, the king and queen will be seen as the “life-
principle of the state,” instilling it with life and love.378 In doing so, they create the “most 
                                                 
373 “Mit der Verheiratung ändert sich das System. Der Verheiratete verlangt Ordnung, Sicherheit, und Ruhe 
– er wünscht, als Familie, in Einer Familie zu leben – in einem regelmäßigen Hauswesen – er sucht eine 
echte Monarchie.” (Ibid. Section 60.) 
374 Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 79. 
375 “Es war die Güte, die aus ihren Augen strahlte, und die unbeschreibliche Huld und Anmut ihres ganzen 
Wesens, die ihr alle Herzen gewannen.” (Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften 
Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 80-1.) 
376 “Veredlung dieser Gesinnung ist die einzige Basis der echten Staatsreform. Der König und die Königin 
können und müssen als solche das Prinzip der öffentlichen Gesinnung sein. Dort gibt es keine Monarchie 
mehr wo der König und die Intelligenz des Staats nicht mehr identisch sind. Daher war der König von 
Frankreich schon lange vor der Revolution dethronisiert, und so die meisten Fürsten Europas.” (Novalis, 
"Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 28.) 
377 “Es würde ein sehr gefährliches Symptom des neupreußischen Staats sein, wenn man zu stumpf für die 
wohltätigen Einflüsse des Königs und der Königin wäre, wenn es in der Tat an Sinn für dieses klassische 
Menschenpaar gebräche. Das muß sich in kurzem offenbaren. Wirken diese Genien nichts, so ist die 
vollkommene Auflösung der modernen Welt gewiß, und die himmlische Erscheinung ist nichts, als das 
Aufblitzen der verfliegenden Lebenskraft, die Sphärenmusik eines Sterbenden, die sichtbare Ahndung einer 
bessern Welt, die edlern Generationen bevorsteht.” (Ibid. Section 28.) 
378 “Der König ist das gediegene Lebensprinzip des Staats...” (Ibid. Section 17) 
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animated impulses” that never turn uncontrollably mercurial.379 Behavior will always be 
“an expression of the highest, contained fullness of force,” governed and “dominated” by 
proper attention to social “etiquette” and “rules.”380 As such, the creation of brimming (not 
overflowing) passions contained within the boundaries of social etiquette is an important 
concern for the royal household and royal representations. It is an instrumental contributor 
to the “taste and love for the monarchical form.”381 The revolutionaries, in contrast, toyed 
with the lines between form and lack of form (“Form” – “Unform”).382 
One might consider revolutions as the ultimate expressions of passions running 
their full course, yet Novalis cautions us against such a dangerous misconception. He 
distinguishes between two kinds of energies, one born out of “weakness and disease,” the 
other the true force of a nation.383 The wrong kinds of passions are born out of weakness 
and result in weakening the country further.384 The trouble with revolutions is that they are 
built upon and foster the wrong kinds of mores: 
 
Those who in our days clamor against aristocrats and nowhere praise order except 
in the new, French manner, […] hide their shallowness and inner nakedness behind 
colorful flags and the currently triumphant fashion…385 
                                                 
379 “lebhaftesten Regungen” (Ibid. Section 17) 
380 “Ausdruck der höchsten, zurückgehaltenen Kraftfülle” (Ibid. Section 17) 
381 “Herstellung der erstern [natürliche Etiquette] wird also keine unwichtige Sorge des denkenden Königs 
sein, da sie einen bedeutenden Einfluß auf den Geschmack und die Liebe für die monarchische Form hat.” 
(Ibid. Section 17) 
382 Ibid. Section 45. 
383 “Revolutionen beweisen eher gegen die wahre Energie einer Nation. Es gibt eine Energie aus 
Kränklichkeit und Schwäche – die gewaltsamer wirkt, als die wahre – aber leider mit noch tieferer 
Schwäche aufhört.” (Ibid. Section 46) 
384 Novalis elaborates that “ein einstürzender Thron ist, wie ein fallender Berg, der die Ebene zerschmettert 
und da ein totes Meer hinterläßt, wo sonst ein fruchtbares Land und lustige Wohnstätte war.” (Ibid. Section 
11) 
385 “Diejenigen, die in unsern Tagen gegen Fürsten, als solche, deklamieren, und nirgends Heil statuieren, 
als in der neuen, französischen Manier, auch die Republik nur unter der repräsentativen Form erkennen, 
und apodiktisch behaupten, daß nur da Republik sei, wo es Primär- und Wahlversammlungen, Direktorium 
und Räte, Munizipalitäten und Freiheitsbäume gäbe, die sind armselige Philister, leer an Geist und arm an 
Herzen, Buchstäbler, die ihre Seichtigkeit und innerliche Blöße hinter den bunten Fahnen der 
triumphierenden Mode, unter der imposanten Maske des Kosmopolitismus zu verstecken suchen, und die 
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The revolutionaries’ true passions are not properly guided; they are “impoverished 
philistines, empty in spirit and poor at heart, mere peddlers of the letters of the alphabet.”386 
Novalis, in contrast, does not blindly invoke and excite all passions, only those that are 
well-directed and containable. At the heart of his emphasis on the embodied, individualized 
state is the image of the sovereign forging justice in a willful, explicitly nonprocedural 
manner.  
 The queen’s premature death (at 34 years of age, in 1810) would seem in this 
context a severe setback to this project: it was the loss of one of the prime symbols of a 
personalized state beyond mechanized procedures. But then again, what could be more 
poetic than the tragic death of a young and beautiful queen?387 Consider again Theodor 
Körner who reworks the rather bland death of the queen into a breathless romantic poem.388 
In it, the queen slumbers until called upon by her nation and “then, German woman, wake 
up, a good angel for a good cause.”389 Similarly, the poets Max von Schulendorf and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gegner, wie die Obskuranten verdienen, damit der Frosch- und Mäusekrieg vollkommen versinnlicht 
werde.” (Ibid. Section 23.) 
386 Ibid. Section 23. 
387 Lest this be thought the expression of a completely archaic world-view, consider the death of Diana, 
Princess of Wales in 1997. For accounts by contemporaries of the Queen Luise’s death see: Friedrich 
Schulze, Die Franzosenzeit in Deutschen Landen 1806-1815, in Wort Und Bild Der Mitlebenden (Leipzig,: 
R. Voigtländer, 1908), 287-90. 
388 For a more somber take on the same subject see also: J.F.W. Himly, "Am Sarge Der Königinn," 
Berlinische Monatschrift (1810): 167.; Feuerstein-Prasser, Die Preussischen Königinnen, 218-19. 
389 Du schläfst so sanft! - Die stillen Züge hauchen 
    Noch deines Lebens schöne Träume wieder; 
    Der Schlummer nur senkt seine Flügel nieder, 
    Und heil'ger Friede schließt die klaren Augen. 
So schlummre fort, bis deines Volkes Brüder, 
    Wenn Flammenzeichen von den Bergen rauchen, 
    Mit Gott versöhnt die rost'gen Schwerter brauchen, 
    Das Leben opfernd für die höchsten Güter! 
Tief führt der Herr durch Nacht und durch Verderben; 
    So sollen wir im Kampf das Heil erwerben, 
    Daß unsre Enkel freie Männer sterben. 
Kommt dann der Tag der Freiheit und der Rache: 
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Heinrich von Kleist praised the queen after her death for being a shining beacon in dark 
times, the only one to emerge victorious and to retain her grace.390  Achim von Arnim, 
similarly, tried to mobilize the corpse of the queen in the context of a larger aesthetic and 
political moment.391 Since then, Luise has been invoked innumerable times throughout the 
German history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One of the most-cited cases 
comes from the legendary Prussian Field Marshall Blücher; looking down from 
Montmartre on the 30th of March 1814 upon a conquered Paris he allegedly proclaimed 
solemnly, “Luise is avenged.”392 
However, all of this was still far in the unforeseeable distance. Back in the time 
surrounding the queen’s death, France seemed undefeatable; her troops still occupied much 
of Prussia and had pacts and alliances with most German states. Part of the problem, so it 
seemed in the minds of many, was that before 1810 the German people simply did not care 
one way or the other about foreign occupations. For a conquered population, the Germans 
of the various territories that French troops occupied were surprisingly docile. Even the 
now famous harsh, ad hoc execution of a lowly bookseller for distributing insidious 
pamphlets only briefly attracted the attention of the nation.393 Most people, it seemed, had 
                                                                                                                                                 
    Dann ruft dein Volk; dann, deutsche Frau, erwache, 
    Ein guter Engel für die gute Sache! 
(Theodor Körner „Vor Rauchs Büste der Königin Luise” - 1812, first published in 1814) 
390 Cited in: Schorn-Schütte, Königin Luise : Leben Und Legende, 90.; See also: Feuerstein-Prasser, Die 
Preussischen Königinnen, 219. 
391 See: “Die Nachtfeier nach der Einholung der hohen Leiche Ihrer Majestät der Königin.” (Ludwig Achim 
Arnim, Werke in Sechs Bänden, ed. Roswitha Burwick, 1. Aufl. ed., 6 vols., vol. 5 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989), 753-6. 
392 Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, Fürst von Wahlstatt (1742-1819). 
393 Johann Philipp Palm had sold pamphlets that decried the brutality of the French occupying troops. After 
a precursory trial, he was executed on the 26th August, 1806. For the pamphlet and various letters 
surrounding this affair see: Eckart Klessmann, Deutschland Unter Napoleon in Augenzeugenberichten 
(Düsseldorf: Karl Rauch Verlag, 1965), 79-94.; See also: Hellmuth Rössler, Zwischen Revolution Und 
Reaktion; Ein Lebensbild Des Reichsfreiherrn Hans Christoph Von Gagern, 1766-1852, 
Veröffentlichungen Der Historischen Kommission Für Nassau ; (Göttingen,: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1958), 
108-9. 
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simply lost interest in fighting the French.394 Perhaps it seemed to them a hopeless 
endeavor, perhaps many silently welcomed the French, or perhaps they were simply weary 
of yet another war. In any case, many writers depicted the population as having lost “all 
previous great interest, which had kept the nation together.”  
Things had gotten so bad that Ricklefs in a popular magazine had to argue against 
the oft-heard opinion that “the Germans really have no character or backbone.”395 While 
the honor of the nation was “trampled by the feet of public opinion,” nobody could be 
rallied by this thought and find sufficient enthusiasm to defend the state.396 Friedrich von 
Gentz observed that the public wass divided into two parts, “of which one, by far the 
greater, regards the current dismal conditions with, more or less, apathy, while the other 
part regards it with approval.”397 Carl von Clausewitz remarked dryly that German 
resistance seemed to falter completely and that everybody “marches willingly into the . . . 
yoke.”398 The influential theologian, pastor, and professor Friedrich Schleiermacher 
lamented similarly that the apathy of his fellow citizens amounted to a “secret war against 
                                                 
394 For much more on this point see: Herman Granier, Berichte Aus Der Berliner Franzosenzeit 1807-1809, 
Nach Den Akten Des Berliner Geheimen Staatsarchivs Und Des Pariser Kriegsarchivs (Leipzig,: S. Hirzel, 
1913), 89-90, 246-51, 78. 
395 F.R. Ricklefs, "Hat Der Deutsche Wirklich Keinen Character?," Minverva 3 (1806): 1-11.  
396 “Wärhend der Jahre 1803 bis 1805 hatten sich in Deutschlands Volksbewusstsein Alle bisherigen 
grossen Interessen, die früher die Nation zusammengehalten hatten, vollends verloren. Die Ehre des 
Reiches war nun längst in der öffentlichen Meinung mit Füssen getreten; aus dieser Vorstellung konte 
weder Begeisterung noch Trost mehr kommen. Selbst an dem einzelnen Statsverhältnisse hatte niemand 
mehr einen Anhalt.” (Heinrich Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren 
Unterrichtsanstalten, 6 vols., vol. 5 (Halle,: Eduard Anton, 1839), 439, 99.)  
397 “...die Masse des Publikums [ist] durchgänging in zwei Klassen geteilt [] wovon die Eine, bei weitem 
die grösste, die Begebenheiten dieser alles-verherenden Zeit mit mehr oder weniger Gleichgültigkeit, die 
andere mit wohlgefallen betrachted“ (Friedrich von Gentz, Fragmente Aus Der Neusten Geschichte Des 
Politischen Gleichgewichts in Europa (St. Petersburg: [s.n.], 1806), xxii, 13, 23.) 
398 Carl von Clausewitz, "An Die Braut," in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit Der Erniedrigung, ed. Rudolf Vaupel 
(München: Drei Masken, 1923), 45. 
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the general welfare.” 399 As the historian Klaus Epstein puts it, the “common mass of 
burghers and serfs [showed] a total apathy in the face of public calamity.”400  
In the words of another commentator, many conquered Germans “embellished their 
private lives” while they looked upon the state as merely a “neutral framework, to which 
one should connect one’s heart as little as possible.” Their passions, instead of fuelling a 
willingness for sacrifice in defense of a humiliated and dishonored state, drove them 
instead to “gorge desserts, and consume their almonds in peace with a glass of wine.”401 
One of the prime suspects behind this almond craze was the “trivial theory of liberalism,” 
which amounted to “a brainchild of egotism.”402 A widely shared view was that bureaucrats 
exemplify such narrow-minded thinking, since they are overly concerned with their salaries 
and petty interests. “Mediocre, philistine pleasures” drive their lives, along with a 
subservient willingness to execute their procedural functions expediently.403 As such, the 
                                                 
399 Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Wie Sehr Es Die Würde Des Menschen Erhöht, Wenn Er Mit Ganzer Seele 
an Der Bürgerlichen Vereinigung Hängt, Der Er Angehört," in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit Der Erniedrigung, 
ed. Rudolf Vaupel (München: Drei Masken, 1923), 216.; For more on Schleiermacher consider: Jolles, Das 
Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter Napoleons, 193-203. 
400 Klaus Epstein, "Stein in German Historiography," History and Theory 5, no. 3 (1966): 250. 
401 “Der Staat hatte in Deutschland seine sittliche Würde verloren. Er erhielt überal die geistige 
Hauptdirection vom Auslande, hatte keine selbstständigen Ehren und gewärte keinen Trost. Die Folge war, 
dass ihn diejenigen, die die Mittel hatten, sich ihr Privatleben auszuschmücken, nur ansahen, als einen 
ziemlich gliechgültigen Ramen, an den man sein Herz so wenig als möglich zu hängen habe; der doch gut 
sei, in wiefern er im Wesentlichen Ruge und Ordnung erhalte und das aufrecht, was man damals Gesittung 
zu nennen anfieng, damit die Leute, die täglich ein Desert verzerten, in Sicherheit ihre Mandeln bei einem 
Glase Wein knacken könten.” (Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren 
Unterrichtsanstalten, 493.). Consider also an interesting contemporary echo of similar concerns: “Painfully 
aware of the dangers that spiritedness poses for a pacific politics, we have, since the inception of modern 
political thought, sought to subordinate the ancient, masculine virtues to the virtue that Adam Smith would 
label ‘humanity.’ But our remarkably successful solution encounters today a new problem: in our emphasis 
on political peace, we now face the danger posed by the political apathy of a large and apparently growing 
number of self-absorbed, because self-satisfied, democratic citizens...” - Thomas K. Lindsay, "Aristotle's 
Appraisal of Manly Spirit: Political and Philosophic Implications," American Journal of Political Science 
44, no. 3 (Jul., 2000).. 
402 Die “triviale[] Theorie des Liberalismus” which essentially amounts to “eine Ausgeburt des Egoismus.” 
(Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 308.) 
403 Der “Beamtetenstand” hatte sich “hinsichtlich seiner Subsistenz vornämlich auf seine Besoldung 
verwisen, schon lange, lange ein von der Regierung völlig abhängiges Leben in einer gewissen 
Geschäftsroutine und bei mediocren, philistrofen Vergnügungen gefürt, in diesen engen Interessen sich an 
perönliche Bedeutungslosigkeit, zum Teil an eigentliche Bedientengesinnung gewönt.” (Ibid., 640-41.) 
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“class of bureaucrats” (Beamtetenklasse) constitutes a “considerable, debilitating, 
inhibitory part of the bourgeoisie” that is unreceptive to the task of protecting the emotions 
surrounding patriotic honor.404 Friedrich von Gentz, an influential and well-connected 
publicist and diplomat, railed against the bureaucrats’ procedural thinking, which renders 
them particularly vulnerable to lackadaisical patriotism.405 Gentz found many in the 
French-occupied territories who, “even if they are not exceptionally bitter, find themselves 
with vituperations [against the French] bubbling from their mouths.” The only remaining 
supporters of the French were, it seems, bureaucrats, “because others don’t exist 
anymore.”406  
In short, we once again find the figure of the bureaucrat used as a contrasting foil to 
purportedly healthy, vibrant passions for patriotism that Romantics encouraged to flourish. 
The corrosive influence of bureaucracies is here demonstrated through the passivity and 
indifference of their incumbents, which has a corrupting influence on the nation as a whole. 
                                                 
404 “Bildete aber diese zaghafte zum Teil geradezu in Nidrigkeit, zum Teil in Selbstteuschung den Fremden 
zugewendete Beamtetenklasse auch einen ansehnlichen, drückend und hemmend ansehnlichen Teil des 
Mittelstandes im grössten Teile Deutschlands, so darf man darum nicht glauben, dass überal das Gefühl für 
vaterländische Ehre erstorben gewesen wäre.” (Ibid., 641.) 
405 For the standard introductions to Gentz’s life, work and considerable influence see: Jakob Baxa, 
Friedrich Von Gentz, Österreich-Reihe ; (Wien,: Bergland Verlag, 1965).; Golo Mann, Friedrich Von 
Gentz; Geschichte Eines Europäischen Staatsmannes (Zürich,: Europa Verlag, 1947).; Paul R. Sweet, 
Friedrich Von Gentz, Defender of the Old Order (Westport, Conn.,: Greenwood Press, 1970).; Jolles, Das 
Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter Napoleons, 220-30.; For Gentz’s own writings see: Friedrich 
von Gentz, John Quincy Adams, and Richard Loss, The Origins and Principles of the American Revolution 
Compared with the Origin and Principles of the French Revolution : A Facsimile Reproduction (Delmar, 
N.Y.: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1977).; Friedrich von Gentz and Günther Kronenbitter, Gesammelte 
Schriften (Hildesheim ; New York: Olms-Weidmann, 2004).; Friedrich von Gentz and Stefan Thomas 
Possony, Three Revolutions: The French and American Revolutions Compared (Chicago,: H. Regnery, 
1959).; For Gentz’s unlikely connection to John Quincy Adams see: Walter J. Morris, "John Quincy 
Adams's German Library, with a Catalog of His German Books," Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 118, no. 4 (Sep. 13, 1974).; John Torrey Morse, John Quincy Adams, American 
Statesmen (Boston,: Houghton, Mifflin, 1899), 24. 
406 From a letter from Gentz to Adam Müller (23 & 25th Oct, 1802): “Selbst, wenn sie gar nicht vorzüglich 
erbittert sind, quillen ihnen die Schimpfwörter aus dem Munde. Wenn Sie einen Anhänger der Franzosen, 
d.h. einen Beamten (den andre gibt es nicht mehr) begegnen, und fragen den ersten besten Menschen aus 
der Stadt: qui est cela? So antwortet er Ihnen ganz ruhig: c’est un coquin, Monsieur: bloss um Ihnen 
dadurch zu bezeichnen, zu welcher Klasse er gehöhrt.” (Friedrich von Gentz and Friedrich Karl Wittichen, 
Briefe Von Und an Friedrich Von Gentz ; Auf Veranlassung Und Mit Unterstützung Der Wedekind-Stiftung 
Zu Göttingen (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1909), 385.) 
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Within the paradigm of this critique, it is of no use for bureaucrats to claim that they 
compartmentalize emotions in order to rationalize the administration of the state and 
achieve cameralistic goals. The depersonalization of the state that they represent and enact 
is the very antithesis of the personified state that many of the Romantic authors cherished. 
Such critics advocated for the personified state as the bedrock of vibrant, healthy, 
passionate patriotism. In Schleiermacher’s understanding, a mode of thought [Denkensart] 
was prevalent in Germany that made it impossible for people to take a “devoted interest in 
the future of the state.”407 If “one thought of the state as an artful machine,” then only those 
within the administration would properly take an interest in the state’s welfare. “However, 
for all others an intense love of one’s country” remains necessarily only a limited 
sentiment.”408 It was to counter this threat that people like Novalis developed a personified 
understanding of the state. As Novalis put it most starkly: the state is an individual 
[Staatsindividiuum, Staatskörper, Staatsseele, Staatsgeist], and the state’s administrative 
branches are its “internal organs.”409 
 
 
6. The Organic and the Mechanic  
 
In a familiar refrain at the time, the philosopher, temporary minister, and cofounder 
of the University of Berlin, Wilhelm von Humboldt charged that “in the ministries of 
                                                 
407 Schleiermacher, "Wie Sehr Es Die Würde Des Menschen Erhöht, Wenn Er Mit Ganzer Seele an Der 
Bürgerlichen Vereinigung Hängt, Der Er Angehört," 216. 
408 “...man hält den Staat für eine kunstreiche Maschine [...] nur denjenigen, so meint man, denen das Wohl 
des Staates unmittelbar anvertraut ist, gezieme es, an allem, was ihn betrifft, einen lebhaften Anteil zu 
nehmen; für alle andere aber sei eine eifrige Vaterlandsliebe nur eine beschränkte Gesinnung.“ (Ibid.) 
409 Novalis, Novalis Werke, 336, 456-7, 64. 
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justice and internal affairs a simple and pure mechanism is the order of the day that kills all 
thought and spirit.”410 He and others suggested that the mechanical, dispassionate, 
depersonalized administration of the state was undermining its legitimacy and its ability to 
survive and thrive. They insisted that “despite all mechanical posing,” the state should 
“remain. . . heartedly organic.”411 A mechanical, procedural understanding of the state 
desubstantiates the state, weakens social mores, and undermines the very foundations of 
patriotic sentiment. As Schleiermacher puts it, the idea that “the state should be nothing 
more than a machine” has been a monstrous “communal calamity.”412 The “eternal law” 
beyond mere procedures that governs the “relation of people to people, therefore also the 
relation between the state and its subjects” must be “lively, fluid, and self-balancing.” In 
contrast to its desubstantiated, mechanical nemesis, this organic understanding of the state 
is deeply concerned “with good and evil, virtue and fear, as well as sin and punishment.”413  
Much is at stake here. The frequent invocations of mechanical and organic 
metaphors at the time carry considerable importance. Whether one refers to the state as an 
organism or a machine invokes paradigmatically different frameworks for the proper 
                                                 
410 “In den Ministerien der Justiz und des Innern sind blosser und reiner Mechanismus und Ertödtung alles 
Geistes an der Tagesordnung.“ (Wilhelm Humboldt, Werke in Fünf Bänden, ed. Andreas Flitner and Klaus 
Giel, 5 vols., vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1979), 428. My emphasis) 
411 Das “ewige[s] Gesetz ist, dass das Verhältniss von Menschen zu Menschen, also auch das Verhältniss 
von Regirung zu Regirten überal und allezeit ein in sich lebendiges, flüssiges, sich im Guten und Bösen, in 
Tugend und Frucht wie in Sünde und Strafe in's Gleichgewicht setzendes, troz alles mechanischen 
Verhaltens ein innerlichst organisches ist und bleibt...” (Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum 
Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 82.). Consider also Novalis on the issue of balance in organic 
organisms: “Gold und Silber sind das Blut des Staats. Häufungen des Bluts am Herzen und im Kopfe 
verraten Schwäche in beiden. Je stärker das Herz ist, desto lebhafter und freigebiger treibt es das Blut nach 
den äußern Teilen. Warm und belebt ist jedes Glied, und rasch und mächtig strömt das Blut nach dem 
Herzen zurück.” (Novalis, "Glauben Und Liebe Oder Der König Und Die Königin." Section 10) 
412 Schleiermacher, "Aus Einem Brief an Georg Reimer (1806)," 231-2.; For more on this theme consider: 
LaVopa, Fichte : The Self and the Calling of Philosophy, 1762-1799, 91-2. 
413 Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 82. 
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purpose and configuration of the state and its role in the administration of justice.414 Just as 
many authors had contrasted vibrant passions with the lifeless, passionless bureaucrat, or 
the personal state with the impersonal bureaucracy, so too did critics of procedures and 
bureaucratization contrast the dull machine of the bureaucracy (characterized by rigid 
procedures and clockwork heartlessness) with the allegedly vibrant and warm organism of 
the nation.  
 
All mechanical behavior between individuals is a surrender of being God’s 
children. Not solely in the smallest circles, in the family, […] – is love the mistress 
– no! it is so everywhere! Worldwide! As far as the breath of god reaches. It is in 
state and church as good as in the home.415  
 
The Romantic celebration of the vital play of passions and opposition to potentially 
depersonalizing institutions is closely linked to a rejection of the mechanical in favor of the 
organic. Heinrich Leo, a renowned Prussian historian and politician, explains this third 
component of skepticism towards bureaucracies by elaborating on the first two elements. 
All “mechanical behavior, each act, which treats humans not as humans, but instead as 
                                                 
414 For helpful introductions to this material consider: Lieselotte Sauer, "Romantic Automata," in European 
Romanticism : Literary Cross-Currents, Modes, and Models, ed. Gerhart Hoffmeister (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1990).; Barry Brummett, Rhetoric of Machine Aesthetics (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
1999).; Alan Scott, "Modernity's Machine Metaphor," The British Journal of Sociology 48, no. 4 (Dec. 
1997).; F.M. Barnard, "Metaphors, Laments, and the Organic Community," The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economique et de Science politique 32, no. 3 (Aug., 
1966).; H.J. McCloskey, "The State as an Organism, as a Person, and as an End in Itself," The 
Philosophical Review 72, no. 3 (Jul., 1963).; Edward A. Hacker, "Rationality Versus Dehumanization," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33, no. 2 (Dec., 1972).; For more on the origins of the 
mechanical metaphor in the thought of Hobbes and Spinoza consider: Olson, The Emergence of the Social 
Sciences, 1642-1792, 38-48, 52-3.; Jacoby, Die Bürokratisierung Der Welt; Ein Beitrag Zur 
Problemgeschichte, 69.; Many readers might also recall Herbert Spencer’s influential use of similar 
dichotomies: Herbert Spencer and J. D. Y. Peel, On Social Evolution; Selected Writings (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1972).; For a helpful but highly selective account of the origins and legacies 
of organic accounts consider: Charles I. Armstrong, Romantic Organicism : From Idealist Origins to 
Ambivalent Afterlife (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
415 “Alles mechanische Verhalten aber von Menschen zu Menschen ist ein Aufgeben der Kindschaft Gottes. 
Nicht bloss in den kleinen Kreisen, in der Familie, in dem Sonderverhältnisse eines wohltuenden zum 
Woltaten empfangenden - ist die Liebe die Herrin - nein! sie ist es überall! weltenweit! so weit des Herren 
Athem dringt. Sie ist es in Staat und Kirche so gut als im Hause.” (Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte 
Zum Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 83.) 
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governed, dead mass” leads to the decay and downfall of the nation. Only the “inner 
organic force” of humans can prevent this from happening.416  
 
How dry, how poor is everything mechanical without that which snatches it away 
from meagerness and poverty – the connection that fuses together love, the 
individuals, the peoples, state and subject, all into One living Whole, into spiritual 
organisms.417   
 
A mechanical order lacks the glue, the proper coherence and order that keep society 
and individuals from falling apart. In short, if we let passions slip away, if we think of the 
state no longer as personified by the unified and unifying figures of the king and queen as 
the embodied state, then we are co-opted into a mechanical, fractured understanding of the 
individual, the state, and society that undermines them all. With the French lurking 
nefariously on the Rhine, this might not be a good idea. Many critics of the cameralist 
agenda thus pushed strenuously for a conceptual stance founded upon organic themes. 
 
 
(i) Humans as Machines 
 
These critics had concrete reasons to be concerned. Cameralist authors had 
habitually employed machine metaphors in their writings to describe the workings of the 
                                                 
416 “...jedes mechanische Verhalten, jedes Verhalten, was in den Menschen nicht mehr Menschen, sondern 
regirte, todte Massen sieht, bricht sich entweder oder fürt zur Demoralisation, zum Untergange beider Teile 
- es strekt die innere organische Kraft des Menschen sich dagegen als rächende Hand empor.” (Ibid., 82.). 
For more on Heinrich Leo and the “organic society“ see: William Shanahan, "The Social Outlook of 
Prussian Conservatism," The Review of Politics 15, no. 2 (Apr., 1953): 245-6, 51. 
417 “Wie dürr, wie arm ist Alles mechanische ohne das, die Verbindung womit allein es seiner Dürre und 
Armut entreissen kan, ohne die Liebe, die Menschen, die Völker, die Regirung und Regirte zusammen zu 
Einem lebendigen Ganzen, zu geistigen Organismen macht.” (Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum 
Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 301-4, 744.) 
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state and society. Johann Justi, for example, described “the great installation of the 
common being as a machine, whereby all parts, all wheels, all springs must fit together.”418 
Going one step further, the French author and physician Julen Offray de La Mettrie argued 
in an infamous series of publications that humans are machines as well.419 Widely 
condemned, La Mettrie had to flee from France to Holland. Eventually, La Mettrie had to 
leave even this relatively liberal bastion. He found refuge in Prussia under the protection of 
Frederick II. The Prussian king had made La Mettrie head of the Berlin Academy of the 
Sciences in 1746, gave him a pension, made him his official physician, and displayed much 
affection and familiarity with La Mettrie in public. Frederick’s eulogy for La Mettrie 
remains one of the most important primary sources on La Mettrie’s life and work.420 La 
Mettrie’s books outraged many, and Frederick’s friendship with him heightened the fears 
and anxieties that many felt. Frederick’s eulogy, for example, was read before the Berlin 
Academy of Sciences in 1752 by Frederick’s secretary and was met with much disgust.421 
An understanding of the state, society, and individuals as machines struck many as morally 
defunct. As La Mettrie argues in Man a Machine, his account seeks to “materialize . . . the 
                                                 
418 The quotation reads in full: “Die grosse Einrichtung des gemeinen Wesens ist eine Maschine, davon alle 
Teile, alle Räder, alle Triebfedern übereinstimmen müssen. Ein jedes muss sich in vollkommenem Stande 
und zulänglicher Einrichtung befinden, seinen Endzweck erfüllen zu können. Der Mangel in den kleinsten 
Teilen zieht allemal eine Unvollkommenheit des Ganzen nach sich, und die geringen Bedienten des Staates 
können durch ihre Unwissenheit und Ungeschicklichkeit so viel verderben und verabsäumen, dass die 
grösste Einsicht und Fähigkeit den daraus entstandenen Schaden und Nachteil kaum wieder auszubessern 
vermögend ist.“ (Justi, Auf Höchsten Befehl an Sr. Röm. Kaiserl. Und Zu Ungarn Und Böhmen Königl. 
Majestät Erstattetes Allerunterthänigstes Gutachten Von Dem Vernünftigen Zusammenhange Und 
Practischen Vortrage Aller Oeconomischen Und Cameralwissenschaften Wobey Zugleich Zur Probe Die 
Grundsätze Der Policeywissenschaft Mit Denen Darzu Gehörigen Practischen Arbeiten Vorgetragen 
Werdenachen, 77.) 
419 Julien Offray de La Mettrie and Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man a Machine ; and, Man a Plant 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1994). 
420 Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Gertrude Carman Bussey, and Frederick, Man, a Machine: Including 
Frederick the Great's "Eulogy" On La Mettrie and Extracts from La Mettrie's "The Natural History of the 
Soul", French-English ed. (Chicago, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1943).; For a useful account of La 
Mettrie’s life and career see: Kathleen Anne Wellman, La Mettrie : Medicine, Philosophy, and 
Enlightenment (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992). 
421 Ann Thomson and Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Materialism and Society in the Mid-Eighteenth Century 
: La Mettrie's Discours Préliminaire (Genève: Droz, 1981), 5. 
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soul.”422 La Mettrie explains unapologetically that the human body is merely “a self-
winding machine.”423 For him, humans are complicated arrangements of “cog wheels and 
springs,” and the soul, in the final analysis, “only an empty word to which no idea 
corresponds.”424 As Frederick II summarized:  
 
[La Mettrie] could clearly see that thought is but a consequence of the organization 
of the machine, and that the disturbance of the springs has considerable influence 
on that part of us which the metaphysicians call soul. [La Mettrie] tried to explain 
by the aid of anatomy the thin texture of understanding, and he found only 
mechanisms where others had supposed an essence superior to matter.425 
 
Corrupt and corrupting in the eyes of many, mechanical metaphors only leave room 
for hollow procedural conceptions of the state and society that are completely at odds with 
the goals and aspirations of the cameralists’ critics.  
 
 
(ii) Horror, Laughter, Wonder: The Tools of the Trade 
 
 To fight back, these critics turned to invocations of horror and ridicule to mobilize 
people against the mechanistic ethos. As we have seen, the first step of the aesthetic-
political project of such patriotic poets as Novalis, Schulendorf, Kleist, and Körner was to 
excite and incite the Germans, to get them to stand up and get going.426 Only by lighting a 
                                                 
422 La Mettrie and La Mettrie, Man a Machine ; and, Man a Plant, 27. 
423 Ibid., 32. 
424 Ibid., 59. 
425 La Mettrie, Bussey, and Frederick, Man, a Machine: Including Frederick the Great's "Eulogy" On La 
Mettrie and Extracts from La Mettrie's "The Natural History of the Soul", 6. 
426 For much more on this see: Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Staat Und Vaterland : Eine Auswahl Aus Seinen 
Politischen Schriften, vol. 4, Deutsche Staatsgedanke. 1. Reihe. Fürer Und Denker ; (München: Drei 
Masken Verlag, 1921), 153-97.; Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Reinhard Lauth, Reden an Die Deutsche 
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fire under their comfortable seats could the docile population be moved to abandon the 
comfort of their homes and march to war. The skillful portrayal of the queen was one 
specific aspect of this project. A second, broader attempt to reshape the imagination of the 
people was carried out through the invocation of horror and childlike suspension of 
judgment. By invoking the power of horror, a staple of the literature of the time, one could 
unsettle reasoned thinking and awaken gut responses. Not only could disgust and fear be 
cultivated and aimed at specific targets (such as a fear of the mechanical, as we will see), 
but it could also be used as the principal fuel to drive the forging of social and political 
(organic) unity. The grotesque and the unexplainable are wholly consistent with the 
deployment of the power of passion against depersonalized rule.427 They fuel a boundary-
preserving social agenda sharply and explicitly at odds with the model of cameralistic 
bureaucracies. Through the deeply personal experience of feeling horror, the German 
people would be unsettled and their imagination could be redirected toward goals other 
than wine and almonds. Consider in this context the original fairy tales of the brothers 
Grimm.428 As they themselves argued, extremes and the playfulness of fantasy and 
imagination characterize the tales they collected:  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nation, 5., durchges. Aufl. nach d. Erstdr. von 1808, mit neuer Einl. von Reinhard Lauth, mit 
Literaturhinweisen u. Reg. ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1978).; Jolles, Das Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im 
Zeitalter Napoleons, 122-43. 
427 For more on this theme consider: Frederick Burwick, "The Grotesque in the Romantic Movement," in 
European Romanticism : Literary Cross-Currents, Modes, and Models, ed. Gerhart Hoffmeister (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1990), 45-6. 
428 Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm began collecting the tales in 1805. The first edition of their work appeared in 
1812 and the last edition was produced by Wilhelm in 1857. For useful accounts of the Grimm tales, their 
collection, and their reception see: Maria Tatar, The Hard Facts of the Grimms' Fairy Tales, Expanded 2nd 
ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).; Donald Haase, The Reception of Grimms' Fairy 
Tales : Responses, Reactions, Revisions (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993).; Ingrid Spörk, 
Studien Zu Ausgewählten Märchen Der Brüder Grimm : Frauenproblematik, Struktur, Rollentheorie, 
Psychoanalyse, Überlieferung, Rezeption, Hochschulschriften Literaturwissenschaft ; (Königstein/Ts.: 
Verlag A. Hain, 1985), 39-51. 
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Everything beautiful is golden and covered in pearls, even golden people live here; 
calamity on the other hand is a nefarious force, a monstrous human-consuming 
giant, who is however beaten in the end. […]. And such an epic tale always ends by 
opening up endless joys. Evil is not something small, close, or bad, because one 
could get used to that, instead, it is something ghastly and abominable.429  
 
Justice in the tales of the brothers Grimm is never procedural. It is administered 
directly and springs from individual will and impulse. It is passionate and it is as 
personalized as the evil at which it aims. The indirect question of justice never arises in 
these tales. The state, insofar as it is present at all, is represented as highly personalized. 
The tales of the Grimm brothers are filled with kind and vile kings, local nobles, and 
handsome princes. Bureaucratic institutions concerned with measuring and improving 
administrative tasks find little room in fairy tales.  
In the words of Eichendorff, the subject drunk with freedom [freiheitstrunkener 
Subjekt] should be exposed through tales to the “alluring song of nature,” the inner music 
the poet hears, the “demonic.”430 However, such tales do not eradicate or even question 
fundamental social boundaries, quite the contrary. As Eichendorff is at pains to point out, 
these fairy tales, even though there is something heathen, messy, and confused about them, 
nevertheless feverishly reject disorder. Only a “pure, faithful, chaste mind”431 can write 
                                                 
429 “Alles schöne ist golden und mit Perlen bestreut, selbst golden Menschen leben hier, das Unglück aber 
[ist] eine finstere Gewalt, ein ungeheurer menschenfressender Riese, der doch wieder besiegt wird [...] und 
dieses Epos endigt immer, indem es eine endlose Freude auftut. Das Böse auch ist kein kleines, 
nahestehendes und das schlechteste, weil man sich daran gewöhnen könnte, sondern etwas Entsetzliches, 
Schwarzes, streng Geschiedenes, dem man sich nicht nähern darf...” - Wilhelm Grimm and Jakob Grimm, 
"Vorrede Zu Den Kinder- Und Hausmärchen," in Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-Jürgen Schmitt 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974). 
430 Joseph von Eichendorff, "Brentano Und Seine Märchen," in Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-Jürgen 
Schmitt (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), 298. 
431 “... nur ein reiner, Gott ergebener, keuscher Sinn kennt die Zauberformel...” (Ibid., 305.) 
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proper fairy tales for the people (“Volksmärchen,” in contrast to “philosophische 
Märchen”) that are as harmlessly beautiful as the “unseen breeze of a Sunday morning.”432  
In Eichendorff’s estimation, poets have powerful tools at hand to shape the public’s 
imagination. They lead an “extraordinary, fantastic partisan war with the mirror-like magic 
weapons of poetry.”433 This struggle is at odds with central pillars of the cameralist project. 
Rather than seeking to understand the world and administer it effectively, horror stories 
emphasize emotional ecstasy (through the extremes the brothers Grimm portrayed) and an 
endorsement of the grotesque and unexplainable. A demystified universe does not lend 
itself to fairy tales. Rather, delusion, illusion, and a magical, organic universe are the 
primary elements of the fairy and horror tales of the era. The worlds authors like 
Eichendorff or Arnim create remain mysterious and keep their secrets locked away.434 In 
sharp contrast to the cameralists’ trust in the power of empirical investigation and reason to 
unlock the causal relations in nature, these authors neither endorse that faith nor think it 
wise.  
Instead, they propagate tales filled with “forest and household goblins, river deities, 
nymphs, ‘father Rhine,’”435 and a by-now-familiar, colorful cast of fantastic characters, all 
at work to drive the reader to experience “longing, rage, and love.”436 As in a dream, these 
tales speak in a “wondrous manner, touchingly, childishly, shockingly.”437 The association 
of childish thinking with fairy tales is important here. Clearly, these tales were not 
originally written exclusively (or perhaps even primarily) for children. But they are the 
                                                 
432 “... der unsichtbare Hauch eines Sonntagmorgens.” (Ibid., 303.) 
433 Clemens Brentano lead a “unordentlichen, phantastischen Partisankrieg geführt hat mit allen 
spiegelblanken Zauberwaffen der Poesie...” (Ibid., 298.).  
434 “...geheimnisvoll[e] Natur...” (Ibid.) 
435 “...Wald- und Haus-Kobolde, Flussgötter, Nymphen, ... , Vater Rhein ...” (Ibid., 303.) 
436 “...Sehnsucht, Zorn, und Liebe.” (Ibid.) 
437 “... und spricht im Traume in abgebrochenen, wundersamen Lauten rührend, kindisch, erschütternd...” 
(Ibid., 305.) 
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model audience since, children (or childlike adults) show an exemplary willingness to 
suspend belief and surrender their imagination to a strange and exciting alien universe. 
They are also, as Kleist argues, more in touch with the simple truth of vibrant, unerring 
patriotism.438 For example, in one of Kleist’s stories a father asks his son why he loves his 
country (“Vaterland”). Rather than contemplating the lengthy intellectual explanations of 
his father, the child repeats stubbornly (here a virtue it seems) that he loves his country 
simply because it is his country. We cannot all be as unerring as this child, but fairy tales 
can encourage us to become the kind of political agents that writers like Kleist want us to 
be. Through tales that encourage us to marvel at the strangeness of the world, we can return 
to the experience of early childhood. Fairy tales are also filled with highly personalized 
representations of good and evil, beyond procedural questions of due process or 
administrative efficiency. Kleist and his colleagues hope that in reading these tales of 
horror and wonder, we will experience, for once, strong emotional reactions. Consequently, 
Kleist, like many of his time, chose fairy tales as one of his preferred genres. Some, like 
Friedrich Schlegel, argued that “all novels should be constructed like fairy tales.”439 The 
conventions of the genre are highly conducive to the aesthetic sensibilities and political 
aspirations of those like Kleist or Novalis who seek to retard bureaucratization.  
                                                 
438 Heinrich von Kleist, "Katechismus Der Deutschen Abgefasst Nach Dem Spanischen, Zum Gebrauch Für 
Kinger Und Alte in Sechzehn Kapitel " in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit Der Erniedrigung, ed. Rudolf Vaupel 
(München: Drei Masken, 1923), 155-66.; Heinrich von Kleist, "Aus Dem Katechismus Der Deutschen," in 
Romantik, ed. Otto F. Best and Hans-Jürgen Schmitt (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974).; For a helpful short 
introduction to Kleist see: Christiansen, Romantic Affinities : Portrait of an Age, 1780-1830, 76-83. 
439 “… jeder Roman nach Art eines Mährchens construirt seyn sollte“ [sic] cited in: Dennis F. Mahoney, 
"The Myth of Death and Resurrection in ‘Heinrich Von Ofterdingen’," South Atlantic Review 48, no. 2 
(May, 1983). 
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One of the most famous (and for many most haunting) tales of the time is E.T.A. 
Hoffman’s The Sandman.440 In it, we follow the adventures of the young university student 
Nathanael. Instead of remaining faithful to the love of his youth (a simple, animated, 
charming young lady named Clara), he falls instead for Olimpia, the somewhat strange 
daughter of one of his cerebral professors. Even though she moves stiffly, hardly talks, and 
seems to lack vitality, Nathanael nevertheless (or perhaps therefore) can’t help himself and 
becomes obsessed with her. Friends try unsuccessfully to warn him about his new love 
interest: 
 
She seems to us – please don’t be mad at us brother – strangely stiff and soulless. 
Her growth and stature is regular, as is her face, that is true! – She could be called 
beautiful, if her face wasn’t without all life, I would say, without the power of sight. 
Her pace is strangely measured; each movement seems to be governed by the 
movements of a wound up wheelwork. Her playing, her singing has the unpleasant 
correct soulless tact of a singing machine, similarly her dancing.”441 
 
The riddle is finally solved when it is accidentally revealed that Olimpia is a 
machine – an ingeniously designed mechanism that pretends to be alive but is doomed to 
be little more than clockwork. As Nathanael stares again at the grotesque façade of 
Olimpia’s mask and sees behind it just wheels and springs, his life falls to pieces, and in his 
madness he commits suicide. Hoffmann immediately contrasts Nathanael’s dire fate—the 
wages of falling in love with the mechanical—with Clara’s human happiness, for she 
                                                 
440 Hoffmann’s even greater claim to fame derives from his authorship of the original Nutcracker, now an 
unrelenting holiday season delight due to Tchaikovsky’s ballet adaptation. The Sandman tale itself has 
received musical attention by Jacques Offenbach in his Les Contes d’Hoffmann. It has also been turned 
into, of all things, a comedic ballet. For more on Hoffmann see: Sauer, "Romantic Automata," 294-6. 
441 “Sie ist uns – nimm es nicht übel, Bruder! – auf seltsame Weise starr und seelenlos erschienen. Ihr 
Wuchs ist regelmässig, so wie ihr Gesicht, das ist wahr! – Sie könnte für schön gelten, wenn ihr Blick nicht 
so ganz ohne Lebensstrahl, ich möchte sagen, ohne Sehkraft wäre. Ihr Schritt ist sonderbar abgemessen, 
jede Bewegung scheint durch den Gang eines aufgezogenene Räderwerks bedingt. Ihr Spiel, ihr Singne hat 
den unangenehm richtigen geislosen Takt der singenden Maschine und ebenso ist ihr Tanz.” (E. T. A. 
Hoffmann, Der Sandmann, ed. Rudolf Drux (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1991), 33. My emphasis) 
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ultimately finds the domestic bliss Nathanael could have never provided. This story 
encourages us to contemplate the horrors of the mechanical versus the allure and natural 
order of the organic. For those who celebrate passion and fight depersonalization, a 
mechanized world is rife with horror.  
 
 
(iii) Machines in the Halls of Justice 
 
Justice, similarly, cannot possibly derive from inhuman, unfeeling, dispassionate 
machine-humans. An episode from Bonaventura’s chilling Nachtwachen from 1804/5 
illustrates the horrors of a mechanical application of justice.442 In the story, the watchman 
Kreuzgang observes a judge who is/behaves like a machine:  
 
I neared one and glimpsed a creature in its nightgown at a worktable, about whom 
at the start I remained in doubt as to whether it was a human being or a mechanical 
figure, so very much was everything human in it erased, with only the mere 
expression of work remaining. The creature wrote, buried in piles of documents, as 
if . . . interred alive. It struck me as if it wanted to sample living and lodging under 
the earth already, in advance, above her, for everything passionate and sympathetic 
was extinguished on its cold wooden forehead and the marionette sat lifelessly erect 
in its document coffin full of bookworms. Now the invisible wire was pulled, the 
fingers clicked, grasped the pen and signed three papers in a row; I peered more 
acutely – they were death warrants.443 
                                                 
442 Bonaventura is a fictional name. The name of the real author remains much disputed, candidates 
include: Brentano, Schelling, Caroline Schlegel-Schelling, Friedrich Gottlob Wetzel, E.T.A. Hoffmann, 
Jean Paul, and Ernst August Friedrich Klingemann (the latter being a very likely candidate). For more on 
this question see: Jost Schillemeit, Bonaventura, Der Verfasser Der Nachtwachen (München,: Beck, 
1973).; For a completely different approach to the same question see: Dieter Wickmann, Eine 
Mathematisch-Statistische Methode Zur Untersuchung Der Verfasserfrage Literarischer Texte, 
Forschungsberichte Des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen ; (Koln,: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969).; For perhaps 
the most definitive answer to this question see: Ruth Haag, "Noch Einmal: Der Verfasser Der Nachtwachen 
Von Bonaventura," Euphorion 81, no. 3 (1987). 
443 Bonaventura and Gerald Ernest Paul Gillespie, Die Nachtwachen Des Bonaventura. The Night Watches 
of Bonaventura, Edinburgh Bilingual Library ; (Austin,: University of Texas Press, 1971), 50-1.; For an 
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The “criminal code” is the “personified soul” of this creature.444 Like one of La 
Mettrie’s automatons, this judge is the exemplar of a distasteful, purely mechanical 
world.445 Justice, dispensed mechanically, lifelessly, procedurally, is chillingly 
dispassionate and horrifying. Notice, however, that the quote from Bonaventura’s episode 
does not address whether the death sentences were just. Perhaps a feeling, passionate, full-
fledged organic individual would have issued the death warrants as well. Irrespective of the 
justness of the outcome, Bonaventura, like Hoffman, is skilled at highlighting the horrors 
of a mechanical application of procedures.  
The irreverent author Jean Paul acquired around the same time a reputation for 
mirroring Eichendorff’s and Bonaventura’s methods, even though he emphasized 
horrifying but amusing satire over outright horror. For example, in one of his short stories 
he speaks of the imminent replacement of all women at court by machines that can play 
cards and speak just as well as they can.446 Underlying this proto-Stepford Wives tale is the 
question whether anybody could even tell that a switch had been made. In an half-
humorous, half-serious reversal of terms, Paul points out that people in the state’s 
bureaucracy routinely seek to “proceed completely like machines” in a vain attempt “to at 
                                                                                                                                                 
unorthodox but helpful introduction to Nachtwachen see: Kenneth Michael Ralston, The Captured Horizon 
: Heidegger and The "Nachtwachen Von Bonaventura", Untersuchungen Zur Deutschen 
Literaturgeschichte, (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1994). 
444 Bonaventura and Gillespie, Die Nachtwachen Des Bonaventura. The Night Watches of Bonaventura, 50-
1. 
445 Wolfgang Paulsen, "Bonaventuras Nachtwachen Im Literarischen Raum. Sprache Und Struktur," 
Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft 9 (1964): 454. 
446 Paul Jean, "Unterthänigste Vorstellung Unser, Der Sämtlichen Spieler Und Redenden Damen in Europa 
Entgegen Und Wider Die Einführung Der Kempelischen Spiel- Und Sprechmaschinen," in Sämtliche 
Werke, ed. Norbert Miller and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann (München: C. Hanser, 1974).; For more on 
the same theme consider also: Paul Jean, "Der Maschinen-Mann Nebst Seinen Eigenschaften," in Sämtliche 
Werke, ed. Norbert Miller and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann (München: C. Hanser, 1974).; Paul Jean, 
"Einfältige Aber Gutgemeinte Biographie Einer Neuen Angenehmen Frau Von Blossem Holz, Die Ich 
Längst Erfunden Und Geheirathet," in Sämtliche Werke, ed. Norbert Miller and Wilhelm Schmidt-
Biggemann (München: C. Hanser, 1974). 
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least appear like artificial machines, since unfortunately they cannot be natural 
machines.”447 Machines now preside even in the halls of justice. This is fitting, since, so 
Paul, machines and justice [Gerechtigkeit] are “built out of similar material” and justice is 




(iv) The State and Society as Machines and Organisms 
 
The renowned, outspoken aristocrat from old stock, Friedrich von Marwitz, 
similarly argues against the horror of surrendering to a splintered, mechanical view of the 
universe rather than staying with a beautiful and unified organic order.449 Marwitz claims 
that the misguided switch away from an organic understanding of the state and society is 
responsible for many of Prussia’s woes. Only in “a time, which truly only knew mechanical 
forces and didn’t know anything but to calculate and organize these forces, would it not 
occur to people that a living spirit exists in bodies, and that it had escaped from the 
                                                 
447 “Daher suchen Männer, die in der Verwaltung wichtigerer Aemter es zu etwas mehr als träger 
Mittelmässigkeit zu treiben wünschen, so viel sie können ganz Maschinenmäsig zu verfahren, und 
wenigstens künstliche Maschinen abzugeben, da sie unglücklicherweise keine natürliche sein können.“ 
(Jean, "Unterthänigste Vorstellung Unser, Der Sämtlichen Spieler Und Redenden Damen in Europa 
Entgegen Und Wider Die Einführung Der Kempelischen Spiel- Und Sprechmaschinen," 169.) 
448 “…die Sprachmaschine und die Gerechtigkeit wirklich aus änlichen Bestandtheilen zusammengesetzt 
sind […] Die Gerechtigkeit ist (wie jeder weiss, der sie an den Rathhäusern oder sonst gesehen) [...] ohne 
alles Leben.“ (Ibid., 173-4.) 
449 For a helpful accounts of Marwitz’s life and thought see: Craig, The End of Prussia, 8-26.; Berdahl, The 
Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 125-41.; 
Robert M. Berdahl, "Prussian Aristocracy and Conservative Ideology: A Methodological Examination," 
Social Science Information 15, no. 4/5 (1976): 591-3.; Eugene Newton Anderson, Nationalism and the 
Cultural Crisis in Prussia, 1806-1815 (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), 216-56. 
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Prussian army and the Prussian administration.”450 The bureaucracy, described routinely as 
a clockwork and mechanism, serves once again as a contrast to the desirable organic unity 
that many skeptics of bureaucracies seek.451 What does the model of a social order founded 
upon organic unity entail?  
Adam Müller provides the first clue to the use of organic models for explicitly 
political gain.452 His political theory relies frequently on organic models to illustrate and 
render persuasive his claims that society is inherently and fruitfully differentiated, and that 
these parts should be kept distinct but united by a common organic animating force (love, 
rather than reason). Müller’s influence at the time was considerable. However, his later 
reception has been mixed. Some historians describe him as “a mystic and reactionary 
thinker, a typical example of Romantic politics” who “pursued in politics the quest of 
Novalis’s blue flower.”453 Similarly, Karl Marx scolded Müller in Das Kapital as a 
                                                 
450 “Es konnte dem Zeitalter, welches überhaupt nur mechanische Kräfte kannte und nichts zu kalkulieren 
verstand, als diese zusammenzusetzten und zu sondern, nicht einfallen, dass ein lebendiger Geist in 
Körpern existiere, und dass dieser aus dem  preussischen Heere so gut wie aus der preussischen 
Administration und Rechtspflege gewichen sein könne.” Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz, "Von 
Den Ursachen Des Verfalls Des Preussischen Staates (1811)," in Preussischer Adel, Aus Den 
Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, ed. Friedrich Schinkel (Breslau,: 
W.G. Korn Verlag, 1932), 272-5. 
451 E.g. Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der 
Marwitz, 223. 
452 The best introduction to Adam Müller’s writings are the following: Adam Heinrich Müller, Die 
Elemente Der Staatskunst. Oeffentliche Vorlesungen, Vor Sr. Durchlaucht Dem Prinzen Bernhard Von 
Sachsen-Weimar Und Einer Versammlung Von Staatsmännern Und Diplomaten, Im Winter Von 1808 Auf 
1809, Zu Dresden, Gehalten, 3 vols. (Berlin: 1809).; Adam Heinrich Müller, Ausgewählte Abhandlungen 
Mit Einem Bildnis, Einem Lebensabriss Und Bisher Unveröffentlichten Briefen Und Berichten Adam 
Müllers, ed. Jakob Baxa, v, 251 p. front. (port.) 24 cm. vols. (Jena,: G. Fischer,, 1921).; Adam Heinrich 
Müller, Versuche Einer Neuen Theorie Des Geldes (Leipzig ; Altenburg: F.A. Brockhaus, 1816).; 
However, they may be difficult to obtain, for a far more accessible and cheaper option consider: Adam 
Heinrich Müller, "Die Elemente Der Staatskunst," in Die Politische Romantik in Deutschland, ed. Klaus 
Peter (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1985).; For more biographical accounts see: Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian 
Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 158-81.; Berdahl, "Prussian 
Aristocracy and Conservative Ideology: A Methodological Examination," 595-8.; Kroll, "Romantik in 
Preussen," 332-4. 
453 Haussmann, "German Estimates of Novalis from 1800 to 1850." (The description of Müller as pursuing 
the blue flower originates with Gottschall); See also: Briefs, "The Economic Philosophy of Romanticism."; 
Benedikt Koehler, Ästhetik Der Politik : Adam Müller U.D. Politische Romantik, 1. Aufl. ed. (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 1980). 
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“romantic sycophant”454 whose sagacity “consists in observing the clouds of dust on the 
surface and presumptuously declaring this dust to be something mysterious and 
important.”455 Other historians, however, have called him one of “the leading conservative 
theoreticians of the early nineteenth century.”456 For some, Adam Müller remains “the real 
and proper theoretician of the Romantic understanding of the state.”457 
 Müller earns this title by arguing that the state is properly understood as “complete, 
composed of a rich spectrum of parts and limbs, sculpted together by living parties into one 
whole growing entity, and not as the aggregate of singular masses.”458 Like Marwitz or 
Schelling, Müller believes that a healthy state is synonymous with an organic state.459 Not 
surprisingly, Müller opposes any references to the artificial origins of a state in, say, a 
social contract. The state “exists for itself, independent of all human arbitrariness and 
innovation […], the state originates from where humans come: from nature, from god, said 
the wise.”460 In this respect, Müller might even out-Burke Burke, one of the dominant 
shaping influences in Müller’s youth.461  In keeping with his resistance to innovation and 
reform, Müller repeatedly insists that 
                                                 
454 Karl Marx, Capital : A Critique of Political Economy, ed. Ben Fowkes and David Fernbach, 3 vols. 
(New York: Penguin Books In association with New Left Review, 1990). Volume One, Part I., Chapter 3, 
section 2C, footnote 34. 
455 Ibid. Volume Three, Part V. Chapter 21. 
456 Robert M. Berdahl, "Conservative Politics and Aristocratic Landholders in Bismarckian Germany," The 
Journal of Modern History 44, no. 1 (Mar., 1972): 12. 
457 “Der eigentliche Theoretiker der romantischen Staatsidee war jedoch Adam Müller.” (Müller, "Die 
Elemente Der Staatskunst," 38.) 
458 “Jeder sollte ein vollständiges, reich gegliedertes, aus unendlich lebendigen Parteien 
zusammengewirktes Ganzes darstellen, als wachsendes Ganze gelten, und nicht als Aggregat von einzelnen 
Massen.” (Ibid., 41.) 
459 “Ein lebendiger Staat, oder ein organischer, ist der, welcher nach Totalität strebt, nicht nach 
Vergrösserung der Summe.” (Ibid.); See also: Briefs, "The Economic Philosophy of Romanticism," 280-4. 
460 “Der Staat ruhet ganz in sich; unabhänging von menschlicher Willkür und Erfindung, kommt er 
unmittelbar und zugleich mit dem Menschen eben daher, woher der Mensch kommt: aus der Natur: aus 
Gott, sagten die Alten.” (Müller, "Die Elemente Der Staatskunst," 296.) 
461 Gentz and Wittichen, Briefe Von Und an Friedrich Von Gentz ; Auf Veranlassung Und Mit 
Unterstützung Der Wedekind-Stiftung Zu Göttingen, 348.; For more on Burke’s influence in Germany see: 
F.L.W. Meyer, "Ueber Die Verdeutschung Der Burkischen Betrachtungen Über Die Französische 
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The state is not simply a manufactured [business association]; it is an intimate 
connection of all physical and psychological demands, of the complete physical and 
psychological wealth, of the complete inner and outer life of the nation, all 
combined into a grand, energetic, infinitely moved and living whole.462 
 
Müller fiercely tries to fight the “corrupted” view that the state is merely a “large, 
organized police and welfare institution.”463 After all, humans can only be compelled to do 
a limited amount by “mechanical force.” Treating subjects like machines [maschinenweise] 
leaves out too large and too central a part of their being.464 One should consequently not 
aim at “mere obedience, fear springing out of domination.” Instead, one should seek to 
capture the subject’s “heart, his love,” not “tribute but intimate devotedness, unlimited 
sacrifice” – say, in a war against the French.465 Lovely pictures of queens can be more 
effective than gallows at the end of every vista.466   
                                                                                                                                                 
Revolution," Deutsche Monatsschrift  (1793).; For Burke’s influence on Gentz see: Gentz and Wittichen, 
Briefe Von Und an Friedrich Von Gentz ; Auf Veranlassung Und Mit Unterstützung Der Wedekind-Stiftung 
Zu Göttingen, 203-04. 
462 “Der Staat ist nicht eine bloße Manufaktur, Meierei, Assekuranz-Anstalt, oder merkantilische Sozietät; 
er ist die innige Verbindung der gesamten physischen und geistigen Bedürfnisse, des gesamten physischen 
und geistigen Reichtums, des gesamten inneren und äußeren Lebens einer Nation, zu einem großen 
energischen, unendlich bewegten und lebendigen Ganzen.” (Müller, "Die Elemente Der Staatskunst," 289.)   
463 “Alle diese Einwürfe sind sehr gegründet, und aus täglichen Erfahrungen, aus einer fast allgemein 
verbreiteten Denkungsart her genommen; aber – welche tiefe Korruption aller ansichten vom Staate 
leuchtet daraus hervor! – Der Staat ist damnach weiter nichts als ein einzelnes Departement der 
menschlichen Angelegenheiten; der Mensch braucht Haus, Hof, Knecht, Magd, vieh und mancherlei Gerät, 
und unter diesem Geräte nun auch Staaten, d.h. grosse organisierte Polizei-Anstalten, erweiterte 
Marechausseen, damit, er alles des groben Gepäckes, welches er auf die Lebensreise mitnehmen muss, 
sicher sei.” (Ibid., 283.)   
464 “...zu einigen Handlungen kann er [der Mensch] maschinenweise, durch mechanische Gewalt, 
gezwungen werden” aber zu „andre und bei weitem die wichtigsten Handlungen der Menschen, bleiben 
geisterweise der Willkür überlassen: sein Herz, seine Liebe kann der Bürger dem Staate verweigern, 
schenken und zurücknehmen, wie er will.” (Ibid., 285.)   
465 “Andere Theorien des Staates tun „lieber auf den schöneren Teil des menschlichen Wesens, auf die 
Gefühle und die Gedanken der Menschen, Verzicht leisten, und sich mit rohem Gehorsam, mit der Furcht 
der Beherrschten, anstatt aller Liebe, mit grober Tributzahlung begnügen, wo sie die innigste Hingebung, 
die uneingeschränkteste Aufopferung, begehren sollten.” (Ibid.)  
466 Consider on this point: Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 62-68. 
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 In Müller’s estimation, the sooner people realize, or are helped to realize, that they 
“are a part, a limb of the state, and as such an organ of a larger corpus,” 467 the sooner can 
the corrupting and isolating theories of the time be fought and reversed. The flaw in such 
theories lies in “the pretense of a state of peace” while they undermine the binding force 
that holds society together.468 As soon as the various orders demand more than their 
assigned domain of activity, they undermine the love that keeps these distinct and separate 
parts united in a functioning organic whole.469  
 Proper organization is the key to this understanding of diversity. A state is best 
thought of as consisting of separate organic elements with separate functions.470 As the 
contemporary commentator Bendavid remarked, society approaches excellence the “more 
exactly the estates are separated from each other.” Individuals may “work and improve” in 
their domain ,“but outside of it they should not dare to venture.”471 As Müller makes clear, 
the unity of an organism is desirable since it implies that all parts (organs) know “their 
place, their relation to each other, their closer and more distant connection with the other 
parts,” rather than demanding an autonomous “isolated existence.”472 As Marwitz laments, 
                                                 
467 “Der Mensch ist Glied eines Staates, und als solches Organ eines grösseren Körpers, also Werkzeug...” 
(Adam Heinrich Müller, "Die Innere Staatshaushaltung," in Die Politische Romantik in Deutschland, ed. 
Klaus Peter (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1985), 324.) 
468 Müller, "Die Elemente Der Staatskunst," 285. 
469 Consider for example of Fischer who argues that  “sobald diese Stande Herrschaft und Gesetzgebung 
verlangen, treten sie aus ihrem Wirkungskreis heraus, und werden schaedlich, anstatt nuetzlich zu sein” and 
that instead each order should stick to its domain “Kriegsstand, Geistlichkeit, Kaufmannschaft.” (G.N. 
Fischer, "Friedrich Und Friedrich Wilhelm, Die Gesetzgeber," Deutsche Monatsschrift 1 (1792): 10.) 
470 “sittliche Auflösung“ (Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren 
Unterrichtsanstalten, 782.) 
471 “Je vollkommener die Einrichtungen in einer buergerlichen Geselschaft ist, je genauer sind auch die 
Stände, in ihr von einander unterschieden. Der Staat teilt Buerger in Zuenfte, Gilden, Tanungen, u.s.w. ein; 
beschraenkt durch Befehle die Taetigkeit, die ungebundene Vervollkommung derselben, und wieset ihnen 
ein bestimmtes Feld an, das sie zwar bearbeiten und verbessern, aber ausser welchem sie sich nicht wagen 
sollen.” (L. Bendavid, "Ist Fortschreiten Nur Mittel Zur Glückseligkeit Oder Höchster Zweck Der 
Menschheit?," Deutsche Monatsschrift 3 (1791): 32.) 
472 “...seine Stelle, sein Verhältniss, sein näherer und entfernterer Zusammenhang mit den übrigen Teilen...” 
(Jakob Baxa and Adam Heinrich Müller, Adam Müllers Lebenszeugnisse (München,: Schöningh, 1966), 
139-40.)  
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the effect of introducing new teachings was to loosen connections between people and to 
“isolate everybody with [their new] insatiable demands.”473 Previously there was a  
 
completely regulated aristocracy in each order – the peasant above the menial 
servant, the master above the apprentice, the merchant and factory owner above 
their servants and workers, the higher bureaucrat of the state above his 
subordinates, the village-leader above his village, the mayor above the city, the 
landlord und royal bailiff above their subjects, all with mutual and reciprocal 
responsibilities and duties to perform certain deeds.474  
 
The long list is important, as it makes clear that Marwitz is not concerned merely 
with preserving the privileges and advantages of his own order. Rather, he advocates for a 
harmonious social order, supported by a balance among the various parts of society that 
contributes to a healthy organism. The various parts are certainly not equal in stature 
(neither are the parts of a human body), but each was supposedly valued in its own right, in 
contrast to the contemporary confusion. The trouble with not acknowledging the organic 
diversity of society is that it leaves few means of discriminating properly between the 
deserving and the undeserving. Heinrich Leo demonstrates the obvious problem with such 
a design through the following illustrative example:  
 
                                                 
473 “Das Resultat der neuen Lehre ist gewesen, alle diese Verbindungen zu trennen und jedermann mit 
unbefriedigten Ansprüchen zu isolieren.” (Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften 
Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 62-4.). Adam Müller makes a similar point in a letter to  
Brinkmann (21.Aug.1804): „Wenn man die Ereignisse der verflossenen Jahre betrachtet, so wird man die 
grosse Auflösung der politischen und wissenschaftlichen Körper sich auf gleiche Weise entwickeln sehen; 
Das wirkliche Isoliren der einzelnen Bürger, Corporationen, Stände, was die Staaten allmähliche Trennung 
der Kenntnisse, der Ansichten, der Ideen in dem eingebildeten Staat oder in der Wissenschaft.” (in: Baxa 
and Müller, Adam Müllers Lebenszeugnisse, 140.) 
474 “Unter diesen Leuten herrschte also damals ein Esprit de corps, unter den besitzenden Klassen eine 
vollständig geregelte Aristokratie in jeder Klasse - der Bauer über seinen Knecht, der Meister über seine 
Gesellen, der Kaufmann und der Fabrikant über seine Diener und Arbeiter, der höhere Staatsbeamte über 
seine Untergebenene, der Schulze über sein Dorf, der Bürgermeister über seine Stadt, der Gutsherr und der 
königliche Amtmann über seine Untertanen, alles mit gegenseitiger Verpflichtung und Diensterweisung.” 
(Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der 
Marwitz, 62-4.; For more on this theme consider: Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being; a Study of 
the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard university press, 1936). 
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The whole famed equality before the law reduces itself in the end to the mechanical 
aspects of [applying] criminal penalties: when the son of a day laborer and the son 
of a Baron commit the same crime, then the same mechanically equal penalty is 
supposed to be applied to them – it has been overlooked that precisely in this 
mechanical application of equality lies the most monstrous moral inequality.475  
 
The problem of discriminating effectively between the deserving and undeserving is 
rooted in a concern for maintaining a proper order. Denying inequality entails “denying the 
possibility of a true community.” Without such inequality, people would not complement 
one another, would not “be bound organically, everybody would be the same as everybody 
else […] – all would fall apart into atomistic points that would only permit a state based on 
violence.”476 
In contrast, emphasizing organic metaphors for state and society allows Müller, 
Marwitz, Novalis and others to acknowledge diversity while keeping it well-regulated and 
contained within safe boundaries. Mechanical thinking, on the other hand, loosens the ties 
of affection that connect the governed with the governing.477 If bureaucrats and subjects are 
reasoning cold-heartedly, then they might be willing to forgo a natural organic order for an 
artificial mechanical one. Bureaucracies, as the proverbial site of mechanical procedures 
and thoughts, are consequently associated with undermining boundaries and eroding the 
                                                 
475 “Diese ganze gerümte Gleichheit vor Gericht reducrit sich also am Ende auf die mechanische Seite der 
Criminalstrafen: wenn der Sohn eines Tagelöners und der Sohn eines Herzogs dasselbe Verbrechen 
begangen haben, sol ihnen die mechanisch gleiche Strafe applicirt werden - das gerade in dieser 
mechanischen Gleichheit die ungeheurerste moralische Ungleichheit liegt, bleib übersehen.” – the comment 
was made with reference to reforms in France that some Germans considered attractive. (Leo, Lehrbuch 
Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 312-3.) 
476 Der “welcher die Ungleichheit der Menschen leugnet,” “leugnet die Möglichkeit eines waren 
Gemeinwesens,” “denn ohne diese Ungleichheit würden die Menschen einander nicht ergänzen, nicht 
organisch zusammengreifen; jeder würde desselbe sein, was jeder andere ist; keiner würde das Ganze an 
sich haben und also das Gemeinwesen als eine unnütze Last und Beschränkung fliehen - alles zerspränge in 
atomistische Punkte, die nur noch einen Gewaltstaat zuliessen. “ (Ibid., 304.) 
477 For an example of this common noblesse-oblige theme see again Marwitz who argues that stability is 
preserved in a country because “die Sitten erhielt und bei den eigenene Gesetzten Bande nicht lösete, die 
seine Fürsten mit dem Volke verbanden.” (Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften 
Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 238.) 
 166 
bonds of society. Keeping subjects focused on ties of affection and personalized 
representations of the state by rallying them with fantastic tales of horror, gore, and lovely 
princesses is the antithesis of bureaucratic concerns with efficiency and rationality.  
 Consider one last example on this theme, this one coming from K.G. Neuendorf, 
who asks rhetorically why all citizens shouldn’t be governed by one set of laws, and why 
all capable citizens shouldn’t be allowed to rise to any level of the bureaucracy.478 
Wouldn’t this entail the foolish attempt to make everybody “equally intelligent, equally 
rich, equally refined and honored”? A world where all people are equals is a world  
 
without masters and servants, without childlike obedience and fatherly authority, 
without subordinates and superiors. […] The child shall, for example, be equal to 
the father? The servant to his master? The day laborer to the one who pays him? 
The soldier equal to the general? The citizen to his superiors? The student to his 
teachers? How distasteful!479   
 
The solution seems clear to Neuendorf: diversity and rigorously enforced separation is “as 
necessary as the diversity of the parts of the human body; none is equal to the others, but all 
are necessary and beneficial for the good of the whole.”480 
                                                 
478 “Alle Staatsbuerger sollen utner einerlei Gesetzen stehn; jeder soll zu dem Lasten des Staates, nach 
verhältniss seines Vermögens, gleichen Beitrag geben; und jeder soll zu dem Posten im Staat, wozu er sich 
tuechtig gemacht hat, eben so wohl zugelassen werden, als irgend ein anderer...” (K.G. Neuendorf, "Kurze 
Belehrung Für Nachdenkende Über Bürgerliche Freyheit Und Gleichheit," Deutsche Monatsschrift 1 
(1793): 137-8.)  
479 “Nun sollen sogar, sagten sie spöttelnd, alle Menschen einander gleich sein; alle gleich klug; alle reich; 
gleich vornehm und geehrt; kein Herr und Bedienter mehr, kein kindlicher Gehorsam und keine väterliche 
Autorität, kein Untergebener und Vorgesetzter mehr: alle sollen sie gleich sein ohne Unterschied. [...] Das 
Kind sollte z.B. seinem Vater bürgerlich gleich sein? Der Verdiente seinem Herrn? der Tagelöhner dem, 
der ihn lohnt? der Soldat seinem General? der gemeine Bürger seiner Obrigkeit? der Schüler seinem 
Lehrer? - Wie ungereimt! Alle diese Personen haben ja nicht gleiche Verhältnisse gegen einander, nicht 
einerlei Pflichten gegen den Staat, nicht einen gleichen Wirkungskreis, nicht einerlei Verstand und 
Einsichten: wie wäre es also möglich, nur an bürgerliche Gleichheit des Standes, des Vermögens u.f.w. 
unter ihnen zu denken?” (Ibid.: 138-9. Emphasis added) 
480 “Nein, hier ist Verschiedenheit eben so notwendig, wie die Verschiedenheit der Gleider am 
menschlichen Körper; keins ist dem andern gleich, aber alle sind zum Besten und Ganezen unentbehrlich 
notwendig und höchst wohltätig.” (Ibid.) 
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 The strength of the organic metaphor consists in its ability to establish outside 
boundaries (vis-à-vis the all-too-cosmopolitan, boundary-eroding alternatives) and to 
differentiate internally. Boundaries are preserved by contrasting the cold, rigid, and 
undesirable mechanical metaphor with the lively and immanently personalized metaphor of 
organic unity and harmony. However, acknowledging diversity is only the first step in an 
attempt to establish firm boundaries between various sections of society. In the same way 
that a leg should be reprimanded for undermining the good of the entire organism if it had 
the ridiculous and unnatural wish to advance up the hierarchy of organs and become a brain 
or a heart, so too should people from lower orders be prevented from violating the 
boundaries of society. The organic metaphor enables the endorsement of diversity while 
shunning social mobility. Here, praise of differences merely reflects and helps to justify a 
rigid social hierarchy. 
 
 
7. In Search of a Moral Core 
 
In response to the cameralistic understanding of the state, some of the critics of 
bureaucratization explicitly rejected a mechanized social order. Instead, they turned in their 
writings towards an idealized model of society centered on a strong moral core, beyond 
procedural questions. Such critics highlighted the dangers of a desubstantiated 
understanding of the state and argued strenuously that such a moral core must lie at the 
heart of any understanding of the state or society. Without it, we would have to fear “moral 
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dissolution.”481 Marwitz, for example, highlighted the dangers of the cameralists’ obsession 
with the indirect question that brought “in place of right and order mere utility.” 482 
Marwitz, like many others, regarded a procedural approach (emphasizing the indirect 
question) as fundamentally incapable of holding a fragmented society together. 
Conceptually and practically, adherence to the indirect question led, in their view, to 
undesirable and dangerous consequences. A procedural version of the state not based on 
the impulsive acts of a singular will lacks a reliable moral core. Lacking direct access to 
questions of normativity, the procedural understanding of the state contributes to individual 
alienation and social disunity. In response, authors such as Novalis stressed the all-
importance of unity and substantively rich understandings of state and society. Novalis, 
like many of his supporters, promoted a model of society that exhibited a strong and direct 
involvement with normativity as a healthy antidote to the desubstantiated, mechanized 
model of the cameralists. Such critics frequently turn to medieval times in their writings. 
The commentator Bendavid, for example, remarked that he could not “resist the wish that 
the world had stood still at the stage it was [in medieval times].”483 Similarly, Novalis 
remarks in the very first sentence of his famous Christianity or Europe that the Middle 
Ages was a “beautiful, shining age” full of aesthetic possibilities precisely because it had a 
stable, substantive moral core that forged social unity.484 In search of that core, Adam 
Müller, Friedrich Schlegel, Clemens Brentano, and many others converted to Catholicism. 
                                                 
481 “sittliche Auflösung“ (Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren 
Unterrichtsanstalten, 782.) 
482 Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der 
Marwitz, 56.) 
483 Bendavid, "Ist Fortschreiten Nur Mittel Zur Glückseligkeit Oder Höchster Zweck Der Menschheit?," 
42.; For similar thinking in Schlegel’s work see: Jolles, Das Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter 
Napoleons, 187. 
484 “…schöne glänzende Zeiten…”  - Novalis, "Die Christenheit Oder Europa (1799)."; See also: Simon, 
"Variations in Nationalism During the Great Reform Period in Prussia," 314-5. 
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This was an explicit effort to return to a time that was marked, in their view, by a direct and 
unified engagement with questions of legitimacy, agency, and sovereignty.485 
At its most extreme, the critics of procedural justice argued that it contributes to a 
soulless, soul-destroying, and dangerous society.486  The cameralist Cöllin unintentionally 
illustrated this point when he referred to soldiers simply and approvingly as “war 
machines” [Kreigsmaschinen].487 Schiller subsequently argued that the desubstantiation of 
moral concepts through the “intricate clockwork of states” tore “asunder the internal bond 
of human nature.”488 For him, modern states are a crucial manifestation of the “soul-
dividing spirit of modern life” that fails to treat individuals as whole and justice as the 
impulse of such unitary individuals.489 The administrative machinery of modern states 
fragments individuals into “eternally many, but lifeless, pieces.”490 Such a “disunion” of 
the individual contributes to an understanding of the state as merely procedural and 
emptied of substantive values.491 Lacking access to an intact moral core, fragmented 
individuals have few recourses other than mechanized, dispassionate, procedural, 
desubstantiated models of political agency. Such a de-substantiation has “torn asunder” 
                                                 
485 This interpretation is fairly widespread, see for example: Briefs, "The Economic Philosophy of 
Romanticism," 288.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative 
Ideology, 1770-1848, 166. 
486 Consider for example the remarks by Friedrich Schleiermacher from 1800: Schleiermacher, "Aus Den 
Monologen (1800)," 215. 
487 Cölln, "Über Verschiedene Mängel Im Militär Und in Der Ehemaligen Geschäftsverwaltung Im 
Preussischen Staate." 
488 “...das verwickeltere Uhrwerk der Staaten eine strengere Absonderung der Stände und Geschäfte 
notwendig machte, so zerriss auch der innere Bund der menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit 
entzweite ihre harmonische Kräfte.” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer 
Reihe Von Briefen, 22.). 
489 For one of the best introductions and interpretations of Schiller see: Bernard Yack, The Longing for 
Total Revolution : Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche, Studies 
in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 134.; For 
more see also: Bernd Roeck, Lebenswelt Und Kultur Des Bürgertums in Der Frühen Neuzeit, Enzyklopädie 
Deutscher Geschichte ; (München: Oldenbourg, 1991), 119-20.; Jürgen Habermas, Der Philosophische 
Diskurs Der Moderne : Zwölf Vorlesungen, 3. Aufl. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 59. 
490 “...unendlich vieler, aber lebloser, Teile ein mechanisches Leben im Ganzen sich bildet.” (Schiller, Über 
Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 23.) 
491 “Zwiespalt” (Ibid., 21.) 
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“laws and morals.”492 Writing in 1806, Friedrich von Gentz argued similarly that the people 
understood the state increasingly as raw, blind force – a development that desacralized and 
poisoned communities.493 All that remains, to the fright of critics like Gentz and Schiller, is 
brute force and a lack of genuine passions and personalized emotions. Individuals, living 
under this “new spirit of the government,” are bound to be reduced “to a paltry and coarse 
mechanism.”494 State and society, under the model that Schiller fears, is a “clockwork” that 
imposes a fractured “mechanistic life” on what formerly had been whole.495 
 Schiller, like Novalis, had nothing but scorn for the “reformers of the state” who 
had brought this danger upon society.496 Procedural thinking was alienating men and 
women from their very humanity.  For Schiller, only a total revolution could restore a 
substantively rich understanding of the state; . only a new “soul-constructing art” could 
revive individuals and society.497  
 
 
(i) The Longing for Totality 
 
 It is for this reason that Schiller is frequently referred to as the “father” of 
                                                 
492 “Auseinandergerissen wurden jetzt der Staat und die Kirche, die Gesetze und die Sitten; der Genuss 
wurde von der Arbeit, das Mittel vom Zweck, die Anstrengung von der Belohnung geschieden.” (Ibid., 23.) 
493 Gentz, Fragmente Aus Der Neusten Geschichte Des Politischen Gleichgewichts in Europa, 23. 
494 “Diese Zerrüttung, welche Kunst und Gelehrsamkeit in dem innern Menschen anfingen, machte der 
neue Geist der Regierung vollkommen und allgemein.” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des 
Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 23.) 
495 The old world order “machte jetzt einem kunstreichen Uhrwerke Platz, wo aus der 
Zusammenstückelung unendlich vieler, aber lebloser, Teile ein mechanisches Leben im Ganzen sich 
bildet.” (Ibid.) 
496 Novalis, Die Christenheit oder Europa, 1799 
497 “Seelenbildende Kunst” (Letter from Schiller to: Herzog Friedrich Christian von Schleswig-Holstein-
Augustenburg, 9th February, 1793). 
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alienation, and as such, an important source for our understanding of Marx and a range of 
other theories that share similar concerns.498 For example, George Lukács argued that 
Schiller recognized the symptoms of modern ills correctly, but failed to provide an accurate 
analysis of their social causes,499 while Jürgen Habermas found Schiller strongly 
reminiscent of the young Marx.500 Whether this genealogy is entirely accurate or not – 
some vehemently doubt the claim501 – Schiller articulated an influential and challenging 
analysis of modern woes. In On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller investigated the 
sources of contemporary decline, the increasing hollowing-out of identities, and the urgent 
need for a return to psychic unity.  
 Written in 1794 as a series of letters to an aristocratic patron, On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man can fruitfully be read in the “mirror of princes” tradition. Surprisingly, 
then, Schiller does not concern himself with direct political responses to the French 
Revolution; he opts instead for a lengthy discussion of the nature of beauty, aesthetics, and 
the proper appreciation of art. This is not a rejection of the political. Instead, Schiller 
grapples with creating the preconditions that will once again allow meaningful and moral 
political interactions. He asserts that the fundamental integrity of the modern world must be 
restored before a meaningful discussion of concrete political proposals is possible. Without 
attacking the deep-rooted causes of our present woes, any reforms or revolutions are bound 
to fail. For Schiller, the French Revolution was doomed to go awry because the people 
                                                 
498 For a representative example see: Deric Regin, Freedom and Dignity; the Historical and Philosophical 
Thought of Schiller (The Hague,: M. Nijhoff, 1965).; See also: Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution : 
Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche, 9. 
499 György Lukács, Beiträge Zur Geschichte Der Ästhetik (Berlin,: Aufbau-Verlag, 1954), 143. 
500 Habermas, Der Philosophische Diskurs Der Moderne : Zwölf Vorlesungen, 60, 62. 
501 Vicky Rippere, Schiller And "Alienation" (Bern ; Las Vegas: P. Lang, 1981). 
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were “not yet prepared” for the micropolitical task of reshaping the state.502 The macro 
conditions underwriting political agency were simply not conducive to the task.  
 It is tempting to categorize Schiller’s analysis as just another attack on the 
Enlightenment project that emerged in the wake of the French Revolution. Schiller does 
indeed question the primacy of reason that disenfranchises emotions, and he is skeptical of 
the overly theoretical culture of the Enlightenment. But his argument does not stop at such 
regurgitation of widespread anti-Enlightenment rhetoric. Instead, he develops an account of 
desubstantiated politics that grapples with disjointed personal identities and the deep 
longing for moral and psychic unity.  
 Schiller sees the root cause of modern woes as the “elemental conflict” of clashing 
desires and motivations.503 This “gross opposition” of contradictory positions undermines 
all hope for political action that can render coherent and moral results. Politics, for Schiller, 
is corrupted and corrupting to the point of being an unsuitable site for well-intentioned 
agency. The destruction of the human totality taints politics, perhaps irreparably.504 In his 
view, modern people’s abandonment of “the totality of their being”505 has had widespread, 
multifaceted and damaging communal effects. People have become separated from their 
own experiences, and thus from themselves and each other (thus the claim that Schiller’s 
thought is an important step in the development of the concept of alienation). No longer 
                                                 
502 Letter from Schiller to: Herzog Friedrich Christian von Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg (13th July, 
1793). 
503 Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 29.; H. A. Korff, 
Geist Der Goethezeit : Versuch Einer Ideellen Entwicklung Der Klassisch-Romantischen 
Literaturgeschichte, 8. unveränderte Aufl. ed., 5 vols. (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelag, 1964), 289.; For useful 
accounts of this theme see: Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution : Philosophic Sources of Social 
Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche, 25, 157-9.; Arthur M. Melzer, "Rousseau and the 
Problem of Bourgeois Society," The American Political Science Review 74, no. 4 (Dec., 1980). 
504 Korff makes this point most forcefully. See: Korff, Geist Der Goethezeit : Versuch Einer Ideellen 
Entwicklung Der Klassisch-Romantischen Literaturgeschichte, 284-5. 
505 “...die Totalität ihres Wesens aufgegeben, und die Wahrheit auf getrennten Bahnen verfolgt. “ (Schiller, 
Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 26.) 
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does a person experience the world as a whole, but rather as a mere component of the 
fractured former self. For modern individuals “sentiments are separated in experiences to 
the same extent that the psychologist separates them in his imagination.”506 Schiller, like 
many others at the time, consequently “longed for totality.”507 He questions “abstract 
thinkers” not merely because of their reliance on reason, but because their emotional 
coldness limits them to “dissecting impressions” that are unable to move the whole heart.508 
Similarly, Schiller indicts businessmen for failing to let their experiences in realms outside 
of their work infiltrate their sentiments at work.509 This, then, is not merely an attack on 
reason, but on the social practices that allow the abstract thinker and the businessman to 
follow the procedural requirements of their professions without thought of the propriety of 
given ends.510 For Schiller, fractured identities isolate us from our ability to evaluate 
outcomes, and lead to impoverished lives: 
 
Always tied to a small fragment of his totality, the human being himself develops as 
a fragments . . . while never developing the harmony of his being, and instead of 
expressing the humanity in his nature, he becomes the mere expression of his 
business, his science.511 
 
                                                 
506 “Bei uns, möchte man fast versucht werden zu behaupten, äussern sich die Gemüthskräfte auch in der 
Erfahrung so getrennt, wie der Psychologe sie in der Vorstellung scheidet” (Ibid., 22.) 
507 This is a widespread view amongst commentators. See for example: Jolles, Das Deutsche 
Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter Napoleons, 169. 
508 “Der abstrakte Denker hat daher gar oft ein kaltes Herz, weil er die Eindrücke zergliedert, die doch nur 
als ein Ganzes die Seele rühren” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe 
Von Briefen, 26.) 
509 “...der Geschäftsmann hat gar oft ein enges Herz, weil seine Einbildungskraft, in den einförmigen Kreis 
seines Berufs eingeschlossen, sich zu fremder Vorstellungsart nicht erweitern kann.” (Ibid.). 
510 On more on this theme and some disagreement with my analysis see: Yack, The Longing for Total 
Revolution : Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche, 157.: “The 
new spirit of culture divides one's life into separate spheres…” 
511 “Ewig nur an ein einzelnes kleines Bruckstück des Ganzen gefesselt, bildet sich der Mensch selbst nur 
als Bruckstück aus, ewig nur das eintönige Geräusch des Rades, das er umtreibt, im Ohre, entwickelt er nie 
die Harmonie seines Wessens, und anstatt die Menschheit in seiner Natur auszuprägen, wird er bloss zu 
einem Abdruck seines Geschäfts, seiner Wissenschaft.” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des 
Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 23.) 
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 Besides alienating us from ourselves, such fragmentation and desubstantiation also 
undermines society and the state. Division, for Schiller, took root in the psyche and in 
society so that now “state and church are torn asunder, laws from morals, pleasure from 
work, means from ends, effort from reward.”512 As a result, we have lost a reliable and 
stable moral core at the heart of our thinking about justice and decency. Instead, society is 
split into warring camps, each degenerating in its own way. The lower orders that have 
succumbed to “lawless passions” and “animalistic desires” threaten the present order.513 
Meanwhile, the higher orders, according to Schiller, have also corrupted their character and 
thereby contributed to the erosion of the bonds of society.514 That is Schiller’s much-
lamented “disadvantageous tendency of the character of our age.”515 Society is crumbling 
into pieces in front of his eyes. Instead of valuing robust notions of justice and deserving, 
we praise individuals for their vapid “mechanical qualities.”516 For Schiller, modern 
individuals are broken into mere “fragments . . . to the point where one has to ask from 
individual to individual to finally collect the totality of the species.”517  
 Schiller contrasts a time when people were whole and questions of legitimacy were 
directly accessible, a time before the “disunion” of the individual from self, society, and the 
state.518 Schiller often turns at such moments towards Periclean Greece, in contrast to 
                                                 
512 “Auseinandergerissen wurden jetzt der Staat und die Kirche, die Gesetze und die Sitten; der Genuss 
wurde von der Arbeit, das Mittel vom Zweck, die Anstrengung von der Belohnung geschieden.” (Ibid.) 
513 Ibid., 18-19. 
514 Ibid., 19-20. 
515 “die nachteilige Richtung des Zeit-Charakters” (Ibid., 26.) 
516 “Wenn das gemeine Wesen das Amt zum Maastab des Mannes macht, wenn es an dem Einen seiner 
Bürger nur die Memorie, an einem Andern den tabellarischen Verstand, an einem Dritten nur die 
mechanische Fertigkeit ehrt...” (Ibid., 24.) 
517 In modern times, individuals are broken into “Bruchstücken, nicht in veränderten Mischungen, [so] dass 
man von Individuum zu Individuum herumfragen muss, um die Totalität der Gattung zusammen zu lessen.” 
(Ibid., 21-22.) 
518 “Zwiespalt” (Ibid., 21.) 
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Novalis, who prefers the model of medieval times.519 For both, however, societies in 
ancient times did not suffer from the defects that befuddle modern humans and hinder our 
agency. As one commentator put it, Schiller is disgusted with the “soul-dividing spirit of 
modern life when compared with the spirit of the Greeks.”520 Schiller is very much 
concerned, as his examples illustrate, with the social phenomenon that people are 
increasingly governed by one standard within one sphere of activity, and by an altogether 
different yardstick as soon as they move on to another sphere. Justice has become fluid and 
procedural, rather than clear and unitary.   
 The causes of this phenomenon lie in developments that are of a recent vintage. 
Predictably, Schiller briefly attacks reason (working through the sciences) for introducing 
ever more refined ways to hollow out justice.521 More sustained, and more interesting, is 
the second prong of his attack: Schiller blames the “intricate clockwork of states” for 
necessitating the increasing separation of different spheres of activity that “tore asunder the 
internal bond of the human nature, and . . . disunited its harmonious forces.”522 The state 
aided significantly in this process by propagating  procedures that “tore human nature into 
pieces.”523 Its administrative apparatus was “forced to deal with the diversity 
[Mannichfaltigkeit] of its citizens through classification” that turned procedural evaluations 
                                                 
519 For more on the similarities and dissimiliarties between Novalis and Schiller see: Habermas, Der 
Philosophische Diskurs Der Moderne : Zwölf Vorlesungen.; Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution : 
Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche, 182. 
520 Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution : Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to 
Marx and Nietzsche, 134.; For a similar view see: Roeck, Lebenswelt Und Kultur Des Bürgertums in Der 
Frühen Neuzeit, 119-20. 
521 Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 22. 
522 “...das verwickeltere Uhrwerk der Staaten eine strengere Absonderung der Stände und Geschäfte 
notwendig machte, so zerriss auch der innere Bund der menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit 
entzweite ihre harmonische Kräfte.” (Ibid.) 
523 “…menschliche Natur…. in Stücke riss…” (Ibid., 21.) 
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into social facts. Schiller sees this as a clear sign of moral and political decline.524  
 The disruption and erosion of clear standards in “the inner individual” is now 
“completed and made common by the new spirit of the government.”525 The world is 
reduced “to a paltry and coarse mechanism” that threatens the bonds of society.526 Schiller 
can see the emerging diversified political and social order only as the loose “piecing 
together of eternally many, but lifeless, pieces.” State and society, under the model that 
Schiller fears, is a “clockwork” that imposes a fractured “mechanistic life” on what had 
formerly been whole.527 For Schiller this amounts to a “gradual extermination of the 
singular, concrete life,” and it means that the state and its citizens will always be strangers 
to each other, “because sentiments cannot find him [the citizen] anywhere.”528 State and 
society are separated. The public sphere, under the cameralistic model, has no role in 
legitimizing and guiding the state. It is a dead weight, passively guided and externally 
managed. This is a dangerous state of affairs. However, the state can do little to remedy it.   
 According to Schiller, the state, having abetted the disintegration of the individual 
and society, is unfit to remedy the negative effects.529 The state’s corrupted contemporary 
configuration renders it powerless to restore the unity Schiller seeks. The state is both cause 
                                                 
524 “Genöthigt, sich die Mannichfaltigkeit seiner Bürger durch Klassifizierung zu erleichtern, und die 
Menschheit nie anders als durch Repräsentation aus der zweiten Hand zu empfangen, verliert der 
regierende Teil sie zuletzt ganz und gar aus den Augen, indem er sie mit einem blossen Machwerk des 
Verstandes vermengt; und der regierte kann nicht anders als mit Kaltsinn die Gesetze empfange, die an ihn 
selbst so wenig gerichtet sind.” (Ibid., 24.) 
525 “Diese Zerrüttung, welche Kunst und Gelehrsamkeit in dem innern Menschen anfingen, machte der 
neue Geist der Regierung vollkommen und allgemein.” (Ibid., 23.) 
526 The world „sank [] zu einer gemeinen und groben Mechanik herab.” (Ibid.) 
527 The old world order “machte jetzt einem kunstreichen Uhrwerke Platz, wo aus der 
Zusammenstückelung unendlich vieler, aber lebloser, Teile ein mechanisches Leben im Ganzen sich 
bildet.” (Ibid.) 
528 “Und so wird denn allmählig das einzelne konkrete Leben vertilgt, damit das Abstrakt des Ganzen sein 
dürftiges Dasein friste, und ewig bleibt der Staat seinen Bürgern fremd, weil ihn das Gefühl nirgends 
findet.” (Ibid., 24.) 
529 “Sollte diese Wirkung vielleicht von dem Staat zu erwarten sein? Das ist nicht möglich, denn der Staat, 
wie er jetzt beschaffen ist, hat das Übel veranlasst” (Ibid., 29.) 
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and symptom of the current malady, certainly not its cure. Novalis seems to concur by 
describing “reformers of the state” [Staatsumwältzer] as variations on the Sisyphus 
theme.530 Any attempt to reorganize the affairs of the state is, in Schiller’s words 
“untimely, and all hope based on it chimerical, until the separation within the inner 
individual is overcome, and his nature is completely developed ….”531 
 
(ii) Total Revolution 
 
 To achieve this, Schiller sets out to reunite what has been put asunder, to create 
humans and societies that are once again whole and can have direct access to questions of 
legitimacy, beyond the indirect question. In his analysis, current times are “far away from 
displaying the constitution of humanity that has been recognized as the necessary condition 
for the moral improvement of the state; instead, it shows us the direct opposite thereof.”532 
Consequently the “urgent desire of our age . . . is the ennoblement of sentiments and the 
moral cleansing of our will.”533 For Schiller, our very humanity is at stake. To be human, 
for him and many contemporaries, is no longer an attribute one inherits by virtue of 
belonging to the human race. Instead, it is an attribute one must achieve and struggle to 
                                                 
530 Novalis, Die Christenheit oder Europa, 1799 
531 “...so muss man jeden Versuch einer solchen Staatsveränderung solange für unzeitig und jede darauf 
gegründete Hoffnung solange für schimärisch erklären, bis die Trennung in dem innern Menschen wieder 
aufgehoben, und seine Natur vollständig genug entwickelt ist, um selbst die Künstlerinn zu sein, und der 
politischen Schöpfung der Vernunft ihre Realität zu verbürgen.” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung 
Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 29.) 
532 “Das jetzige Zeitalter, weit entfernt uns diejenige Form der Menschehit aufzuweisen, welche als 
notwendige Bedingung einer moralischen Staatsverbesserung erkannt worden ist, zeight uns vielmehr das 
direkte Gegenteil davon.” (Ibid.) 
533 “Das dringende Bedürfniss unsers Zeitalters scheint mir die Veredlung der Gefühle und die sittliche 
Reinigung des Willens zu sein.” (Letter from Schiller to Herzog Friedrich Christian von Schleswig-
Holstein-Augustenburg, 13th July, 1793.) 
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retain. Consider again a passage we encountered above:  
 
Always tied to a small fragment of his totality, the human being himself develops as 
a fragment . . . while never developing the harmony of his being, and instead of 
expressing the humanity in his nature he becomes the mere expression of his 
business, his science.534 
 
 To fail to develop as a holistic being is, for Schiller, to fall far short of one’s 
humanity. For him, to be human means to realize the potential embedded in one’s nature, 
not merely to possess that potential. It is questionable whether many people, or anybody at 
all, could reach the pinnacle that Schiller sets at the core of his ideal. In Bernard Yack’s 
words, for Schiller and some that built upon his thought, “modern man is not fully 
human.”535 As Schiller himself is at pains to articulate, current political and social practices 
are hard at work corroding the moral core of individuals and societies. It follows for 
Schiller that the goal of “making the individual into a self-sufficient whole” is as important 
as it is unlikely to be attained by most of us.536 Only when people are reformed toward their 
unity and their “nature is turned around can we [begin to] think of the essential 
establishment of humanity.”537 
 Schiller is thus not concerned with merely improving the conditions of the age or 
articulating answers to narrow political questions. For him, our very humanity is 
endangered, if not already lost. The processes of fragmentation and alienation have 
                                                 
534 “Ewig nur an ein einzelnes kleines Bruckstück des Ganzen gefesselt, bildet sich der Mensch selbst nur 
als Bruckstück aus, ewig nur das eintönige Geräusch des Rades, das er umtreibt, im Ohre, entwickelt er nie 
die Harmonie seines Wessens, und anstatt die Menschheit in seiner Natur auszuprägen, wird er bloss zu 
einem Abdruck seines Geschäfts, seiner Wissenschaft.” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des 
Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 23.) 
535 Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution : Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to 
Marx and Nietzsche, 8. 
536 “...den Menschen zu einem in sich selbst vollendeten Ganzen mach[en]” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische 
Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 68.) 
537 “...da können wir auf eine solche Umwältzung seiner Natur und den eigentlichen Anfang der 
Menschheit in ihm schliessen.” (Ibid., 114.) 
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dehumanized us; they have rendered us less than human. To struggle against this pernicious 
threat is a paramount commandment. The “great calling of [our] existence” is to find and 
realize the “unchangeable unity” of our being that we all carry within us, “in disposition 
and purpose.”538 Given the total corruption of our age, only a total change of our mode of 
existence, our laws, our habits, and our social practices can turn the tide of dehumanization. 
Consequently, Schiller calls for a “total revolution.”539  
 Characteristically, such a revolution begins for Schiller with the ways we receive 
and process sentiments and emotions.540 Schiller needs a sphere of life, a domain of activity 
that has not been completely corroded by fragmentation. He finds it in art. In Habermas’s 
reformulation, the “historic task” of art is to “reconcile the disintegrating modern 
[condition]” within the individual as well as within the shared  communal existence.541 
Only “higher art” is capable of restoring “the totality of our nature.”542 In all other domains 
of activity, humans rely on skills that enable individuals but also constrain and limit 
them.543 The aesthetic realm is unique in that the appreciation of art “leads to that which is 
not contained within boundaries.” Only the “aesthetic [condition] is a whole within itself,” 
where “we feel torn out of time; and our humanity displays itself with a purity and 
                                                 
538 “Jeder individuelle Mensch, kann man sagen, trägt, der Anlage und Bestimmung nach, einen reinen 
idealistischen Menschen in sich, mit dessen unveränderlicher Einheit in allen seinen Abwechselungen 
übereinstimmen, die grosse Aufgabe [not as a matter of course, but involves effort] seines Daseins ist.” 
(Ibid., 15.). 
539 Ibid., 114.; See also: Habermas, Der Philosophische Diskurs Der Moderne : Zwölf Vorlesungen, 59. 
540 This is admittedly a cumbersome, but hopefully precise way to express the German word: 
“Empfindungsweise” that is also found in Schiller’s 27th letter along with “total Revolution.” (Schiller, 
Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 114.). 
541 “Wenn die Kunst die historische Aufgabe, die mit sich zerfallene Moderne zu versöhnen, soll erfüllen 
können, darf sie nicht nur die Individuen ergreifen, sie muss vielmehr die Lebensformen, die die Individuen 
teilen, verwandeln. “ (Habermas, Der Philosophische Diskurs Der Moderne : Zwölf Vorlesungen, 59.). 
542 “Es muss also falsch sein, dass die Ausbildung der einzelnen Kräfte das Opfer ihrer Totalität notwendig 
macht; oder wenn auch das Gesetz der Natur noch so sehr dahin strebte, so muss es bei uns stehen, diese 
Totalität in unsrer Natur, welche die Kunst zerstört hat, durch eine höhere Kunst wieder herzustellen.” 
(Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 28, 33.). 
543 “Alle andere Übungen geben dem Gemüth irgend ein besondres Geschick, aber setzen ihm dafür auch 
eine besondere Grenze” (Ibid., 85-6.). 
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integrity, as if it had not been interrupted by external forces.”544 Art unites that which has 
become disjointed.545   
 For Schiller, art is importantly autonomous of social and political forces. It is 
isolated and preserved by an “absolute immunity from the arbitrariness of humans.”546 
Politics might inhibit art, but it cannot control it.547 Paradoxically, but tellingly, Schiller 
thinks artists can give us the experience of psychic unity because they themselves were 
nurtured by the “milk of a better age” before fragmentation – ancient Athens for Schiller, 
medieval times for Novalis.548 When the artist returns “to his own century,” according to 
Schiller he should not appear cheerful, “but horrible, like Agamemnon’s son, in order to 
purify [his time].”549 Schiller argues that artists should take the content [Stoff] of their art 
from their contemporary time, but draw its form from “a nobler time, a time beyond all 
time, borrowed from the absolute, unchangeable unity of their being.”550 Only then can true 
beauty emerge.  
 I will leave aside the question of whether Schiller’s aesthetic is consistent or 
coherent. Far more important for the argument at hand is Schiller’s original and influential 
thesis that humans, societies, and states can and must be reformed through art and poetry. 
In his account, art does not merely entertain, nor does it serve for the petty edification of 
                                                 
544 “...die ästhetische allein führt zum Unbegrenzten. [...] ...nur der ästhetische [Zustand] ist ein Ganzes in 
sich selbst, da er alle Bedingungen seines Ursprungs und seiner Fortdauer in sich vereinigt. Hier allein 
fühlen wir uns wie aus der Zeit gerissen; und unsre Menschheit äussert sich mit einer Reinheit und 
Integrität, als hätte sie von der Einwirkung äussrer Kräfte noch keinen Abbruch erfahren.” (Ibid.). 
545 This is a common interpretation of Schiller’s work. For a well-put version see: Korff, Geist Der 
Goethezeit : Versuch Einer Ideellen Entwicklung Der Klassisch-Romantischen Literaturgeschichte, 286-7. 
546 “...einer absoluten Immunität von der Willkür der Menschen.” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische 
Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 34.). 
547 “Der politische Gesetzgeber kann ihr Gebiet sperren, aber darinn herschen kann er nicht.” (Ibid.). 
548 “Milch eines bessern Alters” (Ibid.). 
549 When he returns “in sein Jahrhundert zurück” he shouldn't appear cheerful, “sondern furchtbar wie 
Agememnons Sohn, um es zu reinigen.” (Ibid.). 
550 “Den Stoff zwar wird er von der Gegenwart nehmen, aber die Form von einer edleren Zeit, ja jenseits 
aller Zeit, von der absoluten unwandelbaren Einheit seines Wesens entlehnt.” (Ibid.). 
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morals here and there. It serves to recover our very humanity from the abyss and to restore 
the “purely idealistic individual,” beyond fragmentation.551 Only through true art, then, can 
we recover the authentic, pre-alienated life.552 That is why Schiller prioritizes art over 
politics, why he discusses aesthetics instead of the French Revolution, and why he calls art 
the “daughter of liberty.”553  
 Schiller here formulates here, as Habermas argues, a harsh critique of bureaucratic 
institutions and alienation. Both contribute to and are constitutive of a soulless society that 
insists on divisive and mechanical classifications.554 Artificial, procedural machinations on 
behalf of the state drag society deeper and deeper into a “paltry and coarse mechanism.”555 
For Schiller, the emerging modern state is, in a familiar refrain, an “intricate clockwork,” 
pieced together out of many lifeless fragments into a lamentable mechanical entity.556 The 
desubstantiated state, in such a mechanical world, lacks passion, attention to individual 
characteristics, and a reliable moral core. Schiller, though articulate, is hardly original in 
his rejection of all things fragmented and mechanical and his praise of the holistic and 
organic. In the words of one commentator, he is merely articulating “common currency in 
[his] time.”557 
 
                                                 
551 “...einen reinen idealistischen Menschen...” (Ibid., 15.). 
552 Korff, Geist Der Goethezeit : Versuch Einer Ideellen Entwicklung Der Klassisch-Romantischen 
Literaturgeschichte, 276. 
553 “Kunst ist eine Tochter der Freiheit” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung Des Menschen in Einer 
Reihe Von Briefen, 9, 28.). In Habermas’ words: “Die Kunst selbst ist das Medium der Bildung des 
Menschengeschlechts zur wahren politischen Freiheit. “ (Habermas, Der Philosophische Diskurs Der 
Moderne : Zwölf Vorlesungen, 59.). 
554 This insight and formulation derive from Habermas: Habermas, Der Philosophische Diskurs Der 
Moderne : Zwölf Vorlesungen, 60. 
555 „...sank sie zu einer gemeinen und groben Mechanik herab.” (Schiller, Über Die Ästhetische Erziehung 
Des Menschen in Einer Reihe Von Briefen, 23.) 
556 „...kunstreichem Uhrwerke Platz, wo aus der Zusammenstückellung unendlich vieler, aber lebloser, 
Theile ein mechanisches Leben im Ganzen sich bildet.” (Ibid.) 
557 Rippere, Schiller And "Alienation", 23. 
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(iii) Antigone in Weimar 
 
One place where Schiller’s concerns and many of the themes of this section were on 
display was on the stage of a little theater in Weimar. Its artistic director, Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe, got it into his mind at the dawn of the nineteenth century to bring Antigone to 
Weimar.558 As Goethe was the revered head of the Weimarer Hoftheater (from 1791 until 
1817) and one of the cultural cornerstones of Germany, all that stood between his intention 
and its realization was an appropriate translation of the play. Though many Antigone 
adaptations had been produced as operas in the preceding decades, few had been attempted 
as straight plays. Fortunately for Goethe, numerous people had written or were actively 
working on new translations. The tricky part was choosing the right one.  
 Like the cameralist project, German Antigone translations have their roots in the 
Thirty Years’ War. Martin Opitz was the first to translate Antigone into German in 1636.559 
Closer at hand, both Georg Christoph Tobler and Friedrich Leopold von Stolberg had 
translated Antigone in the 1780s. However, Goethe rejected both translations  because they 
seemed outdated, beholden to the aesthetic sensibilities of another era. A fourth possibility 
was a very recent translation by Friedrich Ast from 1804. Ast was an important Greek 
                                                 
558 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Rochlitz, and Woldemar Biedermann, Briefwechsel Mit 
Friedrich Rochlitz. Herausgeber: Woldemar Freiherr Von Biedermann (Leipzig,: F.W.v. Biedermann, 
1887), 14-15. 
559 For a great introduction concerning the influence of Greek theater on German culture and thought see: 
Flashar, Inszenierung Der Antike : Das Griechische Drama Auf Der Bühne Der Neuzeit, 1585-1990, 37.; 
For more, see Steiner, Antigones, 173.; For helpful introductions to Opitz’s life, work, “canonical status“ 
and “paradigm founding“ influence see: Friedrich Gundolf, "Martin Opitz," in Deutsche Barockforschung; 
Dokumentation Einer Epoche, ed. Richard Alewyn (Köln,: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1966).; Gunter Grimm, 
Literatur Und Gelehrtentum in Deutschland : Untersuchungen Zum Wandel Ihres Verhältnisses Vom 
Humanismus Bis Zur Frühaufklärung, Studien Zur Deutschen Literatur, (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1983), 
115-54. 
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philologist, and Goethe held his work in high esteem. But he considered Ast’s translation 
too exact, too literal, and too mechanical.  
A fifth possibility was a translation by Friedrich Hölderlin.560 Hölderlin seemed 
well suited for the task of bringing Antigone to the stage. He had a deep appreciation for 
ancient Greek society, thought, and language, which he had put to highly acclaimed use in 
his best-known short novel, Hyperion. In it, a Greek youth named Hyperion comes to life 
among the Germans. Through his eyes, we see the Germans as fundamentally divided and 
alienated among themselves and within themselves. Hyperion remarks that “I cannot 
imagine a people more mangled than the Germans. You see artisans, but no human beings, 
thinkers, but no human beings, masters and servants, young and elderly people, but no 
human beings.” Only through experience of the richness of life does Hyperion recover a 
fuller sense of humanity and “blessed unity.”561 
 Hölderlin’s translation of Antigone was published in 1804 (it is also referred to as 
Antigonae or Antigonä). Immediately Hölderlin sent two copies of it to his old school 
friends Hegel and Schelling.562 Both were shocked.563  Like much of the public, they were 
stunned by Hölderlin’s rough and seemingly irreverent approach to Sophocles’s work. 
Hölderlin’s idiosyncratic use of the German language is in keeping with his interpretation 
of the play. For him, Antigone is seized by “the spirit of the ever-living unwritten 
                                                 
560 The play can be found here: Friedrich Hölderlin, Sophokles - Sämtliche Werke : Frankfurter Ausg. : 
[Histor. -Krit. Ausg.], ed. D. E. Sattler, 19 vols., vol. 16 (Frankfurt (M.): Verlag Roter Stern, 1975), 261-
407.; For a good introduction to Hölderlin’s remarks on his Antigone translation see: Monika Kasper, Das 
Gesez Von Allen Der König : Hölderlins Anmerkungen Zum Oedipus Und Zur Antigonä, Epistemata. Reihe 
Literaturwissenschaft ; (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2000). 
561 As quoted in: Christiansen, Romantic Affinities : Portrait of an Age, 1780-1830, 83-4. 
562 Christoph Jamme and Frank Völkel, Hölderlin Und Der Deutsche Idealismus : Dokumente Und 
Kommentare Zu Hölderlins Philosophischer Entwicklung Und Den Philosophisch-Kulturellen Kontexten 
Seiner Zeit, 4 vols., vol. 4, Specula ; (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2003), 50-1. 
563 For more on the connection between Hölderlin and Hegel see: Dieter Henrich and Eckart Förster, The 
Course of Remembrance and Other Essays on Hölderlin, Studies in Kant and German Idealism (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 119-40.; Christiansen, Romantic Affinities : Portrait of an Age, 
1780-1830, 84. 
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wilderness.”564 She represents, in a duality reminiscent of the cameralists, “that which lacks 
form.” As such, she is the “reaction” to the “far too formal” Kreon. The clash between 
these two elements is, for Hölderlin, the very definition of tragedy.565 Hölderlin had asked 
Schelling to arrange a staging of the play at the Weimar Theater. Schelling, like many, 
considered this highly unlikely.  
 The artistic establishment fiercely rejected Hölderlin’s work. Friedrich Schiller, for 
example, thought Hölderlin’s work was horrible and hilarious. He would ask Henrich Voss 
to read passages aloud and would then burst into loud laughter. Voss, for his part, 
vituperated privately in his letters against Hölderlin as a “lousy dog” and “fool.”566 Many 
who felt likewise saw themselves validated when Hölderlin started to exhibit outward signs 
of madness and was sent to an insane asylum. He was diagnosed with dementia praecox, or 
what we call schizophrenia. Hölderlin believed that he had been driven to insanity by 
exposure to the sacred fire of the gods: “He who has seen God must die. . . . Like fire is the 
voice of God.”567 Hölderlin began speaking a polyglot gibberish of Greek, German and 
Latin. He addressed all people around him as either “Your Majesty” or “Your Holiness.” 
Hölderlin also conversed often in the roles of two distinct personalities that responded to 
each other’s inquiries. From 1807 until the end of his life (thirty-six years later), he lived in 
a small room above a master carpenter’s shop in Tübingen. The carpenter, it turned out, 
was an admirer of Hyperion.568  
                                                 
564 As cited in: Véronique Marion Fóti, Epochal Discordance : Hölderlin's Philosophy of Tragedy, Suny 
Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 76. 
565 “Das Unförmliche“ and “allzuförmliche.“ Both as cited in: Jamme and Völkel, Hölderlin Und Der 
Deutsche Idealismus : Dokumente Und Kommentare Zu Hölderlins Philosophischer Entwicklung Und Den 
Philosophisch-Kulturellen Kontexten Seiner Zeit, 63. 
566 “Lumpenhund” and “Narren” (Otto Pöggeler, Antigone in Der Deutschen Dichtung, Philosophie Und 
Kunst (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2004), 18-19.) 
567 Christiansen, Romantic Affinities : Portrait of an Age, 1780-1830, 89-90. 
568 Ibid., 89-91. 
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Since the date of its first publication, a debate has raged whether Hölderlin’s 
Antigone was tainted by Hölderlin’s (subsequent?) derangement. Whatever the answer to 
this vexing question, Goethe found it difficult to present a work that was seen by many as 
the product of brute insanity. Hölderlin’s Antigone was not staged until 1913.569 However, 
despite its troubled inception, it has proven tremendously influential. It influenced 
Heidegger and was the basis of an opera by Carl Orff (better known for his Carmina 
Burana) and an irreverent play by Bertolt Brecht.570  
With Hölderlin and other competitors out of the way, Goethe favored a translation 
by Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger. Goethe considered him one of the few good translators 
of Sophocles. Like many of the authors we have encountered in this section, Solger was a 
lowly bureaucrat, and his day job seems to have delayed his artistic output.571 With 
Solger’s version much delayed (Solger’s Antigone did not appear until 1808),572 Goethe 
chose yet another Antigone translation, this one by Friedrich Rochlitz.573  
This translation deviates purposively from the original in numerous ways. First, 
Rochlitz’s Antigone heightens and adds depictions of revulsion and sentimentality. For 
example, Rochlitz adds to one of Kreon’s commands to leave Polyneices unburied the 
phrase “a picture of terror” [ein Bild des Schreckens]. In another place, Antigone lamented 
                                                 
569 Jamme and Völkel, Hölderlin Und Der Deutsche Idealismus : Dokumente Und Kommentare Zu 
Hölderlins Philosophischer Entwicklung Und Den Philosophisch-Kulturellen Kontexten Seiner Zeit, 51. 
570 Otto Pöggeler, Schicksal Und Geschichte : Antigone Im Spiegel Der Deutungen Und Gestaltungen Seit 
Hegel Und Hölderlin (München: W. Fink, 2004), 111-81.; Pöggeler, Antigone in Der Deutschen Dichtung, 
Philosophie Und Kunst, 18-26. 
571 Solger worked for the Kriegs- und Domänenkammer in Berlin. For more on Solger see: Joseph Heller, 
Solgers Philosophie Der Ironischen Dialektik; Ein Beitrag Zur Geschichte Der Romantischen Und 
Spekulativ-Idealistischen Philosophie (Berlin,: Reuther & Reichard, 1928), 6.; Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand 
Solger, Ludwig Tieck, and Friedrich von Raumer, Nachgelassene Schriften Und Briefwechsel, 2 vols. 
(Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1826). 
572 Flashar, Inszenierung Der Antike : Das Griechische Drama Auf Der Bühne Der Neuzeit, 1585-1990, 54. 
573 Pöggeler, Schicksal Und Geschichte : Antigone Im Spiegel Der Deutungen Und Gestaltungen Seit Hegel 
Und Hölderlin, 69-70. 
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dryly in Sophocles’s version that she dies without a friend nearby. Rochlitz turned this 
passage into: 
 
I offer to you the joy of a young bride and the hope of rich marriage bliss, and, oh, 
the heavenly dream of mother joys.574   
 
Second, apart from heightening the emotional thrust of the play, Rochlitz also 
replaces the names of the gods with an interpretation of their functions. “Eros” thus 
becomes, in Rochlitz’s translation, a nontheistic “almighty love” [Allmächtige Liebe].  
Third, Rochlitz weakens the role of the chorus. Rochlitz, like many German 
translators and interpreters before and after him, found it difficult to render the chorus 
passages intelligible and appealing to modern German audiences. For extended passages, 
the chorus simply dissolves into alternating individual speakers.  
Fourth, Rochlitz tends to establish and support a clear-cut political and moral 
hierarchy in his translation. Sophocles’s Antigone supports interpretations that highlight 
multiple sources of authority and clashing evaluations of worth. In contrast, Rochlitz’s 
Antigone seems to put Kreon unambiguously in sanctioned charge of the city. Sophocles’s 
chorus in one part remarks dryly that Kreon may do what he pleases (211). In Rochlitz’s 
version this simple observation turns into a jubilant declaration: “Your decision, my king, 
pleases me as well!”575 Rochlitz also defangs the zesty interactions between the slightly 
rebellious watchman and an aggressive Kreon. He renders the watchman meek and 
suppliant and Kreon magnanimous: instead of driving him away impatiently, Rochlitz’s 
Kreon releases the watchman with the “royal word of honor” not to harm him. All in all, 
                                                 
574 “Ich bring die Wonne einer jungen Braut, die Hoffnung reichen Eheglücks euch dar, und ach, der 
Mutterfreuden Himmelstraum.“ (all Antigone quotations from Rochlitz can be found in: Flashar, 
Inszenierung Der Antike : Das Griechische Drama Auf Der Bühne Der Neuzeit, 1585-1990, 54-6.) 
575 The German is even stronger: “Auch mir gefällt, mein König, dein Entschluss!” 
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Rochlitz is hard at work to render mute Antigone’s negative characterization of Kreon 
(506-7). Viewers of Rochlitz’s Antigone have few opportunities to observe the potential 
dangers of Kreon’s absolute and unchecked rule. Eurydice does not commit suicide with 
Kreon’s sword (1295-7) but simply “falls to the ground, suddenly stiff and dead.”576  
All these changes are not accidental. As Rochlitz makes very clear: he made 
“absolutely no, not even minimal deviations from Sophocles” without abundant thought 
and deliberation.577 Rochlitz and Goethe purposively target the sensibilities of their 
audience. As Goethe explains clearly to Rochlitz in a letter, his translation should aim to 
“ingratiate itself with the audience.”578 Rochlitz, in return, assured Goethe that he would try 
to be attentive to this end. As he explained to Goethe, he had finally found a “manner of 
treating” the material that is suitable for the modern stage and that would achieve a decisive 
“effect on the audience.”579 In some ways this was merely about the successful staging of a 
play. In other ways, however, it is a revealing window on the aesthetic, social, and political 
struggles of an age. Much was at stake in choosing the right Antigone translation. Goethe 
took care, deliberation, and a lot of time to find the right play. Literal or ‘accurate’ 
translations were of little appeal.580 Goethe rejected some versions for being beholden to 
bygone aesthetic ideals, and others for being too stiff and lacking passion. He rejected 
Hölderlin’s work for its disregard of many boundaries his audience held sacred. Rochlitz’s 
translation, though a far cry from being faithful, avoided all of these pitfalls. In Goethe’s 
estimation, Rochlitz’s Antigone “approximates most closely to our sensibilities.”581 
                                                 
576 “...sank sie zu Boden, plötzlich starr und todt.“ 
577 “durchaus keine, auck keine geringe Abweichung vom Sophokles“ (Goethe, Rochlitz, and Biedermann, 
Briefwechsel Mit Friedrich Rochlitz. Herausgeber: Woldemar Freiherr Von Biedermann, 78-9.) 
578 “bey dem Hörer einschmeicheln.” (Ibid., 94.) 
579 “Behandlungsart […] Würkung auf ein Publikum.” (Ibid., 78.) 
580 Ibid. 
581“weil sich diese wol am meisten unserm Sinn nähert.“ (Ibid., 77-8, 91.) 
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Rochlitz’s translation displayed the proper balance of passion and sentimentalism without 
falling into irreverence. Additionally, it portrayed Kreon in a manner that was intelligible 
and agreeable to the audience’s political sensibilities.  
Goethe found Rochlitz’s translation very pleasing and “useful.”582 He staged it 
repeatedly in Weimar in 1808-9, then in Lachstädt, before returning it for another run in 
Weimar. Rochlitz’s Antigone had proven to be in agreement with the aesthetic and political 
sensibilities of the time. His Kreon and Antigone are manifestations of aesthetic 
sensibilities sharply at odds with the cameralist project. Simultaneously with Goethe’s 
Antigone production, at the contentious intersection between cameralistic thought and its 
critics, a convoluted constellation of epic world historical events and mundane mistakes 
was about to redefine the boundaries between facticity and normativity, between the 
administrative sphere and the public sphere.   
                                                 





Experiments: Participatory Citizenship 
 
There existed, then, a wide gap between cameralists and their various critics. The 
two sides were separated by their views on the proper role of passions in governmental 
affairs; the ideals of a personal versus a depersonalized state; the clash of organic and 
mechanical metaphors; and the search for a reliable moral core versus a reliance on 
procedures to secure the stability of the country in contentious times. Both sides had 
accepted a separation between the public sphere and the administrative sphere. However, 
they conceived of these two spheres and their interactions along radically different lines. 
The cameralists emphasized efficiency and facticity in the administrative sphere. For them, 
social order was maintained by excluding the public from questions of legitimacy in favor 
of well-regulated management and administration. Romantics challenged this emphasis and 
posited against it an understanding of society and the state that was, in many ways, its 
antithesis. Romantics had constructed their understanding of the healthy public sphere 
precisely in opposition to the cameralistic, administrative state. The two became 
increasingly separated, divided by a deepening and increasingly hostile gulf. Each side had 
its own logic, built upon different normative commitments; each side emphasized a 
different role for the public; and each side relied on distinct sources of legitimacy and 
disparate understandings of desirable state/society interactions. All these differences 
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amounted to radically opposed views of how to make the country viable in contentious 
times.  
The military repercussions of the French Revolution heightened the stakes of these 
debates in the opening years of the nineteenth century, just as Goethe began searching for a 
proper Antigone adaptation. Germany found itself in a precarious position  in the years 
leading up to 1806: it was blockaded to the north by the British navy and vastly 
outnumbered by the armies of the Austrian empire to the south, Russia to the east, and an 
increasingly bellicose Napoleonic France to the west. Were the cameralists aiding Prussia’s 
standing or undermining the very foundations of its previous strength? Were their critics 
wisely sounding the alarm or were they merely the roadblock to crucial and long-neglected 
reforms? No matter on which side one came down on these questions, they were sure to stir 
up strong sentiments and kindle fierce confrontations. The outcome of these debates was 
profoundly important to contemporaries and far from certain. Raw historical contingencies 
struck repeatedly to derail and enable various conceptual innovations and 
institutionalizations.  
History and unforeseeable historical contingencies consequently matter for the 
account of social and political order on offer in this dissertation. Both are tied up, from 
beginning to end, with the fate of Karl von Stein and a number of his allies and lieutenants. 
All were active in high-ranking government posts and academia and had tremendous 
(temporary) influence on Prussian policy and institution building in the opening years of 
the nineteenth century. They shaped with their deeds, thoughts, and mistakes the 
relationship between the public sphere and the administrative sphere. Faced with a state on 
the brink of annihilation, they articulated and sought to implement a fusion of cameralistic 
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principles with the concerns of the critics of cameralism. That is, they attempted to 
combine procedures with vibrant, passionate, personalized, and substantively rich 
sentiments. In effect, they sought to infuse the organic into the machine, personalize the 
impersonal, fuse the indirect and direct questions of justice, and moderate between the 
antagonized public and administrative spheres. In practice, this meant the careful 
integration of common people into the administrative machinery of the state. Under this 
plan, procedures are supplemented by participatory elements. 
Stein and his allies sought to prototype a new kind of participatory citizenship in an 
effort to stabilize and strengthen the ailing state. They imagined political participation as 
empowering the individuals against the state in order to bolster the  state’s capacities and 
its claims to legitimacy. This counterintuitive position was born out of concerns and 
anxieties over the antagonized separation between the public and administrative spheres. 
As Stein was quick to point out, the two had little in common and tended to mistrust each 
other deeply. The country, thus divided, was easy prey for foreign invasions and 
occupations. Given this analysis, the concern about how to mediate between the 
administrative and public spheres took center stage.  
However, Stein was not content to merely seek new mechanisms to “translate,” in 
Habermas’s phrase, the input of the public sphere into the output of the administrative 
sphere. Stein and his followers did not take the implied division between the two spheres as 
a given. Instead, they theorized, perhaps for the last time, beyond this conceptual split. 
Their institutional innovations aimed at renegotiating and reimagining the relation of the 
public and administrative spheres. Stein and his allies conceived of “translation” as an 
endogenous process intrinsic to both the administrative and the public sphere. They 
 192 
constructed an understanding of participatory citizenship within the administrative 
institutions of the state. Participation, under this model, was not about commissioning 
representatives or yes/no ballots. Instead, Stein and his allies came to think of political 
participation as entailing carefully crafted agency within the state. Stein attempted to 
import elements of the public sphere into the administrative sphere.  
Crucially and paradoxically, Stein conceived of citizenship as enfranchising and 
empowering the individual within the administration against the state in order to strengthen 
the ailing legitimacy of the state. This entailed a radical reconfiguration of the relationship 
between state and society. The social and political orders, under this model, become 
entangled in novel and unfamiliar ways. Stein’s thinking and reforms highlight an array of 
issues, concerns, and proposed solutions about how modern states might enable meaningful 
relations between the state and a political community. One reformer close to Stein 
described his plan as an “amalgamation of public representation and bureaucratic 
offices.“583 It was a strange experiment born out of desperate times.  
Stein, though he could not have known this, was onto something. As abundant 
modern psychological research reveals, people generally perceive decisions as more 
legitimate if they were rendered under procedural rules that allowed for (meaningful) 
participation.584 This finding holds true across a wide spectrum of cultures, socio-economic 
                                                 
583 “Amalgamierung der Repräsentation mit den Verwaltungsbehörden“ (from the Rigaer Denkschrift as 
cited in: Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 
1809-1812, 293.) 
584 The following citations cover some of the landmark pieces on this theme and for an introduction they 
are best read in chronological order: John W. Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice : A 
Psychological Analysis (New York: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1975).; E. Allan Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The 
Social Psychology of Procedural Justice, Critical Issues in Social Justice (New York: Plenum Press, 
1988).; J Brockner and P Siegel, "Understanding the Interaction between Procedrual and Distributive 
Justice," in Trust in Organizations : Frontiers of Theory and Research, ed. Roderick Moreland Kramer and 
Tom R. Tyler (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1996).; Edith Barrett-Howard and Tom R. Tyler, 
"Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Allocation Decisions," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
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backgrounds, educational levels, and so on. In short, it is a surprisingly robust finding. It is 
perhaps for this reason that various theorists in the last half-century tried, again, to 
incorporate citizens into the administrative machinery of the state.585  
The central innovation in Stein’s attempted fusion of the direct and indirect 
questions of justice is a bringing together of procedural requirements and participatory 
norms. Stein and his allies advocated for reconceptualizing popular participation as a well-
regulated procedural element. For Stein, the fairness and legitimacy of a procedure became 
tied to citizens’ opportunity to participate in proceedings. As one of the most famous 
phrases of the time put it, participatory procedural requirements stipulate “democratic 
principles in a monarchical regime.”586 Doing so might avoid the lifeless torpor of 
bureaucratic formalism, but it also invoked the specter of unruly popular participation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
50, no. 2 (1986).; For more legal and political applications see: Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 24-25.; Amy Gangl, "Procedural Justice Theory and 
Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process," Political Behavior 25, no. 2 (Jun., 2003).; For an account of 
procedural justice and the U.S. Supreme Court see: Jeffery Mondak, "Perceived Legitimacy of Supreme 
Court Decisions: Three Functions of Source Credibility," Political Behavior 12 (1990).; Jeffery Mondak, 
"Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Supreme Court Decisions as Detrimants of Institutional Approval," 
American Politics Quarterly 19 (1991).; Consider also the debate between Gibson and Tyler & Rasinski: 
James L. Gibson, "Understandings of Justice: Insitutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political 
Tolerance," Law & Society Review 23 (1989).; Tom R. Tyler and Kenneth Rasinski, "Procedural Justice, 
Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to 
Gibson," Law & Society Review 25 (1991).; James L. Gibson, "Institutional Legitimancy, Procedural 
Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality," Law & Society Review 
25 (1991). 
585 Dwight Waldo, "Development of a Theory of Democratic Administration," The American Political 
Science Review 46, no. 1 (Mar., 1952).; James V. Cunningham, "Citizen Participation in Public Affairs," 
Public Administration Review 32 (1972).; Adam W. Herbert, "Management under Conditions of 
Decentralization and Citizen Participation," Public Administration Review 32 (1972).; David K. Hart, 
"Theories of Government Related to Decentralization and Citizen Participation," Public Administration 
Review 32 (1972).; Jerry Frug, "Administrative Democracy," The University of Toronto Law Journal - 
Special Issue on Administrative Law 40, no. 3 (1990).; Ned Crosby, Janet M. Kelly, and Paul Schaefer, 
"Citizens Panels: A New Approach to Citizen Participation," Public Administration Review 46, no. 2 
(1986).; Carolyn Tuohy, "Bureaucracy and Democracy," The University of Toronto Law Journal - Special 
Issue on Administrative Law 40, no. 3 (1990).; Cheryl Simrell King, Kathryn M. Feltey, and Bridget 
O'Neill Susel, "The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Public Participation in Public 
Administration," Public Administration Review 58, no. 4 (1998). 
586 “Demokratische Grundsätze in einer monarchischen Regierung“ (Karl August Hardenberg, "Über Die 
Organisation Des Preussischen Staates," in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit Der Erniedrigung, ed. Rudolf Vaupel 
(München: Drei Masken, 1923), 98.) 
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Stein walks, again and again, a thin line between vehemently opposed sides. His success 
remained and remains very much in doubt.  
This section will parse Stein’s thought, deeds, and the reaction he engendered 
within their proper historical context. I will proceed chronologically through three chapters: 
Chapter 8 first illuminates the conceptual background of Stein’s thinking before turning to 
pertinent historical conditions leading up to Prussia’s catastrophic defeat and near 
dismantlement in 1806. Chapter 9 traces the development of Stein’s thought in the wake of 
the military upheavals of 1806/7 and his development of participatory procedural 
requirements. Chapter 10 focuses on the attempted implementation of Stein’s thought 
during his brief fourteen-month tenure at the helm of Prussia’s administration. In the 
closing pages of that chapter, I will briefly revisit various critics who remained deeply 






8. The Reformers, the Immediate Context of the Reforms, and the Reforms 
Themselves 
 
(i) Bureaucracy as a Vocation  
 
The thinking behind Stein’s proposed reforms was not born ex nihilo. His response 
to crisis was constrained by conceptual and historical influences. It is consequently helpful 
to understand the nature of the crisis that Stein’s reforms confronted and the tools available 
for doing so.  
Heinrich Friedrich Karl Stein’s life is tangled up, from early on, in the literary, 
aesthetic-political, and pedagogical currents of the time.587 He is influenced as much by his 
cameralist teachers as by their critics. Stein’s life was embroiled in the aesthetic, social, and 
political debates of the time even in his youth. When Stein was still an adolescent, the 
                                                 
587 Stein’s thought, biography, and actions have been subject to interpretatiosn from across the ideological 
spectrum. Virtually all of the claims of this chapter have consequently been disputed by someone, 
somewhere. However, that should not obscure the considerable overlap between mainstream interpretations 
of Stein’s work upon which I build here. For more on the wide range of interpretations of Stein see: 
Epstein, "Stein in German Historiography."; Stefan Berger, "Prussia in History and Historiography from 
the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Century," in The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-
1830, ed. Philip Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000).; Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : Die Preussischen 
Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn Karl Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und Restauration, 96-7.; Gerhard 
Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, [3.] neugestaltete AUfl. ed. (Stuttgart,: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
1958), 11.; For a distinctively marxist perspective consider: E. P. Kadel, I. I. Preis, and Institut marksizma-
leninizma (Moscow Russia), Marx and Engels on Reactionary Prussianism (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Pub. House, 1943).; For liberal accounts (with a touch of democratic socialism) see: Max Lehmann, 
Freiherr Vom Stein (Leipzig,: S. Hirzel, 1902).; Hugo Preuss, Die Wirtschaftliche Und Soziale Bedeutung 
Der Stein-Hardenbergschen Reform (Berlin: Leonhard Simion, 1908).; Hugo Preuss, Verfassungspolitische 
Entwicklungen in Deutschland Und Westeuropa, Historische Grundlegung Zu Einem Staatsrecht Der 
Deutschen Republik (Berlin,: C. Heymann, 1927).; For a conservative interpretation consider: Adalbert 
Wahl, Über Die Nachwirkungen Der Französischen Revolution Vornehmlich in Deutschland : Gedanken 
Und Untersuchungen (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1939).; For an account of the conflicted views of 
DDR (East-German) historians see: Andreas Dorpalen, "The German Struggle against Napoleon: The East 
German View," The Journal of Modern History 41, no. 4 (Dec., 1969). 
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young Goethe spent a couple of months near Stein’s ancestral home. Goethe visited Stein’s 
home periodically while experiencing what he would later fictionalize as the ill-fated love 
story at the heart of the Sufferings of the Young Werther. Stein’s mother had read a 
handwritten copy of Werther prior to its publication, but complained about the prevalence 
and defense of suicide in it. She thought it was an imprudent tool for moral edification.588 
Johann Bernhard Basedow, similarly, was a respected but critically evaluated guest at the 
Steins’ during Karl’s adolescence.  
Stein’s family lived at the intersection of many intellectual currents. On the one 
hand, the family was steeped in contemporary thought and enjoyed the company of the 
avant-garde. On the other hand, they were, in the words of one of the most distinguished 
Stein scholars, “…living vestiges of the medieval feudal system.”589  Similarly, while their 
legal status as “imperial knights”590 was a doomed remnant of the feudal hierarchy, the 
family sent Karl to one of the most progressively oriented universities in Germany and the 
“door to England”591 – the University of Göttingen in Hanover. George II of Britain, then 
still the Elector of Hanover, had founded the university that was one of the main German 
hubs for importing liberal English thought.592 At Göttingen, Stein took courses in 
                                                 
588 She seemingly was also at times skeptical of Basedow’s presence. (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 20-1.; For more see: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Adolf Schöll, and Wilhelm Fielitz, 
Goethes Briefe an Frau Von Stein, 2. vervollständigte Aufl. bearbeitet von Wilhelm Fielitz. ed., 2 vols. 
(Frankfurt a. M.,: Literarische Anstalt, Rütten & Loening, 1883).). 
589  “... lebendige Überreste des mittelalterlichen Feudalwesens...” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 16.) 
590 “Reichsritter” (Craig, The End of Prussia, 9.; Levinger, "The Prussian Reform Movement and the Rise 
of Enlightened Nationalism," 259.) 
591 Marion Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society New Ser., Vol. 76, no. 1 (1986): 54. 
592 Consider for example: Friedrich Buchholz, Der Neue Leviathan (Tubingen,: In der J. G. Cottaischen 
buchhandlung, 1805).; However, books like that seemed to have had little impact outside of the universities 
and university-educated classes (Hans-Eberhard Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil 
Service Reforms in Prussia and England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 145.).; Stein, 
incidentally, would eventually marry one of the granddaughters of George II (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 54.). 
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cameralism and became acquainted with two other students who remained important 
influences throughout his life: Ernst Brandes and August Wilhelm Rehberg. Brandes later 
became one of the foremost experts in Germany on English political circumstances and 
thought,593 while Rehberg’s career took him into the Hanoverian bureaucracy and towards 
becoming an important publicist of the epoch.594  
The influence of English thought was a persistent, multilayered influence on all of 
them. Adam Smith in particular captured their attention, and Stein’s personal copy of The 
Wealth of Nations was well worn and bountifully marked in Stein’s own handwriting.595 
Stein traveled eagerly to England later in his life. His visit, however, was not a sparkling 
                                                 
593 Ernst Brandes wurde “später zum besten Kenner englischer Personalien und politischer Verhältnisse auf 
deutschem Boden.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 31, 103.); For more on Brandes and Rehberg 
see: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 57.; See 
also: Parry, "Enlightened Government and Its Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany," 181. 
594 “August Wilhelm Rehbergs geschichtliche Rolle ist heute nach langer Vergessenheit wieder in helles 
Licht gerückt: nächst Friedrich Gentz, dem grössten Publizisten der Epoche, aber in vollkommener 
Selbständigkeit und Eigenart neben ihm stehend, hat er als der bedeutendste literarische Gegner der 
Französischen Revolution und Vorkämpfer englischen politischen Denkens in Deutschland zu gelten.” 
(Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 100.). For Rehberg’s influence on the reform program 
(especially with respect to the provincial assemblies) see: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics 
under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 110.; See also: Jolles, Das Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im 
Zeitalter Napoleons, 93-4. 
595 Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 71.; Adam Smith’s impact on Stein and 
Germany is hotly debated. For a helpful introduction consider: August Ferdinand Lueder, Ueber 
Nationalindustrie Und Staatswirthschaft Nach Adam Smith Bearbeitet (Berlin: H. Frölich, 1800).; Wunder, 
Geschichte Der Bürokratie in Deutschland, 22.; Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the 
Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 52, 57.; Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The 
Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 186-7, 93.; Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : 
The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 26-27, 60.; Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken 
Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien Zum 
Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 346-52.; For Adam Smith’s influence on cameralism and administrators 
throughout Germany see: Tribe, "Cameralism and the Science of Government," 277-83.; Straubel, Beamte 
Und Personalpolitik Im Altpreussischen Staat : Soziale Rekrutierung, Karriereverläufe, 
Entscheidungsprozesse (1763/86-1806), 109.; For more on Smith’s reception in German culture and 
conservative opposition to it consider: Walter M. Simon, "Prince Hardenberg," The Review of Politics 18, 
no. 1 (1956): 91.; Berdahl, "The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia," 313.; Levinger, "The 
Prussian Reform Movement and the Rise of Enlightened Nationalism," 268-9.; Walter Görlitz, Die Junker: 
Adel Und Bauer Im Deutschen Osten; Geschichtliche Bilanz Von 7 Jahrhunderten (Glücksburg, Ostsee,: 
C.A. Starke, 1956), 173.; Wilhelm Treue, Wirtschaftszustände Und Wirtschaftspolitik in Preussen 1815-
1825 (Stuttgart, Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1937), 140.; For more on connections between Edmund Burke 
and the conservative tradition in German thought see: Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism.; 
Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848.; 
Berdahl, "Prussian Aristocracy and Conservative Ideology: A Methodological Examination." 
 198 
social success: Stein seems to have been overeager to become acquainted with the latest 
English mechanical inventions, and was consequently suspected of being an industrial 
spy.596 
While Stein found much to appreciate in English thought, he also found much to 
dislike. Stein left the university (1777) without taking exams since he, as an aristocrat, even 
a lowly aristocrat, did not need them for his bureaucratic career.597 As modern scholarship 
confirms, in England, as in Prussia, the bureaucracy and officeholding associated with it 
remained “part of a ‘social security system’ for families of gentle rank,” a “gigantic 
outdoor relief department” even for incompetent members of the aristocracy.598 However, 
the hiring and promoting of uneducated, inept, and inefficient aristocrats was not 
exclusively a charitable act of the crown, lending fellow nobility a hand. Rather, as we 
have seen, the crown was long caught between the cameralists’ emphasis on procedures 
and their critics’ emphasis on traditions and the will of individuals (preferably wellborn). In 
a society in which status distinctions implied and required the  display of conspicuous 
inequalities in living standards, the crown took care lest aristocratic rank be debased by 
pecuniary want.599 Keeping aristocrats’ hands on the levers of power within the 
                                                 
596 Stein was in Britain from January to July of 1786 (Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-
1815, 61-2.; Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 44.). 
597 There is some disagreement amongst historians concerning the status of exams. Methodologically this 
question has been a hard nut to crack (given the sparsity of helpful data). For an assessment by a noted 
historian in line with my offered interpretation see: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 31. 
598 This aggressive formulation comes from Mueller, see: Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly 
: Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 96, 107, 40.; However, he is not alone in this 
interpretation. See for example: Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-
Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 146. 
599 Spring, European Landed Elites in the Nineteenth Century, 51.; Consider also William Cobbett who 
writes about England but whose views can also be found in the Prussian context. He writes approvingly 
that public office ought to serve the purpose of “upholding and cherishing those among the ancient nobility 
and gentry, who otherwise would fall into a state that would inevitably bring disgrace upon rank and would, 
thereby, leave us no aristocracy but that of wealth, ten thousand times more grinding and insolent than the 
lords of the worst feudal times.” (cited in: Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service 
Reforms in Prussia and England, 97.) 
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bureaucracy did not merely provide them with money; it also reinforced extraprocedural 
decision making. The cost of this, as we have seen, was an inefficient, capricious 
administration. The requirement of higher education (let alone a completed degree) for all 
but the lowest bureaucratic positions was only introduced much later – by Stein, actually.600 
As he argued repeatedly, work would get done far more efficiently if bureaucrats actually 
took the trouble to learn about laws and regulations. He wished that “almost complete 
ignorance were to be taken care of through instrumental academic education and the strict 
application of tests for young people” eager to join the bureaucracy.601 In the Prussian 
context, this implied training in the cameralist sciences and a commitment to procedures.  
Stein, upon leaving the university and completing practical training, entered the 
Prussian administration and rose slowly through the ranks over the next 25 years.602 Very 
much at odds with the customs of the time, Stein throughout his career repeatedly refused 
prestigious appointments for which he thought himself not sufficiently qualified. Early on, 
while still ingloriously administering mines, he refused diplomatic missions to 
Copenhagen, The Hague, and St. Petersburg. Stein was completely lacking in the 
knowledge, experience, and natural talent to be an effective diplomat.603 More 
                                                 
600 “Although the career sequence of university education and in-service training became quite common 
during the generation preceding Prussia’s defeat in 1806, the requirement of higher education was formally 
introduced only in the context of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms.” (Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and 
Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 126.). 
601  From a memoranda of Stein writen for the “General-Direktorium” (8. June. 1801): “Es ergibt sich 
hieraus, wie sehr der Geschäftsgang wird abgekürzt werden, wenn öffentliche Beamte sich ernsthaft 
befleissigen, die Gesetze und Vorschriften kennen zu lernen, wie sehr es zu wünschen, dass dieser fast 
allgemeinen Unwissenheit durch zweckmässigen akademischen Unterricht und strenge Prüfungs-Anstallten 
bei der Annahme junger Leute abgeholfen werde...” (Karl Stein, Freiherr Vom Stein; Ausgewählte 
Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften ([Stuttgart, Köln]: W. Kohlhammer, 1955), 43.). 
602 For helpful biographical accounts see: Craig, The End of Prussia, 10-11.; Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : Die 
Preussischen Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn Karl Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und Restauration, 26-
38. 
603 “Es fehle ihm [Stein] an allen Kenntnissen und Erfahrungen auf dem diplomatischen Felde, auch alle 
natürliche Begabung zum Diplomaten; er fühle sich ausserstande, den Auftrag befriedigend durchzuführen. 
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exceptionally, he was aware of his limitations and acted on this knowledge. He even 
initially refused his summons from regional assignments to the central administrative 
organs.604 Throughout, incompetence and mindlessness annoyed him endlessly. Stein was, 
first and foremost, a skilled bureaucrat, concerned with efficiency above all else. As such, 
he was focused on the professional fulfillment of his tasks, which had more to do with 
efficiently mining and distributing salt and coal than with preferences for a nonprocedural 
bureaucracy. Early in his career and prior to the French Revolution, Stein showed no sign 
of sharing the concerns of the critics of the cameralist project. Instead, his career took the 
typical path through cameralist training and up through the administrative ranks. Along the 
way, Stein followed cameralist principles and a preference for efficient procedures, even if 
their implicit cost was the undermining of Prussia’s social and political hierarchies. 
Meanwhile, hierarchies were dropping like guillotined heads elsewhere.  
Stein, like many German intellectuals at the time, initially showed sympathy for the 
French Revolution. However, such sentiments turned quickly to outright hate.605 While the 
story of the French Revolution and its immediate aftermath are generally well known, the 
less immediate consequences are less familiar. For my purposes here, they are mostly the 
story of a series of wars and occupations. Throughout the various wars in the aftermath of 
the French Revolution, the Prussian state had difficulty performing effectively and 
efficiently. Many Prussians “honestly feared at this time,” with good reasons—as historians 
                                                                                                                                                 
Eine Selbstkritik, die sicherlich einen Kern Wahrheit enthält.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 
40-42.) 
604 Ibid., 40-42, 122. 
605 Eberhard Weis. “Preussen - Frankreich - Amerika - Revolution und Reform.“ In Otto Büsch, Monika 
Neugebauer-Wölk, and Helmut Berding, Preussen Und Die Revolutionäre Herausforderung Seit 1789 : 
Ergebnisse Einer Konferenz (Berlin ; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 17-8.; See also: “...gegen den 
herausfordernden Übermut der Gironde, gegen die Königsmörder, gegen das bluttriefende “Ungeheuer 
Robespierre”, das Tier aus dem Abgrund “der Hölle gereift”, schliesslich eine sehr primitive Abneigung 
“gegen die scheussliche Nation der Franzosen” überhaupt, die “Verderber des alten Europas.” (Ritter, 
Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 74-5.). 
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concur—that “the King of Prussia would fall victim to the fate of the King of Spain: that 
the remnant of the state would be annexed to Westphalia or Warsaw or become a satrapy 
governed directly from Paris.”606 
 It is easy and tempting to lay the blame for this weakness at the feet of the king, 
Friedrich Wilhelm III. Historians often characterize him as simply of “modest intellectual 
endowment, […] though honorable and righteous, hopelessly irresolute in matters of state 
policy.”607 His leadership style seemed to have been mostly of a paralyzed and paralyzing 
nature. The king, always jealously guarding his powers, tended to be 
 
Narrow, pedantic, spare of words, embarrassed and suspicious in the presence of 
men of superior talents, keenly conscious at all times of his kingly prerogatives, 
obstinate rather than determined, he neither led nor willingly permitted others to 
lead.608 
 
The king missed many opportunities during the prolonged diplomatic and military 
struggle with France, leading up to a series of disastrous decisions that almost wiped 
Prussia off the European map. Like others, Stein wondered at times whether that “average, 
inactive, cold man [Friedrich Wilhelm III]” would ever show some “talent, activity, 
liveliness?”609 In private, Stein judged the king “hollow, dull and trivial.”610 
                                                 
606 Raack summarizes this situation neatly but it can easily be confirmed in countless letters from this time 
period, see: Raack, The Fall of Stein, 4..  
607 See for example: Ibid., 13.; For more on Friedrich Wilhelm III, see: Peter Mast, Die Hohenzollern in 
Lebensbildern (Graz ; Köln: Styria, 1988), 175-89.; For a contemporary account see: Boyen, 
Denkwürdigkeiten Und Erinnerungen 1771-1813, 352-59. 
608 Friedrich Wilhelm III is not treated favorably by historians and biographers. See for example: Ford, 
Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 79.; Craig, The End of Prussia, 13. 
609 Letter of Stein to Reden (Nassau 21. Juli 1807): “...wird ein sehr mittelmässiger, untätiger, kalter Mann 
in seinem 38. Jahr  Talent, Tätigkeit, Lebendikeit zeigen?” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und 
Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1, 418-19.); For a useful introduction to Friedrich Wilhelm III see: Thomas 
Stamm, König in Preussens Grosser Zeit : Friedrich Wilhelm Iii., Der Melancholiker Auf Dem Thron 
(Berlin: Siedler, 1992). 
610 As cited in: Raack, The Fall of Stein, 61. 
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 However, incapable as the king might have been to lead his country in troubled 
times, Prussia’s problems had deeper structural causes. It was not simply that this king or 
the king before him were far from ideal leaders, but that the majority of the population was 
de jure and de facto excluded from participating in administering and leading the 
country.611  The exclusion of most nonaristocrats from the levers of state power barred 
talent from unfolding freely, undermined the procedural reforms of the cameralists, and 
began (due to unique historical forces) to undermine the legitimacy of the state. Singular, 
nonprocedural decision making was already under pressure from the cameralists, but the 
historical forces unleashed by the French Revolution would expose its weaknesses further. 
However, the legitimacy of the state was also—as the critics of the cameralists pointed 
out—increasingly hampered by a focus on means over ends that inhibited a strong reaction 
to foreign threats. The Prussian state, then, was beleaguered on many sides, internally and 
externally. Much that was bubbling below the surface was about to burst forth into plain 
and shocking view. 
In the beginning years of the nineteenth century, Prussia was locked in a desperate 
struggle for survival against seemingly unstoppable French armies. Far from being 
anything like centralized states, Prussia and Germany were motley collections of domains 
vastly differing in size, development, and political leanings.612 Prussia had all but lost in the 
                                                 
611 Letter of Stein to Reden (Nassau 3. Juli 1807): Stein ascribes to the King’s father (Friedrich Wilhelm II.) 
„Egoismsus und Weichlichkeit”  „Kurzsichtigkeit” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche 
Schriften, Vol.II/1, 403-5.); For another assessment by a future revolutionary, see: Honoré-Gabriel de 
Riquetti Mirabeau, Memoirs of the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg, Memoirs of the Courts of Europe ; 
V.5 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910), 51-56, 135-41, 272-3. It was Mirabeau who is customarily 
credited with coining the famous saying that: “The Prussian Monarchy is not a country that has an army, 
but an army that has a country, in which, as it were, it is just billeted.” For more on Mirabeau’s time in 
Prussia see: Hagen Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," in The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking 
Prussian History, 1700-1830, ed. Philip Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000), 201-2. 
612 The formulation “Germany” frequently obscures this point, and most modern readers simply cannot 
image how “Germany” could be so fragmented and politically heteregous to the point of near incoherence. 
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convoluted and treacherous game of Napoleonic diplomacy amongst the various German 
states. Not much stood between Napoleon and an isolated Prussia in the fall of 1806 after 
numerous wars that pitted a varying cast of German domains against one another; the 
temporary occupation of Vienna in 1805; and the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire.613 
Friedrich Wilhelm III had made at this most inexpedient time the fatal decision to wage 
war against Napoleon. Shortly afterwards, French armies routed the Prussian army soundly 
and notoriously at Jena and Auerstedt (October 14, 1806).614 As the later general and 
military reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst put it a month after this defeat in a private letter 
to a friend: “lack of resolve on the part of the leaders, the ignorance of our generals and 
                                                                                                                                                 
For helpful introductions see: Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of 
Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 11, 29.; Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," 203-
06.; Simon, "Variations in Nationalism During the Great Reform Period in Prussia," 307.; Dwyer, The Rise 
of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, 4-5.; Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the 
Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism, 1713-1740," 51-3.; H.M. Scott, "Prussia's Emergence as a European 
Great Power, 1740-1763," in The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, ed. Philip 
Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000), 155. 
613 For useful summaries see: Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian 
Political Culture, 1806-1848, 42-4.; Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen 
Staatsabsolutismus, 32-4.; Simon, "Prince Hardenberg," 92-4. 
614 At least in part due to blurred organizational authority and the lack “of a simplified and rational 
command structure” akin to the French model: Neil M. Heyman, "France against Prussia: The Jena 
Campaign of 1806," Military Affairs 30, no. 4 (Winter 1966).; Just what happened at these battles and, most 
importantly, why has been subject to fierce debates since the day after the battle. For a fairly representative 
cross-section of opinions from now and then see: Gerhard von Scharnhorst, "Vergleich Der Ehemaligen 
Geschäftsführung Der Militärischen Oberbehörden Mit Der Jetzigen," in Stimmen Aus Der Zeit Der 
Erniedrigung, ed. Rudolf Vaupel (München: Drei Masken, 1923), 194-206.; Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era 
of the Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 111-17.; Schulze, 
"The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," 217.; Gerd Fesser and Reinhard Jonscher, Umbruch Im Schatten 
Napoleons : Die Schlachten Von Jena Und Auerstedt Und Ihre Folgen, Jenaer Studien (Jena: Bussert, 
1998).; Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century 
France and Prussia, 190-1.; Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen 
Staatsabsolutismus, 34.; Dwyer, The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, 2-3.; 
Boyen, Denkwürdigkeiten Und Erinnerungen 1771-1813, 136-69, 366.;Mast, Die Hohenzollern in 
Lebensbildern, 177-9.; Michael V. Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin : The Franco-Prussian War in North 
Germany, 1813 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002), 1-18.; Gerhard Johann David von 
Scharnhorst et al., Private Und Dienstliche Schriften, Veröffentlichungen Aus Den Archiven Preussischer 
Kulturbesitz ; (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2002), 363-5, 95-97, 99-403, 512-17.; Kadel, Preis, and Institut 
marksizma-leninizma (Moscow Russia), Marx and Engels on Reactionary Prussianism, 19-20. 
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commanders, and the poor organization of our army pushed us into this misfortune.”615 
What remained of Prussia’s once revered army fled eastwards.616  
Famously, Hegel could see the advancing world spirit of history gallop past him on 
a horse in pursuit of the Prussian army that was fleeing towards the Russian border.617 
Berlin was captured by French troops shortly afterwards. The day before Napoleon entered 
Berlin in triumph, a theater in Berlin staged Iphigenia in Tauris. The chief surgeon of the 
French army, Pierre Francois Percy, remarked without irony that the play was well 
received. Iphigenia’s character, a figure that illustrates the heinous sacrifices war demands, 
was staged with “decorations,” that were, in Percy’s estimation, “at least as good as 
ours.”618 Meanwhile, the Prussian king retreated from Berlin first to Königsberg and then 
further eastwards to the pitiably insignificant remnants of his domain, not far from the city 
of Tilsit.619 Friedrich Wilhelm III was now only in command of a few square miles at the 
northeasternmost tip of his once considerable domain. A mere six months after the battles 
of Jena and Auerstedt the Prussian king was fortunate to retain his title and domain. He 
gladly signed the harsh peace treaty of Tilsit (July 1807).620 The Prussians had discovered 
that conscripted subjects led by ill-prepared nobles were no match for French citizens.621  
                                                 
615 “Die Unentschlossenheit unser Anführer, die Unwissenheit unser Generale und Comandeure und die 
schlechte Organisation unser Armeee hat uns ins Unglück gestürzt.“ (In a letter to Decken, Nov, 13th, 1806 
as cited in: Scharnhorst et al., Private Und Dienstliche Schriften, 396. 
616 For numerous contemporary accounts of the escape eastwards towards Tilsit see: Schulze, Die 
Franzosenzeit in Deutschen Landen 1806-1815, in Wort Und Bild Der Mitlebenden, 105-39. 
617 Letter from Hegel to Niethammer, Jena, 13 October, 1806.  
618 Klessmann, Deutschland Unter Napoleon in Augenzeugenberichten, 171-3.; Iphigeneia seemed to have 
been popular with German audiences that month as other productions attest (Goethe, Rochlitz, and 
Biedermann, Briefwechsel Mit Friedrich Rochlitz. Herausgeber: Woldemar Freiherr Von Biedermann, 45-
7, 49-50.) 
619 Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 44.; Mast, 
Die Hohenzollern in Lebensbildern, 178-80.; Büsch, Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission zu Berlin., 
Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte, 18. 
620 For an extensive account of the events between the French Revolution and Prussia’s defeat see: 




(ii) Jena and the Lack of Procedures 
 
To borrow Thomas Paine’s pun, Prussia’s nobility was best characterized by their 
no-ability. However, this claim is slightly misleading, as the nobility had an abundance of 
skills and abilities that the rest of the population could not hope to match. In fact, the 
education of the typical noble was geared precisely to that effect. Aristocratic education in 
Prussia was oriented meticulously “to the métier des gens d’honneur,” notably dancing, 
riding, and fencing. The subjects of the grammar schools and most of the subjects taught at 
the universities were peripheral to their education. Not surprisingly, the nobles furnished 
few capable administrators. As the respected Prussian minister Ludwig Philipp von Hagen 
remarked prior to Stein’s reforms, most administrators had simply not received a serious 
education in their youth, studied the laws and regulations of their field, or even learned the 
proper use of the pen.622 Gerhard von Scharnhorst, later the head of the Prussian army, had 
hardly learned to read, write, or reckon in his youth.623 Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, 
who led the Prussian army into Paris in 1815 and had a considerable role in the battle of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1807.; Philip Dwyer, "Prussia During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1786-1815," in The 
Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, ed. Philip Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000). 
621 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 78.; Julius H. Schoeps and Bildarchiv Preussischer 
Kulturbesitz., Preussen : Geschichte Eines Mythos, 2., erw. Aufl. ed. (Berlin, Brandenburg: Be.bra, 2001), 
91-2.; Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin : The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813, 10-17.; For an 
account of the fear instilled by the newly constituted French troops amongst the Prussian leadership see: 
Kittstein, Politik Im Zeitalter Der Revolution : Untersuchungen Zur Preussischen Staatlichkeit, 1792-1807, 
45-64.; Klessmann, Deutschland Unter Napoleon in Augenzeugenberichten, 67-70.; Schulze, "The Prussian 
Military State, 1763-1806," 211-19.; Mast, Die Hohenzollern in Lebensbildern, 178-80.; For a range of 
perspectives see: Deborah Avant, "From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice 
of War," International Organization 54, no. 1 (Winter, 2000): 47-8, 55-56, 59-61. 
622 A.B.B. – XV, 119.; Considier also: Karl Ernst Jeismann, Das Preussische Gymnasium in Staat Und 
Gesellschaft, Vollständig überarbeitete Aufl. ed., 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996).        
623 Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," 215-6. 
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Waterloo, was renowned for his valiant struggles with Napoleon and with the German 
language.624 In short, the militarization of Prussian life had done little to encourage nobles 
towards higher learning, which was derided as being merely bourgeois. Hermann von 
Boyen, a highly decorated and respected Prussian general (later field marshal and Minister 
of War) remarked curtly that “it is not good to have a lot of educated generals […] the 
commander of the advanced guard, and perhaps one other, that is enough; the others are 
there to take the bait otherwise there are cabals.”625 In the words of Hans Rosenberg, “To 
obtain an academic degree was such a rare occurrence that it almost implied conduct 
unbecoming a nobleman.”626 Instead, the children of nobles systematically favored a 
military education that was consciously segregated from non-aristocratic places of 
learning.627 Many of the graduates of the military cadet schools were, literally, illiterates.628 
In the minds of many, a military-aristocratic ethos shunned the learned adherence to 
procedures of the cameralists and favored instead proud, willful, inherently idiosyncratic 
decision making. As a result, such highly status-conscious training turned out legions of 
inept administrators and officers who presided over conscripted armies that were no match 
for their far better organized and superiorly led French opponents.629 As various 
                                                 
624 Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, F. von Colomb, and Wolfgang von Unger, Blüchers Briefe (Stuttgart: 
J. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1913). 
625 Cited in: Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," 215.; See also: Boyen, Denkwürdigkeiten 
Und Erinnerungen 1771-1813. 
626 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 58.; See 
also Spring, European Landed Elites in the Nineteenth Century.; Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 
1763-1806," 214-16. 
627 For a helpful account of educational institutions at the time and the thinking behind various curriculums 
see: Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 53. 
628 See for example: Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 
1660-1815, 144-5, footnote 8. 
629 Heyman, "France against Prussia: The Jena Campaign of 1806."; See also: Sieg, Staatsdienst, 
Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien 
Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 117, 36.; Kittstein, Politik Im Zeitalter Der Revolution : 
Untersuchungen Zur Preussischen Staatlichkeit, 1792-1807, 45-64. 
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contemporary pamphlets argued persuasively, divided and inept leadership drove the army 
to the catastrophes of Jena and Auerstedt that marked the conquest of Prussia.630  
 More damning still, “timid and unprepared” aristocratic officers had cravenly 
surrendered various key fortresses that were believed (and historians agree) to be easily 
defensible.631 The young Friedrich Ludwig von Wachholtz, later a general of some 
importance, remained, like many, in shock and disbelief for days over the acts of his 
commanding officers.632 Stein called the behavior of the army and the commanders of such 
fortresses “disgraceful” and named them solemnly one by one in his letters.633 
Embarrassingly, many of these names belonged to famous dynasties that laid claim to 
having shaped Prussia’s history for generations.634 Similarly, many renowned nobles 
behaved disgracefully during the events of 1806 when they quickly and willingly swore 
oaths of allegiance to Napoleon after his occupation of Berlin.635 Consider, for example, 
the case of Schulenburg-Kehnert who had collected the largest number of high-ranking 
                                                 
630 Anonyme Flugschrift. “Deutschland in seiner tiefen Erniedrigung” as well as another anonymous 
pamphlet titled “Betrachtungen über die Ursachen für den derzeitigen Zustand politischer Ohnmnacht 
Deutschlands.” (both to be found in: Hans-Bernd Spies, Die Erhebung Gegen Napoleon : 1806-1814/15, 
Quellen Zum Politischen Denken Der Deutschen Im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert ; (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981).; Craig, The End of Prussia, 12.; For numerous contemporary 
accounts of the confusion surrounding the planning and execution at Jena see: Schulze, Die Franzosenzeit 
in Deutschen Landen 1806-1815, in Wort Und Bild Der Mitlebenden, 29-61. 
631 Friedrich von Cölln, "Fehlerhaftes Betragen Der Preussischen Festungskommandanten, Während Der 
Grossen Kriegsereignisse Im Jahr 1806," in Neue Feuerbrände (Amsterdam ; Cölln: P. Hammer, 1807).; 
Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 259.; Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and 
Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 44.; Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," 
217.; Anderson, Nationalism and the Cultural Crisis in Prussia, 1806-1815, 207.; Mast, Die Hohenzollern 
in Lebensbildern, 178.; Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur 
Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-1812, 38-39.; Scharnhorst et al., Private Und Dienstliche Schriften, 
397. 
632 Friedrich Ludwig von Wachholtz, "Tagebuch," in Die Franzosenzeit in Deutschen Landen 1806-1815, 
in Wort Und Bild Der Mitlebenden, ed. Friedrich Schulze (Leipzig,: R. Voigtländer, 1908), 99-100. 
633 See for example two letters of Stein to Reden (5. April; 3. July 1807, both cited in: Stein, Botzenhart, 
and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1, 364, 403-5.)  
634 Görlitz, Die Junker: Adel Und Bauer Im Deutschen Osten; Geschichtliche Bilanz Von 7 
Jahrhunderten, 167. 
635 Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-
1848, 107.; Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in 
Preussen 1809-1812, 42-3. 
 208 
offices and sinecures ever held by a Prussian administrator, in addition to rising to the rank 
of full general of the cavalry. Clumsy and ineffective, he abandoned Prussia after its defeat 
at Jena and sought employment in the service of Napoleon’s brother.636 Friedrich Wilhelm 
III complained bitterly: 
 
[As king I] singled out [such people], gave them posts, attached them to my person, 
gave them honors, decorations, and land. . . . When all went well they seemed able 
to do anything and everything, [but] in misfortune they were exposed and [they] 
disloyally deserted.637  
 
The inability of the Prussian aristocracy to fight honorably and effectively with 
troops drilled and led in antiquated fashion points to an issue of significance that surpasses 
mere military necessity.638 The aristocratic claim to preferred treatment in the army and the 
administration was largely based on their nonprocedural, willful, proverbial military ethos 
that now turned out to be hollow. As Stein wrote: 
 
The nobility of Prussia is bothersome for the nation, because it is numerous, mostly 
poor and demanding of salaries, positions, privileges and amenities of all sorts. One 
consequence of its poverty is a lack of education, and the necessity to be raised in 
incompletely equipped cadet schools, incapacity [to execute the functions of] the 
higher positions […]. This great number of half-educated individuals exercises their 
presumptuousness at the cost of their fellow citizens in a double capacity: as 
aristocrats and bureaucrats.639 
                                                 
636 Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert 
(1713-1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 81-2.; Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, 
and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 164-5. Notice however that the reformer’s were not 
immune from similar temptations: Craig, The End of Prussia, 14-15. 
637 Cited in: Brose, The Politics of Technological Change in Prussia : Out of the Shadow of Antiquity, 
1809-1848, 29. 
638 “Nun erwies sich aber im Kampf mit den französischen Revolutionsheeren die Unfähigkeit der 
monarchischen Regierungen des alten Europa und ihrer altmodisch gedrillten und geführten Soldtruppen, 
mit den Massenaufgeboten und dem wilden Draufgängertum der Revolutionsheere fertig zu werden.” 
(Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 78.) 
639 “Der Adel im Preussischen ist der Nation lästig, weil er zahlreich, grösstenteils arm und anspruchsvoll 
auf Gehälter, Ämter, Privilegien und Vorzüge jeder Art ist. Eine Folge seiner Armut ist Mangel an Bildung, 
Notwendigkeit in unvollkommen eingerichteten Cadettenhäusern erzogen zu werden, Unfähigkeit zu den 
oberen Stellen, wozu man durch Dienstalter gelangt, oder Drängen des Brods halber nach niedrigen 
geringfügigen Stellen. Diese grosse Zahl halbgebildeter Menschen übt seine Anmassungen zu grossen Last 
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In the words of the commentator, diplomat, and later military officer Varnhagen 
von Ense, the “once praised names” of the Prussian aristocratic dynasties were now met 
with “contempt that was fueled by hate” and that gave rise to “accusations of treason.”640 
Thus the consequences of the French Revolution and the series of resulting wars exposed in 
the minds of many a vulnerability in the claims of the aristocracy to dominate society and 
governmental posts. The task ahead for members of the Prussian government struggling to 
survive was, then, to resolve the deep-rooted dilemmas facing the languishing nation.641 
Combined with new conceptual theories, the failures of the Old Prussian order provided 
room for significant reforms.642 In the words of one pamphleteer in 1808, there were good 
chances for meaningful social changes, since  
 
the old forms are partially completely dissolved, partially riddled with so many 
holes that significant changes become necessary. Thus most hindrances fall away 
by themselves which otherwise might paralyze the careful steps of the well-
intentioned regent towards improvements. Now he has free play for his 
effectiveness.”643 
                                                                                                                                                 
seiner Mitbürger in ihrer doppelten Eigenschaft als Edelleute und Beamte aus.” (Stein, “Beurteilung des 
Rehdiger’schen Entwurfs,“ Königsberg, 8 Sept 1808 – cited in: Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe 
Und Amtliche Schriften, 852-6. (no.813). See also: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 285.; Gray, 
"Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 115.). 
640 Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 
1809-1812, 41. 
641 For a quick summary see: Raack, The Fall of Stein, vii. 
642 “German idealism and neohumanism in the decades around the turn of the eighteenth century ushered in 
a sort of cultural revolution giving the educated middle class a more independent social consciousness. It 
offered not only a political theory legitimating the rule of enlightened bureaucratic professionals but also a 
new standard for judging a man’s worth. The doctrines of German idealism, particularly the concept of 
Bildung, strengthened the defiant attitude of middle-class intellectuals to noble rank, and it moved some 
men even to reverse traditional notions of aristocratic superiority and bourgeois humility. Educated 
burghers who were attracted to this ideology even thought of themselves as the true aristocrats of a new 
enlightened age. Theirs was an aristocracy of cultivation and personal refinement. […] This new ideology 
penetrated the bureaucratic ranks in the last decades of the eighteenth century, enhancing the crisis of the 
aristocracy which had been brewing ever since talented commoners might be placed above aristocrats of 
old lineage in the chain of command.” (Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service 
Reforms in Prussia and England, 228-9.) 
643 “Die alten Formen sind theils ganz aufgelöset, theils so durchlöchert, dass wesentliche Veränderungen 
nothwendig werden. So fallen die meisten Hindernisse von selbst weg, die sonst des wohlwollenden, 
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In short, the miserable performance of the nobility during the wars following the 
French Revolution furnished the unlikely historical contingencies that gave reformers like 
Stein the opportunity to lay the conceptual groundwork for later reforms.644 The 
extraprocedural decision making that many aristocrats favored did not seem to work. Its 
failure opened the door to alternative proposals. Thus the moment of Prussia’s conquest is 
also the moment when Stein and reformers like him reimagined the procedural 
administration of the state and its relation to the citizenry. For example, a close associate of 
Stein, finance councilor Theodor von Schön, argued: 
 
It must all be for the best. The French advances are at least weakening aristocratic 
judicial prerogative, compulsory servitude, the nobility, [and] and limitations in the 
use of private property. The foundation is being laid for the overthrow of [these 
institutions].645 
 
Even the conservative theologian Schleiermacher wrote one month after Jena and 
Auerstedt that “everything political that has existed until now was, by and large, an 
indefensible thing, an empty chimera. This chimera must now disappear, and only on its 
ruins can truth arise.”646 
                                                                                                                                                 
sorgsamen Regenten Schritte zum Besseren lähmen. Jetzt hat er freien Spielraum für seine Wirksamkeit.” 
(Flugschrift: Christian Ulrich Detlev Freiherr von Eggers. “Deutschlands Erwartungen vom Rheinischen 
Bunde.” (Braunschweig, 1808). Found in: Spies, Die Erhebung Gegen Napoleon : 1806-1814/15.) See 
also: Simon, "Variations in Nationalism During the Great Reform Period in Prussia." 
644 This interpretation is widely shared amongst historians of the period. See for example: Demel, Vom 
Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 58.; Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform 
Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-1812, 64-65, 285.; Karen Hagemann, 
Mannlicher Muth Und Teutsche Ehre : Nation, Militär Und Geschlecht Zur Zeit Der Antinapoleonischen 
Kriege Preussens (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2002), 28-30. 
645 Schön to Altenstein, Königsberg, 13 Mar. 1807. Cited in: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and 
Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 46. 
646 Schleiermacher in a letter to Reimer (Halle, 30 Nov. 1806): “Alles Politische, was bis jetzt bestand, war, 
im grossen und ganzen gesehen, ein unhaltbares Ding, ein leerer Schein []. Dieser Schein muss 
verschwinden und nur auf seinen Trümmern kann die Wahrheit sich erheben.” (Quoted in: Münchow-Pohl, 
Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-1812, 63.) 
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Starting from the historical and conceptual constraints of the time, a range of 
reformers began to articulate a novel understanding of the state’s administrative organs. 
While largely faithful to the vision of their cameralist teachers, these reformers also take 
into account the critics we encountered in section 2. Under the informal and formal 
leadership of Stein, reformers like Theodor von Schön, Karl Sigmund Altenstein,647 and 
Karl Nikolaus von Rehdiger sought to incorporate the concerns of these critics within an 





9. The Nassauer Denkschrift 
 
On the 3rd of January 1807, a mere two months after the battles of Jena and 
Auerstedt, Heinrich Friedrich Karl Reichsfreiherr vom und zum Stein received his formal 
discharge from the royal Prussian administration. The discharge of a minister was usually 
of no special importance. However, Stein’s dismissal is notable for two reasons. First, it 
marked a significant low point for the reformers of the ailing Prussian state. Second, Stein 
was not discharged simply for incompetence, as was common, but for resisting the king’s 
ill-advised commands. King Friedrich Wilhelm III dismissed Stein personally, in neat and 
pleasing handwriting but an unusually blunt tone, for being “an intractable, defiant, 
                                                 
647 Altenstein “didn’t just work [with Stein] on the administrative reforms, but actually determined key 
elements” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 238.)  
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inveterate, and disobedient servant of the state.”648 Driven by “personal hate and 
animosity,”649 he allegedly flaunted his “genius and talent”650 rather than being attentive to 
the will of the crown.651 The king’s charge is not terribly persuasive, as he himself had 
offered Stein, just a couple of days previously, the prestigious ministry of foreign affairs. 
Stein had refused the appointment. In his characteristic tone, lacking all diplomatic skill 
and attention to the intricate refinements of aristocratic letter writing, Stein remarked that 
he simply, and evidently, was not sufficiently qualified for the position.652 Historians have 
since taken this episode as an early and important assertion of the bureaucracies’ increased 
deference to rationalized procedures vis-à-vis obedience to the crown’s direct will.  
Stein’s loyalty, however, was never seriously in doubt. He had distinguished 
himself throughout his career as a loyal, attentive, and conscientious civil servant. For 
example, Stein helped on a most practical level to keep the Prussian state functioning at a 
crucial juncture in its demise by evacuating hard cash out of the reach of the rapidly 
advancing French armies.653 However, Stein’s professionalism and commitment to 
efficiency through procedures continued to bother the king. Stein advanced these goals by 
advocating for sweeping administrative and social reforms that might save Prussia. 
However, many wondered whether such reforms were precisely the wrong path for Prussia 
                                                 
648 “ein widerspenstiger, trotziger, harnäckiger und ungehorsamer Staatsdiener.” 
649 “Leidenschaft” and “persönlichem Hass und Erbitterung” 
650 “Genie und sein Talent” 
651 For various accounts of this episode and a range of interpretations see: Georg Holmsten, Freiherr Vom 
Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, [1.-13. Tsd.]. ed., Rowohlts Monographien ; (Reinbek (bei 
Hamburg): Rowohlt, 1975), 51.; See also: Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, 
Vol.I, 329-31.; Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-
1815, 199.; Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung Und Verwaltung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, 
Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 537-41.; Craig, The End of Prussia, 16-7. 
652 As recounted in: Raack, The Fall of Stein, 61. 
653  “...gelang es Stein, durch rechtzeitige Flüchtung der Kassen für die Fortsetzung des Krieges die 
finanziellen Mittle zu sichern.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 165.; see also: Ford, Stein and 
the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 112.).; Craig, The End of Prussia, 16.; Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : 
Die Preussischen Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn Karl Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und Restauration, 
39. 
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to take. After all, popular history, folklore, and legend saw Prussia as one small but 
growing state, constantly surrounded by mighty foreign powers, only held together by a 
strong military ethos and a tight social fabric. Perhaps Prussia’s problems were not lagging 
and long-neglected reforms, but rather their proponents – like Stein – who tried to 
introduce foreign, fashionable ideas and thus unsettle tried and true institutions. Whatever 
the cause, something had gone awry in Prussia, and not following the king’s wishes in this 
heated atmosphere, however pragmatic the reasons, was a move that simply spelled 
political suicide.654 After Stein’s dismissal, he traveled back west through the largely 
occupied German territories to his ancestral home in Nassau.655 Even the staunchly 
conservative Friedrich von Marwitz lamented that:  
 
The last pillar of the state in civil affairs, the minister Stein, received his discharge. 
– I ride away with a heavy heart; I see no rescue for the state in sight and no 
opportunity for me, to be helpful to the state.656  
 
Just one year later the same Friedrich von Marwitz declared Stein a “Jacobin,” one 
“infected by the ideals of the French Revolution, an enemy of the nobility and the 
aristocracy.”657 Many others agreed.658 What happened between 1807 and 1808 that 
changed Marwitz’s view of Stein so radically?  
                                                 
654 Ritter summarizes the conditions surounding Stein’s refusal succinctly, see: Ritter, Stein; Eine 
Politische Biographie, 175-8.  
655 Letter from Stein to Reden (Nassau 5. April 1807). (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und 
Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1, 363.) 
656 “Die letzte Stütze des Staates im Zivilfach, der Minister Stein, erhielt seinen Abschied. - Ich reite mit 
schwerem Herzen ab, ich sah keine Rettung für den Staat und keine Aussicht für mich, ihm nützlich werden 
zu können.“ (Ibid., 329f.); See also: Craig, The End of Prussia, 17. 
657 “...von den Idealen der Französischen Revolution angesteckter [...] Fürsten- und Aristokratenfeind” 
(Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 68.) 
658 See for example: Görlitz, Die Junker: Adel Und Bauer Im Deutschen Osten; Geschichtliche Bilanz Von 
7 Jahrhunderten, 187.).; Simon, "Variations in Nationalism During the Great Reform Period in Prussia," 
305.; Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 
1809-1812, 87. 
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Temporarily out of work, Stein spent his time codifying his thoughts and 
propagating the principles of his proposed reforms. At its core, Stein’s thought is marked 
by a desire to reinvigorate the ailing Prussian state. He advocated for streamlined 
administrative structures, reduced redundancies, and the involvement of a wide range of 
individuals from multiple orders in the decision-making process. Stein’s proposals touched 
upon seemingly separate pillars of the establishment that were, however, deeply 
interconnected in Stein’s mind. Like his cameralist teachers, Stein is beholden to a 
procedural administration of the state, but like many critics of the cameralist program, Stein 
also, and perhaps paradoxically, is distrustful of a purely procedural state. He attempts a 
synthesis of seemingly opposed positions. 
 To do so, his reforms aim at a wide range of targets: Peasants would no longer have 
to ask for the permission of their lords to marry; bureaucrats would be evaluated and rise in 
rank irrespective of their birth order or aristocratic titles; impoverished aristocrats could 
work in bourgeois professions; citizens were to be incorporated into the local 
administration; the cabinet was to be streamlined and rationalized; the army reorganized; 
land-ownership liberalized; the education system separated from religious affairs; the lower 
administration reshaped radically… the list goes on and on. The reduction of legal barriers 
between different orders—deeply ingrained in the reforms—was hailed by some as 
ushering in an age of new freedoms, while others feared the destruction of social and legal 
boundaries as an invitation to disaster and anarchy. People such as Marwitz or Wartenburg 
saw Stein’s reform package as misguidedly emulating the dangerous French model, while 
others saw Stein’s plans as the best answer to Prussia’s deep-rooted weaknesses.659 Central 
                                                 
659 This debate is old indeed and is periodically revived. See for example: Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen 
Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-1812, 285. 
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to this perceived weakness was an increasingly felt legitimacy deficit that hampered the 
support of the people for the Prussian state. Stein’s proposed reforms were aiming at 
precisely this predicament. They sought to make the Prussian state more capable of 
meeting threats by fundamentally reimagining the administrative machinery of the state to 
render it more legitimate in the eyes of its citizenry.  
 Befitting the proposed conceptual reforms, Stein’s writings are not abstract treatises 
detached from pressing earthly concerns. Instead, Stein’s thought is necessarily bound to 
the tasks at hand. As such, Stein’s writings appear “entirely unsystematic, fragmented,” and 
they “developed gradually out of a sober evaluation of practicability and efficiency.” They 
are always and necessarily intertwined with “questions about organizing the organs of the 
state, which form the backbone of [Stein’s] comments and which shape [his] idiosyncratic 
political ethos.”660 It is thus no surprise that Stein’s writings are distributed among 
thousands of letters, memoranda, and even comments scribbled on the margins of books for 
historians to collect and publish in increasingly lengthy anthologies.  
Stein was even approached by Johann Friedrich von Cotta, the prestigious editor of 
the works of Goethe and Schiller, to pen a book that summarized and explained his 
principles.661 Stein refused, and consequently, researchers have no single work that 
encapsulates Stein’s principles and ideas. The closest we come to such a convenience is a 
short but rich, highly influential memorandum by Stein called the Nassauer Denkschrift 
[Nassau memorandum], written between his first dismissal and the attempted 
                                                 
660 Stein’s writings are not guided by a “beherrschdener Gesichtspunkt [....] sondern ganz unsystematisch, 
stückweise und allmählich aus der Erörterung nüchtern praktischer Zwecksmässigkeitsfragen entwickelt. 
Und zwar sind es Fragen der Behördenorganisation, die das Rückgrat der Erörterungen bilden und an denen 
sich das eigenartige politische Ethos unserer Denkschrift entzünden.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 182.) See also: Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a 
Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 110. 
661 Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 120. 
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implementations of his reforms.662 It is, in the words of one influential historian, the 
“outwardly most voluminous, most famous, and biographically most important of Stein’s 
political avowals”663 – the “most faithful mirror image of Stein’s reform ideas for Prussia” 
in existence.664 Furthermore, the Nassau memorandum largely overlaps with the actual 
reforms implemented in 1807/8.665 I will briefly discuss the three main constitutive 
elements of Stein’s reform program (as reflected in the memorandum as well as in the 
reforms later on)—administrative reforms, liberation of peasants, and organization of 
cities—before turning to the larger implications of the reforms in the next chapter.666  
 
 
(i) Taking Apart the Machine 
  
                                                 
662 Its full title is somewhat unwieldy: “Über die zweckmässige Bildung der obersten  und der Provinzial-, 
Finanz- und Polizeibehörden in der preussischen Monarchie.” It can be found in its entirety, most widely 
accecible, in: Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, 380-403. Vol.II/1. Nassauer 
Denkschrift – Nassau, im Juni 1807.; For some background on the origins of the manifesto see: Gray, 
"Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 66.; Marion W. 
Gray, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the County, 
Provincial, and National Levels in 1808," The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 1 (Mar., 1976): 74.; 
Craig, The End of Prussia, 17-18.; Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : Die Preussischen Reformen Des 
Reichsfreiherrn Karl Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und Restauration, 40-1. 
663 “...das äusserlich umfangreichste, berühmteste und biographisch wichtigste seiner politischen 
Bekenntnisse überhaupt.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 181.) 
664 “Sie [die Nassauer Denkschrift] ist das getreuste Spiegelbild der Steinschen Reformideen für Preussen, 
das wir überhaupt besitzen.” (Ibid., 182.)  
665 Ibid., 241.; Consider also: Ilja Mieck, "Zielsetzung Und Ertrag Der Preussischen Reformen," in 
Preussen, Versuch Einer Bilanz : Beiträge Zu Einer Politischen Kultur, ed. Manfred Schlenke (Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981). 
666 “Bauernbefreiung, Verwaltungsreform, Städteordnung,.” (Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in 
Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 64.). For useful accounts of these themes see: Ritter, Stein; Eine 
Politische Biographie, 214. For more on reforms pertaining to the “Städteordnung” see: Gray, "Prussia in 
Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 104-9.; For Stein’s attack on 
guilds see, for example: Craig, The End of Prussia, 13.; Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings 
of Prussian Absolutism, 1713-1740," 54.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development 
of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 124-5.; Frank Schuurmans, "Economic Liberalization, Honour, and 
Perfectibility: Karl Sigmund Altenstein and the Spiritualization of Liberalism," German History 16 (1998): 
178-9. 
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The first thing to notice about the Nassau memorandum is that it is not about 
military affairs, as one might expect.667 After all, Prussia had just suffered a series of 
shocking defeats on the battlefield. Stein, however, does not take a short-term approach to 
solving the problems of the ailing Prussian state. In his short credo, at the most improbable 
of times, Stein sets forth principles for internal organization, rather than opinions on 
international affairs or calls for military preparedness. As is clear from Stein’s 
correspondence immediately prior to writing the Nassaumemorandum, he meant to 
establish a loose, workable practical blueprint for re-constituting the state now on the edge 
of being pushed into oblivion. To do so, Stein sets out on an unintentionally radical path: 
 
A machine is best judged, and it is easiest to propose improvements, when it is 
dismantled and broken into pieces before it is put together again!668  
 
What troubles traditionalists about this approach is of course not merely the 
mechanical nature of the metaphor, but also the irreverence with which a sacred order is 
exposed to the harsh and unflattering light of rational, empirically driven inquiry. One of 
Stein’s first targets was the imperfection at the highest level of the “machine.” The 
cameralists had not been able to overcome the centuries-long practice of adapting the 
Prussian central administration bit by bit. Such organic growth tended to produce 
inefficient, irrational, self-defeating apparatuses that were far too slow or weak to deal with 
                                                 
667 Various historians comment on this disreptancy, see for example: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 182.; See also: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform 
Ministry of 1808," 50.; Nolte, Staatsbildung Als Gesellschaftsreform : Politische Reformen in Preussen 
Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 29-30. 
668 Letter from Sack an Stein (Berlin 26. Mai 1807): “Eine Machine wird am besten beurteilt, wenn sie 
auseinandergenommen, und am gelegensten werden zur Verbesserung Vorschläge getan, ehe sie wieder 
zusammengesetzt wird!” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1 - 373.) 
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significant threats to the state.669 Stein, attempting to complete the cameralist project, took 
such a lack of procedures seriously. One of his first reform projects was consequently the 
reorganization of the highest level of the administration to provide a single, clear, rational 
chain of command.670  
Over centuries, mere secretaries (really scribblers, copiers of letters) had acquired, 
step by tiny step, authority that rivaled that of ministers. Their proximity to the king gave 
them de facto influence over policy that competed on a daily basis with the de jure 
authority of ministers.671 The king and his secretaries resided in Potsdam, while his 
ministers worked in Berlin. Ministers tended to communicate with the king by mail, and 
visited him rarely. During the Seven Years’ War, for example, the secretaries traveled 
constantly with Frederick II, while his ministers remained, mostly, in Berlin – which 
Frederick visited only once during that time. Frederick II highlighted the special status of 
his secretaries in his Personal Testament: “[The secretaries] have a good knowledge of 
affairs and they can, at the beginning of the reign, advise the king on many things of which 
they have knowledge and which are unknown even to Ministers.” One of the primary 
means through which the secretaries exploited their privileged position was by routing mail 
                                                 
669 For accounts that come to the same conclusion see: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics 
under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 49.; Walter L. Dorn, "The Prussian Bureaucracy in the 
Eighteenth Century Ii," Political Science Quarterly 47, no. 1 (Mar., 1932). 
670 For a quick account of this prioritization see: Büsch, Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission zu 
Berlin., Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte, 27-8.; For more on this theme consider: Levinger, 
Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 49-50.; Hintze 
and Oestreich, Regierung Und Verwaltung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und 
Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 424-8, 530-43.; Levinger, "The Prussian Reform Movement and the Rise of 
Enlightened Nationalism," 271.; Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : Die Preussischen Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn 
Karl Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und Restauration, 38-9.; Nolte, Staatsbildung Als 
Gesellschaftsreform : Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 48-54.; 
For contemporary critiques of the old administrative practices see: Karl August Hardenberg and Leopold 
von Ranke, Denkwürdigkeiten Des Staatskanzlers Fürsten Von Hardenberg (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 
1877), 402-11, 68-71.; Boyen, Denkwürdigkeiten Und Erinnerungen 1771-1813, 365-7. 
671 Most historians agree with this simple, but powerful interpretation. See for example: Scott, "1763-1786: 
The Second Reign of Frederick the Great?," 182-5, 99-200.; Dorn, "The Prussian Bureaucracy in the 
Eighteenth Century," 410-3.; Dwyer, The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, 26. 
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not through ministries, but around them. Stein’s objection to this system was not merely a 
concern with inefficiency due to duplicate orders. Rather, he objected to a system that 
caused an inordinate amount of confusion due to its lack of a clear hierarchy. The policy 
positions of ministers and secretaries were often in conflict with one another, and their 
mutual de facto subordinates (such as local administrators) received conflicting orders both 
of which seemed to have the authority of the king behind them. Competing sources of 
authority hampered decision making in the army in the same way as in the central 
administrative organs.672 In response, Stein and his allies pleaded for a “unity in the 
administration,”673 so that “the movements of the state receive a unity” and a clear 
direction.674 However, the king and leading aristocrats continued to oppose such a scheme, 
perhaps because they saw it as following the Napoleonic example too closely.675 
 To make things even murkier, Prussia’s administration was organized partially by 
objects of care (e.g. finance, diplomacy) and partially geographically.676 Again, this was the 
                                                 
672 For an account of the messy intrigue, backstabbing, confusion and orderly disorder of the Prussian elite 
surrounding the king see: Raack, The Fall of Stein. See also: Simon, "Prince Hardenberg," 94-5. 
673 “...Einheit in der Verwaltung...” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, 385.) 
674 “Je grösser der Staat, um so nötiger ist es aber, solche Einrichtungen zu treffen, dass Einheit in seiner 
Bewegung erhalten und die zerstückelten Geschäftszweige endlich an einem Punkt zu einem Ganzen 
verbunden werden.” (Ibid., Vol.II/1 – p.385, Vol.II/2 - p.501-2.) 
675 The details of such a scheme are subject to much dispute amongst historians and contemporaries of 
Stein. See for example: “Hardenberg und Altenstein schwebte das Ideal einer streng „bürokratischen,” dem 
napoleonischen Vorbild angenäherten Verwaltungsorganization vor Augen: mit voller, an keine kollegialen 
Beschlüsse gebundener Entscheidungsfreiheit der Minister, die rasches, energisch durchgreifendes Handeln 
erlaubte – in schärfstem Gegensatz zu den schwerfälligen Verhandlungsformen des alten 
Generaldirektoriums, das sie denn auch gänzlich beseitigen wollten. Vor einer solchen Neuerung hat Stein, 
wie wir schon früher hörten, nachdrücklich gewarnt. Seine Staatsratsideen setzten kollegiale Beschlüsse 
und ein kollegial organisiertes Ausführungsorgan zur Entlastung des leitenden Ministerkonseils voraus.” 
(Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 170.) 
676 For a more detailed discussion of this subject by Stein outside of the Nassauer manifesto turn to his 
“Organisationsplan der oberen Behörden des preussischen Staats” (written in November of 1807) found 
here: Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2 – p.506-45. For a brief 
commentary turn to Ritter: “Dabei sollen Verwaltungs- und Rechtssachen klarer als bisher geschieden 
werden; vor allem soll die alte systemlose Mischung von Pronvizial- und Fachministerien beseitigt werden, 
zugunsten ausschliesslich realer, sachlicher Einteilungsprinzipien, wie sie seit dem Ende des 18. 
Jahrhunderts sich überall in Europa durchzusetzen begannen.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 
183.). See also: "Territorialprinzips" versus "Sachprinzip" (Wunder, Geschichte Der Bürokratie in 
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product of a state growing over many centuries from a royal household overseeing a small 
province to something on the verge of being a nation. While each step of this organic 
growth might have been sensible in the minds of the actors at the time, the cumulative 
effect was a cumbersome mess. Stein proposed to reorganize departments by businesses 
[Geschäften]677 in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative 
organs.678 Born out of cold-minded rational principles, this scheme was once again met by 
bitter opposition.679 Such resistance was motivated partially by petty self-interest and partly 
by veneration of a Burkean “gallery of portraits”680 that would be discounted were it 
revealed that their ancestors had immobilized their own state by their ill-advised insistence 
on traditional methods of maintaining order. 
 Apart from trying to redefine the main organizational principle of the central 
administrative organs, Stein also proposed reshuffling some responsibilities within 
ministries. Most notably, his proposal called for removing responsibility for general public 
education from the ecclesiastical department, while all religious affairs would be subsumed 
under the department for culture. Stein’s opponents saw in such a proposal not merely an 
                                                                                                                                                 
Deutschland, 24-5.); Ernst Rudolf Huber, Dokumente Zur Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte, 3., neubearb. 
u. verm. Aufl. ed., 5 vols., vol. 1 (Stuttgart ; Berlin ; Köln ; Mainz: Kohlhammer, 1978), 162-4.; Gray, 
"Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 66-67. 
677 “...halte ich es für ratsam, den Wirkungskreis des General-Direktorii nach Geschäften und nicht nach 
Bezirken zu verteilen.” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1 – p.386.). 
See also: Organization „nach Gegenständen” nicht nach Provinzen, so dass „ein allgemeiner das Ganze 
umfassender Geist [sich in] der obern Staatsbehörde bildet” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und 
Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2- p.502.).  
678 “Der grosse Vorteil von Fachressorts für das Ganze eines grossen Staatsgebietes – weitgehende 
Spezialisierung der Erfahrungen und Kenntnisse und damit erhöhte Qualität der Leistungen in den 
einzelnen Verwaltungszweigen – fiel bei den Provinzialressorts aus...” (Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in 
Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 38.; see also Bill Drews, Freiherr Vom Stein, vol. 6, Meister Des 
Rechts (Berlin: Heymann, 1930), 64-5.; Wilhelm Humboldt, Werke in Fünf Bänden, ed. Andreas Flitner 
and Klaus Giel, 5 vols., vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1979), 590.) 
679 “moderne rationale Grundsätze.” See also: “...die Abgrenzung der verschiedenen Ressorts und die 
innere Organisation der Ministerien [erfolgt] nunmehr nach streng rationalen Gesichtspunkten.” (Ritter, 
Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 241.) 
680 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 30. 
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appeal to maximizing the effectiveness of different social programs, but also, inherently 
tied up with it, yet another piece-by-piece erosion of the pillars of the old order.681   
 
(ii) Death by a Thousand Administrative Reforms 
 
Stein’s plans did not stop there. Rather, he argued that the state would only be truly 
viable if it related properly to its citizenry and took their experiences and demands 
seriously.682 This was not an easy proposition. Much of Prussia’s population at the time 
was closer to being subjects, even serfs, than self-possessing citizens. Stein’s proposal 
includes, almost accidentally, key steps towards emancipating the peasant class: the 
removal of the jurisdiction of aristocrats over “their” peasants,683 the freedom of peasants 
to possess or to leave the land,684 and the removal of various requirements on peasants to 
work (unpaid) for their masters.685 
                                                 
681 Stein goes into more detail that I will not address here. He sketches a newly to be built central 
administrative organ (Zentralbehörde), as well as the organization of the departments of finance and justice 
and the administration of sub-sections headed each by a minister.  
682 Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 55-
6.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-
1848, 109. 
683 Heinrich Scheel and Doris Schmidt, Von Stein Zu Hardenberg : Dokumente Aus Dem 
Interimsministerium Altenstein/Dohna, Schriften Des Zentralinstituts Für Geschichte ; (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1986), 1.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative 
Ideology, 1770-1848, 54-62.; Brose, The Politics of Technological Change in Prussia : Out of the Shadow 
of Antiquity, 1809-1848, 31. 
684 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 216-7.; Hermann Beck, "The Social Policies of Prussian 
Officials: The Bureaucracy in a New Light," The Journal of Modern History 64, no. 2 (Jun., 1992): 278. 
685 Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1 – p.397. On more about 
“Frondiensten” see: Des Bauers wirtschaftliche Lage soll erleichtert werden indem “er von Frondiensten, 
Zinsen und Abgaben befreit wird, die am Boden haften.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 216-
7.). In summary: “Gesindezwangsdienst, gutsherrliche Erlaubnis zur Heirat, Abzug, zu allen Belastungen 
oder Veräusserungen der Grundstücke u. dgl. mehr” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 228.). 
Historians have commented extensively on the tremendously important themes of “Gutsherrschaft,“ 
“Leibeigenschaft,” and “Erbuntertänigkeit.” For general introductions see: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: 
Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 102, 25-8.; Behrens, Society, Government 
and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 140-2, 92-3.; Sieg, 
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It is telling how Stein justifies the liberation of large portions of the peasant class: 
he bases his controversial proposal not on an appeal to basic moral principles, but rather on 
a cold, Lockean, Protestant hate of waste and inefficiency and a concern with Prussia’s 
economic viability. (Meanwhile, the rhetoric of many aristocrats, who exploited a class of 
peasants living in miserable conditions, is filled with appeals to love, care, and family-like 
obligations).686 Hardenberg, similarly, argued that the elimination of peasants’ servile 
obligations, “the abolition of their drudgery,” would be highly beneficial, to the tune of 
four million taler in annual state revenue.687  
 As a common strand of argumentation at the time held, “the evil” of servile 
peasants living in miserable conditions “lies deep in the present system, under which the 
peasant becomes constantly poorer, lazier, and more stupid.”688 In the words of Stein’s co-
worker Altenstein:  
 
The more rationally a farm/enterprise organizes itself under the guiding light of 
modern influences, the more clearly it was felt that the old system, purely based on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-
1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 279-87.; Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum 
Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 47-9.; Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," 206-10.; 
Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung Und Verwaltung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und 
Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 508-14.; Berdahl, "The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia," 
309-10.; Gray, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the County, 
Provincial, and National Levels in 1808," 76, 79.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The 
Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 18-9, 115-23.; For more on conditions before Stein’s 
reforms consider: J. C. Schmohl, Sammlung Von Aufsätzen Verschiedner Verfasser Besonders Für Freunde 
Der Cameralwissenschaften Und Der Staatswirthschaft (Leipzig: Im Schwickertschen Verlage, 1781), 421-
33. 
686 This view finds adherents old and young: Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 163-
98.; Edgar Melton, "The Transformation of the Rural Economy in East Elbian Prussia, 1750-1830," in The 
Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, ed. Philip Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000), 
111-22. 
687 As cited in: Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative 
Ideology, 1770-1848, 109. 
688  “’The evil,’ says Thaer, writing in 1806 of the servile peasants of the Mark, ‘lies deep in the present 
system, under which the peasant becomes constantly poorer, lazier, and more stupid.’” (Ford, Stein and the 
Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 196. Quoting Knapp, “Bauernbefreiung,” I, 75). 
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coercion, was inefficient. Many landlords understood that coerced labor was only 
seemingly cheap, but was actually disproportionately expensive.689  
  
Reading Altenstein quickly,690 one could mistake his position as concerned purely 
with economics.691 Financial concerns indeed loomed large over the beleaguered Prussian 
state, and consequently it might be tempting to think of the reforms as motivated merely by 
short-term financial needs, rather being than the expression of an emancipatory 
understanding of the state and society.692 Stein himself realized that many elements of his 
reforms would save the state monetary expenses,693 but he argued (sometimes in the same 
breath) that “saving administrative costs is the less important gain which the proposed 
participation [of citizens] would entail,” compared with far more important effects such as 
increasing their autonomy [Selbständigkeit].694 I do not mean to belittle the importance of 
                                                 
689 From Altenstein’s ’Rigaer Denkschrift’: “Je rationaler sich der Betreib unter dem Einfluss moderner 
Zeitströmungen gestaltete, um so deutlicher empfand man das Unwirtschaftliche der alten, auf blossen 
Zwang gegründeten Arbeitsverfassung. Viele Gutsbesitzer begriffen, dass die Fronarbeit nur scheinbar 
billig, in Wahrheit unverhältnismässig teur bezahlt wurde...” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 
218.); Consider also the comments of another one of Stein’s allies, von Schrötter, who argued “that 
freedom of person and property beget prosperity.” (cited in Behrens, Society, Government and the 
Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 150.). See also: Berdahl, 
"The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia," 318.; For more on the Riga Memorandum see: 
Schuurmans, "Economic Liberalization, Honour, and Perfectibility: Karl Sigmund Altenstein and the 
Spiritualization of Liberalism," 178-81. 
690 Which might be difficult since he wrote in a “schwer lesbaren Bürokratenhandschrift” (Ritter, Stein; 
Eine Politische Biographie, 239.) 
691 For more on this potential pitfall see: Gray, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for 
Constitutional Reform on the County, Provincial, and National Levels in 1808." See also: “Schrötter 
forderte nichts Geringeres als ein umfassendes Reformgesetz, das alles auf einmal bringen sollte: volle 
Durchfürhung des Freihandelssystems, Vererbpachtung der Domänen an bäuerliche Parzellenbesitzer, 
Gewerbefreiheit, Beseitigung des Zunft- und Fabrikenzwanges, schliesslich und vor allem: Neiderreissen 
aller Schranken, die der freien Verwertung des Grundbesitzes im Sinne der kapitalistischen 
Wirtschaftsordnung im Wege stehen.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 219.)  
692 The reforms “were born not of a desire to secure the rights of man but to regenerate the state as a better 
instrument for national defense under dynastic leadership. It is this which gives them their essentially 
Prussian-German character.” (Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 221-2.); See also: 
Büsch, Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission zu Berlin., Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte, 21.; 
Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 46. 
693 Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften. Vol.II/1. See for example: p. 390-1, 
394, 502 as well as: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 314. 
694 “Ersparung an Verwaltungskosten ist aber der weniger bedeutende Gewinn, der erhalten wird durch die 
vorgeschlagene Teilnahem der Eigentümer an der Provinzial-Verwaltung, sondern weit wichtiger ist die 
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financial motives (especially in eroding much opposition to the reforms on the part of the 
king and nobles). In fact, the two offered explanations constitute a false dichotomy.695 
Rather than searching futilely for the correct direction of causal arrows, I suggest that the 
crisis brought about by foreign invasion required and enabled drastic measures. Given the 
need to preserve the mere chances for the state’s survival,696 the reformers around Stein 
found it useful to combine economic and social reforms. Tying the welfare of peasants 
more closely to the state rather than to their masters would not only be financially 
beneficial, but would also increase the legitimacy of the state. Given that these peasants 
formed the backbone of the Prussian army, this was a crucial project in the wake of Jena 
and Auerstedt.697 “Stein was both by training and experience primarily an administrative 
and not a social reformer,” but one implicated the other.698  A concern with financial 
solvency as well as with the efficient workings of the state and its organization and 
administration implied, necessarily, a concern with social reforms. Consider again 
Altenstein, who argued strenuously that the “ruined economy of the provinces would 
recover the more speedily the more completely it was liberated from the fetters of state-
                                                                                                                                                 
Belebung des Gemeingeistes und Bürgersinns, die Benutzung der schlafenden oder falsch geleiteten Kräfte 
und der zerstreut liegende Kenntnisse, der Einklang zwischen dem Geist der Nation, ihren Ansichten und 
Bedürfnissen und denen der Staatsbehörde, die Wiederbelebung der Gefühle für Vaterland, Selbständigkeit 
und Nationalehre.” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1 - p.394.) 
695 I am indebted to Levinger for this important insight: Levinger, "The Prussian Reform Movement and the 
Rise of Enlightened Nationalism," 269-70. 
696 For more on these chances and the perceived urgency of drastic actions see: Ritter, Stein; Eine 
Politische Biographie, 308. 
697 For more on the military reforms of the period see: Heinz G. Nitschke, Die Preussischen 
Militärreformen 1807-1813 : Die Tätigkeit Der Militärreorganisationskommission Und Ihre Auswirkungen 
Auf Die Preussische Armee, Kleine Beiträge Zur Geschichte Preussens ([Berlin]: Haude & Spener, 1983).; 
Heinz Stübig, "Die Wehrverfassung Preussens in Der Reformzeit," in Die Wehrpflicht : Entstehung, 
Erscheinungsformen Und Politisch-Militärische Wirkung, ed. Roland G. Foerster (München: R. 
Oldenbourg, 1994).; For more on economic reforms (for example pertaining to guilds) see: Jacoby, Die 
Bürokratisierung Der Welt; Ein Beitrag Zur Problemgeschichte, 26.; See also: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: 
Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 105, 36.; Behrens, Society, Government and 
the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 20-1.; Demel, Vom 
Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 44.; 
698 For the quotation and the well-supported conclusion see: Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 
1807-1815, 221. 
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sponsored protection and the mutual segregation of the estates.”699 It seems he, like Stein, 
simply cannot help it: for both, economic and administrative concerns necessarily implicate 
issues of social organization and the structure of political practices.  
Stein and Altenstein might focus on the economic benefits of emancipating 
significant parts of the population, yet this should not surprise us, given their main 
audience. Deeply embedded in their reform programs is the new understanding that old 
aristocratic norms are detrimental to the flourishing of the state. Notice Stein’s comment, 
for example, that “experience shows that coerced labor [Zwangsarbeit] is bad in the same 
degree that coercion [Zwang] occurs and that it is consequently more salutary to properly 
reward the labor of all individuals.”700 Not surprisingly, the peasant-emancipation reforms 
encountered considerable opposition from a range of skeptics who doubted the reformers’ 
claims that only by removing old barriers and by governing everybody directly through a 
newly constituted bureaucracy could the country prosper in these changed times.701  
 The erosion of time-honored legal and social boundaries did not end with peasants, 
since the elimination of all explicit relations of domination [Untertänigkeitsverhältnisse] 
was an important element of Stein’s reforms.702 As such, the reforms also aimed at 
                                                 
699  From Altenstein’s ’Rigaer Denkschrift’:”Die ruinierte Wirtschaft der Provinz wird sich um so schneller 
erholen [...] je vollkommener sie befreit wird von den Fesseln staatlicher Protektion und gegenseitiger 
Absonderung der Stände.” (cited in: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 219.) 
700 Letter from Stein to Sulzowsky (Memel 29. Dez 1807): “Die Erfahrung zeigt, dass Zwangsarbeit in dem 
Grade schlecht ist, als Zwang dabei stattfindet und dass es daher dem Ganzen heilsamer ist, die Arbeit jedes 
Menschen angemessen zu belohnen...” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, 
Vol.II/2 – p.604-5.) 
701 For a quick overview of sources and the reasons of this opposition see: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 215. 
702 “Nach dem Datum dieser Verordnung entsteht fernerhin kein Untertänigkeitsverhältnis, weder durch 
Geburt, noch durch Heirat, noch durch Übernehmung einer untertänigen Stelle, noch durch Vertrag.” 
(Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2 – p.457-60.); Neugebauer, 
Geschichte Preussens, 94.; Schoeps and Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz., Preussen : Geschichte Eines 
Mythos, 93-5.; For a fairly comprehensive overview of “Gutsherrschaft” in general see: Heinrich Kaak, Die 
Gutsherrschaft : Theoriegeschichtliche Untersuchungen Zum Agrarwesen Im Ostelbischen Raum (Berlin ; 
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removing many legal boundaries that prevented individuals of certain estates from 
occupying a range of professions [Gewerbefreiheit].703 In Stein’s words:  
 
Each aristocrat is allowed, without any disadvantage, to practice bourgeois 
businesses and every member of the bourgeoisie or peasantry is allowed to move 
from the peasant to the bourgeois estate or from the bourgeois to the peasant 
estate.704  
 
Similarly, ancient limitations on the possession of property (particularly land) were 
to be removed through the proposed reforms.705 Most troubling to some:  
                                                                                                                                                 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991).; Berdahl, "The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia," 
300.   
703 This topic is of immense importance to the development of German culture and political institutions. It 
has received considerable attention from a wide spectrum of historians and commentators. For helpful 
introductions and discussions see: Levinger, "The Prussian Reform Movement and the Rise of Enlightened 
Nationalism," 269.; Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 
1808," 130.; Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-
1848, 56, 58-9.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative 
Ideology, 1770-1848, 124-5.; For Stein’s attack on the guilds see: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and 
Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 136-9.; Behrens, Society, Government and the 
Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 20-1.; Demel, Vom 
Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 44.; For Stein’s attack on guilds see, for 
example: Craig, The End of Prussia, 13.; Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian 
Absolutism, 1713-1740," 54.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a 
Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 124-5.; Schuurmans, "Economic Liberalization, Honour, and 
Perfectibility: Karl Sigmund Altenstein and the Spiritualization of Liberalism," 178-9.; Notice also the 
proud pronouncement by one of Stein’s supporters within the Prussian administraton that “Serfdom will be 
abolished, everyone will be able to purchase aristocratic lands, compulsory guilds will be destroyed, and all 
foreign products will become importable!” (my emphasis, from a letter by Friedrich Staegemann to 
Elisabeth von Staegemann, 20 Aug. 1807 cited in:  Friedrich August von Stägemann, Franz Ruehl, and 
Verein für die Geschichte von Ost- und Westpreussen Königsberg., Aus Der Franzosenzeit. Ergänzungen 
Zu Den Briefen Und Aktenstücken Zur Geschichte Preussens Unter Friedrich Wilhelm Iii (Leipzig,: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1904). 
704 “Jeder Edelmann ist ohne allen Nachteil seines Standes befugt, bürgerliche Gewerbe zu treiben, und 
jeder Bürger oder Bauer ist berechtigt, aus dem Bauer- in den Bürger- und aus dem Bürger- in den 
Bauernstand zu treten.” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2 – p.458. 
Stein in Memel, 9. Okt. 1807). See also: Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und 
Bilddokumenten, 66-7. 
705 Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 127-8.; 
Neugebauer, Geschichte Preussens, 94.; Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The 
Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 21-2.; See also: Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung 
Und Verwaltung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 495-6.; 
Berdahl, "The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia," 318-20.; Gray, "Government by 
Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the County, Provincial, and National Levels 
in 1808," 78-9.; Görlitz, Die Junker: Adel Und Bauer Im Deutschen Osten; Geschichtliche Bilanz Von 7 
Jahrhunderten, 174-5.; Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : Die Preussischen Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn Karl 
Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und Restauration, 42-3.; For the effects of this development on the 
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The aristocrat is permitted to own not merely aristocratic land but also non-
aristocratic land, bourgeois and peasant property of all sorts, and the members of 
the bourgeoisie and the peasantry are allowed to own not merely bourgeois and 
peasant land and other non-aristocratic land but also aristocratic land, without the 
requirements of special permissions.706 
 
It is telling how specific and longwinded Stein’s articulations of these reforms are. 
Stein needs to spell out in great detail how the reforms would reshape the pillars of the old 
order. The aristocrat was to be reshaped from a privileged lord of the manor [Gutsherr] into 
a landholder [Gutsbesitzer], a mere proprietor.707 As people realized at the time and 
historians argue now, such a switch would severely undermine the old system of separate 
estates. The “enactments that eliminated serfdom and certain class barriers to professional 
and social mobility” might even be taken to “envisage . . . an end to the feudal organization 
of society.”708  
As if this was not jolting the established order enough, Stein’s proposal then takes 
an additional step that is integral to his overall reform package. The plethora of individual 
policy proposals here and there seek to emancipate subjects and turn them into citizens. 
                                                                                                                                                 
ideology of Prussian Herrschaft see: Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a 
Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848. (Especially chapter 3).; Schuurmans, "Economic Liberalization, 
Honour, and Perfectibility: Karl Sigmund Altenstein and the Spiritualization of Liberalism," 178-9. 
706 “Jeder Einwohner Unserer Staaten ist ohne alle Einschränkung in Beziehung auf den Staat zum 
eigentümlichen und Pfandbesitz unbeweglicher Grundstücke aller Art berechtigt; der Edelmann also zum 
Besitz nicht bloss adeliger, sondern auch unadeliger, bürgerlicher und bäuerlicher Güter aller Art, und der 
Bürger und Bauer zum Besitz nicht bloss bürgerlicher, bäuerlicher und anderer unadeliger, sondern auch 
adeliger Grundstücke, ohne dass der eine oder der andere zu irgendeinem Gütererwerb einer besonderen 
Erlaubnis bedarf....” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2 – p.458. 
Stein in Memel, 9. Okt. 1807). See also: “Dazu kam, kaum weniger bedeutungsvoll, die Niederlegung der 
gesetzlichen Schranken, die bisher den einen Stand von dem anderen getrennt hatten. Künftig darf der 
Bauer und Bürger adlige Grundstücke ohne besondere Erlaubnis erwerben; alle Vorzüge des adligen Erben 
vor dem bürgerlichen fallen ebenso weg wie der Ausschluss bürgerlicher Rittergutsbesitzer von Kreis- und 
Landtagen, vom Patronat, von der Gerichtsbarkeit und von der Jagdgerechtigkeit, die auf adligen Gütern 
haftet. Der Adlige ist ohne Nachteil seines Standes befugt, bürgerliche Gewerbe zu treiben; der Bauer darf 
ohne weiteres in den Bürgerstand übertreten und umgekehrt.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 
220.) 
707 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 220.; Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation 
of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 62.; Craig, The End of Prussia, 23. 
708 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 28. 
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However, Stein does not advocate for this move out of some ethical commitment to 
autonomy or an Enlightenment belief in the inviolability of the individual. For him, this is 
merely an artful but practical attempt to strengthen the state, to maximize the chances of 
attaining that end by inventing new means.  
His plans incorporate properly situated citizens into the administrative functions of 
the state. They would not primarily be “representatives of the people,” but rather, 
temporary “members of the bureau.”709 Such citizens would be taking on two roles, 
switching back and forth between their functions within their private lives and professions, 
and their functions within the administration. Stein seeks to create roles for citizens so that 
they infuse the recently reorganized, rationalized administrative organs with fresh ideas, 
energy, and legitimacy.710 The main responsibilities of such citizens in administrative posts 
would include financial oversight, administration of judiciary functions, and administrating 
the local police and welfare institutions.711 They were to continually check the procedures 
of the administration and, if necessary, apply appropriate pressure to remedy inefficiencies 
and corruption.712 As such, one of the key goals of the reforms was the creation of a sphere 
of liberty within the mechanical workings of the bureaucratic administration of the state.713 
Rather than being a temporary workforce of additional administrators, they were positioned 
to be a source of information for the administrative organs and, most importantly, an 
                                                 
709 “Den Ausdruck Repräsentanten”, so schrieb er über die Stellung solcher Laien in den Behörden, “halte 
ich für ganz unpassend. Es sind ständische Mitglieder der Kollegien”, sie handeln daher „wirklich als 
Offizianten, nicht als Volksrepräsentanten.” (Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform Und Revolution; All-
Gemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung Und Soziale Bewegung Von 1791 Bis 1848, 174.)  
710 For more on Stein’s goals and motivations see: Thompson, "Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture," 392-3. 
711 For more on their duties and spheres of responsibility see: Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und 
Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1 – p.392.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a 
Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 111-2. 
712 “...den Magistrat und seine Geschäftsführung laufend kontrollieren, ihre Gutachten öffentlich erstatten, 
unter Umständen drucken lassen.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 261.) 
713 Ibid., 116.) 
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outside check on institutions rife with abuse.714 Furthermore, citizens attached to 
administrative offices would commission reports and surveys as well as vote for local 
legislative and executive positions.715 Finally, in addition to financial controls, such 
citizens would also oversee and check local police functions. As we saw above, this did not 
merely entail security affairs but also what we now understand to be the internal 
administration: “care for commerce and trade, affairs concerning the poor, schools, 
churches, health care, rations, markets, cleaning, maintenance of roads, immigration and 
tourism, and things like that…”716 
Some commentators have interpreted Stein’s reforms as amounting to “an in 
modern terms hardly comprehensible degree of local autonomy!”717 Notice, however, that 
the citizens in Stein’s plan are not citizens the way we might read the term: they do not 
vote in national elections, they have no say on the constitution of the land, and they are not 
protected by a uniform bill of rights. It is far more accurate and useful to interpret Stein’s 
citizens within a procedural framework that tries to establish participatory requirements. 
Stein attempted to merge the right kind of emancipated citizens with the right kind of 
                                                 
714 “Stände müssen nicht Administratoren sein, sondern die Kontrolle und das Informationsmittel der 
Verwaltung.” (Ibid., 92.)  
715 “Sie blieben beschränkt auf die Aufgabe von Erklärungen und Beschwerden „auf dem Instanzenweg”, 
Abnahme von Kämmereirechnugen zur Entlastung der Stadtkasse, Erstatten von Gutachten u. dgl.; dazu 
trat, als einzige Neuerung, die Wahl der Magistratsmitglieder und Landtagsdeputierten.” (Ibid., 259.). See 
also: Raack, The Fall of Stein, 41. 
716 “Der Begriff der Polizei umfasste damals ausser dem, was wir heute darunter verstehen, die ganze 
innere Verwaltung: Fürsorge für Handel und Gewerbe, Armen-, Schul-, Kirchen- und Gesundheitswesen, 
Lebensmittelversorgung, Markttaxen und Marktaufsicht, Reinigung, Pflasterung, Beleuchtung der Strassen, 
Aufsicht über den Fremdenverkehr, das Innungswesen und dergleichen mehr ...” (Ritter, Stein; Eine 
Politische Biographie, 261.). For more on the (changing) content of police functions see: Gray, "Prussia in 
Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 82.; For more on the 
contemporary use of the term “Polizei“ see: Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of 
Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 25-6.; Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen 
Staatsabsolutismus, 44-5.; Karin Friedrich, "The Development of the Prussian Town, 1720-1815," in Rise 
of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, ed. Philip Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000), 149-
50. 
717 “...ein für unsere heutigen Begriffe kaum vorstellbares Mass von städtischer Autonomie!” (Ritter, Stein; 
Eine Politische Biographie, 263.) 
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properly constituted administrative structure in an attempt to bring together the direct and 
indirect question. Without the Nassau memorandum, it would have “occurred to nobody to 
undertake such a general reform[s].”718 
 Procedures and the indirect question have their place, but as Stein, despite his 
cameralist training, points out periodically, adherence to a procedural understanding of the 
state easily leads to excessive paper-pushing, administrative obstruction, and legal 
formalism [Formelkram].719 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Stein’s most famous employee, 
remarked similarly that “in the ministries of justice and internal affairs a bland and pure 
mechanism is the order of the day.”720 The direct question of justice is all too easily lost 
under such conditions.  Stein’s plan is a response to the “vapid torpor [and] internal decay” 
that such formalism engenders.721 He takes the critics of the cameralist project seriously 
and seeks to infuse into a procedural system the kind of vibrant, personalized, organic spirit 
that Novalis, Brentano, Schlegel, Eichendorff, and so many others praised.  
Stein attempted a tricky balancing act between opposing poles. Doing so solved 
some problems and muted some skeptics, but it also created new grounds for concern. 
Could his proposal tear down onerous social boundaries while resisting the crass 
egalitarianism of the French Revolution?722 Many expressed skepticism that Stein achieved 
this balance, or questioned, like Marwitz, whether it could be achieved at all. Stein’s 
                                                 
718 Ibid., 252. 
719  Ibid., 257-8. 
720 “In den Ministerien der Justiz und des Innern sind blosser und reiner Mechanismus und Ertödtung alles 
Geistes an der Tagesordnung.“ (Humboldt, Werke in Fünf Bänden, 428.); For more on the relationship 
between Stein and Humboldt see: Siegfried A. Kaehler, Wilhelm V. Humboldt Und Der Staat; Ein Beitrag 
Zur Geschichte Deutscher Lebensgestaltung Um 1800, 2., ed. (Göttingen,: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1963), 213-15.; Eberhard Kessel, Wilhelm V. Humboldt. Idee Und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart,: K. F. Koehler, 
1967), 59.; Jeismann, Das Preussische Gymnasium in Staat Und Gesellschaft, 277. 
721 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 188-9.  
722 “Die innere Staatsverwalutng einheitlicher, einfacher und übersichtlicher zu gestalten (ohne deshalb in 
die schematische Egalisierung der Französischen Revolution zu verfallen) war ja überhapt eine der 
Grundtendenzen des Steinschen Reformwerks.” (Ibid., 256.) 
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response (which I will explore in the next chapter) was to circumscribe tightly the 
qualifications and roles of citizens within a bureaucratic procedural framework.723 Through 
such innovations, Stein and his reformers became known far beyond the borders of Prussia 
as the essential rejuvenators of local freedoms.724 Their ideas had influence throughout 
Germany, even where they did not have the force of law.725 Stein’s reforms achieved their 
fame by combining procedural norms with participatory ideals – meaningful participation 
by citizens within an absolutist state.726 Stein did not suggest that citizens had a capacity 
for self-governance beyond monarchical control – he merely suggested that they had a 
capacity to be a useful check on adherence to procedures run awry. However, the porous 
nature of the line between these two positions was not lost on his critics. Stein attacked 
rigid and mindless adherence to protocol within stale institutions as strongly as he attacked 
reliance on the aprocedural, ad hoc decision making of incapable aristocrats. Stein’s 
reforms strike out in both directions. Both would be “shattered” and replaced by a “vibrant, 
progressive, creative spirit.”727  
                                                 
723 See also: Vinke. „Ueber die Organisation der Unterbehörden zunächst für die Polizeiverwaltung.“ 
Berlin, 4 June 1808, cited in: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform 
Ministry of 1808," 84.; See also: “Es zeigte sich aber bald, dass ohne eine grössere Zahl von permanenten 
Stadtbeamten zumal in den Grossstädten nicht auszukommen war. Und alle schverständigen Gutachter 
warnten dringend davor, diese Beamtenstellen durch Befristung ihrer Amtsdauer für strebsame Köpfe zu 
entwerten, die Beamten selbst in unwüridge Abhängigkeit von der Gunst der Menge zu bringen” (Ritter, 
Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 265.); Stein’s Idee dass „“jeder (Unbescholtene), der in der Stadt 
domiziliert, auch am städtischen Wesen teilnemen soll” – d.h. das Bürgerrecht erwerben kann.” – he had in 
mind „’Eximierte’ innerhalb der Stadtmauern ohne jeden Anteil am städtischen Gemeinwesen; darüber 
hinaus waren all wirtschaftlich nicht selbständigen Elemente, Gesellen, Tagelöhner, Gesinde, als blosse 
Schutzverwandte vom Erwerb des Bürgerrechts geradezu ausgeschlossen, obwohl sie natürlich der 
Steuerhoheit, Polizei und Gerichtsbarkeit der Stadt unterstanden.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 258.). 
724 “...gilt heute Stein weit über Preussens Grenzen hinaus als der eigentliche Erneuerer deutscher stätischer 
Freiheit.”  (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 266.) 
725 Nachahmung throughout Germany: „Indirekt hat der Geist der Steinschen Städteordnung weithin auch 
da gewirkt, wo sie juristisch keine Geltung hatte.” (Ibid., 266-7.) 
726 Selbstverwalung in the midst of a „stramme obrigkeitliche Regiment des alten Fürstenstaates.” (Ibid., 
270.)  
727 Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1 – p.394-5. 
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One of the key advantages the masses held, it seems, was that there were many of 
them. Incorporating a group taken from the “confusion of practical life” was not a 
hindrance but an advantage; it entailed a useful wealth of “viewpoints and sentiments.”728 
As such, Stein’s suggestion to emancipate subjects and incorporate them as citizens within 
the bureaucracy is partially founded on a perceived epistemological advantage of the 
multitude. His proposal would simply “multiply the sources of perception” and thereby 
make the bureaucracy more effective and flexible.729  
Stein makes this judgment based not on abstract ideology, but on his long 
experience in bureaucracies. The time spent there convinced Stein, in his own words, “truly 
and vividly of the advantage of properly educated orders.”730 Instead of fearing the 
emancipation of the lower orders as the opening of the floodgates that would sweep society 
into chaos, Stein saw such a move as the harnessing of abundant talent for mutually 
beneficial consequences. Such a move would tie a perhaps apathetic population to the fate 
of its state, and the administrative organs thus reconstituted could function as a proper and 
useful public forum. In Stein’s words, they would become a “well constituted organ of 
public opinion.”731  
                                                 
728 “Der Formenkram und Dienst-Mechanismus in den Kollegien wird durch Aufnahme von Menschen aus 
dem Gewirre des praktischen Lebens zertrümmert, und an seine Stelle tritt ein lebendiger, fortstrebender, 
schaffender Geist und ein aus der Fülle der Natur genommener Reichtum von Ansichten und Gefühlen.” 
(Ibid.) 
729 “...vervielfältigt die Quellen ihrer Erkenntnis...” (Ibid., Vol.II/1 – p.395.). 
730 Stein rants repeatedly against mere “empty metaphysical phantasms of the mind” [von leeren 
Hirngespinsten der Metaphysik] (Ibid., Vol.II/1 – p.391.). 
731 “Auch meine Diensterfahrung überzeugt mich innig und lebhaft von der Vortrefflichkeit zweckmässig 
gebildeter Stände, und ich sehe sie als ein kräftiges Mittel an, die Regierung durch die Kenntnisse und das 
Ansehen aller gebildeten Klassen zu verstärken, sie alle durch Überzeugung, Teilnahme und Mitwirkung 
bei den National-Angelegenheiten an den Staat zu knüpfen, den Kräften der Nation eine freie Tätigkeit und 
eine Richtung auf das Gemeinnützige zu geben, sie vom müssigen sinnlichen Genuss oder von leeren 
Hirngespinsten der Metaphysik, oder von Verfolgen bloss eigennütziger Zwecke abzulenken und ein gut 
gebildetes Organ der öffentlichen Meinung zu erhalten, die man jetzt aus Äusserungen einzelner Männer 
oder einzelner Gesellschaften vergeblich zu erraten bemüht ist.” (Ibid.; For more on this theme see: 
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 Incorporating the wisdom of the multitude into the administration would help to 
overcome some of the central limitations of the current system of administration: adherence 
to rigid rules, “lack of appropriate local knowledge and indifference towards it,” as well as 
a “fear of change and innovation.”732 In contrast, appropriately situated citizens (more 
about that later) do not merely possess local, contextual knowledge but also have the 
incentives to do something about it when given the chance.733  
Stein’s administrative reforms would thus lead to superior outcomes and more 
legitimacy for the state while helping to educate the citizenry. Stein’s bureaucratic reform 
package mirrors the goals of modern deliberative democratic theory without either the 
deliberative or the democratic aspects! Furthermore, his proposals do not merely seek to 
emancipate, but also ground such liberation in a protection of liberties: “to refine the nation 
one has to give the repressed elements of the nation equal freedom, autonomy, property, 
and protection of the laws.”734 Doing so would allow them to prevent the “arbitrary 
                                                                                                                                                 
Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-
1812, 291-2.). 
732 “In die aus besoldeten Beamten bestehenden Landes-Kollegia drängt sich leicht und gewöhnlich ein 
Mietlingsgeist ein, ein Leben in Formen und Dienst-Mechanismus, eine Unkunde des Bezirks, den man 
verwaltet, eine Gleichgültigkeit, oft eine lächerliche Abneigung gegen denselben, eine Furcht vor 
Veränderungen und Neuerungen, die die Arbeit vermehren, womit die bessern Mitglieder überladen sind 
und der die geringhaltigeren sich entziehen. (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche 
Schriften, Vol.II/1 – p.389-90.). I am borrowing the term “wisdom of the multitude” anachronistically from 
Jeremy Waldron’s insightful article: Jeremy Waldron, "The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on 
Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics," Political Theory 23, no. 4 (Nov., 1995). Aristotle, perhaps not 
incidentally, was widely read and analyzed by early cameralists. 
733 “Ist der Eigentümer von aller Teilnahme an der Provinzial-Verwaltung ausgeschlossen, so bleibt das 
Band, das ihn an sein Vaterland bindet, bleibt unbenutzt; die Kenntnisse, welche ihm seine Verhältnisse zu 
seinen Gütern und Mitbürgern verschaffen, unfruchtbar; seine Wünsche um Verbesserungen, die er 
einsieht, um Abstellung von Missbräuchen, die ihn drücken, verhallen oder werden unterdrückt, und seine 
Musse und Kräfte, die er dem Staat unter gewissen Bestimmungen gern widmen würde, werden auf 
Genüsse aller Art verwandt oder in Müssiggang aufgerieben.” (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe 
Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1 - p.389-90.) 
734 “Soll die Nation veredelt werden, so muss man dem unterdrückten Teil derselben Freiheit, 
Selbständigkeit und Eigentum geben und ihm den Schutz der Gesetze angedeihen lassen.” Stein makes this 
comment with respect to Poland but as is clear from the context of this particular sentence, its main thrust is 
equally applicable (perhaps even more applicable) to the more developed German states.  (Ibid., Vol.II/1 – 
p.397.). 
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deviance from the established constitution and lawful order” which under the previous 
system was all too common.735 Seen from this perspective, one of the greatest protections 
of freedom and order, in Stein’s view, would be the contained procedural participation that 
his administrative reforms afforded. Stein, then, fuses a concern over administrative 
efficiency with the project of increasing the legitimacy of the state and emancipating its 
subjects. Perhaps Stein took to heart the remark of one of his colleagues that “true liberty is 
founded far more on the [shape of the] administration than [on] the constitution.”736  
Stein’s Nassau memorandum aroused trepidation in many.  Nonetheless, due to a 
willingness to try just about anything born of desperation, Stein’s proposals eventually 
found a range of supporters, including, eventually and briefly, the king himself.737 
Nevertheless, the route from the reform proposal to the reforms themselves was unexpected 





                                                 
735 “...verhindern die willkürlichen Abweichungen von der Verfassung und gesetzlicher Ordnung, die sich 
die Landes-Kollegien bei dem Drang der Geschäfte nicht selten zu schulden kommen lassen.” (“Bericht 
Steins an das Generaldirektorium” [Münster, 30. Oktober. 1804]. Cited in: Stein, Freiherr Vom Stein; 
Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften, 60.); Nolte, Staatsbildung Als Gesellschaftsreform : 
Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 57. 
736 “...wahre Freiheit‚ ungleich mehr auf der Verwaltung als auf der Verfassung beruhe.’” (Ritter, Stein; 
Eine Politische Biographie, 275. Vorrede Niebuhrs zu Vinckes Darstellung der inneren Verwalutng 
Grossbritanniens 1815.) 
737 Various statements of support for the principles of the Nassauer Denkschrift can be found in the 
following places: 
- Letter of Friedrich Wilhelm III. to Stein  (Memel, 7. December 1807) p.560-1 
- Letter of Friedrich Wilhelm III. to Stein  (Memel, 27. December 1807) p.598-9: die 
„meisterhafter Art verwebte ständische Repräsentation” 
- Letter of Hardenberg to Stein (Libau, 13. December 1807) p.572.  
- Letter of Reden to Stein (Berlin, 17. May 1808) p.736 
(all in: Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2.) 
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10.  Solutions for Weak States 
 
On July 10, 1807, one day after Prussia was coerced to sign the peace treaty of 
Tilsit, Napoleon urged Friedrich Wilhelm III to call Stein back to service.738 With most of 
his country occupied by French troops, Friedrich Wilhelm III had no choice but to do as 
Napoleon commanded. Furthermore, Napoleon stipulated that Prussia surrender large sums 
of hard cash to France under harsh treaty obligations.739 Given Stein’s reputation in 
financial affairs, he must have seemed like the man who could get that job done. Stein, for 
his part, though sick at the time, received the news of his reappointment with zeal and a 
devout resolve.740 At the moment of Prussia’s greatest existential crisis, a moment shot 
through with contingency and possibilities, Stein was briefly, and most improbably, swept 
into a position of tentative but broad power. Though Stein would be in charge of the state 
for a mere fourteen months, much was about to happen. Stein and his allies throughout the 
administration now had the opportunity to implement the principles of the Nassau 
memorandum.741 Incorporating citizens into Prussia’s administrative machinery was high 
on the list of priorities. Quite literally, this task occupied Stein from the very first day of his 
                                                 
738  Napoleon “empfahl Friedrich Wilhelm mündlich in Tilsit die Rückberufung des Reichritters…” (Ritter, 
Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 203-4.; See also: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under 
the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 60, 65.; Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung Und Verwaltung. 
Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 542. 
739 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 308. 
740 Immediatschreiben Steins (Nassau 9. or 10. August 1807). (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und 
Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1, 429-30. 
741 For more on the immediate conditions within the state’s administration see: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 92-3.; Christian Jacob Kraus, "Ueber Die Mittel, Das Zur Bezahlung Der Franzoesischen 
Kriegsschuld Erforderliche Geld Aufzubringen," in Vermischte Schriften Über Staatswirthschaftliche, 
Philosophische Und Andere Wissenschaftliche Gegenstände (Könisberg: F. Nicolovius, 1808). 
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tenure until his final dismissal from office. His last official act on his very last day in office 
was the recommendation to the king to approve the final organizational reform.742 
The crisis that enabled the reforms was also its greatest obstacle. The state Stein 
took over was barely functioning. It was abysmally low on legitimacy and state 
capacities.743 To make things worse, Prussia was also abysmally poor.744 To save money, 
the important proclamations regarding Stein’s administrative reforms had to be printed as 
enclosures in newspapers, spread out in four parts over a month, for the government 
agencies to piece together themselves.745 A set of golden dishes of Frederick the Great and 
various royal jewels had to be sold to raise much-needed cash.746 For the year 1807/8, 
Prussia’s official budget estimated revenues of 15 million taler while the expenses 
                                                 
742 “Keine zweite Reformaufgabe hat Stein mit so stürmischem Eifer angepackt wie die Neugestaltung des 
preussischen Verwaltungsapparates, von der Zentrale bis zu den untersten Staatsorganen in Stadt und Land. 
Fast vom ersten Tage seines Ministeriums an sieht man ihn damit beschäftigt, und noch die letzte seiner 
amtlichen Handlungen war die Empfehlung eines Organisationsplanes, den der König am Tage seiner 
Entlassung vollzog.“ (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 238.) See also: Raack, The Fall of Stein, 
128.; Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 80.; 
Gray, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the County, 
Provincial, and National Levels in 1808," 72. 
743 There is widespread agreement amongst historians on this point. For useful accounts that hightlight 
various aspects of Prussia’s downfall see: Büsch, Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission zu Berlin., 
Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte, 16-8, 32-33, 37-8.; Neugebauer, Geschichte Preussens, 91-2.; 
Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 1, 44-5, 89-90, 
122-3.; Johann Jakob Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern, Bericht Eines Augenzeugen Von Dem Feldzuge 
Der Während Den Monaten September Und October 1806 Unter Dem Kommando Des Fürsten Zu 
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen Gestandenen Königl. Preussischen Und Kurfürstl. Sächsischen Truppen (Tübingen: 
J.G. Cotta, 1807).; Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 
1806-1848, 1-2.; Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-
Century France and Prussia, 190-1.; Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen 
Staatsabsolutismus, 34.; Christof Dipper, Wolfgang Schieder, and Reiner Schulze, Napoleonische 
Herrschaft in Deutschland Und Italien : Verwaltung Und Justiz, Schriften Zur Europäischen 
Rechtsgeschichte Und Verfassungsgeschichte (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995).; Simon, "Variations in 
Nationalism During the Great Reform Period in Prussia," 305-6.; Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : Die 
Preussischen Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn Karl Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und Restauration, 92-4.; 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Henning, Handbuch Der Wirtschafts- Und Sozialgeschichte Deutschlands (Paderborn: 
F. Schöningh, 1991), 190-3.; Brose, The Politics of Technological Change in Prussia : Out of the Shadow 
of Antiquity, 1809-1848, 26-30.; Hagemann, Mannlicher Muth Und Teutsche Ehre : Nation, Militär Und 
Geschlecht Zur Zeit Der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preussens, 17-28.; Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform 
Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-1812, 31-62. 
744 Eckart Kehr, Hanna Schissler, and Hans Ulrich Wehler, Preussische Finanzpolitik, 1806-1810 : Quellen 
Zur Verwaltung Der Ministerien Stein Und Altenstein (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), 13-64. 
745 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 266. 
746  Ibid., 324. 
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amounted to 28.1 million taler. The much-reduced military alone consumed 16.6 million 
taler.747 The simple task of finding a couple of thousand rifles for Prussia’s much-
diminished army seemed nearly insurmountable.748 Meanwhile, French troops had 
plundered much of Berlin, including the Quadriga statue from atop the Brandenburg 
Gate.749 Napoleon, leaving no doubt as to his intentions, instructed his officers in Berlin 
clearly: “We must make money out of everything.”750 The Grande Armée still occupied 
much of Prussia and demanded housing and provisions until Prussia paid all war 
reparations as specified in the treaty of Tilsit.751 Fichte, writing to his wife in Berlin, 
despaired that “I think that the German nation must be preserved; but look, she is already 
extinguished!”752 As general von Gneisenau put it in a letter to Marwitz in the fall of 1807:  
 
We are beaten, bent, insulted, robbed, and poor. We sit here in a miserable nest 
without hope and have, even in the most fortunate case, barely the prospect of 
saving with our greatest effort the sunken state in some sort of precarious 
existence.753  
 
                                                 
747 Kehr, Schissler, and Wehler, Preussische Finanzpolitik, 1806-1810 : Quellen Zur Verwaltung Der 
Ministerien Stein Und Altenstein. 
748 Dennis E. Showalter, "Manifestation of Reform: The Rearmament of the Prussian Infantry, 1806-13," 
The Journal of Modern History Vol. 44, no. 3 (Sep., 1972).; Scharnhorst et al., Private Und Dienstliche 
Schriften, 572. 
749 Magnus Friedrich von Bassewtz, Die Kurmark-Brandenburg Im Zusammenhang Mit Den Schicksalen 
Des Gesamtstaats Preussen Während Der Zeit Vom 22 Oktober 1806 Bis Zum Ende Des Jahres 1808 
(Leipzig: 1851-2), 154-56. Cited in: Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin : The Franco-Prussian War in North 
Germany, 1813, 19.; See also: Friedrich von Cölln, "Über Die Vertheilung Der Von Der Stadt Berlin Zu 
Tragenden Kriegskontribution Auf Ihre Bürger," in Neue Feuerbrände (Amsterdam ; Cölln: P. Hammer, 
1807).; Gottfried Schadow, "Entführung Der Kunstschätze," in Die Franzosenzeit in Deutschen Landen 
1806-1815, in Wort Und Bild Der Mitlebenden, ed. Friedrich Schulze (Leipzig,: R. Voigtländer, 1908), 83.; 
Klessmann, Deutschland Unter Napoleon in Augenzeugenberichten, 171-3. 
750 “Il faut faire argent de tous.” (as quoted in : Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : 
Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-1812, 49.) 
751 Friedrich Buchholz, Idee Einer Arithmetischen Staatskunst Mit Anwendung Auf Das Königreich 
Preussen in Seiner Gegenwärtigen Lage (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1809), 186-7. 
752 Fichte about the peaceof Tilsit (29, July 1807) as quoted in: Schulze, Die Franzosenzeit in Deutschen 
Landen 1806-1815, in Wort Und Bild Der Mitlebenden, 144. 
753 Gneisenau in a letter to Marwitz (Dec.11, 1807): “Wir sind geschlagen, gebeugt, gedemütigt, beraubt 
und verarmt, sitzen hier in einem elenden Neste ohne Hoffnung, haben auch in dem günstigsten Fall die 
Aussicht, nur mit den grössten Anstrengungen einen gesunkenen Staat in einer schwankenden Existenz zu 
erhalten.“ (Gneisenau, Gneisenau; Ein Leben in Briefen, 86-7.) 
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In short, Prussia was on the brink of becoming a footnote in European history 
books.754 To counter this possibility, Stein’s reforms, as actually implemented, combined a 
concern for legitimacy-enhancing measures with an appreciation of participatory 
procedures. The key innovation in this attempted fusion is a bringing together of procedural 
requirements and participatory norms. Stein, in effect, advocated for reconceptualizing 
popular participation as a well-regulated procedural element. For him, the fairness and 
legitimacy of a procedure becomes tied to the opportunity of citizens to participate in 
proceedings. As one of the most famous phrases of the time put it, participatory procedural 
requirements stipulate “democratic principles in a monarchical regime.”755 This is a 
double-edged sword for Stein and his allies.  
On the one hand, it holds the promise of solving many of Prussia’s woes. 
Participatory procedural requirements could help to alleviate the “vapid torpor” of 
bureaucratic formalism, while simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of the state.756 As 
the Romantic critics of the last section pointed out, few people felt they had a stake in the 
fortunes of the state. Stein thought that including a wide pool of people in the 
administration would entangle their talents, insights, aspirations, and energy with the well-
being of the state.  
 On the other hand, participatory procedures invoked in the minds of many riotous 
citizens with pitchforks rather than tablet-wielding components of the bureaucratic 
machinery. With the example of the French Revolution uncomfortably close in time and 
                                                 
754 See for example the assessemnt of Gray who concurs forcefully: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society 
and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 58. 
755 “Demokratische Grundsätze in einer monarchischen Regierung“ (Hardenberg, "Über Die Organisation 
Des Preussischen Staates," 98.) 
756 “...trug längst die Kennzeichen dumpfer Erstarrung, inneren Verfalls.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 188-9.)  
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space, advocating for widespread participation by the masses in affairs of the state was a 
surefire way to invoke images of popular unrest, hysteria, and uncontrollable violence. 
Calling Stein a “Jacobin” was a blunt device to underscore this connection.  
However, this charge, though not entirely unfounded, overlooks that public 
participation under Stein’s scheme is tightly regulated within a procedural framework. 
Stein is not advocating for public sovereignty or self-determination. Stein’s citizens are part 
of the bureaucratic machinery of the state. They are subject to highly regulated rules and 
procedures that constrain their agency. Stein attempts to construct a manageable model of 
citizenship that would save the state, not overturn it.757  
 Highly regulated participatory procedures are instrumental to Stein’s attempt to 
create a new understanding of citizenship and strengthen the ailing Prussian state.758 I do 
not have in mind here the historical switch from subjects to citizens. Prussia’s population 
after Stein’s reforms would not all be equals. In many affairs of their lives, no changes 
would be noticeable. However, in the narrow realm of citizen-advisor and supervisor, 
Stein’s reforms aimed at creating an empowered, contributing, procedurally constrained, 
participatory citizen role. People would move in and out of that role, at one moment 
guiding the affairs of the state, in the next fixing shoes. The cobblers from this example are 
not citizens in the way we might understand the term today; they would not vote on the 
national stage (on candidates or issues), nor have formal rights or liberties.759 For most of 
                                                 
757 For more on Stein’s approach to creating and empowering citizens see: Levinger, "The Prussian Reform 
Movement and the Rise of Enlightened Nationalism," 265-6.; See also: Nolte, Staatsbildung Als 
Gesellschaftsreform : Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 13. 
758 For one of the few interpretations that highlights most of the elements of my formulation see: Gray, 
"Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 14. 
759 However, though little known, Stein had initiated early plans prior to his second dismissal that aimed at 
founding representative bodies on all levels, including the establishment of a national parliament. Stein left 
his office pleading that “the life of our state depends upon the enactment of a plan [of national 
representation].” (Ibid.: 102.) See also: Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, 
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the week, they would still be subjects of the crown within a highly structured and 
discriminating social order. However, at times, they could set down the hats assigned to 
them by their professions or caste rank and switch into their roles as citizens. Entailed in 
this hat-switching procedure is a temporary reconfiguration of duties, rights, and 
expectations that attach to these individuals in their positions within the administration. 
Administrators carrying out the crown’s commands vis-à-vis subjects would in these 
moments encounter the very same people as empowered citizens from whom they had to 
accept admonishments, guidance, and perhaps even direct commands.760  
Ideally, this understanding of citizenship strikes a balance between the cameralists’ 
norms and the concerns of their critics. This attempted balance is illustrated through one of 
Stein’s unlikely temporary allies: the nationalistic “Turnvater” Friedrich Ludwig Jahn. In a 
piece from 1810 titled “The Even Internal Administration,” Jahn argued:  
 
Between head, hand, and foot lies the heart, which must not beat exclusively like a 
machine – it must be raised by honor. This genial feeling is best induced through 
citizen-honor, where the governing recognize the governed as capable of partaking 
in council . . . , and where the governed are not treated as eternal minors in eternal 
tutelage.761 
 
As Stein and his allies argued, establishing such an understanding of citizenship 
under participatory procedural requirements would have the advantages of creating a 
                                                                                                                                                 
II/1, 380-98.; Gray, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the 
County, Provincial, and National Levels in 1808," 93-4. 
760 See for example: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 
1808," 83-7. 
761 “Zwischen Kopf, Hand und Fuss liegt das Herz; das muss nicht bloss maschinenmässig schlagen, es 
muss von Ehre gehoben werden. Dies wohltuende Gefühl wird durch eine Bürgerehre am besten 
eingeflösst, wo die Regierung die Regierten für ratsfähig in eigenen Sachen anerkennt, sie nicht als ewige 
Unmündige in ewige Vormundschaft nimmt.“ (Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, "Deutschen Volkstum," in Stimmen 
Aus Der Zeit Der Erniedrigung, ed. Rudolf Vaupel (München: Drei Masken, 1923), 148-9.) 
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manageable model of citizenship, rendering the government administration more efficient 
and legitimate, and saving much-needed cash.762 
 
 
(i) Problems and Goals 
 
Stein designed his reforms to address the concerns of a weak state in possession of 
few resources and little control or legitimacy. However, in trying to rescue the ailing 
Prussian state, the crown had to make a variety of uncomfortable bargains. Certainly, the 
reform package entailed moves that would make Prussia’s administration more efficient 
and effective, enhance the standing of the crown in the eyes of many, rely on a broader 
pool of talent to lower costs, and diminish the encumbrance of entrenched administrative 
practices. However, the flip side of these achievements was the crown’s (temporary) 
submission to jolting assumptions that were now being built into the very institutions of the 
state. I will highlight three of them: a suspicion of government and a distaste for lack of 
governmental accountability, a suspicion of popular excess, and epistemological humility.  
 First, Stein’s reforms are at pains to walk the thin line between empowering the 
state sufficiently to be effective on the dangerous international scene and empowering it too 
much, so that it would become threatening domestically. The reorganization of the 
administration based on a procedural understanding of the state rendered the state more 
predictable and calculable. As we have seen, it largely replaced lordly fiat and aristocratic 
                                                 
762 The monetary dimensions of Stein’s reforms have not been lost to historians, see for example: Mueller, 
Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 131-2. 
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dicta with stable and known rules and procedures.763 As one historian put it, “by subjecting 
the crown, in matters of personnel administration, to certain binding rules, [various 
reforms] curbed the powers of the absolute king, placed him under the law, [and] reduced 
the personal element in government.”764 Adherence to a procedural understanding of the 
state’s administration helped to depersonalize the state and render it less arbitrary. The 
state, increasingly, was in practice and thought an abstract entity, no longer a person (the 
king). The face of such a state was a regimented and faceless bureaucracy whose defining 
distinction vis-à-vis earlier administrative systems was the prevalence of bureaucrats 
beholden to procedural norms. In the words of one historian, “the establishment of Stein’s 
ministry was a triumph of bureaucracy over personal absolutism.”765 It was a “bureaucratic 
revolution.”766 The king, then, subjected himself to established and known rules and 
procedures. In many ways this was as close as Prussia would get for a long time to an often 
                                                 
763 The lack of a predictable government bound by procedural rules was certainly not a minor problem as 
demonstrated by the famous legal case of the “Miller Arnold“ or Frederick William’s habit of insulting and 
assaulting officials whose judgments he found objectionable on ad hoc grounds (as recounted in: Behrens, 
Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 
111-15, 32-3.) See also: Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen 
Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 43-7, 109-10.; Johann Erich 
Biester, "Zedlitz," Berlinische Monatsschrift 21 (1793): 540-41.; Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat 
Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 10-11.; Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung Und Verwaltung. 
Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 120.; Johan van der 
Zande, "Prussia and the Enlightenment," in The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, 
ed. Philip Dwyer (New York: Longman, 2000), 93. 
764 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 190-1.  
765 Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 73, 155.; 
This view is very widely shared amongst historians. See: Büsch, Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission 
zu Berlin., Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte, 20.; Eckart Kehr. “Zur Genesis der preussischen 
Bürokratie und des Rechtstaats. Ein Beitrag zum Diktaturproblem” [1932], in: Eckart Kehr and Hans 
Ulrich Wehler, Der Primat Der Innenpolitik, Veröffentlichungen Der Historischen Kommission Zu Berlin 
Beim Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut Der Freien Universität Berlin ; (Berlin,: de Gruyter, 1965).; Rosenberg, 
Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, 191.; For a contrasting 
view see: Nolte, Staatsbildung Als Gesellschaftsreform : Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den 
Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 27.; For a very different perspective consider: Sieg, Staatsdienst, 
Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien 
Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 34-40. 
766 Barbara Vogel, Preussische Reformen 1807-1820, Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek ; (Königstein/Ts.: 
Verlagsgruppe Athenäum, Hain, Scriptor, Hanstein, 1980), 17.; See also: Silberman, Cages of Reason : The 
Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain, 4. (My emphasis) 
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promised but never delivered paper constitution.767 Furthermore, the incorporation of 
people in their citizen role within the local administration simultaneously enabled and 
constrained the state. While their tasks were myriad, of particular importance was the 
institutionalized check on governmental spending and taxation.768 In all these ways, then, 
Stein’s reforms exhibit a suspicion of governmental power at the same time as they seek to 
enliven the ailing state.  
 Second, the citizens under Stein’s model never turn into a mob even when endowed 
with unprecedented powers to check governmental overreach and abuse. Stein was deeply 
beholden to monarchical rule; he distained democrats. Stein sought to find the proper, 
historically conditioned balance between participation and process, between liberty and 
coercion, and between suffocating regimentation from above and the overzealous forces 
from below.769 The citizen’s role is, in Stein’s account, consequently just that: a narrowly 
defined, temporarily held position that provides for some powers, for some people, for 
some time. As such, Stein’s citizen appears markedly different from the French citoyen 
who wore his red hat at all times and within all social contexts.  
As many of Stein’s followers as well as opponents were well aware, the example of 
the French Revolution next door had the potential for spreading seeds of unprecedented 
                                                 
767 This theme is of considerable importance to historians. For much more on the numerous promissed 
constitutions see: Neugebauer, Geschichte Preussens, 95-6.; Büsch, Neugebauer, and Historische 
Kommission zu Berlin., Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte, 26.; Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : 
The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 12, 54, 92, 146-57.; Demel, Vom 
Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 59-60.; For a similar thought in a 
different context see: Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung Und Verwaltung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur 
Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 317.; Berdahl, "The Stande and the Origins of 
Conservatism in Prussia," 311.; For more on this theme and disenting viewpoints consider: Nolte, 
Staatsbildung Als Gesellschaftsreform : Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 
1800-1820, 79-85. 
768 See for example Wunder’s analysis to this effect: Wunder, Geschichte Der Bürokratie in Deutschland, 
25-6. 
769 For more on Stein’s thought on this point and its origins see: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 
193-4. 
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discontent. Two argumentative strategies respond to this challenge and try to avert the 
excesses of a bloody revolution. The first, taken by many of Stein’s opponents, praises the 
virtues of the old order and suggests the ultimate dissatisfaction that awaits cobblers who 
do not stay at their last.770 The second, advocated by reformers like Stein, does not try to 
put awakened minds back to sleep, but rather sees this as an opportunity to harness their 
still slumbering energy if used properly and fruitfully.771 Stein’s proposal was far from 
either emotional appeals to ancient chivalry or an endorsement of blind equality. Rather, he 
(like many others) suggested that reform, the “education of the lower classes and the 
improvement of their conditions seems to be the most secure tool to anticipate and forestall 
revolution.”772 Stein, then, seeks to carve out an understanding of the concept of ‘citizen’ 
that enables the state but does not lead to wild populism.  
 Third, crucial to the task of creating effective bureaucratic machinery within Stein’s 
reform program is an embedded reliance on epistemological humility. Not only did Stein 
prepare his reforms circumspectly, but they themselves are built upon an understanding of 
epistemological limitations. What might be good for Brandenburg might prove disastrous if 
applied to the people in Königsberg. Local context not only matters but is best known by 
local individuals who have a stake in the outcome of various governmental initiatives.773 
Equally important, allowing people to make decisions for their own communities (again, 
                                                 
770 For a general introduction to this theme see for example: Hannah More, Village Politics (1793), 
Revolution and Romanticism, 1789-1834 (Oxford [England] ; New York: Woodstock Books, 1995).; Given 
a wave of popular unrest, riots, and outright rebelions throughout the German countryside (mostly of a 
local nature), many conservatives felt much urgency in advocating this viewpoint (for a collection of 
studies on this point see: Helmut Berding, Soziale Unruhen in Deutschland Während Der Französischen 
Revolution (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988).; See also: Günter Birtsch. “Revolutionsfurcht in 
Preussen 1789-1794.“ In Büsch, Neugebauer-Wölk, and Berding, Preussen Und Die Revolutionäre 
Herausforderung Seit 1789 : Ergebnisse Einer Konferenz, 87-101.  
771 Levinger, "The Prussian Reform Movement and the Rise of Enlightened Nationalism," 263-5. 
772 “Bildung der unteren Klassen und Verbesserung ihres Zustandes scheint mir das sicherste Mittel, um 
Revolution zuvorzukommen...” (Stein, Freiherr Vom Stein; Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und 
Denkschriften, 31.) 
773 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 95. 
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within certain roles at certain times) encourages a sense of responsibility and agency that, 
so Rehberg, encourages a “liberal stance.”774   
 
 
(ii) “For a Nation of Cheaters and Criminals”775 
 
Stein, then, was far from being a lofty ideologue. He had little patience with people 
who were jumping at the chance to experiment with the latest conceptual innovations. 
However, he realized that Prussia could not afford the status quo, not fiscally, militarily, 
politically, or socially. His conceptual innovations and adaptations aimed, simply, to revive 
an ailing state at the brink of extermination. One of the first steps in creating new 
foundations for the Prussian state was to erode resistance to all forms of public 
participation in governmental affairs, procedural or not. 
Key to this move was an erosion of the social boundaries that had given shape to 
the Old Prussian order. As many of Stein’s opponents were very much aware, Stein and 
like-minded reformers saw little utility in subdividing the state’s population into absolutely 
separate estates in all affairs of life. Under the old model, a person’s caste [Kaste] shaped 
that person’s rights, responsibilities, legal constraints, and status in all of his or her 
interactions.776 Particularly with respect to the offices of the state, it seemed foolish to Stein 
                                                 
774 “liberale Gesinnung“ – cited in: Ibid., 116. 
775  “…für eine Nation von Betrügern und Verbrechern” - The quote is from Hardenberg with respect to the 
general trend of legal and social reforms in Prussia (cited in: Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform Und 
Revolution; All-Gemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung Und Soziale Bewegung Von 1791 Bis 1848, 159.) 
776 For the best treatment of the origin, development, and vituberative use of this term see: Otto Brunner, 
Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe; Historisches Lexikon Zur Politisch-
Sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart,: E. Klett, 1972). 
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and his allies to let caste restrictions determine bureaucratic rank and influence. Such 
restrictions made it difficult to incorporate a wide spectrum of citizens into the 
administration of the country. They also hindered procedural practices from taking shape, 
since aristocratic norms favor the will of individuals over mechanized decision-making 
procedures in which anybody could, theoretically, make those decisions. 
Importantly, Stein never proposed the elimination of aristocratic ranks and titles. 
Instead, his reforms worked with and around caste roles by containing them within some 
contexts while excluding them from others. As such, Stein’s reforms did not eradicate the 
Old Prussian social order, but rather tried to reshape it in novel and innovative ways. In 
fact, far from seeing this question as a revolutionary challenge to the very foundations of 
the old order, Stein saw reforms of this dimension as the only method of saving the ailing 
state. Just days before writing the Nassau memorandum, he wrote to a friend that it is 
imperative to purge the civil administration and the military of “the vile caste spirit […], 
since it enfeebles the richer members of the aristocratic caste while it leaves the poorer 
uneducated and frequently entirely crude.”777 Equally damning in the eyes of Stein, the 
complicated system of legal and social controls that kept estates contained in tightly 
circumscribed fields of activity was draining the lower estates of any willingness to 
contribute to the affairs of the state. As long as “thus underdeveloped estates are not 
permanently entangled in the administration […] nothing can be expected from them in 
extraordinary cases” – such as Napoleonic invasions or occupations.778 Stein was not 
                                                 
777 Letter of Stein to Reden (Nassau 7. June, 1807): “Der elende Kastengeist muss aus den Zivil- und 
Militärverhältnissen heraus, um so mehr, da in der adligen Kaste die reicheren Individuen verweichlicht, 
die ärmeren anspruchsvoll und halbgebildet oder oft ganz roh sind.”(Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, 
Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/1 - p.378-9.)  
778 Letter of Stein to Reden (Nassau 7. June, 1807): “Nach dem, was ich vernehme, ist das Benehmen des 
kurmärkischen ständischen Komitees inept, und ich glaube, dass solange unsere Provinzialstände nur aus 
Landjunkern bestehen, man sie nicht auf die breite Basis der Grundeigentümer setzt, solange man diese so 
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particularly subtle or caring in his criticism. Neither was Altenstein, who once again 
agreeed with many of the key objections of his fellow administrative reformer: 
 
There remain sharply divided castes or status groups – a condition that became 
worse in recent years. There remains a nobility with many essential privileges, 
especially exclusive possession of all that bestows unearned honor, prestige, etc.; a 
bourgeoisie with municipal rights, guilds, and monopolies that are seemingly 
beneficial but are actually paralyzing the nation’s energy; and a very large part of 
the nation altogether unable to acquire property and in condition of personal 
slavery.779 
 
In short, many boundaries invisibly, and sometimes all too visibly, constrained 
behavior and shaped the constitution of the established order. Unfortunately, rather than 
being primarily enabling, these boundaries seemed to the minds of many to have become 
suffocating.780 It was one of Stein’s central aims to design and implement novel 
administrative structures that would not weigh down the state with the inefficiency of 
aristocratic norms imported into the administration.781 For example, in good cameralistic 
fashion Stein vituperated against the quasi-rent extraction that hampered the effective 
administration of Prussia’s domains.782  
Numerous like-minded commentators focused on the spirit of the administration 
[Geist der Verwaltung] and the need to revive it from its current languid condition.783 They, 
                                                                                                                                                 
ungebildeten Stände nicht wirklich mit in die Landesverwaltung permanent verwickelt, ihnen eine gewisse 
Menge auf das Interesse der Provinz sich beziehender Verwaltungszweige überträgt, dass so lange von 
ihnen in ausserordentlichen Fällen nichts zu erwarten ist.” (Ibid.)  
779 Altenstein: “Über die Leitung des preussischen Staats an Seine des Herrn Staatsministers Freiherrn von 
Hardenberg Exzellenz” (in Georg Winter and Rudolf Vaupel, Die Reorganisation Des Preussischen Staates 
Unter Stein Und Hardenberg, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Leipzig,: Hirzel, 1931), 392.; Mueller, Bureaucracy, 
Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 130.) 
780 Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 130. 
781 Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2. p.501-2. 
782 Kurt Utermann, Der Kampf Um Die Preussische Selbstverwaltung Im Jahre 1848 (Berlin,: Verlag Emil 
Ebering, 1937), 180.; Gray, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform 
on the County, Provincial, and National Levels in 1808," 75-6. 
783 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 94-5. 
 248 
like Stein, hated red tape and the mechanistic grind within administrative offices.784 As 
Stein outlined in one of his reports, the effectiveness of many administrative branches was 
severely hindered by a “lack of knowledge about the administrated district, an indifference 
and frequently absurd dislike of it, as well as a fear of change and innovation.”785 Stein’s 
letters expressed remarkable abhorrence for the administrative offices in which he had 
served. A professional life spent in the Prussian administration had taught him the 
deficiencies of an administrative cadre lacking sufficient skill, professionalism, and 
commitment to procedural norms. Prussia’s military had been defeated on the battlefield, 
but as Stein saw it, Prussia’s administration had contributed much to this defeat. Stein 
subsequently longed to do away with outmoded administrative practices and inefficient 
aristocratic norms: 
 
I saw a machine, of the military kind, fall on the 14th of October 1806 [at the battle 
of Jena and Auerstedt]; perhaps the administration will have its 14th October as well 
one day.786 
 
Stein’s arguments about the bracketing of old status privileges and monopolies and 
the participation of the masses scared many within the established order. Critics often could 
not picture anything but an undifferentiated, ugly mob when confronted with the specter of 
public participation in governmental affairs. Adherence to caste distinctions was the 
                                                 
784 Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 133.; 
Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 
110. 
785 Immediatbericht Steins, Memel, 23. Nov. 1807 (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche 
Schriften, Vol.II/2. p.504-5.); See also: Immediatbericht Steins, Memel, 23. Nov. 1807 (Stein, Botzenhart, 
and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2. p.505.) 
786 “Eine Machinerie, die militärische, sah ich fallen in 1806, den 14. Oktober, vielleicht wird auch die 
Schreibmaschinerie ihren 14. Oktober haben.“ (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche 
Schriften, Bd.6, p.381.)  
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foremost roadblock to the participatory/procedural administrative institutions Stein 
envisioned.  
The widely circulated term ‘caste’ [Kaste, Kastengeist] itself conveys part of the 
dislike for the static nature of such restrictions placed on individuals of all estates. Far from 
simply constraining some while freeing others, the caste system placed limitations on all 
individuals in virtually all domains of their lives (though of course they were not equally 
burdensome).787 As Friedrich Schleiermacher, the later nemesis of Hegel at the University 
of Berlin, explained in a sermon in 1808:  
 
Our previous constitution was marked by a great inequality of the separate parts of 
the members of the state. Unjustly we thought thereby only of the difference 
between the higher and lower estates: however, it was more so the case in all estates 
where one was freed from encumbrances and authority that another (much like him) 
had to carry, while somebody else was provided with freedoms and advantages that 
were lacking in the order of the life of another.788 
 
As applied to the administration, Schleiermacher continued, these “imbalances and 
prerogatives are the greatest hindrance to a complete and beneficial rebirth,”789 partially 
because of the resentment inspired by a lack of meaningful professional and social 
                                                 
787 Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 66-7. See also: Gray, "Prussia 
in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 16.; Demel, Vom 
Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 43-5. 
788 “Unser bisheriger Zustand zeichnet sich aus durch eine grosse Ungleichheit der einzelnen Theile und 
Mitglieder des Staates. Mit Unrecht dachten wir dabei nur an den Unterschied der höheren Stände von den 
niederen; es war vielmehr so in allen Ständen, von Lasten und Obrigkeiten war der Eine befreit die ein 
Anderer ihm ganz ähnlicher zu tragen hatte, mit Freiheiten und Begünstigungen der Eine versehen, welche 
Andern aus seiner Ordnung fehlten.” (from a sermon of Friedrich Schleiermachers. “Ueber die rechte 
Verehrung gegen das einheimische Grosse aus einer früheren Zeit” (Halle, 24. January, 1808). Cited in: 
Spies, Die Erhebung Gegen Napoleon : 1806-1814/15.) See also: Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung Und 
Verwaltung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 494-5. 
789 “...sondern auch der Verstand der an der Spize der Verwaltung steht auf diese Ungleichheiten und 
Vorrechte als auf das grösste Hinderniss einer vollständigen und gedeihlichen Wiedergeburt hinweiset.” 
For more on the urgency of the times that drive Schleiermacher’s argument see: “...so lasst uns auch ja 
nicht eben durch jene verfehlte Anhänglichkeit an das Vergangenen zurükgehalten werden dasjenige nicht 
gern und willig zu thun, was der gegenwärtige Zustand der Dinge von uns fordert.” (both quotations from a 
sermon of Friedrich Schleiermachers. “Ueber die rechte Verehrung gegen das einheimische Grosse aus 
einer früheren Zeit” (Halle, 24. January, 1808). Cited in: Spies, Die Erhebung Gegen Napoleon : 1806-
1814/15.) 
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mobility. In an essay from 1809, an anonymous pamphleteer sketched his “political dream” 
that would lead the country out of its predicament towards better times. One of the central 
pillars of the presented vision holds that in a recovered Germany “no privileges, no caste-
spirit incite the jealousy and resentment of fellow citizens. The path to honor and public 
service up to the highest levels are open to each man of talent.”790   
Similarly, what troubled Stein and the people around him the most (as in this case 
the aforementioned Rehberg) was the “crossing out of the regulations of service to the state 
through insistence on preferred treatment for members of the aristocratic estate.”791 
Rehberg, for example, argued strongly that aristocrats should not be treated differently than 
anybody else while occupying positions in the administration or the military.  
 Preferential treatment in the army and administrative organs of the state, universally 
applicable status distinctions, and a nonfragmented understanding of a person’s rank and 
worth were all-important pillars of the old social order. Many anticipated that opening the 
state’s administrative machinery to talent irrespective of class background would be an 
important (hailed or lamented) step towards ending the feudal organization of society and 
opening the door to widespread participation.792 An important goal of the reforms was 
consequently the dismantling of absolute estate barriers [Standesschranken] in favor of 
                                                 
790 “Keine Privilegien, kein Kastengeist erregten mehr den Neid und den Unwillen der Mitbürger. Jedem 
Manne von Talent stand die Bahn der Ehre und der öffentlichen Würksamkeit bis zur höchsten Stufe 
offen.” ("Ein Politischer Traum Vom Jahre 1806," Minerva  (January 1809).  
791 “Was Rehberg persönlich am stärksten erbittert, ist die Durchkreuzung der staatlichen Dienstordnung 
durch adlige Standesansprüche. Innerhalb der Staatsdienerschaft darf es seiner Meinung keinerlei 
Vorzugsstellung adliger Elemente vor nichtadligen geben. Ebensowenig im Militärdienst.” (Ritter, Stein; 
Eine Politische Biographie, 109.) 
792 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 28. 
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creating participatory institutions.793 In the words of one historian, this would entail the 
freeing of “administrative institutions from the constraints of ‘caste’.”794 
 The reformers attached high hopes to the desired transformation of the state through 
participatory procedural measures. By freeing individuals, as one historian puts it, from 
“the fetters of castes,” a newly liberated but “politically integrated society” was to be 
created – perhaps one day even with a proper legal constitution.795  
Such a progressive drive towards reregulating the social order was based, in part, 
upon Kantian thought.796 For example, Heinrich Theodor von Schön, one of Stein’s closest 
allies and most outspoken proponents, had studied under Kant in Königsberg and remained 
vocally proud of that fact for the rest of his life.797 Similarly, Johann Gottfried von Frey 
was a student and later an acquaintance of Kant who was instrumental in Stein’s city 
                                                 
793 “Ein Ziel der Reform war, die Standesschranken niederzureissen, um eine „vernünftige Rangordnung” 
herzustellen, die – mit Hardenbergs Worten – „nicht einen Stand vor dem anderen begünstigte, sondern den 
Staatsbürgern aller Stände ihre Stellen nach gewissen Klassen nebeneinander anwiese” (as cited in: 
Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform Und Revolution; All-Gemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung Und Soziale 
Bewegung Von 1791 Bis 1848, 158.) 
794 Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 127. 
795 “Durch Befreiung aller Individuen aus den Fesseln der Kasten, wie die alten Stände von den Reformern 
genannt wurden, sollte eine wirtschaftlich freie, aber politisch in den Staat eingebundene Gesellschaft 
entstehen, deren neuständische Rechte, auch der Repräsentation, nach Abschluss des Reformwerks in einer 
Verfassungsurkunde niederzulegen waren.” (Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform Und Revolution; All-
Gemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung Und Soziale Bewegung Von 1791 Bis 1848, 153.); For more on the 
debates around a proper legal constitution see: Neugebauer, Geschichte Preussens, 95-6.; Berdahl, The 
Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 182-98.; 
Levinger, "The Prussian Reform Movement and the Rise of Enlightened Nationalism," 273-5.; Büsch, 
Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission zu Berlin., Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte, 26.; 
Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 12, 54, 
92, 146-57.; Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 55.; Dwyer, 
The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, 26.; Nolte, Staatsbildung Als 
Gesellschaftsreform : Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 79-85. 
796 Matthew Levinger, "Kant and the Origins of Prussian Constitutionalism," History of Political Thought 
19 (1998).; Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination : The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth 
Century.; Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. 
Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis Des Absolutismus, 80, 357-61.; Hubatsch, Stein-
Studien : Die Preussischen Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn Karl Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und 
Restauration, 43-4, 48-63, 76-7, 103-5. 
797 Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 52.; Kurt 
Raumer, "Schrötter Und Schön," Altpreussische Forschungen 18 (1941): 124-5.; Hubatsch, Stein-Studien : 
Die Preussischen Reformen Des Reichsfreiherrn Karl Vom Stein Zwischen Revolution Und Restauration, 
56-7.; Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 11.  
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reform programs.798 Kant’s categorical imperative, as Stein and his allies understood and 
used it, suggests equivalent treatment of all under common laws in a well-regulated society. 
It is completely oblivious to the virtues of caste systems. Kant recommended in the 
Metaphysik der Sitten “such a civic [staatsbürgerliche] constitution, which reason (through 
the categorical imperative) commands us to pursue.”799 Few politicians and officials at the 
time had read Kant closely, but the general thrust of Kant’s philosophy could easily be 
mobilized by advocates like Schön to rail against caste separation and to argue for Stein’s 
participatory notion of citizenship. As Altenstein argued, the emancipatory program 
embedded in the reforms aimed at “removing the old constitution in which the individual 
was not respected as such, but was considered the object of other people in the state.” The 
replacement of “all manners of paternalism [Vormundschaft] with a proper and lawful 
administration was the ideal goal of the reformers.”800 
 The reformers’ aim of helping the ailing Prussian administration implied concerns 
with proper social boundaries, and vice versa. In their view, the country had to be rendered 
strong again through the removal of long-standing legal and social impediments that 
restricted the functions a person could exercise in the administration of the state. For the 
reformers, the old order was unable to deliver the administrative efficiency and social 
                                                 
798 Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 245. 
799 See Immanuel Kant: Metaphysik der Sitten, Teil 1, §49. See also Kosselleck from which the quote used 
above originates: “Kant entwarf in seiner Metaphysik der Sitten jene staatsbürgerliche Verfassung‚ nach 
der zu streben uns die Vernunft durch einen kategorischen Imperativ verbindlich macht’. [...] . Erst wenn 
die Gleichordnung aller ‚Gesellen’ unter gemeinsame Gesetze erricht sei, lautet der wortgetreue Schluss, 
könne von einer Gesellschaft die Rede sein.” (Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform Und Revolution; All-
Gemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung Und Soziale Bewegung Von 1791 Bis 1848, 153-4.) 
800 “Ziel der Reform sei, definiert Altenstein, die alte Verfassung zu beseitigen, in der ‘der Mensch nicht als 
solcher geachtet, sondern als Sache anderer Menschen im Staat betrachted’ ... werde.“ (Winter and Vaupel, 
Die Reorganisation Des Preussischen Staates Unter Stein Und Hardenberg, 391.; Ritter, Stein; Eine 
Politische Biographie, 227.); “Die Beseitigung der Herrschaft von Mensch über Mensch, die Ablösung 
jeder Art von Vormundschaft durch eine sachgerechte und gesetzmässige Verwaltung war das ideale Ziel 
der Reformer.” (Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform Und Revolution; All-Gemeines Landrecht, 
Verwaltung Und Soziale Bewegung Von 1791 Bis 1848, 154.) 
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stability needed by a weak state at the edge of dissolution. Summing it up, Stein’s 
successor Hardenberg, while being proud of his own aristocratic title and defending the 
nobility as an institution, suggested that   
 
every position of the state, without exception, shall be open not to this or that caste 
only, but to deserving, talented, and able men of all status groups. Every position 
shall be the object of general competition, and no man, however lowly, shall have 
his ambition stifled by the thought that he will not be able to achieve a goal for 
which he has eagerly and actively prepared himself.801 
 
Not surprisingly, such an idea was cause for considerable alarm. Consider 
Hardenberg’s specific phrasing: was truly every position to be open to people of talent? 
Even the king’s position? The reformers denied that their program was incompatible with 
absolutist rule, but it was also in keeping with the cameralist project we encountered above. 
As one historian put it, the participatory procedural administration Stein sought to 
implement 
 
[led to] the imposition of codes of conduct, rules of procedure, and all the other 
regulations of behavior we associate with bureaucratization [that] were also part of 
a social-cultural effort at harnessing a heterogeneous officialdom into a cohesive 
and servile instrument of dynastic policy.802 
 
While the reforms nominally supported the crown, their implications were largely 
in keeping with the cameralist project: the crown’s sovereignty would be bolstered, but tied 
to constrictive procedural, participatory limitations. Stein advanced the cameralist project 
but with an important twist: his procedures implicated the participation of the masses. 
Under such a plan allegiance shifts, glacially, from obedience to the king’s will towards 
                                                 
801 Cited in: Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and 
England, 128, 314.  
802 Ibid., 57. 
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adherence to rules and procedures. The king, as some historians suggest, might have 
thought of the institutional innovations happening around him purely in terms of the 
endless chess game between the crown, the aristocracy, and foreign crowns.803  However, 
that was merely one level of the reforms. Far more important was the possibility that 
Stein’s reforms would replace “the rule of old absolutism” with “the rule of a pure 
ministerial bureaucracy.”804 It is only a slight exaggeration to say that, Stein’s reforms, 
intentionally or not, “replaced the old absolute monarchy with a system of absolute 
bureaucracy.”805 
While the institutional changes themselves were highly political questions, the 
functioning of the newly constituted bureaucracy was to be marked by an absence of 
politics in favor of questions concerning the efficient implementation of various urgently 
needed programs. Minimizing the predominance of aristocrats in the administrative system 
was meant to bracket such contested political questions in favor of administrative 
efficiency. As Stein was well aware, at the most fundamental level his reforms prioritized 
processes over goals and procedures over the will of individuals.806 Public participation 
was subject to this prioritization. Stein was a bureaucrat, certainly not a proto-democrat.807 
                                                 
803 “Auch ohne parlamentarische Einrichtungen fühlen diese Minister sich verantwortlich vor der „Nation” 
– einstweilen einem rein idealisch-fiktiven Begriff – mehr als vor dem Monarchen; denn sie wissen, dass 
aller politische Fortschritt in diesem Lande allein in ihren Händen ruht.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 154-5.) 
804 “Sollte also die Herrschaft des alten Absolutismus förmlich abgelöst werden durch eine Herrschaft der 
reinen Ministerialbürokratie – oder sollte sie nur gemildert werden durch einen verstärkten und 
unmittelbaren Einfluss der die Verwaltung leitenden Männern auf den königlichen Willen.” (Ibid., 169.) 
See also: Herbert von Borch, Obrigkeit Und Widerstand; Zur Politischen Soziologie Des Beamtentums 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1954), 98-100.; Beck, "The Social Policies of Prussian Officials: The Bureaucracy in a 
New Light," 264-5.  
805 Der „Kampf um die Kabinettsregierung ging [...] nicht um eine Frage der blossen Zweckmässigkeit: es 
war eine Verfassungskrisis allerersten Ranges, ein hochpolitisches Problem. Will man, die Gegensätze 
zuspitzend, ein wenig übertreiben, so könnte man sagen: es ging um die Verdrängung der alten absoluten 
Monarchie durch ein System der absoluten Bürokratie...” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 141.) 
806 Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 31. 
807 Schoeps and Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz., Preussen : Geschichte Eines Mythos, 96. 
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The reforms he penned marked neither an end to monarchical rule nor the straightforward 
political empowerment of the masses. Rather, they reshaped key assumptions underpinning 
the relationship between the indirect and direct question of justice, between subjects and 
citizens, the crown and the aristocracy, participation and procedures.  
The reformulation of procedures in the administration replaced an administrative 
structure staffed by inept but independent-willed aristocrats with an efficient bureaucracy 
that was primarily loyal to rules and procedures. Including citizens in such a procedural 
administrative framework was an innovative (yet perhaps fatally flawed) attempt to reshape 
citizenship from its totalistic and threatening role in the French context into a procedural 
requirement within a well-functioning  bureaucracy. Doing so tied individuals to the state 
and gave them a stake in its success while, importantly, containing populist tendencies. 
Citizens could contribute to the state without being able to claim sovereignty. It would be, 
in Hardenberg’s words, a “revolution in the good sense, directly realizing the purpose of 
perfection of mankind by means of a wise government rather than a violent impetus from 
within or without.”808 Even commentators skeptical of innovation like Adam Müller 
seemed to concur, reluctantly. In a letter addressed to the king at the nadir of Prussia’s 
political fortunes, Müller lamented that now “every single subject wants to be asked about 
rules and regulations; everyone believes they can help the government with their individual 
opinions and experiences.”809 Unenthusiastically, he continued that “the government cannot 
disdain the public political opinion; it cannot completely refuse the dialogue with its 
                                                 
808 Cited in: Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and 
England, 128, 306. See also: Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung Und Verwaltung. Gesammelte 
Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 506.; Winter and Vaupel, Die 
Reorganisation Des Preussischen Staates Unter Stein Und Hardenberg, 305. 
809 “...jeder einzelne Untertan möchte über die Massregel der Regierungen befragt werden; jeder glaubt, der 
Regierung mit seinen individuellen Ansichten und Erfahrungen dienen zu können.” (Scheel and Schmidt, 
Von Stein Zu Hardenberg : Dokumente Aus Dem Interimsministerium Altenstein/Dohna, 409-10.) 
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subjects over laws and commandments.”810 The crown, long worried about the “race of 
rambunctious individuals” that attempt to “spread the spirit of revolution,” agreed, for a 
while, with this assessment and allowed the reforms to move forward.811 With the crown 
behind the reforms and many critics temporarily silenced, prospects looked bright for 
Stein’sprogram. His experiment of bridging the indirect and the direct question was poised 
for real-life testing. The final obstacle for participatory procedures came from an unlikely 
source: the reluctant participants themselves.  
 
 
(iii) The Problems of the Created Citizen 
 
In the minds of the reformers, the newly created bureaucracy could only function 
effectively if it was integrated into the right kind of polity – one composed of properly 
situated citizens. The old administrative system was filled primarily with aristocrats who 
administered a feudal order in which the direct question reigned large. The new 
bureaucratic system was to be built on the indirect question of procedural requirements that 
were supervised and enlivened by citizens and citizen administrators.812 In Stein’s words, it 
was imperative to grant “the nation […] the Estates […] and their representatives an 
                                                 
810 “Die Regierung kann also diese öffentliche politische Meinung nicht verachten; sie kann das Gespräch 
mit ihren Untertanen über die Gesetze und Beschlüsse nicht ganz zurückweisen; sie muss sich mit den 
bessern verständigen.” (Ibid.) 
811 “...gegen diese Rasse turbulenter Menschen [...] um ihnen die Mittel zu nehmen, den Geist des Aufruhrs 
in Deutschland zu verbreiten.“ (Cited in: Günter Birtsch. “Revolutionsfurcht in Preussen 1789-1794.“ In 
Büsch, Neugebauer-Wölk, and Berding, Preussen Und Die Revolutionäre Herausforderung Seit 1789 : 
Ergebnisse Einer Konferenz, 92.) 
812 Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 12. 
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appropriate participation in and influence upon administration.”813 First, however, such 
legendary citizens had to be found – forged, actually, often against their will.  
 As we have seen, many voices of Stein’s time lamented that their contemporaries 
lived impoverished, passionless lives. Seemingly oblivious to the world around them, 
except perhaps with regard to narrow material enrichment, such dull individuals seemed to 
care little about the military upheavals around them.814 The peasants, in a familiar chorus 
among historians, were still very much “parochial in their interests, ignorant and 
apathetic.”815 Given their large percentage in the army, this was quite troubling. Similarly, 
the middle class (with the exception of a few families) was completely lacking in “any 
political ambitions.”816 Such apathy is a serious roadblock to any significant reforms that 
seek to build upon popular participation, and Stein consequently found himself in the same 
boat as many of his opponents. Both sides tried to move a population to action, but they 
employed very different strategies for doing so. Stein takes the analysis of his critics 
seriously while analyzing the same situation from a conceptually foreign perspective.  
 At the heart of his reform is an attempt to move citizens to care for their 
community, help administer it, and take an active part in shaping its fortunes; many of his 
critics, by contrast, seemed to have worried mostly about the ‘caring’ part, but were deeply 
                                                 
813 Stein, Immediatbericht, Memel, 23 Nov. 1807, Scheel, Reformministrium 1: 94-99 (no. 44). Cited in: 
Ibid.: 79.  See also: Ernst Zeeden, "Hardenberg Und Der Gedanke Einer Volksvertretung in Preussen 1807-
1812," Historische Studien 365 (1940): 23-27. 
814 Dwyer, The Rise of Prussia : Rethinking Prussian History, 1700-1830, 24.; See also: Eckart Klessmann, 
Die Befreiungskriege in Augenzeugenberichten (Düsseldorf: K. Rauch, 1966), 17-19.; Jolles, Das Deutsche 
Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter Napoleons, 86-110. 
815 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 5-6.  
816 “Das handel- und gewerbetreibende Bürgertum der preussischen Städte hatte sich noch nirgends – wenn 
man absieht von ein paar wohlhabenden Familien der grossen Städte, meist jüdischer Herkunft – über ein 
enges, gedrücktes Spiessertum erhoben [...] ohne jeden politischen Ehrgeiz.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 125.) 
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suspicious of the ‘active’ and thus potentially destructive element.817 Stein wavered about 
the ease with which people could be brought out of their seeming apathy. He argued at 
times that merely providing people with the opportunity for meaningful participation would 
be enough to encourage a new civic-spiritedness: 
 
Experience proves that […] schoolchildren, who are shown trust, develop 
autonomy and one can consequently save an army of schoolmasters. Similarly, 
when we are shown the same trust and left to take care of our own business, then 
one can compare us to such schoolchildren and save an army of administrators!818 
 
At other times, Stein evidently believed that strong nudging or outright pushes were 
needed to force people to embrace their role as citizens: “concerning the quiet Germans, 
who, as one of our poets says, love of all times the time for consideration the best, one has 
to apply stimulants, rather than opiates.”819  
 In either case, Stein’s reforms were not in the realm of abstract administrative 
theory, but had the very real potential to change many lives, since the reforms entailed the 
(forced or not) “blossoming of a new civic consciousness.”820 However, large portions of 
the population seemed to have simply no interest in such a project. They “remained 
completely and respectfully in subjection to the old-inherited glamour of the courtly-
                                                 
817 “Grundgedanke der Steinschen Städtereform: Erweckung von Gemeinsinn des Bürgers duch Tätigkeit 
für das Wohl seiner Stadt und innere Belebung der städtischen Verwaltung durch Teilnahme der Bürger an 
ihr...” (Ibid., 270.) 
818 From a letter Stein sent to Vincke: “So wie die Erfahrung bewiesen, dass nach der Lancasterschen und 
Bellschen Methode man die Schulknaben selbst, indem man ihnen Vertrauen zeigt, ihre Selbständigkeit 
anspricht, zum Unterricht in den Schulen brauchen und ein Schulmeister-Heer ersparen kann, so zeige man 
uns gleiches Vertrauen, überlasse uns unsere eigenen Angelegenheiten, setze uns denen Schulknaben gleich 
und erspare ein Beamtenheer!” (See: Ibid., 199.) 
819 “…man muss bei den ruhigen Deutschen, die, wie einer unserer Schriftsteller sagt, unter allen Zeiten am 
meisten die Bedenkzeit lieben, eher Reizmittel anwenden als Opiate” (cited in: Ibid., 286.; See also: 
Heinrich Friedrich Karl Stein and Erich Botzenhart, Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften 
(Aalen: Kohlhammer, 1955), 56.) 
820 “[Selbstverwaltung] bezeichnet eigentlich nur das Mittel zum Zweck, denn hier geht es nicht um 
irgendeine Art von Verwaltungsreform, sondern um die Entfaltung einer neuen staatsbürgerlichen 
Gesinnung.” (Stein, Freiherr Vom Stein; Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften, 96.) 
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aristocratic society.”821 Stein finds himself here in the midst of one of the most vexing 
paradoxes that bedeviled the reformers: he seeks to end the paternalism that constrains 
many of the people around him without being paternalistic himself. However, what should 
one do with people who do not want to be emancipated?822 According to one historian, 
there is no proof of “a single voice from bourgeois circles” that asked or demanded 
anything like the local liberties and initiatives of Stein’s reform.823 Stein seemed to care 
little about stepping on the toes of the very people he needed for his reforms to succeed. 
Given the pressing needs around him and the perceived urgency of restoring the state, Stein 
showed no concern for niceties in his formal writings, private letters, or policies. The 
participation of the masses was required under his administrative scheme and their 
disinclination to partake in the procedural machinery of the state was of little concern to 
him and his allies. Not surprisingly, this caused widespread resentment. As one renowned 
historian summarized the mood at the time: 
 
The reform of the local administration in 1808 originated exclusively through the 
initiative of the higher bureaucracy. Its introduction was met everywhere in the 
state with astonishment, misgivings, and complaints of the most varied nature – 
almost nowhere was it meet with joyous consent.824 
 
                                                 
821 “Es verharrte durchaus in Unterwürfigkeit und Respekt vor dem altererbten Glanz der höfisch-adligen 
Gesellschaft...” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 125.) 
822 See for example: Mika LaVaque-Manty, "Kant’s Children," Social Theory and Practice 32, no. 3 (July 
2006): 366. 
823 “Man hat bisher nicht eine einzige Stimme aus bürgerlichen Kreisen nachweisen können, die nach 
Erneuerung altdeutscher städtischer Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung verlangt hätte.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine 
Politische Biographie, 125.) 
824 “Die Städteordnung von 1808 ist ausschliesslich der Initiative des höheren Beamtentums entsprungen, 
und ihre Einführung stiess überall im Lande auf Verwunderung, Kopfschütteln, Bedenken und 
Beschwereden der verschiedensten Art – so gut wie nirgends auf freudige Zustimmung.” (Ibid.). However, 
others disagree with this view. Consider the following description of Guy Stanton Ford: The proclamation 
of the reforms governing local administration were meet with joy by many who marked the occasion by 
“elaborate ceremonials – religious services, singing the Te Deum, the ringing of bells and, in the evening, 
balls and the illumination of the city.” (Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 254.) 
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Ironically, one of the first things many freshly minted citizens did with the new 
rights imposed on them was to undermine Stein’s reforms and supporters. In Königsberg, 
Berlin, and a host of smaller cities, the citizenry overwhelmingly supported outspoken 
critics of the Stein ministry.825 Undeterred, Stein and his allies pushed for more reforms to 
be imposed on the reluctant population.  
Does this mean that Stein took his study of Rousseau a bit too seriously?826 Did his 
reforms in the end aim at a frightful reconfiguration of the fallen and corrupted? The 
answer is clearly no.827 In the minds of Stein and his associates, it was not the fate of 
humanity that was on the line but, rather more humbly, simply the ability of a nation to 
rebound from a devastating war and occupation. Stein’s thinking led him to appreciate the 
value of properly situated citizens to that project. He walked the thin line between giving 
the government sufficient power to exercise its narrow functions properly and giving it 
enough power to become a nuisance itself (Stein harbored a lifelong suspicion of 
government, even while he was part of it). Incorporating citizens into the administrative 
framework would both make the administration more attuned to local needs and desires and 
simultaneously contain the excesses of a languid mechanical bureaucracy. Notice how 
Stein achieves both without appeals to either emotional excesses or a denial of autonomy. 
In fact, Stein’s model relies on both cold rationality and a surprising faith in the capacities 
of citizens to contribute to the aforementioned balance, if properly prepared and situated in 
the right kind of procedural framework.   
                                                 
825 Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 45.; Gray, "Prussia in 
Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 109. 
826 Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 112. 
827 Letter of Stein to Frau von Berg (9.9.1792): “....der Ausdruck seiner [Rousseau’s] überspannten 
Reizbarkeit enthält nicht Wahrheit und darf nicht zum Grundsatze erhoben werden.” (Stein, Freiherr Vom 
Stein; Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften, 29.) 
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 Such preparation has very few of the frightening overtones of Rousseauian projects. 
Instead, it embodies “Stein’s political and pedagogical central idea: to educate the subject 
to be a free individual and an active and responsible participant in the civic life 
[Staatsleben].”828 The reforms are meant primarily as enabling, not reconfiguring. As Stein 
argues, people have to get used to taking responsibility by “escaping the condition of 
childhood in which a steadily anxious, steadily bustling government tries to keep them.”829 
 Stein is sometimes referred to as the “political Pestalozzi” precisely because his 
reforms rely on the permanent self-education presupposed and entailed in watching over 
the internal functioning of the government.830 As Johann Gottfried von Frey, one of Stein’s 
lieutenants, put it: “Participation in public affairs fosters political [growth], and the more 
this increases [the more] the interest grows in the common good.”831 The problems of local 
administration, of peasant rights, and of feudal caste limitations had of course existed 
before Stein’s tenure, yet the task of creating “political citizens,” in the words of one 
commentator, was an “education task” that was intimately tied to the peculiar historical and 
conceptual forces at work in Stein’s age.832 Yet insofar as Stein was a “psychologist and 
                                                 
828 “Stein’s politische und pädagogische Leitidee: den Bürger vom Untertanen zum freien Individuum, zum 
aktiven, verantwortlichen Teilnehmer am Staatsleben zu erziehen.” (Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in 
Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten.)  
829 Letter from Stein to Hardenberg (8.12.1807): „Man muss die Nation daran gewöhnen, ihre Geschäfte 
selbst zu führen und aus diesem Zustand der Kindheit herauszukommen, in dem eine ewig unruhige, ewig 
geschäftige Regierung die Menschen halten möchte.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 275.) 
830 “...politischer Pestalozzi...” - “Selbstverwaltung in seinem [Stein’s] Sinne ist permanente 
Selbsterziehung durch tätige Mitarbeit an gemeinsamen Interessen und Aufgaben.” (Stein, Freiherr Vom 
Stein; Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften, 97.). See also: Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism 
: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 201-5.; Paret, Yorck and the Era of the 
Prussian Reform, 1807-1815, 118-9.; Carla R. Thomas, "Philosophical Anthropology and Educational 
Change: Wilhelm Von Humboldt and the Prussian Reforms," History of Education Quarterly 13, no. 3 
(Autumn, 1973): 221-2. 
831 Frey, “Vorschläge zur Organisierung der Munizipalverfassungen.“ Cited in Heinrich Scheel, Karl Stein, 
and Doris Schmidt, Das Reformministerium Stein. Akten Zur Verfassungs - Und Verwaltungsgeschichte 
Aus Den Jahren 1807/08 (Berlin,: Akademie-Verlag, 1966).  
832 Theodor Heuss, "Forces and Elements Forming a Political Style," The Journal of Politics 15, no. 4 
(Nov., 1953).  
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educator,”833 he was not overly paternalistic in the sense of imposing ends, but merely 
sought toenable means by the “freeing of forces through self-governance.” Indeed, that was 
the meaning he assigned to the ominous-sounding term Nationalerziehung 
[education/upbringing of the nation],834 a meaning completely at odds with more 
philosophically inclined thinkers such as, famously, Fichte.835 One exemplary site of 
Stein’s educative stance is his practical reform proposal concerning the separation of the 
ecclesiastical department from educational matters. The two, in his mind, simply stand in 
no “natural connection.” Their separation was much lamented by a wide range of critics, 
who took this as another indication of an undue focus on efficient means rather than on 
wholesome moral ends.836  
 Why did Stein bother with such a contentious reform program that sought to 
educate the reluctant to citizenship? On the one hand, the involvement of citizens in 
regulatory and supervising functions serves to contain government. However, such a goal 
entails a paradoxical move: in order for the government to become less of a nuisance and 
run more smoothly, citizens have to put up with the burdensome role of citizen – a nuisance 
itself in the eyes of many. On the other hand, the payoff of having properly situated citizens 
is now available and quite significant. It consists of a perceived epistemological advantage 
on the part of the citizenry over administrators. One of the guiding principles of the reforms 
was the belief that people are, generally, the best judges of their own interests and needs.837 
                                                 
833 Ibid.  
834 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 198. 
835 Fichte and Lauth, Reden an Die Deutsche Nation.; For more on this theme see: Ritter, Stein; Eine 
Politische Biographie, 199.; Concerning Fichte’s influence and reception consider: Ritter, Das Deutsche 
Problem; Grundfragen Deutschen Staatslebens, Gestern Und Heute, 60-61. 
836  Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 55.; See also: Stein, 
Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, 384.  
837 Consider for example Mill on this theme: “He is the person most interested in his own well-being: the 
interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it is trifling 
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Thus Stein considered it important to infuse the bureaucracy with people who not only 
possessed local knowledge, but were motivated to act upon it.  
 Career administrators, in contrast, might be caught up in “torpid forms and 
mechanical processes.” It would be much better, so Stein’s thinking goes, to underwrite 
bureaucratic regularity with “specific knowledge of individual local […] conditions” as 
well as “a wealth of views and sentiments that reflect the abundance of nature.”838 Stein’s 
reform might have implied a reduction of the static, legally imposed and maintained 
diversification of society, but his proposals betrayed at their heart an understanding of 
society that values pluralism of perspectives as an antidote to the twin dangers of 
bureaucratic formalism and disdain for procedure.839 While many of Stein’s opponents 
praised static diversity in order to preserve the old hierarchy, the reformers around Stein 
made practical use of diversity, implicitly praised it, and used it to justify their program of 
undermining the old feudal hierarchy in order to strengthen the state.  
However, Stein’s appreciation of pluralism is not boundless. This is not a story of 
unqualified praise of diversity. For Stein and many of his contemporaries, only individuals 
                                                                                                                                                 
compared with that which he himself has, […] with respect to his own feelings and circumstances the most 
ordinary man or women has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by 
anyone else.” (John Stuart Mill and Elizabeth Rapaport, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1978), 
74.)  
838 Die „aus dem Gewirr des praktischen Lebens genommenen Repräsentanten” have „genauere Kanntnis 
individueller Lokal-, Sach- und Personal-Verhältnisse” and a „lebendigen feststrebenden Geist, einen aus 
der Fülle der Natur genommenen Reichtum von Ansichten und Gefühlen” that fights the „Formenkram und 
Dienstmechanismus” of the rest of the administration. (Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und 
Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2 - p.505.) See also: “Der Formelkram und Dienstmechanismus in den Kollegien 
wird durch Aufnahme von Menschen aus dem Gewinne des praktischen Lebens zertrümmert, und an seien 
Stelle tritt ein lebendiger, fortstrebender Gesit, und ein aus der Fülle der Natur genommener Reichtum von 
Ansichten und Gefühlen.“ (Stein, Freiherr Vom Stein; Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften, 
120.) 
839 “Nicht Uniformierung und Zentralisierung des politisch-gesellschaftlichen Lebens im altpreussischen 
oder bonapartistischen Sinne, sondern Achtung vor seiner Eigenständigkeit und Mannigfaltigkeit – das ist 
das politische Ideal Steins, und sein Staat traute es sich zu, die Vielfalt der verschiedenen Kräfte in 
Einklang zu bringen und zu dirigieren.” (Stein, Freiherr Vom Stein; Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und 
Denkschriften, 94.) 
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who held a good amount of property could be called properly situated citizens.840 Stein’s 
thinking sharply limited the domain of individuals who would be the carriers of new rights. 
Far from switching from a system that preferred aristocrats to one that spread freedoms 
evenly, Stein’s reforms simply replaced the principles upon which access to or exclusion 
from certain freedoms, rights, and responsibilities would be based. As some historians put 
it, the reforms might have “undermined the patriarchal position of the aristocracy” and 
“robbed them of their privileged treatment in the army and administration,” but that did not 
imply a crass egalitarianism on the part of Stein, as his contemporary critics alleged.841 
Instead of basing important political rights on birth, Stein preconditioned their enjoyment 
on property ownership.842 His original plans envisioned restriction of voting and holding 
office to those with significant income or property.843 Stein, like many, advocated for a 
                                                 
840 Consider for example: Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society, 55-6, 83, 85-8.; See also Gray, "Government by Property Owners: 
Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the County, Provincial, and National Levels in 1808." 
841 “Die Reformgesetzgebung seit dem Oktoberedikt hatte alles getan, um die alte Herrenstellung des Adels 
auf dem Lande auszuhöhlen, gleichzeitig ihn seiner Vorrechte in Armee und Verwaltung zu berauben, die 
scharfe soziale Abgrenzung zwischen Adel und Bürgertum immer mehr zu verwischen. Vinke zog in einer 
Verfassungsdenkschrift, die er Stein am 20.September einsandte, daraus die Folgerung, den Adel ebenso 
wie die Geistlichkeit als besonderen Stand überhaupt nicht mehr gelten zu lassen und alle politischen 
Rechte nur noch‚ auf die ursprüngliche germanische Form’ des Eigentums, also vorzugsweise (aber nicht 
ausschliesslich!) auf Bodenbesitz zu gründen.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 283.; See also: G. 
H. Pertz, August Wilhelm Anton Gneisenau, and Hans Delbrück, Das Leben Des Feldmarschalls Grafen 
Neithardt, 5 vols., vol. 1 (Berlin,: G. Reimer, 1864), 412.) 
842 Gray, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the County, 
Provincial, and National Levels in 1808," 77-8. For Stein, „’Eigentum’, nicht edle Geburt [ist] die erste und 
natürlichste Voraussetzung politischer Freiheit.” (Ritter, Gerhard. Stein; eine politische Biographie. 
Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (1958). 3rd edition. p.110) See also: Ritter, Gerhard. Stein; eine 
politische Biographie. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (1958). 3rd edition. p.191: “Wie also ist der 
Steinsche Reformvorschlag zu erklären? Überhaupt nicht aus bestimmten Vorbildern – den es gab keine -, 
sondern aus folgerechter Anwendung seiner ständischen Ideale auf das Städtewesen. Die „mit Häusern und 
Eigentum angesessenen” Bürger der Nassauer Denkschrift sind gewissermassen die Inhaber der 
Möserschen Land- und Geldaktien auf städtischem Grund und Boden: natürliche Vertreter des 
Gemeinwohls, vollberechtigte Mitglieder der alten freien Volksgemeinde.”  
843 Ford, Guy Stanton. Stein and the era of reform in Prussia, 1807-1815. Gloucester, Mass., P. Smith, 1965 
[c1922]. p.227, 251; Ritter, Gerhard. Stein; eine politische Biographie. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 
(1958). 3rd edition. p.258; See also: Vinke. „Ueber die Organisation der Unterbehörden zunächst für die 
Polizeiverwaltung.“ Berlin, 4 June 1808, cited in: Marion Gray. “Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics 
under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. New Ser., 
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variety of possessive individualism long familiar from British political thought.844 
Immanuel Kant spelled out the details of this seemingly arbitrary standard that was widely 
supported at the time:  
 
The person who has the right to vote under [a representative system] is called a 
citizen […] as distinguished from a resident. [...] The qualification for this […] is 
solely that the person be his own master. […]. [He must] possess property that 
supports him, under which may be reckoned any art, craft, fine art or science.845 
 
One of Stein’s allies, Morgenbesser, made the related point that income 
qualifications were necessary to prevent the “great mass of […] unreliable people” from 
flooding and corrupting citizenship.846 Similarly, Schön argued that without property 
qualifications “it is to be feared that deputies without interest [in the state]” attain undue 
influence.847 Vinke, another of Stein’s lieutenants, argued in the same vein for what he 
understood as “the original Germanic practice of basing representation on property 
ownership.” He continued that “he who is most established, he who has the most to lose, he 
who must pay the greatest taxes […] can be assumed [to have] the greatest interest in 
public affairs.”848  Just as in the “Metaphysics of Morals,”849 Stein and various reformers 
around him distinguished between active citizens (who are economically independent and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Vol. 76, No. 1. (1986), p.84, 99.; Consider also: K.F. Häberlin, "Über Die Güte Der Staatsverfassung," 
Deutsche Montasschrift 1 (1793). 
844 I borrow this term, of course, from: C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism 
: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford Paperbacks ; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). 
845 Immanuel Kant. “Ueber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die 
Praxis.“ (1793). 
846 Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 107. 
847 Cited in: Ibid.: 113. 
848 Vincke. “Organisation der ständischen Representation,” 20 Sept. 1808, cited in: Karl Stein and G. H. 
Pertz, Denkschriften Des Ministers Freiherrn Vom Stein Über Deutsche Verfassungen (Berlin: G. Reimer, 
1848), 2-13. 
849 Immanual Kant. „Die Metaphysik der Sitten.“ (1797) §43-49). 
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govern their own affairs) and mere passive residents.850 In many cities, including 
Königsberg, Stein’s reforms were built upon two official classes of people: citizens 
[Bürger] and residents [Schutzverwandte].851 However, citizenship was easily obtained and 
had, significantly, nothing to do with guildmmembership. As the City Government Act 
ordered (commonly referred to as the ‘Preussische Städteordnung’):  
 
Citizenship may not be denied to anyone of reputable character who has taken up 
residence in the city [and who] wishes this privilege. […] Also, unmarried persons 
of the female gender may, when they possess these qualifications, receive 
citizenship.852 
 
Though not spelled out in the law itself, it was understood that economic and social 
dependents (wives, children, servants, apprentices, vagabonds, paupers) would not qualify 
as citizens. Just to make sure, the act required a small application fee prior to attaining 
citizenship. In short, Stein designated that only “property owners, and indeed all classes” 
could “participate in provincial and municipal governments.”853 
                                                 
850 However, a few of the reformers around Stein (e.g. Auerswald and Rehdiger) argued for significantly 
lower barriers. See, for example: Auerswald, “Generallandtag” (20 May 1808), cited in: Scheel, Stein, and 
Schmidt, Das Reformministerium Stein. Akten Zur Verfassungs - Und Verwaltungsgeschichte Aus Den 
Jahren 1807/08. (No.174). Rehdiger, arguing against the already radical thinking of his cohorts, that 
“nothing is more false, than the conception that the state consists of shares of property and wealth.” (cited 
in: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 279-82.); See also: Levinger, "The Prussian Reform 
Movement and the Rise of Enlightened Nationalism," 267-8. 
851 Technically, there was a third category of the “Eximierten” which I will not discuss here for reasons of 
time and relevance. For more on these categories see: Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment 
: The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 15-6.; Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : 
The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 57.; Nolte, Staatsbildung Als 
Gesellschaftsreform : Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 58.; 
Bassewitz, Die Kurmark Brandenburg, Ihr Zustand Und Ihre Verwaltung Unmittelbar Vor Dem Ausbruche 
Des Französischen Krieges Im Oktober 1806, 30-31.  
852 Cited in: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 
105. It is noteworthy that women (no matter their situation) were excluded from certain elections. See also: 
Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 57-8.  
853 Stein. Nassauer Denkschrift. (e.g. Stein, Botzenhart, and Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, 2/1: 
390, 94.); See also: Demel, Vom Aufgeklärten Reformstaat Zum Bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus, 44-5.; 
For an elaboration on the range of thresholds various reforms had in mind with respect to property 
qualifications see: Gray, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on 
the County, Provincial, and National Levels in 1808," 86-92. 
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Limiting citizenship to property owners is important in Stein’s thinking because it 
ensures that the carriers of such positions would be bound tightly to the interests of the 
country through their ownership of a chunk of it.854 In Stein’s thinking there is simply little 
to fear (certainly not of the revolutionary variety) from property owners who have an active 
stake in the well-being of the nation. In contrast, Stein is skeptical of regular low-level 
bureaucrats precisely because they tend to lack significant property ownership, merely 
follow procedural guidelines, and often care little for the affairs of the land.855 In short, 
Stein understood his reforms as replacing a system in which attachments, privileges, and 
responsibilities were founded upon one’s birth with a system based on contracting and the 
choices of the market. In Stein’s words: 
 
[After the reforms] all attachments would be dissolved which do not originate from 
the ownership of property or from a contract, through which a free person obtains 
attachments to another free person.856 
 
                                                 
854 “Stände sind durch das Eigentum und Anhänglichkeit an das Vaterland fest an das Interesse eines 
Landes gekettet, das dem fremden öffentlichen Beamten gewöhnlich unbekannt, oft gleichgültig und 
bisweilen selbst verächtlich und verhasst wird.” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 93.); See also a 
letter from Stein to Reden (August 1st. 1790): “In dem Mass als die Gehälter sich erhöhen, sinkt man in die 
Gewöhnlichkeit der Klasse der Angestellten herab, und man verliert damit das Recht zu sagen, dass die 
reinste Belohnung das Zeugnis unseres Gewissens und die Achtung unserer Mitbürger ist.” (Stein and 
Botzenhart, Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften, 42-3.; Gray, "Government by Property 
Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the County, Provincial, and National Levels in 1808," 
96. 
855 “Die Regenten haben von Ständen, die aus Eigentümer bestehen, nichts zu fürchten, mehr von der 
Neuerungssucht jüngerer, der Lauigkeit und dem Mietlings-Geist älteren öffentlichen Beamten und von der 
alle Sittlichkeit verschlingenden Weichlichkeit und dem Egoismus, der alle Stände ergreift.” This thought 
is repeated frequently in Stein’s writings, for example in the Nassauer manifesto (Stein and Botzenhart, 
Ausgewählte Politische Briefe Und Denkschriften, 60.) 
856 Letter of Stein to Sulzowsky (Memel 29. Dez 1807): “Hiernach fallen alle Verbindlichkeiten, welche 
nicht aus dem Besitz eines Grundstücks oder aus einem Vertrag oder sonstigen Titel folgen, wodurch der 
freie Mann Verbindlichkeiten gegen einen freien Mann erhält, durchaus weg.” (Stein, Botzenhart, and 
Hubatsch, Briefe Und Amtliche Schriften, Vol.II/2 – 604-5.) See also: Hintze and Oestreich, Regierung Und 
Verwaltung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Zur Staats-, Rechts- Und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 510. 
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Allowing for some degree of choice and flexibility in contracting for rights and 
obligations vis-à-vis the state seems fairly attractive to modern minds. In the words of one 
historian: 
 
The status order of fixed rights and duties had to be swept away before the new 
market order of distributing life chances could predominate. This method of 
distributing life chances knows no personal distinctions, only naked property and 
mere technical-functional skills.857 
 
Contemporaries found much to like in this monumental shift, but they also found 
much to deride. For one, the criterion of holding significant property as a precondition for 
certain rights seemed somewhat arbitrary (how much is enough?). Second, some charged 
that Stein had chosen the wrong principle for exclusion. Third, Stein’s property 
qualifications entailed a change to the much-ridiculed atomistic society many despised. 
Liberation, after all, cuts both ways. Stein’s reforms did not merely free nonaristocrats 
from duties they had towards their superiors, but also curtailed aristocrats’ duties towards 
‘their’ inferiors.858 Opponents of the reforms were quick to cite excellent cases of paternal 
interest and care for ignorant, thriftless, and dependent peasants.859 As Marwitz argues: 
 
They thought they had done a great benefaction towards the peasant, when they 
removed him from the protection and care of the landlord and handed him over to 
far stricter lords, his creditors, who have [now] the right and exercise it relentlessly 
                                                 
857 Mueller, Bureaucracy, Education, and Monopoly : Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England, 29. 
858 Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 195.; Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 
220, 25, 27-8.; Spring, European Landed Elites in the Nineteenth Century, 48.; Gray, "Prussia in 
Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 10.; Otto Büsch and Historische 
Kommission zu Berlin., Das Preussenbild in Der Geschichte : Protokoll Eines Symposions (Berlin ; New 
York: de Gruyter, 1981), 148-9.; Berdahl, "The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia," 313-6.; 
Kadel, Preis, and Institut marksizma-leninizma (Moscow Russia), Marx and Engels on Reactionary 
Prussianism, 21-23.; Beck, "The Social Policies of Prussian Officials: The Bureaucracy in a New Light," 
274-6.; Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-
1848, 144-57.; For an interesting account from a different historical context see: Thompson, "Patrician 
Society, Plebeian Culture." 
859 Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815, 196.; See also: Gentz, Fragmente Aus Der 
Neusten Geschichte Des Politischen Gleichgewichts in Europa, 13.  
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to take away his harvest, drive him from his house and farm, and set themselves in 
his place.860 
 
 Even those sympathetic to Stein’s reforms were deeply worried about the negative 
effects of liberation on peasants. For example, the high-ranking bureaucrat and widely read 
publicist Friedrich von Cöllin emphasized the unfair advantages landowners attain when 
liberated from the burden of maintaining and caring for ‘their’ peasants, to the detriment of 
the peasants’ well-being.861  
Coming from very different ideological backgrounds, both Cöllin and Marwitz 
charge that Stein’s program sounds good in a theoretical position paper laced with high-
flying abstractions like emancipation, equality, and autonomy. However, if implemented, it 
would lead to a most uncaring universe, one lacking the glue that makes societies possible 
and bearable. What Stein proposes is a “Kaufmanngesetzgebung”862 – a system of laws by 
and for businessmen. A society built upon such laws, Stein’s opponents allege, would be 
governed by mere economic self-interest rather than by duty and honor. Such a society 
would not imply the creation of free people beyond legal technicality, but rather a kind of 
“slavery or serfdom” of the debtor at the hands of the creditors.863 Surely, they say, the 
                                                 
860 “... da vermeinte man allerdings dem Bauern eine grosse Wohltat erzeigt zu haben, wie man ihn dem 
Schutz und der Vorsorge des Gutsherrn entzog und ihn wehrlos den weit strengeren Herren, seinen 
Gläubigern, überlieferte, welche das Recht haben und auch schonungslos üben, ihm seine Ernte zu nehmen, 
in von Haus und Hof zu treiben, und sich selbst an seine Stelle zu setzen. “ (Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, 
Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 60.) 
861 Cölln, "Welche Veränderungen Sind in Der Preussischen Staatsverfassung Und Verwaltung 
Nothwendig?," 16-18. 
862 “Eine Kaufmannsgesetzgebung, so lange sich die Welt noch nicht umgekehrt hat, wuerde auf Eigennutz 
gebaut, und bloss auf die Einnahme des Gesetzgebers berechnet sein.” (Fischer, "Friedrich Und Friedrich 
Wilhelm, Die Gesetzgeber," 9.) I take this concise term from Fischer who writes well before Stein’s 
reforms. His description, analysis, and fears are reflective, however, of thinking that was widespread 
before, during, and after Stein’s reform. 
863 “Sklaverei oder Leibeigenschaft” (Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften 
Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 187.); See also: Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism : The 
Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848, 56-57.; Sieg, Staatsdienst, Staatsdenken Und 
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caring, sympathetic, ordered universe upheld by many of Stein’s opponents is preferable.864 




(iv) “Political Irreligiosity” 
 
 In the eyes of Marwitz, Wartenburg, Stein, and other contemporary intellectuals, the 
very vitality and sustainability of Prussia was at stake in the debates surrounding Stein’s 
reforms. Yet while Stein saw his reforms as tapping into neglected resources being wasted 
by overblown concerns with archaic boundaries, others saw a crass egalitarianism that was 
quite unacceptable to the partisans of the older society and their conception of dignity, 
honor, and justice.866 In a widely published letter to the king, Marwitz and numerous other 
distinguished members of renowned aristocratic families wrote in response to Stein’s 
reforms: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dienstgesinnung in Brandenburg-Preussen Im 18. Jahrhundert (1713-1806) : Studien Zum Verständnis 
Des Absolutismus, 280-83. 
864 Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der 
Marwitz, 187.; Spring, European Landed Elites in the Nineteenth Century, 50.; There are surprisingly 
strong echoes of this line of thought in Carl Schmitt’s thought. Schmitt, perhaps not incidentally, was very 
much aware of the discoursive struggles in Stein’s era, see: Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).; Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie – Vier Kapitel Zur Lehre Von 
Der Souveränität (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), 7.; Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy, 1st MIT Press paperback ed., Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 18, 24.; For more see: Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London ; 
New York: Verso, 1993), 11.  
865 “Lieber noch drei Auerstedts als ein Oktoberedikt.” - Beck, "The Social Policies of Prussian Officials: 
The Bureaucracy in a New Light," 271.; See also: Friedrich Buchholz, Freimüthige Betrachtungen Über 
Die Verordnung Vom 27. October in Betreff Des Finanz-Wesens (Berlin: Buchhandlung des Kommerzien-
Raths Matzdorff, 1810). 
866 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 28. 
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The equalization of all estates turns the lower, uneducated orders defiant as they see 
only the worth of their own person and nobody above them […]. Furthermore the 
switch of systems of administrations […] necessarily creates a sense of civil 
egoism, a political irreligiosity, which sees the state as merely an institution of 
force. The first occasion will be taken to tear themselves away, in order to impose 
violence rather than endure it. – We have experienced the horrifying example of 
such a vision in our own time!867 
 
In the words of one historian: seen “through conservative eyes, domestic forces, not 
the French, were destroying the nation, and this in the name of saving it.”868  
Of course, the French had had a hand in this after all. Not only did they contribute 
to the conditions that facilitated Stein’s push for reforms, but they had also contributed 
some of the key conceptual weaponry. Marwitz posited that Stein was influenced by the 
“theories of Rousseau and Montesquieu,” whose dangers had been well known since the 
French Revolution.869 Some, as we have seen, accused Stein of “Jacobinism.” A pamphlet 
written in 1809 described Stein and his allies in its title simply as “The new Jacobins in 
Prussia.”870 
For such critics, Stein was a bureaucratic reformer of the absolutist state who had 
become corrupted by the spirit of the Revolution.871 How else could one explain Stein’s 
ostensible hatred of the aristocracy when he replaced the “old absolute monarchy with a 
                                                 
867 “Die Gleichmachung aller Stände macht die unteren, ungebildeten trotzig, sie sehen nur sich und den 
Wert ihrer Person, niemand über sich, denn der König steht ihnen zu fern; dazu das notwendige Wechseln 
der Systeme in der Administration, da keines mehr durch Grundgesetze festgehalten und das 
entgegengesetzte nicht ausgeschlossen wird; alles dieses muss notwenig einen solchen bürgerlichen 
Egoismus, eine solche politische Irreligiosität erzeugen, die den Staat wie eine blosse Zwangsanstalt 
betrachtet und den ersten Anlass ergreift, sich von ihm loszureisen, um lieber die Gewalt selbst zu üben, als 
sie zu erdulden. - Wir haben das schreckhafte Beispiel solcher Zeit in unseren Tagen erlebt!” (Marwitz, 
"Lebuser Denkschrift (9. Mai. 1811) ", 247. Emphasis added); Craig, The End of Prussia, 23.  
868 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 28. 
869 Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der 
Marwitz, 184-5.)  
870 “Die Neuen Jacobiner in den Preussischen Staaten” (Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : 
Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 1809-1812, 302.) 
871 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 27.; Görlitz, Die Junker: Adel Und Bauer Im Deutschen Osten; Geschichtliche 
Bilanz Von 7 Jahrhunderten, 187.).; Simon, "Variations in Nationalism During the Great Reform Period in 
Prussia," 305. 
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system of absolute bureaucracy”?872 Stein brought the “revolution into this land,” a 
revolution whose result would be more costly “than the extortions of Napoleon.”873 
Marwitz, who had praised Stein as “the last pillar of the state in civil affairs” upon his first 
discharge, now called him a “traitor.”874 After all, Berlin had “been occupied in old Fritz’s 
time after similar military defeats, [yet] no one then had thought that a domestic revolution 
was necessary.”875  
 Marwitz argued that through Stein’s reforms “every city of the monarchy would be 
turned into a little republic,”876 and the people within it would lose more and more faith in 
the crucial social boundaries that hitherto had given shape to the old Prussia. In its stead, 
the country would follow the path of France “towards leveling, the turning of the people 
into one undifferentiated mass.”877 Stein’s alleged revolution, in the eyes of some of his 
key opponents, would unleash  
 
a war of the poor [Besitzlosen] against those with property, of industry against 
agriculture, the changeable against the stable, crass materialism against the order 
led by God, imagined use against right, the moment against the past and future, the 
individual against the family, speculation […] against acres and trades, the bureau 
                                                 
872 Der „Kampf um die Kabinettsregierung ging [...] nicht um eine Frage der blossen Zweckmässigkeit: es 
war eine Verfassungskrisis allerersten Ranges, ein hochpolitisches Problem. Will man, die Gegensätze 
zuspitzend, ein wenig übertreiben, so könnte man sagen: es ging um die Verdrängung der alten absoluten 
Monarchie durch ein System der absoluten Bürokratie...” (Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 141.; 
Holmsten, Freiherr Vom Stein in Selbstzeugnissen Und Bilddokumenten, 68.) 
873 Stein brachte „uns die Revolution ins Land, deren Resultate dem Lande so viel gekostet haben, dass die 
Erpressungen Napoleons dagegen verschwinden wie ein Gaukelspiel vor einer schreckenvollen 
Wirklichkeit.” (Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs 
Von Der Marwitz, 182.) 
874 “Verräter” (Ibid., 184.)  
875 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 75. 
876 Die Städteordnung “durch welche jede Stadt der Monarchie in eine kleine Republik verwandelt wurde.” 
(Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der 
Marwitz, 187.) 
877 “Der französische Staat war bereits auf dem Wege der Nivellierung, der Vereinheitlichung des 
Volkstums, der Verarmung an Kräften, also nicht auf dem Wege zur Modernität.” (from the introduction 
to: Ibid., 18.). See also: Craig, The End of Prussia, 23.; Anderson, Nationalism and the Cultural Crisis in 
Prussia, 1806-1815, 236-8. 
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against the relations grown out of the history of the land, knowledge and imagined 
talent against virtue and honorable character.878  
 
An assembly of notables from Priegnitz complained loudly to the king that the new 
laws had been invented by “novices” and “pixilated brains.” Meanwhile delegations from 
Lebus and Beeskow-Storkow asked aggressively “why one allowed the young foreigners 
(who influence the royal majesty) to experiment with precisely our mother country to test 
their newly fashionable theories.”879 
Apart from connecting Stein and his reforms to French thinkers and the French 
Revolution, Stein’s opponents ascribe his conceptual schemes to another source. 
Wartenburg, for example, argues that Stein’s ideas originate in a “poorly digested Adam 
Smith,” dreamed up by businessmen and professors who sputtered out dangerous and 
senseless “philosophical blather.“880 Abolishing the “so-called enslavement” of the 
peasantry, as Stein proposed, was “an attack on the foundation of the social order.”881 Its 
conceptual roots lay with the disciples of Adam Smith and Kant.882 Friedrich Marwitz’s 
brother, Alexander von der Marwitz, provocatively declared  in 1811 that it is crucial to 
                                                 
878 Stein began the “Revolutionierung des Vaterlandes,” “den Krieg der Besitzlosen gegen das Eigentum, 
der Industrie gegen den Ackerbau, des Beweglichen gegen das Stabile, des krassen Materialismus gegen 
die von Gott eingeführte Ordnung, des (eingebildeten) Nutzens gegen das Recht, des Augenblicks gegen 
die Vergangenheit und Zukunft, des Individuums gegen die Familie, der Spekulation und Comtoire gegen 
die Felder und Gewerbe, des Bureaus gegen aus der Geschichte des Landes hervorgegangenen 
Verhältnisse, des Wissens und eingebildeten Talents gegen Tugend und ehrenwerten Charakter.” (Marwitz, 
Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 184.). 
See also: Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz, Ein Märkischer Edelmann Im Zeitalter Der 
Befreiungskriege (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1908), 492-3. 
879 Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 
1809-1812, 300-1. 
880 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 75. See also: Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform Und Revolution; All-
Gemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung Und Soziale Bewegung Von 1791 Bis 1848, 168.; Wilhelm Treue, "Adam 
Smith in Deutschland, Zum Problem Des 'Politischen Professors' Zwischen 1776 Und 1810," in 
Deutschland Und Europa; Historische Studien Zur Völkerund Staatenordnung Des Abendlandes, ed. 
Werner Conze (Düsseldorf,: Droste-Verlag, 1951). 
881 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 75. 
882 Ibid., 165. 
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study the teachings of Adam Smith since “next to Napoleon he is now the most powerful 
monarch in Europe.”883 In Friedrich Marwitz’s words:  
 
The spirit of Stein’s edicts rests on the [...] view of equality and leveling. Its 
guiding concepts were taken entirely from Adam Smith, [they are] therefore 
necessarily materialistic…884 
 
Marwitz charged that such principles, applied to Germany, would lead to massive 
instability and destroy the very state Stein sought to protect.885 Renewal of the state had to 
be founded on moral principles [Sittlichkeit] rather than on appeals to the demands of 
efficient administration and the removal of social boundaries thereby entailed.886 
Desubstantiating the administration of the state eroded crucial pillars of Prussia’s old social 
order. Marwitz and his allies charged that the results would be a “widespread loss of 
coherence.”887 Without a strong moral core, the administration Stein proposed would be 
built on vapid principles that do not pay sufficient heed to crucial elements of the existing 
social conditions.  Consider, for example, the following comments by Theodor von Schön, 
one of Stein’s staunchest allies within the reform administration, that contributed to the 
anxieties of people like Marwitz: 
 
                                                 
883 Rahel Varnhagen et al., Briefwechsel Mit Alexander Von Der Marwitz, Lebensläufe ; (München,: Kösel, 
1966), 93. 
884 “Der Geist der Edikte [Stein's] ruhte auf der schon sattsam geschilderten Gleichheits- und Flachheits-
Ansicht. Die darin herrschenden Begriffe waren ganz aus Adam Smith geschöpft, also durchaus materiell... 
“ (Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der 
Marwitz, 281.) 
885 Ibid., 224-5.  
886 Ibid., 249. See also: Berdahl, "The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia," 312-5.  
887 “...hieraus entstand notwenigerweise ein Mangel an Übereinstimmung und Einklang in der 
Administration des Staates, der die allgemeine Auflösung herbeiführte.” (Marwitz, "Von Den Ursachen 
Des Verfalls Des Preussischen Staates (1811)," 272-3.) For more on disintegration, particuarly of a moral 
kind see:  Leo, Lehrbuch Der Universalgeschichte Zum Gebrauche in Höheren Unterrichtsanstalten, 782. 
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The nobility as it exists must decline. […]. If it is tied to other classes, it will 
unconsciously, gradually dissolve and disappear.888 
 
To Stein’s opponents, such statements made it clear that the adoption of the reform 
proposals would not just have dire consequences for the integrity of the state, but would 
also affect society adversely. The radical unbalancing of the body politic was thus the 
anticipated effect of Stein’s reforms in the minds of their skeptics.889 For these critics, true 
freedom hinges on the old distinction between liberty [Freiheit] and mere license 
[Zügellosigkeit].890 However, as they understood these terms, true liberty was a function of 
one’s role within the castes.891 A different set of liberties consequently attaches to people in 
different estates. Gestures towards switching to a system where rights and responsibilities 
are based on property qualifications are dangerous and misguided from this perspective. 
Such a switch contributes to a world without a stable moral core that is susceptible to a 
slide into pure procedural thinking.  
From the vantage point of Marwitz and his allies, the reforms were not simply 
adapting myopically to the short-term needs of the state. Instead, the reforms entailed a 
vision for society in which individuals from all estates would act based on short-term 
interests rather than duty and principle. Everything was to be “bought and sold” and enter 
the world of “exchange and change” [Handel und Wandel].892 All social interactions, some 
                                                 
888 Schön, “Gutachten.” (1808) cited in: Pertz, Gneisenau, and Delbrück, Das Leben Des Feldmarschalls 
Grafen Neithardt, 412-15. 
889 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 42. 
890 For more on this frequently drawn distinction see for example: Neuendorf, "Kurze Belehrung Für 
Nachdenkende Über Bürgerliche Freyheit Und Gleichheit."  
891 Marwitz, "Von Den Ursachen Des Verfalls Des Preussischen Staates (1811)," 254.  
892 “... Mobilisierung des Grundeigentums. Alles soll gekauft und verkauft werden und in den Handel und 
Wandel kommen. Und dennoch ist es grade Grundbesitz, der am festesten an den Staat kettet, der 
Kaufmann aber ist der, der sich in allen Staaten gleich wohlbefindet.” (———, "Lebuser Denkschrift (9. 
Mai. 1811) ", 246.) For more on Marwitz and this point see: Behrens, Society, Government and the 
Enlightenment : The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 187-8. 
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charged, would be reduced to brute competition, in the fields, the cities, and crucially, the 
“organs of public administration.”893 A collection of aristocrats from the East Prussian 
district of Morungen complained in 1809 about the vapid core of Stein’s unduly procedural 
reforms. In their view, the reforms destroyed any sense of “vocation” and attachment to 
land and people. Instead, “no other calling remains but to consume revenue.”894 Rather than 
seeing land as the ground from which noble lines of ancestors sprang, it is now a mere 
commodity, prey to speculation and the ephemeral whims of impersonal, unseen, unheroic 
market forces. Crucial ties would be dissolved, and all that would be left in their place after 
the reforms of Stein would be a society of masterless men; unbound, adrift, legions of “the 
poor, vagabonds, and criminals.”895 
 How could it be otherwise when the foundations for drawing distinctions were 
being eroded away in all fields of life? When “nobody knows anymore that an aristocrat is 
more than a land-owning man?”896 The causes of this danger are the “newly fashionable 
theories” that harp upon the importance of acquiring money and the aspiration of raising 
                                                 
893 “in Konkurrenz [...] sowohl als Gutsbesitzer wie im Staatsdienst.” (Scheel, Stein, and Schmidt, Das 
Reformministerium Stein. Akten Zur Verfassungs - Und Verwaltungsgeschichte Aus Den Jahren 1807/08, 
1138.; Otto Richard Sigismund Tschirch, Geschichte Der Öffentlichen Meinung in Preussen Vom Baseler 
Frieden Bis Zum Zusammenbruch Des Staates (1795-1806) Mit Dem Rubenowpreise Der Universität 
Greifswald Gekrönte Arbeit, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Weimar,: H. Böhlaus nachf., 1933), 450-52.) 
894 “Wer konnte noch den geringsten Beruf in sich fühlen, auf Gütern zu leben, in denen ihm keine andere 
Bestimmung mehr verbleibt, als seine Revenüen zu verzehren.” (Ernst von Meier, Die Reform Der 
Verwaltungs-Organisation Unter Stein Und Hardenberg (Leipzig,: Duncker & Humblot, 1881), 330.; As 
cited in Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 
1809-1812, 289.) 
895 “...Armen, Vagabunden und Verbrecher...” (Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen 
Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 186.); See also: Bendavid, "Ist Fortschreiten Nur 
Mittel Zur Glückseligkeit Oder Höchster Zweck Der Menschheit?," 29-42.; For more on “masterless“ men 
in the British context see: Don Herzog, Happy Slaves : A Critique of Consent Theory (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1989). 
896 “Niemand wusste mehr, dass ein Adeliger nichts anderes sei, als ein grundbesitzender Herr [...] - 
sondern man glaubte ganz treuherzig: Ein Adeliger sei ein Mensch wie andre, von dem die Gewohnheit 
wolle, dass man ihn ‘Herr von’ nenne.” (Marwitz, "Von Den Ursachen Des Verfalls Des Preussischen 
Staates (1811)," 264.) 
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one’s own person through talent and effort.897 In this context, the proposal of Rehdiger in 
1808 to abolish all preferred treatment of the aristocracy in the army, politics, or 
administration, and instead to create mountains of bland honorary certificates 
[Ehrenauszeichnungen] for the members of aristocratic families, was plainly of a mocking 
nature.898 Similarly, Vinke, one of Rehdiger’s allies, hoped that the nobility would become 
an “empty class” with only “title and shield.”899 Divested of real clout, such outward 
distinctions would be vapid at best. 
 Wartenburg exclaimed that Stein’s reforms would “lead the peasants to 
Eldorado.”900 The senseless “equalizing of the estates”901 would undermine the “position of 
the nobility, founded on property and privilege,” and thus overturn the “old Prussia […] 
domestically.”902 In a pamphlet titled “Concerning the Causes of the Dilapidation of the 
Prussian State,” Marwitz charges that the various reforms were influenced by the 
fashionable “philanthropic ideas of equality and leveling.”903 Like many, Marwitz viewed 
Basedow’s philanthropic teachings as absurd and dangerous. They failed, like Stein’s 
reforms, to draw and defend distinctions crucial to society. For example, many could not 
understand the suggestion that the aristocracy be taxed on a par with peasants and city 
                                                 
897 “Fremdlingen” ... “mit ihren neumodischen Theorien” ... welche “nur allein auf den Erwerb des Geldes 
und auf die Emporbringung ihrer eigenene Personen gestellt sind” (———, "Lebuser Denkschrift (9. Mai. 
1811) ", 245.)  
898 “Ideen über eine Adelskonstitution” Rehdiger-Nachlass, cited in: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische 
Biographie, 283-4. For more on Karl Nikolaus von Rehdiger see: Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and 
Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 113-4.; Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 279-
82. 
899 Vincke: “Ueber die Organisation der ständischen Representation.“ Bollendorf, 20 Sept., 1808, in Stein 
and Pertz, Denkschriften Des Ministers Freiherrn Vom Stein Über Deutsche Verfassungen. See also: Gray, 
"Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Constitutional Reform on the County, Provincial, and 
National Levels in 1808," 84. 
900 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 155-6. 
901 “Gleichmachung aller Stände.”(Marwitz, "Lebuser Denkschrift (9. Mai. 1811) ", 246.)  
902 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 28. 
903 “...den grade damals herrschenden philanthropischen Gleichheits- und Flachheits-Ideen” (Marwitz, 
"Von Den Ursachen Des Verfalls Des Preussischen Staates (1811)," 264-5, 71.   
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dwellers. Some thought this absurd, as the peasants were already taxed, and most of them 
belonged to aristocrats anyway. Aristocrats were thus (indirectly) already taxed!904  
Liberating peasants, opening the offices of the state to all people of talent, allowing 
citizens to help administrate their own communities were all taken as signs of the all-
pervading and undiscriminating “principle of equality” that would “completely equate 
aristocrats with peasants” and “unleash subjects and blackguards” [Gesinde] into a most 
unstable and murky future.905 
Marwitz caught a concrete glimpse of such a future at the dawn of the procedural 
state. He had been proudly in charge of various police functions in his native district. 
Marwitz had executed these functions in a nonprocedural, idiosyncratic, unsystematic 
manner. It offended his aristocratic sensibilities to think of his office along procedural 
lines. In his estimation, anybody can be a cog in a machine but it takes a strong, passionate, 
willful, aristocratic character to lead a population properly. One of the police functions 
Marwitz managed in this manner (the Landarmenkasse, or poor-relief) was forcefully taken 
away from him because of “disorder,” incompetence, and a general reluctance to relinquish 
his nonprocedural, aristocratic manner. The low point of his career came in 1811, when he 
repeatedly offended the crown over opposition to the reforms and was imprisoned for five 
weeks without a trial in the Spandau fortress. Ironically, and perhaps inconsistently, he 
decried this nonprocedural act as following the “tyranny of Richelieu.”906 For the rest of his 
                                                 
904 K.F. Häberlin, "Etwas Über Die Steuerfreyheit Des Adels in Deutschland," Deutsche Montasschrift 1 
(1793): 257-67. See also: Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment : The Experiences of 
Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia, 21-22. 
905 “das Prinzip der Gleichheit allenthalben vorherrschte”  ... “Edelmann und Bauer sollten vollkommen 
gleichgestellt werden” ... “Untertanen und Gesinde wurden losgelassen.”(Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus 
Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 277.) 
906 Münchow-Pohl, Zwischen Reform Und Krieg : Untersuchungen Zur Bewusstseinslage in Preussen 
1809-1812, 299-301. 
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life, until 1837, Marwitz staunchly and on principle refused any involvement with the 
civilian administration of Prussia. 
 
 
(v) The Nest of Vipers Dissolved 
  
Meanwhile, Stein was in charge of Prussia’s newly constituted bureaucracy and was 
at the apex of the most productive and influential period in his life.  Unexpectedly, his 
plans were cut short by the vagaries of history. Before Stein could complete his reforms, 
the king expelled him a second time from his official duties. Stein had foolishly handed a 
sensitive letter to an incompetent courier who was caught by a French patrol.907 Napoleon 
in Spain, hearing about Stein’s call for a German insurrection against his occupying troops, 
declared Stein an enemy of the French state and instructed his army to execute Stein with 
dispatch if caught.908 The Prussian Queen Luise commented frankly that the intercepted 
letter was “the low end of [Stein]! So small, so miserable, so human indeed.”909 Her 
husband, Friedrich Wilhelm III, this time unwillingly, had to let go of Stein. He first went 
into hiding and then escaped to Russia, where he would form an influential relationship 
                                                 
907 Guy Stanton Ford’s describes this episode as “a great blunder,” that shows “Stein’s imprudence and 
essential incapacity to play the diplomatic game in the Napoleonic era” (Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform 
in Prussia, 1807-1815, 150-4.). For other assessments of this great monument to the contingencies of 
history see: Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 346.; As well as: R.C. Raack, "When Plans Fail: 
Small Group Behavior and Decision-Making in the Conspiracy of 1808 in Germany," The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 14, no. 1 (Mar., 1970).; For key passages from the actual letter see: Spies, Die 
Erhebung Gegen Napoleon : 1806-1814/15, 52.; Stein’s letter was eventually published in the Journal de 
l’Empire “with an appropriately derisive commentary.” (Raack, The Fall of Stein, 22-3, 66.); For more see: 
Gray, "Prussia in Transition: Society and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of 1808," 144-5.; Büsch, 
Neugebauer, and Historische Kommission zu Berlin., Handbuch Der Preussischen Geschichte, 34.; Craig, 
The End of Prussia, 19.; Mast, Die Hohenzollern in Lebensbildern, 181-2. 
908 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 105.; Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 361.:  Napoleon’s 
Ächtungsdegret of Stein (16. Dez).; Simon, "Prince Hardenberg," 96.; Craig, The End of Prussia, 19. 
909 Cited in: Schorn-Schütte, Königin Luise : Leben Und Legende, 77. 
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with the Russian Czar. Even though Stein himself could do little for his initiated reforms 
from that position, they were nevertheless soon carried forward by Hardenberg (they are 
thus sometimes referred to as the Stein/Hardenberg reforms).910  
News of Stein’s fall was greeted with delight by many. As we have seen, Stein’s 
program had faced mounting opposition from various influential opposition groups who 
thought, first and foremost, that Stein’s program desubstantiated the moral core of 
individuals and society. Under Stein’s participatory/procedural framework, it became 
increasingly difficult to sustain boundaries that had served for long to discriminate between 
people in inhomogeneous societies.911 York von Wartenburg, the “archetypical Junker” and 
famous military officer, was, like many, delighted by Stein’s clumsy fall and dismissal.912 
Wartenburg proclaimed gleefully that “one mad head [unsinniger Kopf] is now crushed; the 
rest of the nest of vipers [Natterngeschmeiss] will dissolve in its own poison.”913  
Stein’s relationship with the Prussian Queen Luise illustrates nicely the arc of his 
rise and fall. After the treaty of Tilsit she indicated in letters that she was glad that Stein 
had been recalled to office. She even claimed to have been instrumental in reinstating 
him.914 In the initial phases of Stein’s tenure, he received sporadic aid and panicked letters 
                                                 
910 For more on Hardenberg see: Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility : The Development of a 
Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, 123-34, 42-44.; Nolte, Staatsbildung Als Gesellschaftsreform : 
Politische Reformen in Preussen Und Den Süddeutschen Staaten, 1800-1820, 32-9, 93-104.; Raack, The 
Fall of Stein, 126, 64-5, 73.; Marwitz, Preussischer Adel, Aus Den Nachgelassenen Schriften Friedrich 
August Ludwigs Von Der Marwitz, 224.; For more on Stein’s important (temporary) secretary Ernst Moritz 
Arndt see: Jolles, Das Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein Im Zeitalter Napoleons, 204-19. 
911 Raack, The Fall of Stein, 27. 
912 Ibid., 74-5.  
913 Johann Gustav Droysen, Das Leben Des Feldmarschalls Grafen York Von Wartenburg (Leipzig,: Im 
Insel, 1913), 162-3.; Raack, The Fall of Stein, 74-5.; See also: Paret, Yorck and the Era of the Prussian 
Reform, 1807-1815, 4-5.; Brose, The Politics of Technological Change in Prussia : Out of the Shadow of 
Antiquity, 1809-1848, 33. 
914 Ritter, Stein; Eine Politische Biographie, 208-9.  
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from the queen.915 For a while he seems to have had the “complete confidence of the 
queen,” and could count on her to inform him of the plots of aristocrats who opposed to his 
plans.916 However, her support quickly waned and, as one historian characterized it, she 
“gained a sudden violent dislike for the minister whom she had once so completely 
idolized.”917 By December of 1808, Queen Luise took personal credit for Stein’s dismissal 
during a meeting with a French consul  (Clérembault) in Königsberg, and asked him to 
convey this message to Paris.918 As it did to many in the circle around her, Stein’s agenda 
seemed to her far too radical and far too experimental to merit continued support once dire 
political urgency had passed.919   
From an institutional perspective, Stein’s reforms present a mixed legacy.920 In 
command for a mere difficult fourteen months,921 Stein never fully realized his aspirations, 
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and they were diluted by later administrations and the changing whims of the king (no 
longer directly threatened by Napoleon). Historically, the reforms had limited effects on 
Prussia but were widely admired and partially emulated throughout Germany.922 They 
prepared, as some historians have put it, the “foundations for a better, more humane status 
of the peasants and city dwellers in the spirit of the Enlightenment and the early liberal 
conception of the state.”923 They also provide a genealogical link, though conceptually 
complex and perhaps inconsistent, of how procedural and participatory elements can be 
combined.  
It is for these reasons, then, that some historians have long characterized Stein’s 
reforms as the birthplace of a short-lived early German liberalism. Gerhard Ritter, for 
example, describes the reforms as a “historically unique version of German liberalism” that 
was nurtured by “Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt” and to which “Stein contributed in an 
original manner.”924 This “early Prussian liberalism,”925 a “bureaucratic liberalism,”926 is 
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built upon a fusion of the direct and indirect question of justice. It combines a concern with 
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Each of the sections above teaches us an important lesson about bureaucracies. 
Section 1 showed us how and why cameralists desubstantiated bureaucracies in the interest 
of simultaneously strengthening and containing the state. An emphasis on procedures 
avoids the arbitrariness, inefficiency, and inconsistency of relying on the will of 
individuals. It replaces the moody biases of individuals with consistent, passionless, 
regularized procedures that apply mechanically to a domain of cases. Modern 
bureaucracies are hardly thinkable without these innovations. Much was gained by this 
move. 
However, much was also lost. Section 2 illustrated some of the pitfalls of such an 
approach. People came to be treated by the bureaucracy as a dead, administered mass 
without voice and agency. For the critics of the cameralist project, the state and society are 
and have to be centered around the passionate will of individuals. The specter of a 
mechanized, depersonalized understanding of the social order fills such individuals with 
horror. The Romantics’ objection to the cameralist project still rings familiar to many 
opponents of bureaucracies.  
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I suggest we take both sides seriously. Not only did both contribute important 
insights to our understanding of bureaucracies, but both recommended important 
improvements that could be made. Perplexingly for the would-be reformer, however, their 
proposals are in opposition to each other for much of the time. Section 3 suggested a 
manner in which these two sides could be reconciled. The proper term here is the German 
aufheben. It is notoriously difficult to translate. The term has been popularized, not 
accidentally, by Hegel. He uses the term to encapsulate the process whereby a thesis is 
combined with an antithesis into a synthesis that supersedes its conflicting conceptual 
parents. It is at once a lifting up and a negation.  
Stein is doing something very similar. He and his allies suggested and sought to 
implement a way in which we can reconcile the differences between the cameralists and the 
Romantics. This could by achieved by reconstituting bureaucracies and the social order 
they administer along novel lines.  
Such a proposal is hard to imagine now. The experiment of Stein and his allies did 
not succeed. We live in a world inherited from this failure. Modern struggles over social 
order and the shape of the modern state reveal a hard separation between the administrative 
sphere of the state and the deliberative sphere of the political community. Attempts to bring 
them together have largely failed, and we consequently struggle with relating the two, 
either through hopes of “translating” the commands of one into the output of the other, or 
by resigning ourselves to a future of desperate resistance to endless encroachments on the 
lifeworld.  
We have become accustomed to a certain way of understanding bureaucracies and 
their relation to society. Our theories of state and society are built on the old clash between 
 286 
the cameralists and the Romantics. Perhaps our thinking has become fossilized in the mold 
of this clash. Most of us accept as axiomatic that society and administration are two 
irreconcilably separate and foreign domains. Later thinkers, including Habermas and 
Foucault, have also largely accepted this division as given. Returning to its point of origin 
has allowed us to reexamine the wisdom of accepting such a division.  
Fortunately, history is not only the roadblock to improvement; but also its enabler. 
Before a division between the public and the administrative sphere was taken for granted 
and blessed by a patina of custom and acceptance, people struggled against this unfortunate 
division. The reformers we encountered in section 3 suggest a way to retain some of the 
benefits of both the cameralists’ and the Romantics’ visions of state and society.  
The narrative arc of this dissertation is consequently not tragic in nature. Stein’s 
proposal failed not due to intrinsic flaws, but due to the vagaries of history. Prussia’s 
history, and perhaps the history of bureaucracies, might have been very different if 
pressures on the Prussian state had not eased suddenly or if Stein had not fallen out of 
favor.  
The attempted fusion by Stein and his allies of the administrative and deliberative 
spheres could work. The episode suggests that the two spheres are not separated by logical 
necessity. The genealogy on offer here shows the process through which the administrative 
sphere and the deliberative sphere became separated. This process was not inevitable or 
predetermined. Instead, it was the outcome of a history driven by accident and contingency. 
The separation of the administrative and deliberative spheres is the outcome of a complex 
historical process. 
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That is not to say that it is easy to change, but hopefully unlocking the connection 
between competing notions of social order, political community, and the state provides raw 
material for reimagining, once again, what modern politics could look like beyond the 
grasp of Creon’s secretaries. The genealogy on offer here suggests a way forward in a 
manner commonly not thought of: a careful reconnecting of the public sphere and the 
administrative sphere in which citizens are empowered within the state, against the state. 
This entails a recreating of the political public sphere within the state, not outside and in 
conceptual opposition to it.  
This is in keeping with the metaphor of Creon’s secretaries and the three 
interpretations of that phrase that we have encountered in the three sections of this 
dissertation. Perhaps the most intuitive way to read Dürrenmatt’s warning about Creon’s 
secretaries is that bureaucrats are omnipresent and stifle the very lifeblood of humanity. 
Romantics could sympathize with this interpretation. Cameralists might reply that there is a 
second way to read the same quotation. They might argue that it is a terribly good thing 
that the secretaries handle Antigone’s case. Unlike Creon, these secretaries are not given to 
arbitrariness, outbursts of personal sentiment, and the vagaries of changing sympathies. 
Instead, the secretaries actually manage to contain Creon’s misguided wrath and let 
procedures standardize and regularize the relation between the state and the political 
community.  
But there is a third understanding of social order entailed in Dürrenmatt’s phrase: 
perhaps we can avoid the dangers that both the Romantics and the cameralists highlight, if 
we dare to become Creon’s secretaries ourselves.  
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With Stein’s experiments in mind, we can imagine, once again, what this would 
entail. It would mean that citizens are incorporated into the administrative machinery. But 
these citizens have to be in the bureaucracy but not of the bureaucracy. We have to 
integrate citizens into the bureaucratic structure without turning them into bureaucrats. 
Perhaps the most familiar model of such integration is the jury system in civil and criminal 
lawsuits. Stein’s proposal is not that different, and it offers a novel perspective on the 
interaction between the bureaucracy and the citizens it administrates. Instead of being a 
dead, resentful, administrated mass, such citizens could guide and check administrative 
decisions on a micro level. 
As with juries, some people might not like to be forced into these duties (Stein 
certainly encountered much resistance). This is an enduring paradox for those interested in 
keeping state abuse in check: to make and keep people free, they might have to do things 
they do not want to do. This is not, strictly speaking, a contradiction. It is an appreciation of 
the fact that some things do not come for free.  
 The benefits of this proposal outweigh the costs. It would result in superior 
outcomes and more legitimacy for the state, and would help to educate the citizenry. Local 
knowledge is often crucial in translating broad policy goals into concrete programs that 
produce successful results. At least since the time of the cameralists, a science of 
administration has tried to approximate local knowledge with complex information-
gathering and information-analyzing tools. Though they used the term slightly differently, 
“statistics” is a term that often crops up in cameralistic textbooks. However, the social 
world is a messy place. Often it is difficult to gather information, or the information is not 
reliable, or explanatory variables are unobservable or too costly to obtain, or explanatory 
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models might lack crucial elements. In short, having an institutionalized process in place to 
solicit localized knowledge could contribute to a superior translation of policy into 
outcomes.  
This, in itself, might increase the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. In 
addition, legitimacy is enhanced by simply allowing for participation. People perceive 
decisions as more legitimate if they were rendered under procedural rules that allowed for 
(meaningful) participation. People will be more likely to support, or at least adhere to, 
administrative decisions. They are also far less likely to feel alienated from the political 
process and the state that administers a range of important functions in their lives. As with 
a jury system, this would not imply that all people affected by any given administrative 
decision would participate in making it. However, representatives of the community would 
have the time and institutional position to gather information, contribute to decisions, and 
report back to the community.  
Apart from superior outcomes and increased legitimacy, the scheme of integrating 
citizens into administrative institutions also serves to educate citizens. It would expose 
citizens to the internal workings of the state, the constraints and possibilities inherent in 
public administration, and a range of professional and nonprofessional viewpoints about 
concrete problems.  
As Stein suggested, citizens integrated into the bureaucracy possess local 
knowledge, can explain decisions to their neighbors, check governmental abuse, and are 
motivated to instigate action where bureaucrats might not be. In the process, they 
contribute to the health of the state, make its decisions better, and educate themselves.  
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A responsive and legitimate bureaucracy might, then, only be attainable if we 
supplant traditional models of state legitimacy with a model that allows for citizen 
participation. Under the traditional model, the legitimacy of state action is ascertained by 
its proximity to the declared will of the sovereign. This model works well when states are 
simple and when the relationship between “author” and “actor” is straightforward. 
However, as states grow in complexity, these relationships quickly become unwieldy. 
Citizens are principals in relation to representatives who appoint department heads who 
control mid-level careerists who are in charge of an army of bureaucrats. Citizens might 
feel, legitimately, that their intention and authorship is lost somewhere between their act of 
voting and final administrative determinations somewhere down the bureaucratic chain. 
Notice that this conclusion holds true even if there is considerable deliberative activity. As 
Habermas points out, the process of “translating” deliberation in the public sphere into 
output in the administrative sphere is crucial to the health and legitimacy of democratic 
states and can be extremely tenuous. Under a traditional model of the state, legitimacy is 
supposed to flow from one end of the chain (the citizens) through all the links towards the 
other end: outcomes “authored” by the sovereign. Often, this is not the case. Even when it 
is, citizens might think that it is not. 
 I consequently suggest we supplement the traditional model of legitimacy with one 
that allows for citizen input and control at both ends of the chain. This would be a kind of 
bureaucratic legitimacy that supplements other forms of legitimacy. It does not enhance the 
legitimacy of the bureaucracy, but rather provides for legitimacy through the bureaucracy. 
This form of legitimacy generation could act at one end of the chain while other forms 
uphold the other end. Stein provides the inspiration for this model. The cameralists spell 
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out what aspects of bureaucratic structure and procedure provide efficiency and dispassion 
and need to be retained. Romantics suggest why inviting living citizens into this structure 
might strengthen a sense of community, fight feelings of alienation, and enliven the human 
spirit.  
These are grand themes, mixed with the boring details of administrative practices. 
Perhaps that is as it should be. Either in isolation fails to persuade. Together, they suggest 
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